HISTORY TEACHING REVIEW
YEAR BOOK

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Professor Geoffrey Barrow retired in 1992 from the Fraser Chair of Scottish History in the University of Edinburgh. From 1950 to 1979 he taught medieval history and Scottish history at University College, London and the Universities of Newcastle upon Tyne and St Andrews. His published work has ranged widely in Scottish history from the 5th to the 14th century. In particular he has edited the charters of the kings of Scots from 1114 to 1214, and has produced studies of *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland* (1965, 3rd edn 1988), of government, church and society in *The Kingdom of the Scots* (1973), and of feudalism in *The Anglo-Norman Era in Scottish History* (1980). English history figures in *Feudal Britain* (1956 and later edns) and in the earliest work he wrote, a history of the west Oxfordshire parishes of Langford and Kencot, due to appear in a future volume of the *Victoria History of the County of Oxford*. He was elected FBA in 1976, FRSE in 1977, and holds honorary degrees from the universities of Glasgow and Newcastle upon Tyne.

Professor Alison Brown taught history at Royal Holloway, University of London for 25 years or so. She was appointed Professor of Italian Renaissance History in 1998, being made an Emeritus Professor in London University on her retirement in 1999. Her books include a biography and an edition of the writings of a Chancellor of Florence from 1465 to 1497, *Bartolomeo Scala* (Princeton, 1979, Tempe, Az., 1997), and a volume of collected essays, *The Medici in Florence. The Language and Exercise of Power* (Florence and Perth, 1992). She edited a volume of essays, written from a variety of disciplines and points of view, that reevaluate the Burckhardtian model of the Renaissance, *Language and Images of Renaissance Italy*, (Oxford, 1992). She has recently produced a second edition of her Seminar Studies volume on *The Renaissance* (London, Longmans, 1999). She is at present engaged in a study of Lucretius in the Renaissance.

Dr Alex Murdoch is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Scottish History at the University of Edinburgh. He is a native of Philadelphia who was awarded his Ph.D. and the Dalziel prize in 1978 for a thesis published subsequently as *The People Above: Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Scotland* in 1980. He co-edited *New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland* in 1982 and has published many essays and articles, including two in *The Scottish Historical Review*, of which he is now book review editor. After training in the antiquarian book trade and working as a researcher in Scotland for the North Carolina Colonial Records Project's Scottish Records Program, he was appointed to a post in History and American Studies at what is now University College, Northampton in 1991, taking up his current post in 1995 after being awarded a research leave grant by the Humanities Research Board of the British Academy. He had also published *British History 1660-1832: National Identity and Local Culture* (Macmillan 1998).

Dr Michael J. Turner read Modern History at Oxford, gaining his BA in 1987 and his doctorate in 1991. He then spent a year as Postgraduate Fellow at the University of Rochester, New York, before beginning full-time lecturing. He has held posts in the history departments of several universities, including Sheffield and Hull, and was recently appointed as Senior Lecturer in Modern History at the University of Sunderland. Dr Turner was elected as Fellow of the Royal Historical Society in 1998. He has published articles on reform movements in Britain and America, one of which was awarded an international prize in 1997. He has also published two books, *Reform and Respectability. The Making of a Middle-Class Liberalism in Early Nineteenth Century Manchester* (Carnegie/Chetham Society, 1995), and *British Politics in an Age of Reform* (Manchester University Press, 1999). A third book, *The Age of Unease. Government and Reform in Britain, 1782-1832*, will be published by Sutton in the spring of 2000. Dr Turner is now working on a book entitled *Independent Radicalism in Early Victorian Britain*.

David Brown is a lecturer in American History in the Division of American Studies, University College, Northampton, having taught previously at The University of the West of England, Bristol. He is co-author of *The History Atlas of North America* (New York: Macmillan, 1998) which should shortly be available in a British edition. He has recently completed his Ph.D. at the University of Hull, successfully negotiating the viva in April, so will happily accept the title of Dr. in the Summer! The dissertation looked at issues of race, class, and the coming of the Civil War in the antebellum American South via the writing of the native North Carolinian Hinton Rowan Helper (1829-1909). He is currently working on a biography of Helper.

