




HISTORY TEACHING REVIEW YEAR BOOK



The Reverend George Duncan in the Church Hut at Montreuil which he bought for 50f.

VOLUME 8

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YEAR BOOK

EDITOR : ANDREW HUNT

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Bruce Webster retired last summer from a Senior Lectureship at the University of Kent at Canterbury, where he taught medieval history. He has written on the sources for Medieval Scotland in the *Sources for History* series; and edited the charters of David II for the *Regatta Regum Scottorum*. He is now working on a short book on medieval Scotland, with the subtitle 'The Making of an Identity'.

Editorial

ANDREW HUNT

The Year Book this year has only the vaguest of themes: you could appropriately call it "Historian's Miscellany" if you wished. This is because, for this 1994 issue, the Editor's job was made easy by the fact that none of my powers of editorial persuasion were needed and that essentially, all the articles were unsolicited. In other words the contributors either offered an article of their choice, or I had approached them over the past years when they were too busy, but they promised that at a later date they would produce something that would interest SATH members. This year is when they have obliged.

As Editor, you can imagine that I am both quite pleased that the academic promise is worth all that it is said to be and also that the reputation of the Year Book and its readership is such that it is seen in academic circles as a respectable platform of published debate. From professional conversation and personal experience, I could assure any contributor that asked, that their ideas do filter into classroom teaching and discussion, especially at the S5-6 level. Further comment to me however reveals that SATH readers enjoy the Year Book most of all because of the reminder it gives, of what good historical writing can be all about. The Year Book format gives an opportunity for any combination of insight and perception, brevity and incisiveness, lyricism or wryness. Unfailingly, year on year, the contributors take advantage of this and contribute a range of zappy and authoritative articles that take the readers into new fields with a fresh eye. So this issue of the Year Book is a mixed bag full of good things; a bit of biography, a bit of social-economic and a bit of ecclesiastical history, spread over different times and even going beyond Britain's shores. I hope this width will be welcomed by the readers.

As usual, any editorial must thank the contributors. I have referred already to their spirit of generosity and good memory, I must also add their punctuality in providing what they said they would write and their courtesy in their communications to me. It almost makes editorial deadlines a thing of the past when everything arrives just as you were told it would.

I wouldn't want it to seem that I was going as far as "... and now I'll thank the dinner ladies" ... but after 5 years as Editor, I feel it is right that the printers should for once get more of a mention than one small line at the bottom of the back cover. The re-designed appearance and professional look of the Year Book, are largely the work and inspiration of the production team at Tantallon Press. SATH members are probably aware that producing a high quality and attractively presented Year Book is not a cheap enterprise, possibly half of each member's annual subscription goes on it. At a time of steadily rising prices, Tantallon have always done their best to hold down their costs and suggest economies we could make, while at the same time not compromising on the quality of the product they send me at the end of May each year.

Members already know that all the thought that goes into the Year Book is the contributors', all the work that goes into it is the printer's yet the Editor sits there and takes the credit for doing not much more than nothing. Seems fair to me!

The Chaplain Who Could Make Anyone Fight : The Reverend George Duncan at GHQ, 1916 - 1918

Dr GERARD J. DE GROOT


Over the 75 years which has passed since the armistice, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig has become synonymous with the apparently senseless carnage of the Great War. Unfortunately the storm of vilification which has broken upon him has often impeded a real understanding of his character and motivation. How, for instance, was he able to maintain his resolve when his campaigns produced casualties measured in hundreds of thousands and gains measured in mere miles? His critics have often concluded that he must have been stubbornly insensitive to suffering — exorcised of all inconvenient emotion. But that is far too simplistic. Rather, it now appears that Haig drew his strength in large part from his faith in a benevolent God, an idea supported by the recent release of the papers of his devoted chaplain, the Reverend George Duncan. From the time he assumed command of the BEF, Haig believed that he had been selected by God to lead the British to victory. His assurance that God was always by his side and that he was an instrument of Divine providence were matters of faith central to his confidence in his ability to command.

It is perhaps not surprising that religious beliefs had such an influence on Haig during the Great War. Religion had always played a very important part in his life. As a boy, he was exhorted by his pious mother to seek God's guidance in any difficult predicament: "you will be wisely directed and you may rest passive".¹ But passivity did not imply complacency. In keeping with Calvinistic strictures, Haig believed that hard work brought spiritual purification. The diligence inspired by his Presbyterianism and the self-belief which his doting mother encouraged, undoubtedly contributed to his relatively swift rise in the Army. His religious faith at the same time transformed what might have been seen as coarse ambition into a Christian sense of purpose: to serve Britain to the best of one's ability was to serve God. As a young soldier, he saw action in the Sudan (1897 - 8) and in South Africa (1899 - 1902) where he was conspicuously disdainful of danger — a manifestation perhaps of his certainty that God had singled him out for a higher purpose.²

Religion made things simple for Haig: it provided life with order, meaning and justice, and left no room for self doubt. The fact that he was near the top of the Army at the very time the Great War broke out seemed to him further proof of God's great plan. Haig's faith also brought sense to an incomprehensible war. As a cavalryman, he expected glorious charges but encountered instead stalemate, trenches and mud. Refusing to be unnerved, he drew solace from his favourite Bible passage, II Chronicles, (20: 15): "Be not afraid nor dismayed by reasons of this great multitude: for the battle is not yours but God's."

Haig's belief in divine direction did not prevent him from blaming the war's early misfortunes on the Commander in Chief of the BEF, Field Marshall Sir John French. When French's supposed incompetence became too much to bear, Haig campaigned hard for his removal and for his own promotion. In December 1915 he got his way when he was appointed Commander in Chief. Upon taking over, he noted a sense of relief among the GHQ staff: "all seem to expect success as the result of my arrival, and somehow give me the idea that they think I am 'meant to win' by some superior Power".³

Shortly after assuming command, Haig attended a Church of Scotland service conducted by a "most earnest young Scotch man, George Duncan". He was profoundly impressed; "one could have heard a pin drop during the service".⁴ Henceforward, according to Duncan, "the half hour of worship" was "not merely something Haig valued; it was apparently something which must not be missed".⁵ As the war progressed, Haig began "to view in a more definitely religious light both the issues at stake . . . and the part which he himself was being called to play".⁶ He relied ever more on the "fine manly sermons" to provide sense to the carnage. Duncan became Haig's secret weapon, the chaplain who could, he claimed, "make anyone fight!"



The Reverend George Duncan in the Church Hut at Montreuil which he bought for 50f.

Duncan and Haig remained together from March 1916 until the end of the war. The commander attended nearly every one of the padre's services and had Duncan as a guest at lunch nearly every Sunday. Though it would be inaccurate to describe the two men as intimates (a very rigid decorum and sense of hierarchy prevailed), nevertheless Duncan observed a side of Haig which perhaps no one else saw. An interesting symbiosis developed between the two men. Haig felt a spiritual hunger which became especially acute after he became Commander in Chief, and Duncan seems to have satisfied that hunger. Duncan in turn discovered a very special and important calling in serving Haig.

George Simpson Duncan looked more like a young, suitably eccentric university professor than a potential Messiah. Born in 1884, he was the son of Alexander Duncan, a tailor's cutter from Forfar. He gained a first class honours in classics from Edinburgh University and then went on to graduate work in Cambridge, St. Andrews, Marburg, Jena and Heidelberg. By 1914 he was a New Testament scholar of considerable renown within academic circles.⁹ Angular, clumsy, rather shy and soft-spoken, he was thirty-two years old when he arrived at GHQ, knowing "next to nothing about Army life".¹⁰ Orphaned at an early age, he quite possibly found a father-figure in Haig, who he likened to "an old Homeric hero".¹¹ He gave Haig unquestioning loyalty which bordered on adoration. His services were noted more for their soft-spoken logic than for any fire or brimstone. Sermons inspired contemplation more than adoration; Duncan persuaded rather than exhorted. It was not a formula which inspired universal appeal, but it suited Haig perfectly.

Like a good chaplain, Duncan tailored his messages to suit the course of the war. But he also tailored them to suit Haig. On a Sunday in late February 1917, he noticed that "the Chief looked much older than I have ever seen him before". The padre consequently chose a subject "relevant to him in the present situation". Afterwards, Haig "looked his old self, fresh and alert" and Duncan was rewarded with a "very cordial and approving smile".¹² But striking the right tone was not always easy. After a dejected Haig returned from a particularly difficult meeting with David Lloyd George, Duncan made the mistake of delivering a rather sombre sermon. He realised too late that "perhaps what the Chief needs is something that is aglow with confident hope".¹³

There is no doubt that Haig took what he wanted from Duncan's sermons. It is, for instance, difficult to believe that the padre, who had lost both of his parents, actually said (as Haig recorded) that "We lament too much over death. We should regard it as a welcome change to another room."¹⁴ But both men nevertheless believed that the price of victory, no matter how steep, was ultimately worth paying. After a particularly disastrous action, Haig recorded that

Anything worth having has always to be paid for fully. In this war, our object is something very great. The future of the world depends on our success. So we must fully spend all we have, energy, life, money, everything, in fact, without counting the cost.¹⁵

As for the dead, their sacrifice was their reward. Duncan believed that "a process of selection was going on by which the best were being picked out for some special service beyond the grave". Those who survived the war, on the other hand, would be cleansed and purified by their experience. "After the war none of us can be the same as before it!",¹⁶ Haig wrote. Despite the enormous losses in men and money that Britain endured, he still thought that the experience would render the nation "the greatest gainer, the whole empire would be welded together into one great whole, and imbued with a higher spirit". By way of contrast, the United States, "though more money had been amassed, would decline because of the spirit of luxury and extravagance which was being developed".¹⁷

This glorious rebirth was of course dependent upon British victory, but of that Haig and Duncan had no doubts. The only uncertainty concerned the time required to defeat the Germans. After Duncan preached from St. John's letter to the Christians at Smyrna, Haig concluded that

The contents of the letter might have been addressed to the British Army in France today. We must look forward to still harder times, to the necessity of redoubled efforts, but in the end all will be well.¹⁸

He remarked on how different was the attitude to that which was prevalent when the British began the war, when there was an expectation of being home by Christmas:

"Now we are beginning to learn our lessons, and to be sobered by hard experience and to be patient."¹⁹ But despite the fine words, Haig did not immediately accept the inevitability of a long struggle. His gargantuan self-assurance led him to believe that he would succeed with one great offensive in 1916. Sixty thousand casualties on Day 1 of the Somme offensive did not destroy his confidence: he was still able to predict that "in another fortnight, with divine help . . . some decisive results will be obtained".²⁰ "But God kept Haig waiting.



Sir Douglas Haig as Commander in Chief.

As victory seemed ever more elusive, Haig grew more circumspect. In a somewhat chastened mood, he told his wife, prior to the Messines attack of June 1917, that "nothing is certain in war. Success lies in a Higher Power than me".²¹ A modest victory followed and God was duly thanked. When, later in the year, Haig's high hopes were smothered in the deep mud of Passchendaele, he took solace in Duncan's promise that "**At the right time** the Lord will bring about a great victory . . . we must be able to endure and not be impatient."²² Haig's faith was tested to the full in March 1918 when the German Army broke through the Allied lines and advanced as far as forty miles. "**Our** ways may not always be the ways chosen by the Divine Power", he concluded, but "If one has full confidence that everything is being directed from above **on the right lines**, then there is no reason for fussing."²³

Confidence that the war was divinely directed, absolved Haig from examining his methods of command. While French's failures had been human errors; Haig's were the will of God. "Whether or not we are successful lies in the Power above", he explained to his wife. "So I am easy in my mind and ready to do my best whatever happens."²⁴ This meant that Haig, at least outwardly, refused to take credit for the successes which did come his way. "It isn't me" he insisted when Duncan tried to congratulate him on a victory.²⁵ After the triumph at Arras in 1917, he wrote "I know quite well that I am being used as a tool in the hands of the Divine Power and that my strength is not my own, so I am not at all conceited."²⁶

Late in 1918, Haig's faith was rewarded. The German Army, worn out by its own offensive, could not withstand Haig's counter-punch. An armistice quickly followed. The British people were initially grateful to Haig. "But I scarcely feel that I deserve this gratitude," he wrote rather sheepishly, "for as the Old Testament says 'the battle is not yours but God's' . . . I have only been the instrument to carry out the Almighty's intentions".²⁷ His work done, he retired from the Army as soon as he could and spent the rest of his life working tirelessly for the British Legion, serving the soldiers who had fought under him. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he felt no need of self-justification when questions began to be raised about whether the massive casualties could have been avoided. His sudden death of a heart attack at the relatively young age of 67 might suggest a tormented soul existed beneath the surface serenity, but that is dangerous speculation.

Duncan was the true "outsider as insider": a man with no military experience who was suddenly thrown into a community of staff officers who manned the control room of the British war machine. He dined and spoke with the most senior military and political figures of his day, from all the allied nations, and certainly became intoxicated by the heady atmosphere in which he operated. But, at the same time, he often ventured outside the ramparts of Montreuil, where GHQ was located. He attended social clubs, church services and Casualty Clearing Stations near to the fighting front. He saw and heard of the effects of the war on junior officers and ordinary soldiers and was therefore closer to the "real war" than was Haig.

One often senses, in reading his diaries, that Duncan was torn between his devotion to Haig and his sensitivity to the sufferings of the common soldiers, whose spiritual needs would have seemed more immediate and profound. "The last few days have been for me one of those dry seasons of the soul that recur with pathetic frequency", he complained on 10 December 1916.²⁸ A visit to a Casualty Clearing Station during the battle of Arras inspired the following poignant observations:

. . . the saddest sight of all some fifty of our boys lying side by side while a "labour party" was digging them graves — stark & stiff as they had been picked up on the battle field, their arms sometimes held up as if imploring help or seeking to stave off a fate they felt overwhelming them: one had his arm linked in his comrade's. By the side of another there lay a sheet of a letter written in a woman's hand. It was full of the anxieties of war: one brother had been wounded, another had fortunately been transferred to a timber-cutting detachment and had prudently renounced his leave lest in his absence he should lose this "safe" job: and it went on in this strain: "Cannot you get a transfer dear: it would be much safer if you could get on the roads or something instead of the trenches. Oh, how I wish this awful war was over."²⁹

Duncan's sense of unease caused him briefly to consider taking an assignment with a unit closer to the line, so that his energies could be more predominantly focused upon the needs of the ordinary soldier. The Principal Chaplain, the Reverend John Simms, would not, however, sanction the transfer, writing to Duncan as follows :

I beg of you to steady your brain. I look on you as a gift of God to our great Chief. Do you not think that that is duty grand enough for any chaplain, to stay & strengthen & uphold his hands in this titanic struggle? Who needs it more, who deserves it better, what more splendid work, God knowing & man helping could any chaplain at this crisis in our fortunes put his hand to?

I know of absolutely none.³⁰

Dutiful to the core, Duncan subsequently abandoned the idea and remained at GHQ until the end of the war.

After the war Duncan succeeded to the Chair of Biblical Criticism at St. Andrews in 1919. He stayed in St. Andrews for the rest of his career, eventually becoming Principal of St. Mary's College in 1940 and Vice-Chancellor in 1952. He was Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1949. Though his diary reveals that he was deeply affected by the tragedy of the Great War, he never in any way blamed the losses on Haig, nor did he seem to worry that the deaths might have been in vain. He was deeply bothered by the barrage of criticism levelled against Haig after the latter's death. This apparently motivated Duncan to write *Douglas Haig As I Knew Him*, in which he recalled his time at GHQ and eulogised Haig.³¹ He died in April 1965, before the book was published.

Critics of Haig have often argued that his religious beliefs had a distorting effect upon his perception of his role as Commander in Chief. Basil Liddell Hart, for instance, argued that from his "sense of divine call naturally grew a sense of divine right".³² Though Duncan vehemently denied this charge,³³ one is nevertheless inclined to agree with Liddell Hart. The evidence suggests that at times Haig's tactical decisions were based on nothing more substantial than mere faith. For instance, on the eve of the Somme offensive, he wrote that "The men are in splendid spirits . . . The wire has never been so well cut, nor the Artillery preparations so thorough".³⁴ But Haig could not have known his men's true feelings; the size of his army and his separation from the front precluded real intimacy. Trust in a benevolent God caused Haig to assume that his men felt as secure as he did. The same trust may have inspired the belief that the front had been well-prepared for the attack, when in fact it had not. Machine guns were not neutralised; wire remained uncut. Intelligence to this effect had been passed to Haig, but it was not believed by him. The problem with Haig's faith was that it could at times be blind.

In October 1916, Haig noted with profound interest Duncan's warning that "We have all had . . . enough of good advice. What we wanted now was some help". The padre told his congregation to "Have patience, do your best and look above for help".³⁵ Whilst it would be impossible to establish a causal link between Duncan's words and Haig's receptivity to advice, it is clear that suggestions from outside experts did not always find fertile ground at GHQ. Those who disagreed with Haig's methods found it difficult to maintain their opposition in the euphoria which pervaded his headquarters. In September 1917, the CIGS Sir William Robertson arrived at GHQ intent upon persuading Haig to adopt a change of strategy. The morning after his arrival, Haig noted that "A night's reflection and Duncan's words of thanksgiving . . . seemed to have had a good effect" on Robertson, who appeared "less pessimistic and seemed to realise that the German Army was in reduced circumstances".³⁶



A sketch of George Duncan by Douglas Anderson, a Soldier/Artist stationed at Montreuil.

To Haig, faith was at least as important as facts. When the War Office produced a report on the state of the German Army which was less optimistic than that provided by his own staff, he commented:

I cannot think why the War Office Intelligence Department gives such a wrong picture of the situation except that General McDonough is a Roman Catholic and is (perhaps unconsciously) influenced by information which reaches him from tainted (i.e. Catholic) sources.³⁷

Confident of God's help, Haig never doubted that the British Army would eventually win. With the end predetermined, events along the way diminished in importance. If intelligence data was occasionally ignored, it was because the goodness of God was the most reliable indicator of the way the war would be resolved.

On a Sunday morning in February 1917, when the news from the front and from home was universally bleak, Haig listened to Duncan preach "on the need for which all of us suffer of having nourishment for the spiritual side of life . . . We must really feel Christ in us, so that we are safe whatever happens".³⁸ It would be easy to argue that the spiritual nourishment which Duncan provided led to a dangerous detachment from the real war. The belief that "we are safe whatever happens" suggests that Haig's certainty in life everlasting may have caused him to be reckless with lives temporal. But to concentrate on the possible ill-effects of his deep religious conviction is to see but one side of the issue. The Great War was a ghastly, horrifying, utterly demoralising conflict. A commander with a vivid imagination and heightened sensitivity, a man who felt the utter tragedy of every death and who could sense the long-term impairment to society which so much destruction would cause, might not have had the strength to lead the British Army to victory. It is a sad fact that in order to win Britain needed Haig and Haig needed Duncan. Losses needed to be justified; victory had to seem worthwhile.

FOOTNOTES

1. Rachel Haig to Douglas Haig, 25 February 1879, Haig MSS, NLS, Acc. 3155, No. 3(a).
2. Haig's early career is covered extensively in De Groot, *Douglas Haig: 1861 – 1928*.
3. Haig to Lady Haig, 27 December 1915, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 141.
4. Haig Diary, 2 January 1916, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 104.
5. G. S. Duncan, *Douglas Haig as I Knew Him*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 43.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 21 – 22.
7. Haig Diary, 17 September 1916, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 108.
8. Duncan Diary, 29 April 1917, Duncan MSS, St. A. MS 37090/3/61.
9. Biographical information on Duncan taken from *Dictionary of National Biography*, (1961 – 1970) and from personal knowledge.
10. Duncan, op. cit., p. 18.
11. Duncan Diary, 24 July 1916, Duncan MSS, St. A. MS 37090/3/61.
12. Duncan Diary, 4 March 1917, Duncan MSS, St. A. MS 37090/3/61. Duncan was referring to the way Haig had looked on the previous Sunday.
13. Duncan Diary, 25 February 1917, Duncan MSS, St. A. MS 37090/3/61.
14. Haig Diary, 23 April 1916, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 105. Douglas Duncan to G. De Groot, 25 February 1989.
15. Haig Diary, 16 July 1916, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 107.
16. Haig Diary, 19 March 1916, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 105.
17. Haig Diary, 5 October 1916, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 108.
18. Haig Diary, 4 June 1916, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 106.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Haig Diary, 8 July 1916, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 107.
21. Haig to Lady Haig, 5 June 1917, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 147.
22. Haig Diary, 30 September 1917, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 117.
23. Haig to Lady Haig, 11 April 1918, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 150.
24. Haig to Lady Haig, 30 June 1916, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 144.
25. Duncan Diary, 29 April 1917, Duncan MSS, St. A. MS 37090/3/61.
26. Haig to Lady Haig, 20 April 1917, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 146.
27. Haig to Lady Haig, 17 November 1918, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 153.
28. Duncan Diary, 10 December 1916.
29. Duncan Diary, 12 April 1917.
30. Reverend John Simms to George Duncan, 4 August 1917, Duncan MSS, St. A. MS 37090/3/78.
31. See especially Chapters 12 – 16.
32. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Through the Fog of War*, (London, 1938), pp. 55 – 6.
33. See Duncan, op. cit., p. 125.
34. Haig to Lady Haig, 30 June 1916, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 144.
35. Haig Diary, 5 November 1916, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 109.
36. Haig Diary, 10 September 1917, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 117.
37. Haig Diary, 10 October 1917, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 118.
38. Haig Diary, 11 February 1917, Haig MSS, Acc. 3155, No. 110.

Social Welfare and Politics in the Weimar Republic

Dr PETER D. STACHURA

The social history of the Weimar Republic is as important to an understanding of the reasons for its development and ultimate failure as any other theme. The provision of a public welfare system, or *Sozialstaat*, was one of the most crucial challenges of social policy that central and local government in Germany's first democratic state was asked to meet, and inevitably, the political implications were profound. By the early 1930s, the complex welfare network had evolved to the point where it had become linked inextricably to the fate of the Republic as it came under siege, particularly by the totalitarian movements of Communism and National Socialism.

The proliferation of social problems as a result of Germany's rapid and extensive process of industrialisation and urbanisation during the last quarter of the nineteenth century led to increasing demands from various directions for a revision of traditional conservative and liberal attitudes towards poverty, unemployment, homelessness, educational opportunity and many other related issues. Concepts of self-help and of paternalism seemed more and more inadequate to changing circumstances which saw Germany emerge into the modern era as a dynamic industrial capitalist power. Debate concerning the responsibilities of the state intensified and hinged on the critical question of the extent to which it should intervene to protect and care for its subjects, especially those of the underprivileged classes. Bismarck's social insurance system, which had been introduced in the 1880s for both humanitarian and politically expedient reasons, had been generally welcomed as a progressive measure, but by the 1890s it had been overtaken by sweeping changes in the fabric of society, not least by the vast increase in the size of the urban working class.¹

A broadly based movement of social reformers, comprising medical specialists, liberal educationalists, socialists, trade unionists, social workers and other interested professional groups, began to press for a more actively interventionist role by the state in the general welfare field.² This movement was motivated by a genuine desire to ameliorate the material condition of the lower classes and at the same time to establish standards of civic behaviour and attitudes which would make the recipients of welfare into good, reliable citizens. Before the First World War, however, the impact of the social reform movement on the authoritarian political establishment of the *Kaiserreich* was limited. Although some advances in welfare provision were recorded, particularly in health, pensions and housings, the response of the authorities had been disappointing and had been conditioned to a large extent by suspicion and fear of the Social Democratic Party as a potentially subversive, revolutionary force, acting on behalf of the working class. Consequently, repression rather than reform had characterised the state's reaction.³

Only the experience of the First World War produced a fundamental change in the attitude of government. The mobilisation of material and human resources in support of the war effort, which also involved for the first time millions of young people and women, the strident appeals to the patriotism of the masses, and the subsequent suffering and deprivation, which overwhelmed private welfare agencies, served to reinforce the argument for large-scale state interventionism.⁴ By 1918/19, against a backdrop of the 'turnip winter' of 1916/17, growing industrial unrest and the starvation caused by the Allied blockade, the expanding case for a radically new approach to public welfare could no longer be ignored by political leaders. A series of political developments of dramatic significance soon made that case unanswerable.

The November Revolution in 1918 demonstrated the radical political temper of at least some sections of the German working class. Groups such as the Spartacists and then the nascent Communist Party (KPD) pursued strategies whose aim was the establishment of Bolshevik-style proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet mould. This agitation convinced the moderate Majority Socialist (SPD), now the leading party in government, that there was a danger of the situation drifting out of their control unless appropriate action was taken. Part of their response was the infamous alliance with the army (*Reichswehr*), the Ebert-Groener Pact, to suppress forcibly the far Left. But also forming an integral component of government strategy was a decision, influenced also by demands of the militantly left-wing Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD), to consolidate the loyalty of the moderate majority of the working class by laying the foundations of what was envisaged as the first fully-fledged welfare state in German history.⁵

The SPD leadership, most notably Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidmann, believed that the working class, the most naturally supportive constituency of the new parliamentary democratic Republic, could be wedded to the state, in part at least, through a decided improvement in their material situation. In this initiative, the party received enthusiastic backing from the socialist trade unions (ADGB), which traditionally had been concerned with bread and butter issues rather than the implementation of socialist ideology. Progress on the welfare front appeared to both these leading working class organisations to be entirely compatible with the development before 1914 of reformism, while welfare provision was regarded as a vital step towards realising the still-cherished longer-term objective of a socialist state. The SPD, in particular, energetically articulated the view that an infant parliamentary democracy had to display a caring face vis-a-vis the poorer sections of society, thus in sharp contrast to the stern outlook of Wilhelmine Germany. It was imperative, the SPD reasoned, for the Republic to cultivate a spirit and an ethos with which the working class could readily identify.

For a combination of humanitarian motives and political expediency, therefore, the SPD put the notion of a welfare state high on the political agenda in 1918/19, especially in view of the incontrovertible fact that a large majority of the middle and upper classes was inherently antagonistic towards the democratic Republic and already hankering after the restoration of authoritarianism in government. These groups also posed a danger because as a result of the cautious outcome of the November Revolution, they continued to dominate the institutional framework of the state, including the civil service, judiciary, the churches, universities, and above all, the army. For the SPD and the trade unions, wide-ranging welfare reform was one of the main keys to the long-term survival of the Republic. Their priority was shared also by the other partners of the so-called 'Weimar Coalition', the Centre Party, which included in its ranks a strong faction dedicated to the ethical Catholic notion of social justice, and the German Democratic Party, representing middle-class liberal opinion in favour of welfare reform as necessary to progress in a modern democracy.⁶

On the broader front of enlightened educated opinion, there was a growing acceptance of the idea, derived from social darwinism and from the embryonic sciences of eugenics and social anthropology, that a healthy population was essential for a nation's survival in an increasingly competitive world: in the specific case of Germany, this meant recovery following defeat in the war and the 'Diktat' of Versailles as a major force in European and world affairs. State-sponsored welfare, it was argued, would make good any deficiencies in the racial stock (*Volkskörper*).⁷ In practice, this meant improving not only the health and general material situation of the lower classes, perceived as the most vulnerable members of society, but also shaping their attitudes in a manner deemed 'proper', according to bourgeois criteria.

The imperatives behind the new beginning to welfare provision were expressed immediately by several clauses covering the position of labour in the Weimar Constitution of 1919. For example, Article 163 recognised the right of every German to work and the state undertook to protect the unemployed. Further Articles granted legal status to trade unions for the first time, allowing them to organise and negotiate wage agreements with employers through collective bargaining procedures. Measures designed to enhance protection of workers in employment led to the Factory Council Act of February 1920, which created factory councils throughout industry in which both sides had representation. To complement this, a state arbitration system under the supervision of the Reich Labour Ministry was established to settle unresolved grievances. The fact that the Ministry was led during the 1920s by Heinrich Brauns of the Centre Party (1920-28) and by the Social Democrat Rudolf Wissell (1928-30) ensured that the workers were generally given sympathetic treatment.* Finally, in a blow for gender equality, the Constitution extended the franchise to women, thus enlarging an already substantial working-class electorate. The SPD calculated that most female voters from the working class would naturally incline towards it, and the party was not usually to be disappointed in this respect.

Despite the persistent air of economic and political crisis enveloping the Republic in the early 1920s, the SPD and its partners in government succeeded in constructing the embryo of a welfare state. In a notable victory for the trade unions who had long campaigned for it, the 8-hour day had been secured throughout most of industry as a result of the historic agreement in November 1918 between employers and labour (*Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft*). The working class also benefitted directly from the state's drive to improve health care and housing. More hospitals were built and a slum clearance programme launched, new rights for tenants in rented accommodation were announced and rent levels frozen until 1923. In 1922, the Republic, mindful of the contemporary slogan, 'Who has youth, has the future', sought to demonstrate its interest in the younger working class by enacting the National Youth Welfare Law, which provided a comprehensive range of benefits, and by encouraging the growth of vocational education and training facilities."