Professor John Crump is the Chair of Japanese Studies at the University of Stirling. His most recent books are *Hatta Shuzo and Pure Anarchism in Interwar Japan* (Macmillan, 1993) and *Hatta Shuzo to Nihon no Anakizumu* (Aoki Shoten, 1996). He is currently engaged in two research projects: a study of Japan-Scotland relations and a study of the role played by employers' federations within Japanese capitalism. He can be contacted at the School of Modern Languages: Japanese Studies, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA (fax: 01786-466088; email: j.d.crump@stir.ac.uk)

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Dr Francisco J. Romero Salvadó is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Modern History at London Guildhall University. His publications include *Twentieth Century Spain. Politics and Society, 1898-1998* (Macmillan, 1999) and *Spain 1914-18. Between War and Revolution* (Routledge, 1999). He is currently working on an analysis of Spain's political crisis and social conflict of the period 1917-23, and on a new book on the Spanish Civil War.

Dr Christopher Read is Reader in History at Warwick University. He has degrees from Keele and Glasgow Universities and from the London School of Economics. He has written widely on twentieth century Russian History including *From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and Their Revolution* (London 1996) and *The Making and Breaking of the Soviet System* (Macmillan, forthcoming, early 2001) which are of particular relevance to the current article. He has also taken part in the production of several *Warwick History Videos* designed to back up class room teaching, including *The Decline of Tsarism; Stalin* (with Alec Nove) and *The Second World War* distributed via Warwick University Bookshop.

Robert Mackay is Senior Lecturer in History at Nottingham Trent University and Associate Lecturer in the Open University. He has recently published *The Test of War: inside Britain, 1939-45* (UCL Press, 1999), and 'Safe and Sound: new music in wartime Britain', in N. Hayes & J. Hill, *Millions Like Us? British Culture and the Second World War* (Liverpool University Press, 1999). He is currently writing a book on civilian morale in Britain during the Second World War, to be published by Manchester University Press.

Editorial

ANDREW HUNT

For all different sorts of reasons, I didn't just stumble across the theme of the Year 2000's issue of the *Year Book*, it positively leapt up and demanded that it be covered. Some people suggested that there should be a "Millennium" edition; but I asked myself; would authors really want to write articles debating issues involved in the passage of philosophical time, could I find them if they did, and did I give a damn if they would?

No; a far more pressing need asserted itself; **History at Advanced Higher:** the time has come to target the highest level of secondary History teaching. The perfect score would, of course, have been to obtain 13 articles, one on every field of study. The fatness of this volume shows how close we have come to achieving that target. It contains ten highly relevant articles: sometimes a review article of the latest thoughts on many of the key issues to be discussed, or sometimes an article focusing on a single issue within a field of study. In only three fields (Roman Britain, Louis XIV and South Africa) could nothing be obtained. Seeking out something in those fields, is of course the challenge for 2001, when the *Year Book* theme will be Advanced Higher History; *The Sequel.*

The fact that SATH's *Year Book* has been successful in recruiting so many top authorities to write on exactly the topics that we examine at Advanced Higher, is a tribute to the name that SATH has gained as a respected spokesman of History teaching in Scotland. SATH is known as a provider of relevant and topical in-service at conferences, and the growing SATH membership is a ready sign of the value that History teachers place on the Association as a promoter of what goes on in their daily teaching. I raise this point because it now seems that History teachers are not the only ones to appreciate SATH's value. You may have recognised the additional logo on the front of this issue of the *Year Book*. Yes, SATH is proud to acknowledge that in addition to its teacher support, we have now, for this volume at least, received the official *imprimateur* of the HSDU. This volume has been produced with the financial support of the Higher Still Development Unit.