These government initiatives took place in a postwar German society where, as a result of the upheavals of war and revolution, the basis of national wealth had been redistributed inadvertently in a way that favoured the working class. Income differentials between professional middle-class and working-class occupations and also between skilled and unskilled working-class jobs were being eroded to a notable degree, a trend further accentuated by the creeping inflation. Consequently, the real income levels of the working class increased, until suffering a reduction under the impact of the hyperinflationary crisis in autumn 1923."¹⁰ Altogether, however, the working class and the labour movement recorded material advances in 1918-23 which had, in turn, significant political implications, as exemplified by two episodes, in particular.

The defeat of the right-wing Kapp Putsch in spring 1920 was occasioned mainly by the successful general strike organised against it by the trade unions, which were able to mobilise quickly large sections of the industrial proletariat, who interpreted the attempted overthrow of the government as an attack on *their* Republic. More dramatically, the survival of the Republic in late 1923 in the face of a catalogue of misfortunes, including the Ruhr invasion, Communist-inspired unrest in central and northern Germany, the Hitler Putsch in Munich, separatist agitation in the Rhineland and the collapse of the currency, owed a great deal to the stubborn loyalty of most workers, who continued to identify the democratic state as serving their basic interests. If this had not been the case, it is difficult to see how the Republic could have been maintained by any other factors, even by the subsequent introduction of the new

currency (*Rentenmark*) and the Dawes Plan of reparations in 1924. In 1923, as in 1920, the bulk of the working class was resolute in its defence of the political and welfare/material advantages it had enjoyed since the creation of the Republic.¹¹

The considerable foreign capital investment in Germany during the so-called 'Golden Years' of the mid-1920s was used partially by central and local government to develop further the *Sozialstaat*. Indeed, contemporaries noted a veritable spending spree, which contrasted sharply with the relative austerity of the early postwar era, but which also served to underline a new mood of optimism in the country at large that the troubles of the war and its consequences could at last be forgotten. The self-exclusion of the SPD from national government during this middle period in the Republic's history may have had deleterious political consequences in the long run, but it did not impede the advance of public welfare because of a tacit agreement that the party would tolerate the bourgeois cabinets in return for their commitment to this cause. Accordingly, alongside the implementation of the National Youth Welfare Act in 1924, health and education were extended, and civic amenities, such as parks, libraries, and sports grounds, were built on an ambitious scale. Welfare expenditure by the state increased by 25% between 1925-28. Workers, who had witnessed the loss of some of their gains in 1923, including the 8-hour day, found their situation improving once again. For many of them, real wages increased by an average of 9% in 1927 and by a further 12% the following year.¹² The Labour Courts Act of 1926 offered prospects of better work protection, but the fundamental achievement of these years was the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1927 which, by abolishing means-testing, established for the first time in Germany the legal right of the unemployed, subject to certain qualifying criteria, to state benefit. The legislation, which set an example to other European countries, seemed all the more apposite at this time in Germany because of the periodic high levels of unemployment, notably in the winters of 1925/26 and 1927/28, accompanying the vigorous rationalisation programme in industry.¹³

The political payoff from the enlargement of the welfare system was revealed unequivocally by the results of Reichstag elections in May 1928, when the SPD, the principal creator and overseer of the *Sozialstaat*, impressively augmented its vote from 1924 levels to just under 30%, thus allowing it to consolidate its status as not only the leading party of the working class, but also as the single most popular party in Germany. Equally heartening for the Republic was the poor showing of its main opponents on the Right, the German National People's Party (DNVP) and the National Socialists (NSDAP). There were, of course, other factors which helped shape the outcome of this election, but there is no denying that the SPD's victory was intimately connected with its priorities on the wider welfare front and with what may be described loosely as the 'social revolution' to the benefit of the working class which the development of the welfare state entailed.

The growth of the *Sozialstaat*, however, did not answer all the Republic's problems which, in many ways, remained formidable. In fact, it compounded these problems in respect of a vitally important constituency. Although the hostility of broad sections of the middle and upper classes and their domination of key national and state bodies continued, as did the instability in cabinet and the serious agrarian crisis, it was the attitude of many employers in industry, particularly in the traditional sectors of coal, iron and steel, which probably carried the gravest danger for the Republic. By the late 1920s, they had become deeply resentful of the advances of the welfare state and of the working class as a whole, and were convinced that the Republic was intrinsically antagonistic towards capitalism. Complaining that wages were outstripping productivity and that their taxes were paying for welfare gains when it would have been better to channel them into investment, industrialists argued that Germany's ability to compete

effectively in the crucial export markets of the world economy was being seriously compromised. Their disgruntlement over these social, economic and financial matters found expression increasingly in extreme right-wing political views, though did not yet stretch as far as the NSDAP. Prominent industrialists had concluded that the Republic and its pro-worker welfarism had to be destroyed and replaced by some form of authoritarian political system which would champion their interests over those of labour and make the welfare state a relic of a discredited past.¹⁴ There was no good reason to expect from the prospective of 1929, when the Republic appeared reasonably stable, that they would be able to realise their objective quickly. The onset of the Depression, however, changed everything for everyone.

The Depression was probably felt more severely in Germany than in any other European country. Not simply the economy, but political life and the structure of society were devastated by mass unemployment and its multifarious consequences.¹⁵ By mid-1932, six million people were officially registered as jobless, with up to a further two million categorised as 'invisible' unemployed. For the first time in Germany, white collar workers were affected to a painful extent, but the large majority of the jobless were drawn from the industrial working class, particularly from the unskilled of the cities and major towns. Berlin, Hamburg, Essen, Breslau and Cologne had unemployment levels of 40% or more. Adding to the misery was the rigid deflationary strategy of the presidential cabinet headed by Heinrich Brüning of the Centre Party, incorporating drastic cuts in public expenditure, higher taxes and wage and salary reductions. It was not for nothing that Brüning became known as the 'Hunger Chancellor', appearing insensitive to the suffering around him as he doggedly pursued his primary aim of convincing the Allies that reparations should be cancelled.

As a direct result of the economic crisis and governmental policy, which were compounded by the banking collapse of 1931, the welfare state was bound to be rendered extremely vulnerable and unlikely to be maintained in the manner to which it had become accustomed.¹⁶ At the same time, the forces of the political Right, which included not only President Paul von Hindenburg and his ultra-conservative circle, Brüning and his successors as Chancellor, Franz von Papen and Kurt von Schleicher, but also the lobby of industrial employers, who now, in the early 1930s, recognised that the opportunity had arisen at last for a wholesale assault on the welfare state, the working class and the parliamentary system of the Republic. In the era of mass unemployment and the concomitant debilitation of labour and the trade unions, the balance of power tilted in favour of capital and the employers.

Before long, all spheres of the welfare state were weakened and then undermined by drastic reductions in their funding, following a series of emergency decrees issued by government, with the unemployment insurance scheme being the most conspicuous and important casualty. Designed at its inception to cater for a maximum of 800,000 unemployed per annum, it could not cope with the demands made on it after 1929/30, even when the qualifying rules were tightened, including the effective restoration of means-testing in 1932, the level of benefit substantially scaled down and the categories of eligible workers reduced. By 1932, the scheme and the associated emergency aid system (*Krisenfürsorge*) had all but collapsed, leaving millions of jobless in receipt either of a mere pittance from the state or nothing whatsoever. More and more of them were forced on to the indignity of local charity relief.

The material deprivation of the industrial working class and dependents reached catastrophic proportions. Abject poverty and destitution inevitably caused health standards to suffer, which was vividly indicated by the widespread reappearance of malnutrition, rickets, tuberculosis, and begging. Family break-ups and petty crime multiplied under the strain, and suicide, hitherto a middle-class phenomenon in

Germany, was resorted to by growing numbers of desperate workers. Even for those still in work the situation was only marginally better, for employers were in a perfect position to reduce wages, increase working hours, disregard safety measures and hold the threat of dismissal over workers' heads. By mid-1932, the *Sozialstaat* had been reduced to a pale shadow of its pre-Depression status, and just as welfare reform had paid important political dividends for the democratic Republic in the 1920s, so the virtual disintegration of the welfare system had disastrous ramifications for it in the early 1930s.

The first intimation that the welfare issue would occupy a central political role during the last phase of the Weimar Republic came in March 1930, when disagreement between the SPD and German People's Party (DVP) over the future funding of the unemployment insurance scheme proved to be the final crisis which Hermann Müller's 'Grand Coalition' government could not solve.¹⁷ The replacement of this last parliamentary cabinet of the Republic by a presidential-style regime under Heinrich Brüning inaugurated the era of political authoritarianism in Germany which may be said to have culminated in Adolf Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor in January 1933. In other words, the welfare issue lay at the very heart of the effective demise of German parliamentary democracy after little more than a decade.

The swing to the Right, which had begun in the late 1920s but which dramatically accelerated with the onset of the Depression and the collapse of the Müller government, contributed a great deal to the disintegration of the traditional middle class parties, the DNVP, DVP and German Democratic Party (DDP), and the radicalisation of their electorate to the good of the NSDAP. Hitler's party became the principal vehicle for the pent-up anti-democratic, nationalist and anti-Marxist sentiments of substantial sections of the middle and upper classes, particularly those who were Protestant and resident in the smaller towns and rural areas of northern, central and eastern Germany.¹⁸ As part of this crucial development during the same period, growing numbers of influential industrialists began to turn their thoughts in the direction of the NSDAP and to offer a degree of financial support. From mid-1932, as the governments of Brüning and then of von Papen faltered, more and more employers, who were determined that the welfare state and its main supporters, the Left, should be destroyed once and for all, decided that Hitler alone could be relied upon to deliver this result. Their backing, along with that of important groups of large landowners and the army, proved indispensable to the Führer's advent to power a few months later.¹⁹

The virtual collapse of the welfare state by 1932 produced widespread disillusion and despair among its major beneficiaries, the working class, who had been also until then the most numerous, consistent and loyal supporters of the democratic Republic. The so-called WTB-Plan notwithstanding, neither the SPD nor the trade unions produced a viable scheme for alleviating mass unemployment, arguably the single most corrosive factor in the overall crisis facing Germany.²⁰ The SPD's adopted policy of toleration towards the Brüning government meant that the savage attack on the welfare system went largely unchallenged from the principal architect of that system.²¹ Furthermore, the SPD, which was the dominant party in many local councils, especially in its bastion of Prussia,²² found itself in the position of having to actually implement at the grassroots level welfare cuts decreed by central government.

The political consequences soon became clear: a large majority of the younger, unskilled unemployed deserted the SPD for the KPD, whose share of the popular vote increased in Reichstag elections from 10.6% in May 1928 to 16.9% in November 1932. During the same period, the SPD's share fell from 29.8% to 20.4%. Some workers — usually those not in the mainstream of the socialist movement — went over to the NSDAP.²³ But in both cases, where they turned to the extreme parties, workers were motivated invariably not by ideology but rather by a desire to vent their feelings of anger

and resentment at a system which, in circumstances of mass unemployment and welfare collapse allied to political crisis, they felt had comprehensively betrayed them. Even those workers who remained faithful to the SPD did so very often out of a sense of ingrained loyalty rather than genuine conviction, and were not, therefore, of a frame of mind to lend muscular support to the Republic, as they had done to such telling effect in 1920 and 1923, in its hour of greatest need.

Many factors contributed to the failure of the Weimar Republic. Among the most important of these was the almost total destruction of the welfare system, which nourished the growing susceptibility of German society to totalitarian radicalism in the early 1930s. Where earlier in the Republic's history, public welfare provision had helped secure its electoral and political support and also given it a not inconsiderable part of an identity as a progressive, fair-minded democratic state in Europe, so the virtual disappearance of the *Sozialstaat* inevitably undermined the Republic in a fundamental fashion.

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Working - Class Girls' Education in Glasgow, 1872 - 1900

Dr. JANE McDERMID

Introduction

In the 19th century, there was a preoccupation with the state of Scottish education. It was seen as integral to Scottish distinctiveness, as a key agent in preserving Scottish identity which was being challenged by industrialisation, urbanisation, immigration, and anglicisation.

Yet Scottish national identity was essentially a masculine construction in terms of the educational tradition, or myth, of democracy and universality. Lindy Moore has shown that girls were less likely to be sent to school than boys; that when they attended, girls stayed for a shorter time than boys; and that they were taught a more restricted curriculum.¹ Helen Corr has shown the influence of the developing Victorian concept of gender.² By the late 19th century, despite the fact that working-class girls and boys were taught together, and female and male teachers worked together, the experience of the Scottish education system differed for the sexes — in curriculum, attendance, expectations.

It could be argued that the situation of Scottish girls and women in terms of education resembled that of English girls and women: one of inequality, of inferiority. The mythology of the Scottish egalitarian tradition in education is gender-blind. Yet we need to examine what it meant to be a female Scot in the 19th century educational system, to identify the variations and alterations in the Victorian concept of gender, to investigate the gap between the ideal and reality. The Victorian period has been seen as redefining femininity for Britain as a whole; but we should not assume that definition was simply or passively accepted.

In the 19th century, Scotland had a very regionalised economy centred on four key urban centres: Glasgow, Dundee, Edinburgh and Aberdeen: Glasgow dominated by heavy industry, Dundee by textiles, Edinburgh by the professions and service sector, and Aberdeen with a more diverse pattern (and interestingly, with the smallest percentage of occupied females).

The focus of this article is Glasgow. The Glasgow School Board, set up with the 1872 Education (Scotland) Act, was the biggest in Scotland, and arguably faced the biggest pressures of industrialisation and immigration in the 19th century. Its economic development reflected that of Britain as a whole, with a mixture of commerce, textiles, coal and iron, engineering and shipbuilding. It was fully integrated into both the regional and imperial economies. Its population of 478,000 in 1871 represented 14 per cent of the people of Scotland, and it was responsible for the education of a fifth of all Scots children.

Girls' education in the Public schools is the main concern here, but there will be a contrast with the situation in Catholic schools. Scottish national identity was not only conceived as masculine; it was Presbyterian. We have to keep in mind that there was much dissension in Presbyterianism, especially in the first half of the 19th century: that there were tensions within the Catholic community between the Scottish clergy and the incoming Irish; and that there was much conflict between Protestants and Catholics. The main point is that while the essence of Scottishness was seen to be Protestantism, that was not the only source of national identity by the 19th century. There was a large Catholic minority (from the Highlands as well as from Ireland) which kept itself outside

of the national education system, which had its own crisis of identity, and which sustained its identity through separate schools as well as through the Church.

A few words need to be said about evidence. Scottish records seem as gender-blind as the education tradition itself. There is most difficulty for the pre 1872 period, for though numerous educationalists gathered material on the higher subjects studied by schoolchildren, they rarely distinguished between the sexes. There is some evidence from HMI reports, from Minutes of the Committee of Council on Education, from the Argyll Commission and from school log books; but in general, these sources are gender-blind, only very occasionally revealing a lass o' pairts. However, a detailed study of Glasgow's school log books reveals a gender inequality which was mitigated by the headmasters' fervent belief in the national education tradition, and by their resistance to anglicisation.

Working - Class Girls' Education in Glasgow

For Glasgow, I have examined the log books of 76 schools, to 1900, including 14 Roman Catholic schools, as well as the minute books of five school boards.³ The Board, or Public, schools were mixed-sex, though some standards, usually from the second or third, were divided into girls' and boys' sections. Organisation depended on the headmasters who were prepared to change, so that some of the older girls and boys might be taught together. Roman Catholic schools generally tended to be divided into girls' and boys' schools, with the girls having a female head teacher, visited regularly by a male manager, usually a priest.⁴ A few schools, however, seem to have been mixed, and to have had a female head. The practice seems to have been to have mixed infant schools, and then send the boys to a separate school, or at least to teach them separately from the girls in the same school. It should be noted that although the Public Schools were mixed, they were built in such a way as to separate girls and boys everywhere except in the classroom — there were separate stairs, entrances and exits, and playgrounds for the sexes.

The Public schools all seemed keen on teaching more than the elementary subjects and class subjects (of geography and history). They introduced Specific Subjects — such as mathematics, French, German, Latin, Greek, English language and literature, physical geography, animal physiology and physiology, mechanics, chemistry, botany — for both girls and boys. Specific Subjects were instituted by the first Scotch Code of 1873 and were taught until 1898. They allowed for a degree of secondary work to be done at public, or primary, level, in keeping with the old parish schools. They were paid for by government grant. Generally, those who stayed on to the fifth, sixth and ex-sixth standards were offered at least two Specific Subjects, with most girls seeming to take Domestic Economy as one, and with few girls taking the traditionally male (because associated with university) subjects of mathematics, Latin, Greek, science, or physical geography.

There were occasional HMI complaints of girls being over-loaded with Specifics, which could indicate that some at least took more than two, and that the HMIs thought girls should stick to domestic economy. Yet, as discussed below, there was a tension in the attitudes of headmasters and HMIs towards such gender-specific subjects, especially sewing, which were seen to interfere with the more academic work of the school. The Catholic schools, being poorer, generally did not offer Specific Subjects, either to boys or girls.

Of the Specifics, girls as well as boys took French, German, physiology and English literature. Generally, boys took mathematics, though girls also studied this subject at the City Public School; boys took Latin, though girls also studied it at a few schools —

Hillhead and Maryhill Public schools, with female pupil teachers taking Latin at Eastpark Public School. In addition, when Garnethill Public School had a higher grade department, and later (in 1898) when it became a High School for Girls, girls were taught both Latin and Greek. Few boys in Board Schools were taught Greek, while Garnethill seems to have been the only school in Glasgow to offer it to girls. It should be noted that it became a High School for Girls to attract middle-class girls who would not have gone to a mixed-sex public school.

Boys generally took physical geography, while girls took domestic economy, but a few schools offered the former to girls as well. The same seems to have been the case with science. At an elementary level, it seems to have been taught to boys only, but in a few schools which either had a higher grade department or became Higher Grade Schools (usually around 1900), girls had the opportunity to take science. At Garnethill, in 1892, a few were mentioned as passing first class in science, and when the boys left, the headmaster retained science, trying to persuade the girls to take one or more science classes. He met with only limited success, however, due it seems to parental disapproval, but he remained confident of an increase as girls looked more to medicine as a career.⁵ Girls also took science at City Public School (in 1891), at Bellahouston Public School (1899) and at John Street Public School (1900). In the last, girls took a different science from boys — hygiene, but it was criticised by the HMI who thought that it needed a foundation in chemistry and physics.

Both headmasters, in their frequent examinations of classes, and HMIs, in their annual reports, tended to compare the performances of girls and boys, as if measuring the sexes against each other, and perhaps expecting the same standards. Yet girls and boys were still seen as performing according to their 'natural' sexual characteristics. There were frequent comments that while girls seemed more expressive than boys in reading aloud, they were more reticent, shy in oral answering than boys. Occasionally, however, it was stated that boys performed better than girls generally because of extra time spent by girls on 'other' subjects — by implication sewing.

Yet despite this implied criticism of the emphasis put on sewing in girls' education at the expense of academic subjects, the log books contain many complaints that girls did not take advantage of sewing. Indeed, it was claimed that sewing classes may have contributed to irregularity of attendance among girls, which indicates their, or their parents', resistance. There were complaints that the girls often could not, or did not, bring seams to sew, and calls for the Board to provide, which it did from around 1886. Some schools would cut time spent on sewing in order to increase the time for other subjects in which the girls had fallen behind the boys, or to coach the girls intensively before the drawing examinations.⁶

HMIs were often critical of the girls' 'industrial work'. They seemed to want to raise the level of the teaching of sewing, as if to make it more scholarly. Thus, for example, the HMI report for Keppochhill Public School in 1883 censured the failure of girls to show specimen seams, even though they had done the work. It seems that their sewing had been required at home as soon as it was finished, and that they would have to knit until they could bring a new seam. The HMI insisted that this was not good enough:

The progress in this branch cannot be satisfactory if it is to depend upon the caprice of ignorant parents. The pupils should be classified in this as in other subjects, according to their proficiency, and the instruction carried on in a regularly graded system.⁷

The implication in these reports is that the instruction would always be by female teachers, who it seems did not always come up to male standards. In one school — Rutland Crescent — it was reported that in 1890 the female staff were sent specimens of

sewing from Germany, perhaps an effort by the Board to raise expectations. Indeed, at another school — Keppochhill — the headmaster himself taught the first stage in domestic economy, in 1882 and 1883, apparently because he considered the standards of the female teachers too low.⁸

In some schools, girls in the higher standards were also expected to take cookery and laundry, but there was criticism if the demands were so heavy as to detract from their 'ordinary' work, for example in the HMI Report of 1896 for Dalmarnock Public School:

The demands on the time of the girls for Cookery and Laundry work are heavy: and the practice of making up lessons in these subjects by dropping the ordinary work is not commendable.⁹

Boys seem to have taken manual instruction when girls took laundry. Both sexes were taught drawing; other common subjects were singing/music, and drill and swimming, from the 1890s, though these were taught at different times to girls and boys.

As in the Board schools, there were HMI reports about the need to give more attention to needlework in Catholic schools. It seemed to be more difficult to teach Domestic Economy in Catholic schools, because of the cost, lack of accommodation, and heavy pressures on the headmistresses. Thus in St. Aloysius' school, cookery classes only began at the end of November 1888, after the Reverend Manager had had a stove installed in a cupboard, while the Reverend Manager of Holycross school had to give the headmistress permission to give Domestic Economy lessons during the time allotted to composition on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and physical geography on Tuesdays and Thursdays.¹⁰

Yet the log books for Glasgow's Catholic schools seem to show a more positive approach to the introduction of Domestic Economy for girls, especially in the evening schools. One explanation might be that it was the only Specific Subject open to girls in Catholic schools. When Specific Subjects were introduced, they appear to have been mainly reserved for boys.

In view of the widespread poverty among the Catholic population in Glasgow, it should not be surprising that the stress was on elementary education, for boys as well as for girls. Besides the irregularity of attendance, log books for Glasgow Catholic schools reveal that few, girls or boys, stayed on into the senior standards. Indeed, this was a recurring complaint, into the early twentieth century. Moreover, there were now complaints that so many 'old' children were being admitted to school for the first time — girls between the ages of nine and ten, who had not gone through the infant school, and were regarded as almost unteachable, a drag on the others.

In terms of attendance, registers often give such brief reasons for a child leaving school that it is difficult to generalise much, but in a few cases at least, and very rarely for boys, it was stated that girls left to help at home. In the log books, it was occasionally noted that girls stayed at home, especially at certain periods, such as just before the new year, to help with the cleaning. While both girls and boys in outlying districts would be kept off at harvest time, either to pick potatoes or to stay at home while their mothers worked in the fields, it was more often the girls who did so. Still, at Barrowfield Public School, there were complaints in 1876 that boys were being kept at home 'to do work, or to go messages', and at St. Mungo's Roman Catholic Boys' School in 1867, it was noted that some boys were habitually absent on Fridays, to run messages or to mind younger siblings while the mother did the washing.¹¹ Despite frequent complaints about the absence of girls in the higher standards, often no reason was given. Boys were more often described as playing truant, implying that their absences were less productive and domestic than that of girls, and less acceptable. Whereas the absence of girls was regretted, boys were more likely to be punished, or even expelled, for truancy.

Generally, in terms of behaviour, HMIs and headmasters complained of the unruly and uncouth manners of the lower class of children, girls as well as boys, and especially in the Catholic schools where the children tended to be poorer. There were some complaints of violence: of boys fighting, of Catholic boys attacking Public School boys, especially on St. Patrick's day, and occasionally of boys hurting girls. There were very few references to female violence or disruptive behaviour, but at Springburn Public School, in May 1877, the headmaster related that five older girls seemed to have spread 'vile' stories about a male teacher, which had undermined his standing with the pupils. The girls eventually confessed to lying, and two left, but the teacher in question resigned, apparently after failing to recover his authority.¹² In the log books, only girls are recorded as making 'false' accusations, implying that girls were seen as more devious than boys.

In 1880, the headmaster of Govan Cross Public School noted a letter from the School Board which pointed to the rudeness of the pupils in and out of school, and indeed especially in the streets, and suggested that occasional lessons in manners and morals should be given to girls and boys, perhaps separately in some, unspecified instances. Two years later, Fairfield Public School log book recorded instructions from the School Board to introduce for use in schools a manual entitled *Maxims in Morals and Manners for Boys and Girls at School*.¹³

If a school had a considerable number of middle-class children, however, more was expected in terms of behaviour. Thus the headmaster of Crossmyloof Public School in 1879 thought it desirable that every encouragement should be given to his middle-class pupils by promoting their education in a few polite accomplishments, such as dancing and instrumental music. At the same time, he saw these children, who had come from private schools, as poorly educated, academically, compared to the usual Board School children. At Garnethill Public School, which actively sought to attract middle class girls, a Lady Superintendent was appointed around 1894, to oversee the morals, manners and behaviour of the girls, both in class and in the neighbourhood.¹⁴ Thus, girls' education was subject to the pressures of social class as well as of gender.

Nevertheless, what the Glasgow log books show is that the stress was on academic subjects, for girls as well as for boys. Headmasters particularly resented sacrificing academic for industrial work for girls, while parents resented both the cost of the latter and the implied criticism of the home conditions. The log books also reflect a widespread belief among headmasters that education was held in higher esteem in Scotland than in England. The headmasters all sought to offer as wide a variety of Specific Subjects as possible in the apparent belief that in doing so they were preserving the parochial school tradition. From the beginning, Specific Subjects were open to girls: so too were bursaries. Yet despite the opportunities, few boys and fewer girls of the working classes in Glasgow were able to continue their education to secondary level. By the 1880s, moreover, the HMIs were arguing that to be taught efficiently, these subjects would have to be limited to a few schools. When Higher Grade schools were established in Glasgow in the late 1890s, most were for boys (five), with only one (Garnethill) for girls; but some Public Schools kept secondary departments, while others had the one year beyond Standard 6 (the ExVI).

Still, through its support for Specific Subjects, the Glasgow School Board tried to encourage secondary education. From the early 1880s, the Board considered establishing a High School for girls, to provide them with the same opportunities as boys. Such schools, however, attracted lower-middle class, rather than working-class girls. The working class could not afford to keep its children, especially its daughters, at school longer than was necessary. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Glasgow's economy was dominated by heavy industry and ship-building. Jobs for working-class

women declined, not only in textiles, but also in domestic service. Perhaps the socio-economic composition of the city — predominantly working class, with a high proportion of skilled male workers — helps explain the stress in the Board Schools on industrial work (sewing for girls, manual instruction for boys). Nevertheless, the Scottish tradition of a wider curriculum was retained, indeed was consciously promoted, for girls as well as boys.

Conclusion

A sense of national identity was very complex in nineteenth-century Scotland. Most Scots seem to have viewed themselves as both Scottish and British, and to resent the English equation of being British with being English. Yet the Irish Catholics in Scotland, too, sought to preserve a separate identity, distinct from both the English and Scottish, but in terms of educational tradition, influenced by the latter.

Tom Gallagher argues that the Scottish stress on 'the democratic intellect' was not open to the Irish Catholics, unless they were prepared to give up their ethnic identity.¹⁵ At the same time, economics, rather than resistance to the Presbyterian 'democratic intellect' kept the Catholics of Glasgow outside of the Scottish educational tradition. Yet the impression from the Catholic schools' log books, as well as from the Reports of the Catholic Schools Committee, is of efforts by both clergy and teachers to raise the standards of education, for girls as well as for boys. Thus in St. Aloysius' school by the end of the nineteenth century, girls as well as boys were encouraged to try for the Merit Certificate, and to enter university examinations.¹⁶ The numbers receiving a secondary education remained tiny, however, for boys as well as for girls.

At the same time, the Victorian concept of gender and cult of female domesticity influenced the Scottish educational tradition, as it did the English. Some who write about Scottish girls' education, see little difference between the Scottish and English experiences.¹⁷ Yet the evidence of the Glasgow log books shows a more complex situation, with resistance to domestic education for girls, at least in the Board schools, not because of any disagreement with the domestic ideal, but because, in Glasgow at least, it undermined the traditional stress on academic learning.

How typical of lowland Scotland was the educational experience of working-class girls in Glasgow? Reports on education in the Dundee region, for example, reveal that it was in a particularly difficult position.¹⁸ Dundee had been the Scottish town most heavily dependent on adventure schools before the 1872 Act. There were more half-timers in Dundee than elsewhere. In contrast to Glasgow, Dundee's economy was dominated by the woman worker.¹⁹ The impression is of an even greater stress on sewing in the school log books and HMI reports. Yet as in Glasgow, there was resistance to this stress.