The HSDU's view was that SATH was doing exactly what it was generally trying to do in the first place: providing accessible materials for staff and pupils to up-date their teaching and learning for new courses. The sensible question was therefore, why should there be a wasteful duplication of effort? HSDU held the opinion that if the *Year Book* was going to be good and useful to SATH members teaching Advanced Higher, why should they alone be the ones to gain? .... instead, send it out to every secondary school in Scotland, and HSDU would sponsor the cost. Cynics may say that SATH has saved HSDU an awful lot of money, but that's not entering into the true spirit of the thing. That would be forgetting that no one is in a competition here; we're all labouring in the same vinyard. What on earth value would SATH gain by depriving any History teachers from access to all the great ideas in this volume just because they didn't happen to be SATH members? No, that's not SATH's style; if SATH had a mission statement on its publications it would not include the words, 'Only to be read by those who've paid the 18 quid a year'. So SATH is pleased to think that it has fulfilled its main function; to broaden its contribution to the promotion of Scottish History teaching, and, as a result, more people now know SATH's name and can see its works. We also know that the contributors are pleased that their thoughts are going to reach a wider audience than the original plan. SATH, on behalf of all Scottish History departments, extends its great and grateful thanks to all contributors for their concise and elegant offerings.

I suppose I had better accept that Editorials are, by their very nature, boring. Readers don't expect to be enlivened and invigorated by the Editorial, that's the job of the actual contributors. However, this *Year Book* has been a bit special and something of a departure from the normal run (not just because its size rivals the whopper edition of 1992!), so I hope readers have overcome the boredom threshold, heard me out, and can now appreciate why the Millennium theme got the thumbs down; in fact, it was never really in the running!

Scotland's experience of feudalism in the twelfth century

PROFESSOR GEOFFREY BARROW

As we all know, feudalism is a modern term, coined (in 1839) by an early sociologist to classify a type of pre-industrial society already identified in 1776 by the Scottish philosopher and 'father of economics', Adam Smith, as the 'feudal system'. Even as an adjective in English the word 'feudal' cannot be traced before the time of Henry Spelman the legal antiquarian (1639). In Scotland there was probably more awareness than in England of social structures and property relationships which could be described as 'feudal'. The reception of continental legal ideas and practices during the sixteenth century led to a familiarity among Scots lawyers with the *Libri Feudorum,* the collections on the law of property begun by Lombard jurists in the twelfth century and eventually incorporated into the body of Roman Law as taught in the universities and law-schools. Sir Thomas Craig (1538-1608) wrote a treatise on the land law of Scotland which he called simply *Jus Feudale,* 'feudal law'. The powerful attraction for Scots lawyers in the sixteenth century of the splendid neo-Roman legal edifice on the one hand and, on the other, their profound ignorance in regard to the twelfth- and thirteenth-century situation in their own country meant that they produced a property law which might indeed be described as a 'feudal system' but which bore little resemblance to what early medieval evidence allows us to envisage.

Not long ago, the debate about the English experience of feudalism turned on the question whether feudal ideas and practices had been growing gradually in the centuries before the Norman Conquest of 1066 or, on the contrary, 'came with the Conqueror', new and fully-fledged. Just as the proponents of the latter, 'cataclysmic change', theory had begun to relax under the impression that their opponents had fled the field, Susan Reynolds, in a volume of densely packed evidence and argument running to nearly 550 pages (*Fiefs and Vassals,* OUP, 1994) cut the Gordian knot of stubborn dispute by demonstrating that feudalism had never existed anywhere, at any time. 'The idea (Reynolds writes) of this development [i.e. the growth of 'feudal' relations from the early days of warrior kings and their war-bands to late medieval 'feudal' monarchies] derives ultimately from a small piece of conjectural history put forward in the early twelfth century by one of the Lombard lawyers whose little treatises were soon after combined into the *Libri Feudorum*'.