The HMIs and the ladies appointed by the Dundee Board to inspect the girls' industrial work insisted on its necessity. The stress on sewing and knitting may be seen as related to the dominant industry of textiles. Interestingly, the Dundee schools were more tolerant of knitting than the Glasgow Board. While the Dundee School Board insisted — following government education policy — that sewing was for girls only, there were reports of boys earning money by this skill, sewing sacks. There were fears that the girls, especially the half-timers, would be deficient at domestic skills, particularly cooking. Of the Specific Subjects offered — many fewer than in Glasgow — girls were obliged to take Domestic Economy.

It seems that among the older pupils in Dundee, both sexes had irregular attendance because of outdoor work, including planting, turnip hoeing and fruit picking. Poor weather and a downturn in the economy — both frequent occurrences — accounted for

ill-attendance for boys and girls. But the biggest obstacle to improving their educational standards was recognised by the Dundee headteachers to be the system of half-time work. Boys as well as girls were half-timers. Dundee, however, was unique in Scotland, indeed in Britain, in its reliance on female labour, a high proportion of whom were Irish Catholics, and on half-time education. The two would seem to be connected. Working-class girls in Dundee did not have the same opportunities at school as those in Glasgow. In both, their educational experience was gendered; but in Dundee, whatever the stress put on teaching girls sewing and cooking, the School Board was influenced significantly by the demands of mill owners for female labour, while the poverty, lower than average wages and higher cost of living, ensured that school was a brief and episodic experience for most working-class children, and especially for girls.

The log books of the Glasgow Board schools reveal how seriously the headmasters viewed the national tradition in education, how proud and anxious they were to preserve it. That tradition has been subjected to much revision in the last twenty years. The revision does not deny the tradition validity. Rather, it sees the democratic myth as an idealisation of what by the nineteenth century was a very complex reality. However simplified or distorted, the democratic myth played a vital part in the assertion of national identity. Paterson and Fewell argue that gender inequality is a fundamental but ignored aspect of that ideal, and is woven into the fabric of national identity.³⁰ The Glasgow log books uphold that judgement; but they also show that, whatever the intentions of the educators, working-class girls after 1872 had a range of educational opportunities in the Board Schools greater than in England. It was also greater than in the Catholic schools of Glasgow, and than in most other parts of Scotland. Glasgow's non-Catholic, working-class girls did not have equal opportunities with non-Catholic, working-class boys. Nevertheless, the democratic tradition as well as resistance to anglicising tendencies worked in their favour.

NOTES

1. Lindy Moore, 'Invisible Scholars: Girls learning Latin and mathematics in the elementary public schools of Scotland before 1872', *History of Education*, June 1984, vol. 13, no. 2, pp 121 - 137; 'Educating for the "Woman's Sphere": Domestic Training versus Intellectual Discipline', chapter 2 in *Out of Bounds: Women in Scottish Society 1800 - 1945*, edited by Esther Breitenbach & Eleanor Gordon (Edinburgh, 1992).
2. Helen Corr, 'The Sexual Division of Labour in the Scottish Teaching Profession' chapter 7 in *Scottish Culture and Scottish Education 1800 - 1980* edited by W. M. Humes & M. Paterson (Edinburgh, 1983); and Helen Corr, 'Home - Rule in Scotland: The Teaching of Housework in Schools 1872 - 1914', chapter 3 in *Girls in their Prime: Scottish Education Revisited* edited by F. M. S. Paterson & J. Fewell (Edinburgh, 1990).
3. The log books and Board Minute Books are held in Strathclyde Regional Archives (SRA), Glasgow. See also James Roxburgh, *The School Board of Glasgow 1873 - 1919* (London, 1971).
4. For Catholic education in Scotland see, for example, 'Catholic Elementary Education in Glasgow 1818 - 1918' by Sister Martha Skinnider in *Studies in the History of Scottish Education, 1872 - 1939*, edited by T. R. Bone (London, 1967); J. H. Treble, 'The Development of Roman Catholic Education in Scotland 1878 - 1978', *The Innes Review*, 1978, vol. 29, pp. 111 - 139; T. A. Fitzpatrick, 'Catholic Secondary Education in South - West Scotland Before 1972: its contribution to the change in status of the Catholic community (Aberdeen, 1986); James McGloin, 'Catholic Education in Ayr, 1823 - 1918', *Innes Review*, 1963, vol. 13, pp. 77 - 103.
5. Garnethill Public School Letter Book, vol. 3 (1895 - 1898), entry for January 1898, pp. 910 - 912 (SRA, D-ED7/96/6).

6. See for example Baillieston Public School Log Book entry for 25.1.1878, p. 204 (SRA, SR10/3/549/3/1); Dovehill Public School Log Book entries for 25 Feb. 1878, p. 38 and 30 April 1880, p. 156 (SRA, D-ED7/60/1/1); Fairfield Public School Log Book entry for 6 March, 1890, p. 333 (SRA, D-ED7/73/1/1); Bellahouston Public School Log Book entry, HMI Report, March 1894, p.327 (SRA, D-ED7/18/1/1); Albert Road Public School Log Book entries for 26.1.1878, p. 36 and 1.2.1878, p. 37 (SRA, D-ED7/3/1/1); Dovehill Public School Log Book entry for 8 May 1878, p. 48 (SRA, D-ED7/60/1).
7. Keppochhill Public School Log Book entry, HMI Report for year ending 28 February 1883, p. 84 (SRA, D-ED7/117/1/1).
8. Rutland Crescent Public School Log Book entry for 18 April 1890, p. 318 (SRA, D-ED7/182B/1/1); Keppochhill Public School Log Book entry for February 1884, p. 89 (SRA, D-ED7/117/1/1).
9. Dalmarnock Public School Log Book entry, HMI Report, May 1896, p. 119 (SRA, D-ED7/56/1/1).
10. St. Aloysius' School Log Book entry for 30 Nov. 1888, p. 203 (SRA, D-ED7/188/1); Holycross School Log Book entry for 20 Dec. 1889, p. 94 (SRA, D-ED7/103/1/1).
11. Barrowfield Public School Log Book entry for 17 May 1876, p. 23 (SRA, D-ED7/16/1/1); St. Mungo's Academy Log Book entry for 24 Aug. 1867, p. 110 (SRA, D-ED7/247/1/1).
12. Springburn Public School Log Book entry for 11 May 1877, p. 20 (SRA, D-ED7/202/1).
13. Fairfield Public School Log Book entry for 22 Nov. 1882, p. 142 (SRA, D-ED7/73/1/1); Govan Cross Public School Log Book entry for 22.9.1880, pp.149 – 150 (SRA, SR10/3/667/6/1).
14. Crossmyloof Public School Log Book entry for 29 Sept., 1879, p. 30 (SRA, D-ED7/129/1/1). Garnethill High School for Girls Log Book entry for April 1895, pp. 1 – 4 (SRA, D-ED7/96/2).
15. Tom Gallagher, *Glasgow The Uneasy Peace: Religious tension in modern Scotland, 1819 – 1914* (Manchester, 1987), pp.52 – 57.
16. St. Aloysius' School Log Book entry, p. 354 (SRA, D-ED7/189/1/1). See also St. Mary's Girls' School Log Book entry for 6 August, 1897, p. 36 (SRA, SR10/3/894/2/1).
17. See for example Helen Corr, in *Girls in their Prime* (note 2).
18. See J. C. Stock, 'Education in Dundee', ch. xxvii in *Dundee and District*, edited by S. J. Jones (Dundee, 1968) and *The Life and Times of Dundee*, C. A. Whatley, D.B. Swinfen, A. M. Smith (Edinburgh, 1993).
19. See E. Gordon, *Women and the Labour Movement in Scotland 1850 – 1914* (Oxford).
20. Paterson & Fewell, *Girls in their Prime*, chapter 1.

Scottish Brewing : A Snapshot in the late 1940s*

Dr TERRY GOURVISH

The standard works on the history of British brewing usually make only passing reference to Scottish brewers and the distinctive characteristics of the Scottish market. Alfred Barnard, it is true, gave due weight to Scottish breweries in his four-volume survey of breweries of 1889–91.¹ Noting the reputation of the leading firms for bottling techniques and success in exporting, he included eleven Scottish firms in his vignettes of 109 breweries. Other writers gave less attention to Scotland, however. G. B. Wilson's seminal work on *Alcohol and the Nation* of 1940 had comparatively little to say about Scottish conditions. He did provide separate statistical tables for Scotland's beer consumption, production, and the incidence of drunkenness. There was also a short chapter on the peculiarities of the Scottish licensing system, which came into operation much later than in England and Wales, and had as its distinguishing feature the Act of 1913 giving local districts the right of opting whether to issue liquor licences.² Peter Mathias's monumental survey of brewing from 1700 to 1830, published in 1959, confined itself to England, and in fact limited much of its analysis to the operations of the great London brewers.³ In the following year, John Vaizey's much briefer economic analysis of British brewing to the early 1950's made only passing reference to Scottish conditions. The amalgamation in 1931 of William McEwan and William Younger to form Scottish Brewers Ltd. in 1931 was mentioned in a section on inter-war mergers, and there was a brief, and misleading, reference to the extent of 'tied' i.e. brewer-owned/controlled, public houses in Scotland.⁴ Yet there was much that was distinctive about the industry, although it accounted for only about seven per cent of total UK production in the 1920's and 1930's, and eight – ten per cent in the 1950's and 1960's.⁵ The differences included the development of distinctive Scottish beer styles; the long-established export specialisms of the Edinburgh and Alloa brewers, most notably William McEwan and William Younger; the early receptiveness of the Scottish market to lager; and differences in the structure of retailing. Many of these elements are now more clearly understood, thanks to Ian Donnachie's book on Scottish brewing, and the pioneering work of the former archivist of the Scottish Brewing Archive, Charles McMaster.⁶ However, Donnachie's book is much stronger on the 18th and 19th centuries than on the 20th, the period after 1914 being described in a mere 17 pages (in a text of 247 pages), while McMaster would be the first to concede that his contributions to our knowledge of Scottish brewing have come in the form of short anecdotal articles rather than a full-length analytical work. Further research on the post-1914 period would clearly be welcome, and should be encouraged by the Scottish Brewing Archive, now that it has been re-established on a firmer footing in Glasgow. In this article a modest contribution is offered, based upon material collected by the Brewers' Society and the Brewers' Association of Scotland on beer retailing to support their parliamentary lobbying during the passage of the Labour Government's Licensing Bill of 1948 (which became the Licensing Act 1949). More specifically, returns were collected from members on their beer distribution and retail operations. This reveals a great deal not only about conditions in the UK as a whole, but also about Scotland's specialised trade and, in particular, the more limited extent of vertical integration in Scottish brewing.

The Brewers' Society questionnaire was organised to counter 'obvious mis-statements' in parliament and the press about the extent of the 'tied' (i.e. brewer-owned licensed

premises), free (free public Houses, etc. **not** owned by brewers) and the club (i.e. private club) trades. Concern had been expressed about the brewers' domination of retailing, and the rise of an independent club trade, some of it supplied by 'club breweries', had been welcomed in some circles. Yet precise information was lacking. Although the number of licences was published annually, sales to the various trades remained essentially a matter for conjecture. The Society conceded that it was at a disadvantage in challenging mis-statements because it had no reliable figures available, and so in December 1948 it duly canvassed its members. Their responses were collated early in January 1949, together with a separate return compiled by the Brewers' Association of Scotland.⁷ The results are not easy to analyse. The manuscript which contains the collated replies is certainly not free of transpositions and errors. For example, the information given for the premier Alloa brewers, George Younger, which reveals annual sales of only 3,100 barrels, must surely be incorrect; there is a strong possibility that the data apply to J. J. Young of Portsmouth. Gillespie Sons & Co. are shown to have had three club customers but no beer appears to have been distributed to them. More importantly for present purposes, it is not easy to disentangle English and Scottish data. The aggregate return for 31 member companies assembled by the Brewers' Association of Scotland was described as applying to the 'Scottish Trade Only'. However, in addition, 16 Scottish brewers reported directly to London, and this information (we may presume) covers the UK trade of these brewers. We cannot be sure that by adding the two aggregates together we have an accurate total for the Scottish brewing industry, since there may have been some double-counting in the procedure. Equally, it is not clear whether the heading 'Scottish Trade Only' means that the Scottish return excludes the trade of Scottish brewers in England. Nor can it be certain that the Scottish brewers reported by the Brewers' Society in London as having produced 'no return' actually responded instead to their Association in Edinburgh. They may have just failed to complete their questionnaire. There were 13 such companies, including Archibald Campbell Hope & King, Drybrough, Machlachlans and J. & R. Tennent.⁸ Finally, the aggregate return produced in Scotland provides information on a different basis from that employed in London.

Nevertheless, with all the attendant difficulties, the information collected in 1948 – 49, which are presented in Table 1 and analysed in Table 2, provide a reasonable guide to the structure of brewing retailing in Scotland in the late 1940's. Table 1 provides information on issued capital (where available), tied estates (on and off licences⁹), customers (tied and free¹⁰) and sales for each of the 16 companies which reported to London, together with the following averages: the 16 companies; the 31 companies which reported to Edinburgh; the sum of the two; and England & Wales.¹¹

From the results, it is clear that Scottish brewers had a sales and retailing profile which was markedly different from the UK norm. First, their customer base was dominated by the free trade and the clubs and industrial canteens. The tied trade provided only four per cent of customers: ten per cent for the 16 – company group, four per cent for the 31 – companies. In England and Wales, on the other hand, the tied trade predominated. Here, 57 per cent of customers were the tenants and managers of the licensed properties owned by the brewery companies, while free trade customers were only 28 per cent of the total. Second, the pattern of sales revealed the same contrasts. Over 70 per cent of the barrelage sold went to the free trade (87 per cent for the 31 – companies; 41 per cent for the 16 – companies, where the average reflects the more diversified trade of the three major concerns, William McEwan, William Younger and James Deuchar). In contrast, 69 per cent of the British barrelage went to the tied trade, and only 21 per cent to the free trade (Table 2).

Table 1. Scottish Brewers and their Retail Trade, 1948

Company	Issued capital (£m)	Tied estate:			Customers:				Barrels supplied to:			
		on-licences	off-licences	tenandt managd	Free On	Free Off	Clubs	Canteens	Tied Trade	Free Trade	Clubs/ Canteens	Total
1) 16 Companies reporting to the Brewers' Society in London:												
John Aitchison	£0.20	5	63	8	167	96	185	0	31985	17164	19111	68260
James Aitken	£0.19	1	2	0	69	0	12	0	768	20546	2882	24196
T & J Bernard	£0.25	2	14	0	17	2	21	0	4840	1474	3215	9529
James Calder	£0.17	9	16	3	3	0	2	0	10838	713	945	12496
James Deuchar†	£1.00	9	127	3	49	4	102	0	74202	12791	13461	100454
Gillespie Sons	---	0	4	0	0	0	3	0	520	0	0	520
Gordon & Blair	---	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	0	600	600
John Jeffrey	£0.20	0	6	0	45	33	125	0	1755	2462	12735	16952
George Mackay	---	1	3	0	25	0	26	0	600	1200	3900	5700
Maclay	£0.12	0	12	0	10	0	77	0	3400	620	7100	11120
William McEwan	£1.00	4	53	4	245	154	151	538	24921	72239	30895	128055
Steel, Coulson	£0.19	0	11	0	6	2	112	5	6074	500	3875	10449
Thomas Usher	£0.14	0	0	0	22	2	21	1	0	1016	6516	7532
George Younger	£0.75	0	0	0	16	9	31	63	0	1400	1700	3100
Robert Younger	£0.18	1	1	0	152	0	54	0	630	23240	5280	29150
William Younger	£1.22	123	66	0	1028	108	612	786	75231	119537	47422	242190
Total [1]	---	155	378	18	1854	410	1555	1393	235764	274902	159637	670303
2) Aggregate of 31 Companies reporting to the Brewers' Association of Scotland:												
---	205	177	-*	38540**			1233	654	102021	1128642	68190	1298853
3) Sum of 1+2												
---	360	555	-*	40804**			2788	2047	337785	1403544	227827	1969156
4) England & Wales:												
---	45600	9340	8760	18290	13090	/	/	19.5m	5.9m	2.8m	28.3m	

Source: BS, Return on 'Hotels, Tied Houses and Clubs', January 1949, BAS, Return, January 1949; Stock Exchange Year-Book, 1949.

* off-licences not separated; tied house data exclude 1,214 loan-tie houses. ** free on and off-licences not separated.

† Company based in Newcastle, but brewery in Montrose.

Table 2. Analysis of 1948 Survey

Company	Customer Base:		Clubs/ Canteens	Tied Houses (on-licences):		Sales		Clubs/ Canteens
	Tied	Free		Tenanted	Managed	Tied	Free	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1]								
John Aitchison	15	50	35	7	93	47	25	28
James Aitken	4	82	14	33	66	3	85	12
T & J Bernard	29	34	38	13	87	51	15	34
James Calder	85	9	6	36	64	87	6	8
James Deuchar	47	18	35	7	93	74	13	13
Gillespie Sons	57	0	43	0	100	100	0	0
Gordon & Blair	0	0	100	-	-	0	0	100
John Jeffrey	3	37	60	0	100	10	15	75
George Mackay	7	45	47	25	75	11	21	68
Maclay	12	10	78	0	100	31	6	64
William McEwan	5	35	60	7	93	19	56	24
Steel, Coulson	8	6	86	0	100	58	5	37
Thomas Usher	0	52	48	0	0	0	13	87
George Younger	0	21	79	0	0	0	45	55
Robert Younger	1	73	26	50	50	2	80	18
William Younger	7	42	51	65	35	31	49	20
Total [1]	10	39	51	29	71	35	41	24
[2] BAS	4*	91	5	54	46	8	87	5
[3] 1+2	4	85	10	39	61	17	71	12
[4] E&W	57	28	15	83	17	69	21	10

* includes loan-tie houses

There are also differences in the way Scottish breweries chose to run their smaller tied estates. In England and Wales, the predominant form was the tenanted public house (83 per cent of the total), in which the publican leased the pub at a nominal 'dry' rent, paying an additional 'wet' rent — a premium over the free trade price on the beer supplied to him by his brewer. The alternative was the 'managed' house, in which the pub was run by a salaried manager. The brewer retained both the wholesale and retail profit margins, but was liable for the full running cost of the pub. By the late 1940's there had been much debate about the merits of the two systems. For large pubs in densely populated areas managed houses were potentially more profitable, but they could also be costly where trade was modest or uncertain. In Scotland managed public houses were much more prominent, reflecting the high proportion of the country's population congregated in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen. Such pubs accounted for 61 per cent of the combined total (71 per cent for the 16 – companies, 46 per cent for the 31 – companies). However, there is a complication here. The Brewers' Association of Scotland return included an additional category, 'loan – tie', that is on – licensed premises where 'the licence holder being financed by us in the purchase of property and/or goodwill' [was] 'thereby . . . obliged to purchase our bulk beer': there were 1,214 in this category, four times the number of formally tied properties listed in the return. If these properties were counted as *tenanted* tied houses, then the Scottish and English percentages would be very similar.¹² This said, tied houses, whether tenanted or managed, were clearly in a minority in the Scottish market. While in England and Wales, 75 per cent of on – licensed properties were tied to brewers, for Scotland the figure was about 28 per cent, and **not** the 80 per cent claimed by Vaizey.¹³

Of course, one should not be encouraged by aggregate averages to think that Scottish brewing (or English brewing for that matter) exhibited a uniformity. This is important since the Scottish industry was made up of a few large companies, which tend to dominate any average, and several very small ones. The figures for individual companies in Tables 1 and 2 show considerable diversity in the market strategy pursued by the companies, whether large or small. James Calder, James Deuchar and Gillespie, for example, were more enthusiastic tied house operators than most, while Gordon & Blair supplied beer exclusively to clubs and canteens, and Steel, Coulson were not far behind them. In sales terms, the club trade was the important mainstay of brewers such as Jeffrey, Maclay and Usher. As regards public house management, tenanted tied houses were preferred by William Younger. The latter's managed houses made up only 35 per cent of the total, while all the Jeffrey, Gillespie, Maclay and Steel, Coulson pubs were managed (Table 1 and 2). Nevertheless, the tendency to rely on the non – tied trade was characteristic of most companies.

Our findings reveal something of the vulnerability of Scottish brewing immediately after the Second World War, which made it ripe for rationalisation and takeover in the early 1960's. As Gourvish and Wilson have noted, worn-out plant, low investment, and the loss of export markets during the war made life difficult for all but the best organised firms. 'Those features which had previously set it apart — early bottling skills, vigorous exports, distinctive Scotch strong beer, and the skill to adapt best English and continental practices to local traditions — counted for little'.¹⁴ Dependence on the free trade when most UK brewers were retrenching behind tied trade barriers at a time of sluggish demand (before 1959) was a hazardous strategy. The situation helps to explain the rapid and extensive rationalisation of the industry in the early 1960's.

NOTES

- * I should like to thank Dr Richard Wilson, Director of the Centre of East Anglian Studies, University of East Anglia, Dr Fiona Wood, Records Manager, Brewers and Licensed Retailers Association, and Mrs Alma Topen, Archivist, Scottish Brewing Archive, University of Glasgow, for their help in the preparation of this article.
- 1. Alfred Barnard, **The Noted Breweries of Great Britain and Ireland**, (4 Vols, 1889 – 91). The companies were: in Vol.II Wm. Younger (Edinburgh); James Aitken (Falkirk); George Younger (Alloa); and R. & D. Sharp (Blackford); in Vol.III T. & J. Bernard (Edinburgh) and Ballingall & Son (Dundee); in Vol. IV John Fowler (Prestonpans); John Jeffrey (Edinburgh); Edinburgh & Leith Brewing Co.; James Calder (Alloa); and Steel, Coulson (Glasgow).
- 2. G. B. Wilson, **Alcohol and the Nation** (1940), esp. Ch. 11.
- 3. Peter Mathias, **The Brewing Industry in England, 1700 – 1830** (Cambridge, 1959).
- 4. J. E. Vaizey, **The Brewing Industry, 1886 – 1951** (1960), pp. 30, 69. For the error, see below, p. 9.
- 5. Data for 1925 – 9 [7%] and 1934 – 6 [7%] in standard barrels (36 gallons, 1055° gravity), data for 1951 – 5 [8%] and 1966 – 70 [10%] in bulk barrels (36 gallons, any gravity). Wilson, **Alcohol and the Nation**; T. R. Gourvish and R. G. Wilson, **The British Brewing Industry, 1830 – 1980** (Cambridge, 1994); **Scottish Abstract of Statistics**, 1973.
- 6. Ian Donnachie, **A History of the Brewing Industry in Scotland** (Edinburgh, 1979); Charles McMaster, **Alloa Ale: A History of the Brewing Industry in Alloa** (Edinburgh, 1985); **Scottish Brewing Archive Newsletter**, *passim*. Scotland does receive attention in Gourvish and Wilson, **British Brewing Industry**, esp. pp. 103 – 10, 384 – 5, 467 – 8, 523 – 5.
- 7. Brewers' Society, 'Hotels, Tied Houses and Clubs', January 1949; Brewers' Association of Scotland, Return on 'Scottish Trade', 10 January 1949, Brewers' Society [BS].
- 8. The others were: Ballingall; Blair; Robert Deuchar; Fowler; Robert Knox; McLennan & Urquhart; William Murray; John Young; and John Wright.
- 9. On – licenced premises were licensed to sell alcohol for consumption on the premises; Off – licences sold alcohol for consumption elsewhere.
- 10. Free trade customers were free to buy beer and other alcoholic drinks from any brewer. Tied trade customers were required to buy draught beer (and often other beers and alcoholic drinks) from the brewer who owned or leased the premises.
- 11. The England and Wales aggregate data appear to include some Scottish sales.
- 12. 83 per cent for England and Wales, 74 per cent for Scotland.
- 13. Vaizey, **Brewing Industry**, p. 69.
- 14. Gourvish and Wilson, **British Brewing Industry**, p.103.

The Medieval Church and the defence of a Scottish Identity

BRUCE WEBSTER

On Whitsunday (27 May) 1072, at Windsor, William the Conqueror had his seal set on a document recording the settlement of a dispute over the primacy between Lanfranc, archbishop of Canterbury, and Thomas archbishop of York¹. The essential point was to establish that the archbishop of York was subject to the authority of Canterbury, and had to make a profession of obedience to its archbishop.

This famous document might seem quite irrelevant to Scotland and its identity. The Scottish king Malcolm III was not present; nor were any Scottish bishops or nobles included in the long list of those who 'subscribed' or 'consented' to it. But none the less it had a direct bearing on the status of the Scottish kingdom. It not only confirmed that York was subject to Canterbury; it also laid down the limits of York's own jurisdiction: Canterbury conceded to York 'the subjection of the bishop of Durham' (the only suffragan that York actually had at that time) 'and of all the regions from the boundaries of the diocese of Lichfield and the river Humber to the ultimate limits of Scotland'.

This casual provision contained a double implication. It claimed that Scotland was part of the province of York; and that the Scottish church, like all other parts of that province, were subject to the remoter authority of Canterbury. In part this was based on the original plans of Gregory I when he sent St. Augustine to Kent². His ideas were based on his knowledge of Roman Britain, which had been divided into two provinces centred on London and York. That was not quite how it worked out; but the two provinces of the English church had their roots in Gregory's scheme. However neither Gregory nor the settlement of 1072 recognised any distinct place for a Scottish church.

There was also a secular side to all this. William was conscious that some at least of his English predecessors had claimed an authority over all the isles of Britain; and that there were precedents for the king of Scots recognising in some way the overlordship of the king of Wessex, as for example in the coronation ceremonies of king Edgar in 973, when Kenneth, King of Scots, was said to have been one of eight under-kings who swore to be his helpers on land and sea³. For William, Lanfranc was the head of "his" church and that church was, in his mind, co-extensive with his kingdom. So if Lanfranc had jurisdiction over the Scottish church, William presumably had jurisdiction over Scotland. It was in August 1072, less than three months after the sealing of the Windsor accord that William I led his most serious expedition into Scotland, as a result of which 'King Malcolm came and made his peace, gave hostages, and became his vassal'⁴. The idea of a realm of Britain was clearly in William's mind; and the organisation of his church which he dictated fitted this concept. Nothing came of this. As the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle astutely observed, William 'gained no advantage from' the 1072 expedition. Neither Malcolm Canmore nor his church showed any practical sign of the submission which William exacted; but William and his successors long continued to hold on to the idea of an empire of Britain.

Such ideas had little connection with reality. No king of England had ever exercised any real authority further north than Yorkshire, and even there their authority had been intermittent and uncertain. Since the mid-ninth century, *Scotia* (roughly the land between the Forth Valley and the Highland Line but also including Argyll in the west) had been ruled by a single line of kings, which by the early eleventh century had gained authority over the Lothians and Strathclyde, though these areas still maintained an identity distinct from *Scotia*.

In this situation, the king of Scots were as concerned as was William to assert their authority by every possible means; and they shared his sense that the church was an essential element in their power; they too wished to maintain their jurisdiction over all the clergy in their realm. When two members of the community of Durham, one of them the future prior Turgot, biographer of St. Margaret and eventually bishop of St. Andrews, tried in 1075 to set up a cell or hermitage on the site of Cuthbert's ancient monastery at Melrose, now desolate, king Malcolm was concerned about the threat to his authority and tried to insist on the monks performing fealty to him. They were forced to withdraw by the threat of ecclesiastical censures from their bishop, Walcher of Durham, who was probably more conscious of the political issues.⁵ Later when Alexander I wished to revive the bishopric of St. Andrews, vacant since 1093, he had perforce to look to England and chose Turgot, who was by then prior of Durham. But the issue of obedience to York was crucial and Alexander was clearly determined to avoid it. This caused some delay; but in the end Turgot was consecrated without making the contentious profession. Curiously this was achieved with the support of Henry I whose sympathies seem to have lain with Canterbury, rather than York. When Turgot died in 1115 Alexander proposed to appoint a monk of Canterbury. Eadmer, the biographer of St. Anselm. He was strong enough on the York issue and obtained a very cogently argued brief against its supremacy which would have pleased the king, but alas insisted on making a profession to Canterbury! Alexander, with more determination than he has often been given credit for, would have none of it. Eadmer gave up the probably unwelcome struggle and returned unconsecrated to the peace of Canterbury.⁶

There followed a long battle by the Scottish church, with the backing of the kings, to maintain its position as a distinct and independent province, covering all or most of the kingdom. If the church achieved that, then it would have gone far to achieve universal recognition of the separate identity of Scotland. But there were two difficulties: first the church of *Scotia* was not yet seen as co-extensive with the realm of the kings of Scots: not till the late twelfth century was Glasgow recognised as a "Scottish" see. And more drastically, the "Scottish" church had no archbishop who could naturally act as metropolitan. There were, and were to remain, two rivals for that position: St. Andrews, whose bishop was known till the mid-twelfth century as bishop of *Scotia*, but whose relationship to the new sees rapidly being founded north of Forth was undefined; and Glasgow, which was not in *Scotia* but whose bishops had an especially close link with the crown. At least two, perhaps three, of the chancellors of the twelfth century became bishops of Glasgow.