The Scottish historian, unlike his English counterpart, has never enjoyed the luxury of debate about the significance of 1066. Instead of having a substantial body of record material stretching back from the Conquest to the seventh century - some of it admittedly hard to interpret with certainty - to set beside the much larger body of less ambiguous evidence for the period 1066-1400 (or later), the student of Scottish feudalism possesses only a handful of uncertain indicators before c. 1100 and very little by way of hard evidence before the mid-twelfth century. Yet in some respects this evidence is clearer cut, less ambiguous, than its English counterpart. The Scottish kings and the barons and knights to whom they granted land in return for military service had not read Susan Reynolds. They dealt unhesitatingly in fiefs or feus (*feuda, feoda*), in knight service (*servitium militia)* or 'free service' as it was significantly known, in castle garrison service (*warda castri, custodia castellorum*), in such concepts as homage and fealty (*homagium,* later Scots *manret* or *manrent*; *fidelitas,* Scots *fewté;* and above all in heritable tenure in accordance with well-established rules (in feudo et hereditate, 'in fee and heritage').

Whether or not we call this feudalism we must recognise that we are dealing with power - its acquisition, retention and distribution. Where the kings were concerned, power was needed to protect the integrity of their kingdom, inherited from ancient times, to establish its frontiers, to naturalise linear ('father to son') succession in the royal dynasty, and to uphold justice among the lieges. Above all, for the five twelfth-century kings - three sons and two great-grandsons of Malcolm III Ceann-mór and St Margaret - there was the overriding motive of strengthening the Christian religion as they had been taught it and understood it. There was, unquestionably, a close link between the political and military structure erected by the twelfth-century kings and what were seen to be the needs of the Church and the Christian faithful.

If we ask why these rulers, impelled as they clearly were by religious zeal and fears of the Day of Judgement, brought into Scotland not only monks, canons and secular clergy but also lay men and women from England and the north-west European continent, we are still in the sphere of power. The crown depended on the loyal support of men trained in the most up-to-date forms of warfare. This involved the art of fighting on horseback, the use of swords, lances, shields, helmets and hauberks (coats of mail) of hitherto unknown types, the construction of 'motte-and-bailey' (or at least 'motte') castles and the breeding (in specially maintained studs) of *dextrarii*, 'destriers', horses capable of carrying an armoured warrior and unflinching in the face of hostile onslaught.

Hypothetically, Scotland's twelfth-century kings might have carried on in the manner of their eleventh- or even tenth-century forebears. Putting aside the thought that if they had done this their kingdom would almost certainly have been invaded and overwhelmed by an aggressive Norman or Angevin kingdom of England (as did in fact happen to much of Ireland in the period 1170-1245), we still have to admit that their programme for the Church and their desire for strong royal government, including linear succession, would not have been accomplished or satisfied. Of one thing we may be sure: the not-feudalism of the twelfth century was not the same as the not-feudalism of the eleventh.

The late R.A. Brown (founder of the well-known annual Battle Conference for Norman studies) argued that to satisfy the English historian's requirements for feudalism a society must have four features: the knight, or trained mounted soldier (with, naturally, his trained horse); the practice whereby one free man commended himself to another, to be his faithful vassal, offering military or knight service in return for protection and patronage ('vassalic commendation'); the *feudum* or fief, that is the estate, usually in land, sufficient to support the knight, his family and his household and to give him the income needed to pay for horses, weapons etc.; and finally (but in Allen Brown's opinion far from least important) the castle of earth and timber or of stone (or a mixture), serving simultaneously as a home and as a fortress.

No-one who has studied the Scottish evidence could deny that all four of these features can be found in the sources before the end of William the Lion's reign (1214), the knight, the fief and the castle in those terms, vassalic commendation appearing as *homagium* (homage).

Charter by King William the Lion to Philip of Seton, Winton and Others 1165-1189 for Knight service. Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland.

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Knights and fiefs become common in the sources from c. 1150, homage is not infrequently met with, but recorded castles are mostly royal, not 'private', until the end of the twelfth century. Nevertheless, actual castles or their still visible remains are still quite thick on the ground in many parts of Scotland. Most of these 'motte' structures consist of a simple earthen mound (originally surmounted by a strong timber tower) guarded by a deep ditch and bank, which would have been palisaded. In some cases, but rather rarely in Scotland, there was also an outer enclosure formed by a longer stretch of ditch and palisaded bank. This was the 'bailey', giving rise to the archaeologist's usual name for the type, 'motte-and-bailey castle'. The old French word for a mound, *motte* or *mothe*, passed into Scots as 'mote'. One of the best-preserved examples of such a castle in Scotland is the Mote of Urr in the Stewartry of Kirkcudbright, a large motte-and-bailey built towards the end of the twelfth century for the Somerset adventurer Walter of Berkley (Norman forerunner of the Scottish Barclays).

Mote of Urr in the Stewartry of Kircudbright.   Reproduced with the kind permission of The Royal Commission on The Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotand.

Fortified residences of this type were recognised as an exotic import from England. Had they been brought to Scotland before 1100 the Gaelic adjective *saxanach* (modern *sasunnach*) would have been applied to them. In fact, however, they attracted the Middle English adjective *ingles* or *inglis*. Thus Ardneil in West Kilbride (North Ayrshire), which had one of these newfangled structures, was called 'Yngles Ardnel', while the motte castle at Eassie in Angus was known as 'Ingliscasteltoun'. More commonly, however, settlements with motte (or motte-and-bailey) castles, distributed widely from Galloway to Inverness, were simply named 'inglestun', producing either Ingleston or Ingliston as the modern form. For something like a century and a half, it seems to have been normal for a man of knight's (or often of baron's) rank to own a fortified residence of this simple, far from luxurious, kind. Such men, with their motte castles, their knights' fees held heritably of the king, their participation in military campaigns and their prominent role in local government, were the direct precursors of the class of lairds who formed the core and essence of Scottish political society from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century.

Before the death of King David I in 1153 much of southern Scotland, except for Carrick, Nithsdale and Galloway, had been formed into lordships held of the crown on feudal terms. The south west was left under the control of its native lords. Although we may be sure that society there was organized in a kin-based system, we are ignorant of how lordship was graded, exercised, partitioned or inherited. Much the same would be true of most of the highlands. When fundamental changes came to Moray and Galloway they came in the wake of serious warfare - Moray taken over by the crown after the defeat and death of its last *mórmaer,* Angus son of King Lulach's daughter, in 1130, Galloway partitioned by feudatories after Alexander II's savage campaigns in the 1230s.

Even though the crown retained a good deal of land and lordship in its own hands, the capacity of David I and his grandsons Malcolm IV and William I to dispose of real estate to dependents and followers thenceforward bound to the king by feudal ties was altogether remarkable. Malcolm distributed the middle and upper wards of Clydesdale to, as he put it, 'my barons and knights', while William granted fiefs liberally in Gowrie, Angus and the Mearns. From the beginning of this process of settlement adventurers would come from far afield. One of the earliest knights to be reported as operating in Scotland was an Englishman from Hampshire, Robert son of Godwine, whose father had championed the cause of Edgar the Atheling, St Margaret's brother and theoretically pretender to the English throne. Robert took up arms in the fight which the Atheling's nephew King Edgar was waging against his uncle Domnall Bán (1097-8). One of the first things we hear of Robert doing after King Edgar had rewarded him with land in Lothian was building a castle - unfortunately we are not told where. Another knight early on the scene was also called Robert, probably from a small village near Dijon in Burgundy. He was given Lochore in west Fife, where his descendants were prominent for two centuries. It is safe to assume that building a castle was high on this second Robert's list of priorities, probably in the reign of Edgar (died 1107) or his brother, Alexander I.