Without an archbishop, Scotland's status as a province was hard to maintain; and pope after pope in the earlier part of the twelfth century issued orders to the Scottish bishops to be obedient to York as their metropolitan, a command which the Scots persistently ignored. Once at least, in 1125, the pope hesitated, and ordered an enquiry to verify York's right; but the papal position was consistent if not always pressed. York was the rightful metropolitan, a position which precluded the independent existence of a Scottish church and thus perhaps of Scotland itself. In practice however king and churchmen were able to see to it that there was no effective outside influence on either church or kingdom.⁷

The great change seems to have come at the time of the Beckett controversy, and perhaps because of it. The pope, Alexander III, was himself in a difficult position for his title was contested and he was opposed by an imperial anti-pope. In this situation, it was important for Alexander to win the backing of Henry II, and therefore he needed the support of all who might influence Henry; Roger of Pont L'Eveque, archbishop of York and leading opponent of Beckett, was potentially useful. Hence perhaps the issue of a bull in September 1162 commanding ten identified bishops, all with sees in what is now Scotland, to show obedience to archbishop Roger of York as their metropolitan or face

papal sentence in retribution. It was the last in the line of such orders issued by the popes. There is no evidence that the Scots took any more notice than they had previously. Nor does the pope seem to have done anything to enforce his sentence. Between November 1162 and July 1164 there were a series of papal privileges to Scottish abbeys and bishops: no less than seven survive, which does not suggest any follow-up to the threats of 1162.

The decisive change came on 1 November 1164 in a bull to the Dean and Canons of Glasgow. By this time, Alexander knew of the serious conflicts between Henry and Becket at the councils of Westminster and Clarendon. He could hardly yet have known of the final breakdown of relations between Henry II and Becket at Northampton, and certainly not of Becket's flight from England which did not happen till 2 November. We do not know how much he knew of Archbishop Roger's opposition to Becket; but the bull to Glasgow reflected a dramatic change in the papal position. King Malcolm IV and the church of Glasgow had sought the consecration of their bishop elect Ingram, archdeacon of Glasgow and chancellor of the kingdom. The text of the pope's response is worth quoting: 'Although the emissaries of our venerable brother the archbishop of York who were present pressed us not to proceed, nevertheless we . . . with the advice of our brethren (the cardinals) . . . have consecrated him bishop. We therefore . . . send him with the fullness of the grace and benediction of the apostolic see to you as our special sons and commend him to you.'⁸ Two things stand out amidst the formal wording: the specific mention of the objections of York, which were disregarded; and the remarkable description of the canons of Glasgow as *speciales filios* a term which was later explained as implying direct subjection to the papacy without any intermediary. This remarkable bull was apparently matched by another, whose text does not survive but which belongs to 1164 or the early months of 1165, giving the bishops of Scotland permission to consecrate the bishop elect of St. Andrews. Again, Roger of York appears to have objected. An anonymous Canterbury account tells us that Roger wanted the pope to compel the bishop elect of St. Andrews to come to York for consecration, and asked, should he refuse to come, that Rodger himself should have permission to suspend him. 'But he could not obtain this.'⁹ Together these two decisions of the pope overturned York's case and established the Scottish church as independent. It was something Scottish kings and churchmen had sought since the days of king Alexander I; ironically it seems to have been gained as a by-product of the more celebrated conflict of Henry II and Becket.

This was not the end of the story. Henry II had a chance to press claims of overlordship over Scotland when William the Lion, king of Scots since 1165, joined in the great rebellion of English and French nobles against Henry II in 1173/74, and was captured at Alnwick in 1174. The treaty of Falaise, which Henry exacted from him in return for his release, included the provision 'that the church of Scotland shall henceforth owe such subjection to the church of England as it should do, and was accustomed to do in the time of his (Henry's) predecessors as kings of England.' The bishops of St. Andrews and Dunkeld, the abbot of Dunfermline and the prior of Coldingham had to promise 'that they will not oppose the right of the church of England' . . . and 'this same thing shall the other bishops and clergy of Scotland do.'¹⁰ The pope however took no notice. there was a vacancy in the see of Glasgow, and at the end of 1174, Alexander issued an authority for the bishop elect to be consecrated — there is no reference in it to the position of York.¹¹ At some date early in 1175, this was followed by a special protection for the church of Glasgow as the *specialem filiam nostram nullo mediante* (our special daughter with no intermediary).¹² In July 1176, Alexander, in another bull, wrote that he has learned, presumably from the Scottish clergy, that Henry II has compelled the bishops of Scotland to swear to obey the English church, which is 'an affront to God and to Alexander himself, and an attack on ecclesiastical liberty. Kings and princes have no

right to arrange ecclesiastical matters'. The pope is determined that the liberties of the Scottish bishops shall not be reduced and forbids the archbishop of York to exercise the metropolitan authority over them unless the pope or his successors find that this is justified. Until and unless that might happen, the bishops of Scotland are to show obedience to no-one except the Roman pontiff.¹³ The end came finally in the famous bull *Cum Universi* of Celestine II in 1192, addressed to William the Lion, which decreed that the Scottish church is a 'special daughter' of the papacy and should be subject directly to it with no intermediary. In this bull, for the first time, the see of Glasgow is explicitly included among the sees of the 'Scottish' church.¹⁴

By this long struggle, that church had freed itself, and by implication the kingdom, from the claims of English superiority. It was a struggle fought together by kings and bishops which often focussed on technical matters of professions and metropolitan jurisdiction, but which involved, as they and ultimately the popes headed by Alexander III understood, the liberty and identity of Scotland. In the end, the popes recognised that Scotland was a distinct entity with its own church as well as its own king, whose liberties were entitled to the highest protection the popes could give. An anomaly remained and was to remain till 1472: Scotland had no archbishop. There is no clear answer as to why this remained so for so long. The reason probably lies in the conflicting claims of the sees of Glasgow and St. Andrews. In the event the church was allowed to run its affairs by councils under a "conservator" elected for the meeting:¹⁵ such councils were necessary in the flush of ecclesiastical reform initiated in the Third Lateran Council which was convened by Innocent III in 1215; but they continued as a recurrent if mostly ill-recorded feature of the Scottish church until the very eve of the Reformation. From 1192 there was no question that there was a Scottish church and that it was subject only and directly to the papacy. The existence of Scotland had received a public and decisive recognition by the highest tribunal in Christendom.

For much of the thirteenth century, this victory and the recognition which churchmen and kings had won seemed secure. But the death of Alexander III in March 1286 and the later death of his only direct heir, the child Margaret, in 1290 gave Edward I the chance to raise once more English claims to superiority. With thirteen claimants to the vacant throne, of whom Robert Bruce and John Balliol were the chief, Edward had the chance to demand a recognition of his alleged right to be treated as "Lord Superior", on which he could found a permanent claim to overlordship. Scotland's liberty and identity were both under threat. Like other parts of the community, churchmen were divided in their response. Were they for Balliol? Were they for Bruce? How far was it in the interests of Scotland to resist the pressures from her overbearing southern neighbour? Yet by 1309, the Scottish clergy in a parliament at St Andrews formally recorded that Robert Bruce 'in whom the rights of his father and grandfather to the forsaid kingdom, in the judgment of the people, still exist and flourish entire' had been 'with the consent of the said people . . . chosen to be king . . . and with him the faithful people of the kingdom will live and die as with one who, possessing the right of blood, and endowed with the other cardinal virtues, is fitted to rule and worthy of the name of king.'¹⁶ We do not know who produced this rhetoric; but with it the Scottish church formally took its stand for the independence of Scotland.

For two centuries after this crisis, the continuing conflicts with England threw up a need to articulate and express a sense of Scottish identity, a need which had not existed before. In the early fourteenth century, the claims of Edward I and Edward II needed to be answered. Soon after Edward's deposition of John Balliol in 1296, the Guardians, nobles who continued to maintain a Scottish government in the name of king John, were concerned to establish their legitimacy, and to do so took their case again to the papal court which had served them so well against Henry II. This policy had to be articulated by churchmen who understood the ways of the curia and the arguments that would

weigh with it. Pope Boniface VIII responded in 1299 with a bull calling on Edward to desist from his oppressions of the Scots, who were the vassals of the papacy rather than of him — a new twist to the *filia specialis* argument!¹⁷ This forced Edward to deny jurisdiction and argue his case, that Scotland had always been subject to the king of England. This the Scots countered by arguing from remote and imaginary mythology, that they had never been so subject. Both sides raked over ancient legends, and in time concocted much nonsense. To us today the arguments seem ludicrous. In 1401 English ambassadors as a preliminary to serious and relevant negotiations, began by stating claims which went back to tales of the doings of Brutus and his sons 'in the days of Eli and Samuel the prophets', stories developed from the twelfth century *History of the Britons* of Geoffrey of Monmouth and designed to show that the rulers of Scotland had always been vassals of those of England.¹⁸ The Scottish counter case went back to the aftermath of the Trojan War, to the doings of a Greek named Gaythelus and his Egyptian wife Scota, daughter of Pharaoh, from whom ultimately were descended Scots and Gaels! These stories were eventually demolished by the more developed historical techniques of the seventeenth century, and since the early eighteenth century have been relegated to the lumber-rooms of history; but however doubtful they were as history, they were for at least two centuries or more the expression of rival Scottish and English identities, and should not be ignored, as they too often are.

These myths were first used as pleadings before the papacy in 1301 by a group of clerics headed by one Baldred Bisset, who deserves a more prominent place in the history of Scottish identity than he has often been given. Both his brief and his actual pleadings have survived, copied into a fifteenth-century chronicle.¹⁹ They seem to have served well at the time; but any papal sympathy for the Scots was extinguished by the death in 1303 of Boniface VIII and the eventual succession, after the short reign of Benedict XI, of the Gascon Clement V, who naturally sympathised with Edward I, since Gascony was at this period part of Edward's dominions. Nevertheless, the arguments were to be the basis for a long line of identity myths. They next appeared in the letter to the pope in 1320, known as the Declaration of Arbroath because it was dated at Arbroath, and this was in the form of a letter of the Scottish barons to the pope.²⁰ It was the culmination of a long campaign in which the pope, John XXII, partly influenced by appeals from Edward II, and partly from his own concern for the peace of Christendom as a prelude to the renewal of crusading against the Turks, called on Bruce again and again to stop the war against England and make peace. This he was quite willing to do, since by 1319 he had recovered control of Berwick, which had been in English hands since 1296. He had in fact made and was observing a truce. His main remaining concern was that both Edward and especially the pope should formally recognise him as king of an independent Scotland. The Declaration of Arbroath stresses Scotland's ancient and unconquered independence, complains of England's attempts at conquest and oppression, and asks the papacy to tell Edward II to desist. Other letters asked John XXII to lift the ecclesiastical censures which he had imposed on the Scottish king and his bishops, stressing that they too shared his desire for peace. The author or authors of these letters were Bruce's agents and all presumably churchmen, since no-one else could compose the elaborate documents necessary for such a diplomatic offensive. It was reasonably successful. The censure on Bruce was lifted and the pope wrote to Edward II asking him to do his part in making a settled peace.

These diplomatic efforts were vital in putting Scotland's, and in 1320, Bruce's case before a universal tribunal. In themselves, they were a notable service in the cause of maintaining a Scottish identity. But in the next two centuries there was to develop a much wider proclamation of that identity, in a very strongly anti-English form, which was to set the mould of Scottish national feeling for long to come. Again it was churchmen, as the writers of literature and history, who were mainly responsible.

There were two lines of argument, both historical. One was developed, as Scottish national feeling has often tended to be, from the Wars of Independence, and especially from the campaigns of Wallace and Bruce, seen as the critical moment in the defence of a national identity; the other drew on a longer history, following the lines of Baldred Bisset's pleadings and the Declaration of 1320, and proclaimed the ancient and unchallenged independence of Scotland. Edward I and English argument in general had based their history on Geoffrey of Monmouth's *History of the Britons*. Scottish historians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries spent a lot of effort on elaborating the skeleton of descent from Gaythelus and Scota into a lengthy history. These myths, having no discernable basis in fact, have been largely ignored by modern historians. For their authors and readers in late medieval Scotland they were the main message of history for Scots who were determined to preserve their identity. And all this "history" was written by churchmen.

The basis was produced by John of Fordun, who seems to have been a chantry priest of Aberdeen, writing between the 1360s and the 1380s. His history²¹ dealt in some detail with the careers of Gaythelus and Scota and their descendants, and continued through Roman times to the death of David I. Thereafter he produced only increasingly sketchy "annals", though these are important sources for modern historians. Throughout his fully worked out sections, the emphasis is on the stalwart defence of Scottish liberties — an early declaration by the Scots of their determination to resist all servitude even frightened off Julius Caesar! The whole history documented the claim in the Declaration of Arbroath that Scotland had always been independent and had resisted all attempts at conquest. In the 1440s Walter Bower, abbot of Inchcolm, expanded Fordun's efforts into a vast sixteen book history of Scotland from the very beginning to the death of James I in 1437.²² These volumes provide a national history which is throughout a proclamation of Scottish identity.

The other theme, perhaps more popular than these largely academic histories, was the Wars of Independence themselves. Here the main, and still most read work of all, was *The Bruce*, written by John Barbour, archdeacon of Aberdeen²³, and evidently, from the evidence of pensions paid to him, a favoured poet of Robert II. *The Bruce* is an epic of considerable literary merit, which has established the position of Bruce, Douglas and Randolph as the great heroes of the struggle to maintain independence, a position which they retain to this day. *The Bruce* is also an important historical source.

Throughout the middle ages, the church was always involved in the maintenance of a Scottish identity. This is not to claim any special nationalist proclivities for churchmen: they were a sample of society at large and reflected its attitudes and concerns. But their particular problems and abilities involved them especially in the maintenance of a Scottish identity. In the twelfth century, it was in the organisation of the church that that identity seemed threatened. English kings could rarely spare the resources to make much of their claims to overlordship, save when luck gave them a chance, as happened as a result of the family quarrels among the descendants of Malcolm Canmore in the 1090s, or because of William the Lion's capture at Alnwick in 1174. In the secular sphere, Scotland was particularly independent; but the claims of York and Canterbury were a threat which churchmen had to fight. That they won may have been due to the particular circumstances of the Becket controversy; but that is not to discredit the persistent and determined struggle which they waged through the century with the steady backing and encouragement of their kings. In the thirteenth century the Scottish monarchy developed in strength and confidence. There are few proclamations of identity at that period for none were needed; but the effects of this period of calm appear in the troublous times of the 1290s, and in the rest of the middle ages there emerged a proclamation of Scottish national identity whose effects are still with us. In this, as diplomats, historians and poets; churchmen played their part, as the voice of an

increasingly articulate Scotland. The church did not create a sense of identity; that was produced slowly by long-term processes of history; but churchmen played a distinctive part by giving to Scottish identity a literate expression which it would otherwise have lacked.

NOTES

1. The text is given (in Latin) in *Facsimiles of English Royal Writs to AD1100*, ed. T. A. M. Bishop and P. Chaplais (Oxford, 1957) at plate xxix.
2. Gregory's plans for the British Church are set out in a letter to St. Augustine, which is given in Bede, *A History of the English Church and People*, translated L. Sherley-Price (Penguin Books, 1965), 84–5.
3. A. O. Anderson, *Scottish Annals from English Chroniclers, AD500–1286* (London, 1908), 76.
4. *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, translated G. N. Garmonsway (Everyman's Library, 1953), 208.
5. A. O. Anderson, *op.cit.*, 97–8.
6. For Turgot and Eadmer, see M. Brett, *The English Church under Henry I* (1975), 17–18 and 20–21. The brief prepared for Eadmar by Nicholas, prior of Worcester, is in A. W. Haddan and W. Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, vol.ii part 1 (Oxford, 1873), 202–4 (in Latin).
7. There is a brief discussion of papal relations with Scotland in the introduction to R. Somerville, *Scotia Pontificia* (Oxford, 1982), 3–10. This book contains, in date order, texts or summaries of all papal letters to Scotland before 1198.
8. *Registrum Episcopatus Glasguensis* (Bannatyne and Maitland Clubs, Edinburgh, 1843), i, no.19.
9. Somerville, *op.cit.* no. 57 gives details of the evidence for this text and quotes the Canterbury account which I have translated.
10. *Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174–1328*, ed. E. L. G. Stones (1965), 1–2.
11. Somerville, *op.cit.*, no.69.
12. *ibid.*, no.76.
13. *ibid.*, no.80.
14. *ibid.*, no.156.
15. The authority for this was a bull of Honorius III in 1225, translated in *A Source of Scottish History*, ed. W. C. Dickinson, G. Donaldson and I. A. Milne (1952), i, 55–6.
16. *ibid.*, 124–6. For the date see G. W. S. Barrow *Robert Bruce* (3rd ed. 1988), 184–5.
17. The text of the bull is translated in *Anglo-Scottish Relations*, ed. Stones, 81–87. It includes an account of events which must be based on Scottish representations.
18. *ibid.*, 175.
19. The brief and the pleadings are edited and translated in Walter Bower, *Scotichronicon*, ed. D. E. R. Watt, vi (1991), 134–189.
20. The text has often been printed and translated, e.g. in *A Source Book of Scottish History*, ed. Dickinson, Donaldson and Milne, i, 131–5; or in A. A. M. Duncan, *The Nation of the Scots and the Declaration of Arbroath* (London, Historical Association, 1970, 34–37).
21. Translated by W. F. Skene, in *The Historians of Scotland*, iv (Edinburgh, 1872).
22. The full text is only available in Latin, in *Joannis de Fordun Scotichronicon cum supplementis et continuatione Walteri Bower* (2 vols, Edinburgh, 1759). Despite its title, this is in fact an edition of Bower's work. Fordun's original version was not printed till Skene's edition (see note 20). There is now in progress a new edition of Bower under the general editorship of D. E. R. Watt in 9 volumes of which five have so far appeared, (see note 18).
23. *The Bruce*, by John Barbour, ed. W. M. Mackenzie (London, 1909).

Scottish Whig historians and the creation of an Anglo-British identity, 1689 – c.1830

Cambridge University Press.

£35.00.

Hbk.

322pp.

1993.

As a general rather than expert reader in this period, central to the formation of modern Scotland, albeit a reader who has struggled over many years to excite a variety of teenagers about the changes in Scotland in the 1770s, I found this book challenging, enjoyable and exciting. It covers a wide span since it concerns ideas — ideas which have shaped and to some extent continue to shape Scottish identity, our understanding of what it is to be “Scottish” and what that means for the courses of action we choose to follow.

The study explores two related issues. Why was it that the Union of Scotland and England did not result in a similar unified ideology of British constitutionalism? The dominant whig ideology was an Anglo-British one, leaning heavily on the pre-Union arguments and exposition of English whigs. Why was it then, given the post-Union dominance in political argument of the libertarian traditions of English whiggism, that the Scotland of Scott, already above many nations in philosophical achievement, breadth of letters, economic accomplishment and commitment to “progress”, was unable to develop a romantic nationalism which would cluster political direction around the liberties and liberty of the nation? Every nation has its individual story yet looking at Europe, indeed even within the British Isles, in the nineteenth century, it must be seen as surprising that there was no convincing argument or association of political developments with the concept of the Scottish nation. Scots did not see an independent Scotland as the best route to guarantee continuing liberty and development and were happy to frame political arguments and take political action on the British stage, a British stage whose terms of reference were English.

In analysing the ideas associated with the major constitutional changes of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Colin Kidd displays a wide reading not just in Scotland or England, but within parallel developing political societies. The footnotes can be read page by page quite independently as a treasure trove of further reading — through serendipity alone, time spent with the book might be well spent. The 34 page bibliography would also repay close attention for any budding scholar in the field and testifies to the thorough research which underpins this discursive narrative. He has carefully filtered through a wide range of sources constantly asking the key question — how did Scottish men (and it is on the whole men for indeed there are few women who appear in this history — without knowledge of other possible sources I can do no more than note this) conceive of Scotland? What was their sense of Scottish identity?

It is the period immediately before and after the Union which emerges as the decisive time in Kidd's narrative. In the years between 1690 and 1750 a political struggle was being conducted in terms of the past. In Scotland the dominant *Mythistoire* was that of George Buchanan whose account of the foundation of the Scottish monarchy by the legendary Fergus MacFerquhard in 330BC and its long independent tradition of liberty, based on the active role of prominent nobles in ensuring that the monarchy was not a tyranny, was widely accepted in the post-Reformation period, a time when the Culdaic myth gave substance to the fierce arguments for an independent Presbyterian Scottish church. Both before and after the Union, this tradition gave much comfort to prominent Scots figures in defending their sense of nation against an incorporating Union — Scotland had a long martial tradition of independence and liberty.

This nation hath continued now upwards of two thousand years in the unalterable form of our monarchical government, under the uninterrupted line of one hundred and eleven kings.”

Sir G. Mackenzie (quoted p78)

In this long chronicle, the Declaration of Arbroath stood out, like Magna Carta south of the border.

This potent myth which had sustained a consensual Scottish identity across a wide political spectrum could not withstand the antiquarian scholarship of the early Enlightenment. In particular the work of Thomas Innes, in his *Critical Essay on the ancient Inhabitants of North Britain*

(1729), established that many of the histories of the past had been manufactured for the purposes of the powerful. After Innes, the sophisticated scholars of a golden era in the Scottish Universities brought a broad understanding to the development of contemporary liberty. Within the powerful concepts of social and political change developed by Hume, Robertson, Ferguson, Smith and others, the thin myths of seventeenth century history were seen functionally, contributing to the maintenance of a feudal oligarchy whose unenlightened self-interest had contributed to the sorry state of poverty and disorganisation into which Scotland had descended by 1700. For the Scots intellectuals of this era, the history of England and of the development of English institutions was more significant in the story of liberty. At the same time, the Culdaic myths in relation to the Scottish Church were discredited and a more moderate line of defence of Scottish Presbyterianism was sought than that which the Covenanting tradition had taken.

A strong British identity did not emerge at this time, however, though there were signs in the French imperial wars, in continuing anti-Catholic themes and in the economic integrations of early industrialisation, of such an identity. More widespread was the acceptance among Scottish intellectuals that the history of liberty in Scotland owed more to England than to Scotland, not just in 1707 but perhaps even more in 1747. In the Anglo-British identity which developed from this, Scots could gain recognition by their widespread contribution to the development of British culture and Empire. The Scottish character became the focus of Scottish identity — Scottish political and institutional values had been seen to be empty. Looking back, it was hard to see the Covenanting tradition, the legal framework so entwined with feudal possession and jurisdictions and the self-serving nobility as offering a reputable tradition on which identity could be built. By the time of Thomas Muir, all Scots, whatever their political hue, accepted British institutions and the terms of debate set at a British level.

Scottish "legend" consisted of fragmented isolated narratives, of Bruce and Wallace, but without continuity and without institutions in what Scots could take pride. Scottish historical interest now centred on individuals, on language, on balladry and romantic tales. Nowhere is this more true than in Scott, who showed in his novels set in the Highlands, disapproval of a *"despotic and patriarchal social system which displays few signs of civilisation."* (p259).

When in 1876 the Royal Commission recommended that chairs in history should be established in the Scottish Universities, it was held that Scottish history was of its nature too anecdotal to justify this — it was not part of the mainstream story of the past. National identity was fragmentary and episodic.

While this may be seen as a cause of regret, to discover such weakness at the core of the national myth, Kidd rightly concludes by arguing that this fragmentation can be seen as the sign of a mature nation, sufficiently self-confident to come to terms with and recognise its weaknesses. Scotland would not fall prey to the false excesses of romantic nationalism which swept the continent. The gaps and uncertainties in the Scottish identity reflected the wisdom of the Scots — and the sophisticated understandings of their intellectual leaders.

The work is well argued and sustains interest. It raises many important questions for the teacher of history to consider. It highlights the relationship between historical concepts and historical narrative and contemporary political direction — the generalisations made today about the past carry within them a set of judgements and seeds for action for the future. It casts new light on Scotland's relationship with England, from the incorporating Union seen by the English as extension of Empire to the strength of association of Scots with the English constitutional tradition, even to the present day. Above all, the ideas covered clearly point to the grey territory between *Myth* and *history*, where the generalisation of the school teacher and of the text book summarises complex developments in a simple narrative, fixed in one direction by young minds who lack the maturity to recognise the uncertainties and unpredictability of developments which have been swept up in a simplified story.

How do teachers today in the Scottish classroom represent the story of Scotland? Is it not easier to portray the *Parcel of Rogues* than to engage young people in the intellectual arguments advanced in this study? Indeed here lies some of the difficulty. I found the text of Kidd's study heavy going, as a general reader. It carries assumptions of knowledge in its vocabulary and reference which would make it inaccessible to many. This is the final question which its reading has raised for me. Has our academic model, represented very well here in a text which will provide a sound basis for much University work, become too detached from the world of common political discourse? Indeed is such a development inevitable in any event in a democracy where the values of the consumer far

outweigh those of the teacher and where those who vote do not require to be educated in and are sometimes resistant to the history and development of the democratic institutions for which they have responsibility? How can the important questions and insights raised in this book about ideas and their influence on our understanding of ourselves and our actions, in this case ideas of Scottish identity, be brought to a wider public . . . if not through the school teacher? . . . and yet, as so many of us know, what we can teach relates very closely to what is valued in the wider society outwith the classroom.

This is the real challenge for the years ahead if continuing debate on our democratic institutions, and their national and international character, is to have the vibrancy, sophistication and complexity which characterised the past. If Scotland is to have a separate constitutional future once more, it should be based on our recognition of what has been gained as well as lost within Britain, not on a myth of oppression, generalised from a selection of the events of the past. It should be a debate characterised by understanding of the role of ideas in shaping understanding, not just by a consumer's interest in the acquisition of private wealth. While studies of this type illuminate and educate, they leave the public by. All those of us who interpret the past need to ensure that our debates and mutual understanding take us and the ideas we generate and handle, out into the community.

DANIEL MURPHY

The Imperial Roman Army

Yan Le Bohec

Batsford

£30.00

Hbk

304pp

1994

The strength — and the weakness — of this book is that it is a synthesis of recent scholarship (much of it Le Bohec's own) upon the first three centuries AD as far as the accession of Diocletian. The author is to be congratulated upon the amount of information contained in this survey. I have, however, two reservations about this book: the more serious is that Le Bohec does not inspire total confidence (e.g. p33 cites *Tacitus' figures of about 60 men per century* but the relevant passage refers to a special detachment), and secondly, over-simplification (e.g. p110 *mounted soldiers wore a particular helmet* — no details appended).

In nine chapters Le Bohec examines in turn the organisation of the army (via "The Divisions of the Army", "The Men" and "Recruitment"), training tactics and strategy, and finally the role of the army. This is defined initially by a gallop through 314 turbulent years of history, then comes a chapter upon the "Practical Role" (which the author interprets as the economic impact upon the environs of permanent frontier encampments) and finally its "Cultural Influence" (i.e. the religious habits of the Roman soldier).

The subject index is only of use to those with a working knowledge of the Latin for Roman military terms. In general, the selectivity and incompleteness of both indices restricts the book's value as a reference work.

There is the occasional factual error: e.g. contrary to p139, an *onager* was not a *small scorpion*. The information about Roman warships (p127) evidently antedates experience with the Greek trireme replica. Perhaps this reflects the 1989 publication date of the French edition. Presumably the idiosyncratic terms *triarch* and *tetrarch* instead of trireme and quadreme also derive from this being a translation: plus my personal favourite of *hydraulic cement* at p114. The translation factor may also be to blame for the statement (p26) that units of cavalry *were divided into 16 squadrons (turmae) of 500 or 24 of 1000*. It might not be immediately apparent that this is explaining that units nominally of 500 were comprised of 16 *turmae*, each of 32 men, and that a unit classified as 1000 strong was made up of 24 *turmae*. Other peculiarities exist. *Caveat emptor*.

STEVEN BRANFORD.