If we are not to describe what happened in twelfth-century Scotland as the introduction of feudalism it becomes hard, perhaps impossible, to explain the fact that between the reign of David I and the first war of independence (1124-1328), two quite distinct systems of defence and army service existed. One looks ancient: it was called 'Scottish service', 'Scottish army' or 'common army'. It seems to have involved all able-bodied males, no doubt between certain ages. In some cases it might be commuted to supplies of food for those on active service, and this service was performed on foot. Scottish service was contrasted with 'free service' which suggests that it was demanded of all classes including the unfree. It was due not from fiefs but from the land assessment unit which was standard for any particular region, e.g. davoch, ploughgate, pennyland etc. Knights and mounted serjeants (only slightly less well equipped and trained than knights) were exempt from Scottish service as long as they performed their own superior service, due explicitly in respect of the fiefs they held.

In Alexander III's reign, Henry laird of Nevay in Angus declared that his father had long ago explained how service due from part of his estate would be performed whenever it happened that the army of knights (*exercitus militaris)* and Scottish army (*exercitus Scoticanus*) operated in the king's service together or separately. About the same time the knight Gilbert of Cleish (Kinross), giving land to his nephew John of Pitliver, stipulated that if John did not accompany him when the national army was summoned, he must perform the 'forinsec' (i.e. Scottish) service due from his land (probably in

money). But if John rode off on his own horse with his uncle, to help him perform his knight service, he would be exempt from forinsec service and his uncle would pay his expenses.

Matters were no doubt simpler in the days of Alexander I and David I, when there had not been any opportunity for the variety of individual private bargains which must have proliferated during the thirteenth century. But the dichotomy of 'knightly army' and 'Scottish (or common) army' was fundamental from the early twelfth century to 1286. This dichotomy was due to the crown's insistence on power, power to defend the realm and to exercise decisive control over the lieges, great and small. The methods adopted - not, of course, peculiar to Scotland nor originating there - involved the castle, the knight, the fief, homage and heritable succession.

A long line of historians, including a substantial number who have looked at the Scottish evidence, have thought it reasonable to classify the phenomenon, briefly summarized here, as 'feudalism' or the 'feudal system'. On the basis of written evidence, supported as it is by a considerable quantity of physical evidence, it would not be easy, as far as Scotland is concerned, to find any terms which would be more appropriate or convenient. The ethos of the society so described could hardly be better epitomised than in a document of 1166 which, although it comes from south Northumberland, may safely be taken to represent the attitude of scores or even hundreds of Scottish tenants in chief. It is a letter sent to King Henry II by the lord of Gosforth in reply to an enquiry into the extent and nature of the service owed to the crown by the king's tenants throughout England.

To his revered lord Henry king of the English, William son of Siward sends greetings.

Your command, promulgated throughout England, has come to me, as to others, by your sheriff of Northumberland, that we should inform you of our fee and the tenure which we hold of you. Therefore I notify you by this letter that I hold of you a certain village named Gosforth and half of another called Middleton, for the fee and service of one knight. I perform this service faithfully to you, as my ancestors did to your ancestors, and I have enfeoffed no-one with the estate but hold it in my own demesne.

Teaching the Renaissance

PROFESSOR ALISON BROWN

I retired from university teaching in the autumn, having recently completed a revised edition of *The Renaissance* for the Seminar Studies series. So thinking about the Renaissance and how to teach it was the last thing I wanted to spend my first 'free' Christmas doing. However, I have to admit that my appetite had been whetted by a series of exhibitions of Renaissance art. There was 'Florence in the 1470s', an exciting exhibition organised by Patricia Rubin and Alison Wright at the National Gallery in London. By confining itself to the first ten years of Lorenzo de' Medici's exercise of power and concentrating on the workshop of one artist, Andrea Verrocchio, it was able to show how an amazingly creative period of art arose from a combination of political and artistic stimuli – the ideal context for discussing patronage and the relationship between 'art and power' that are central to the problem of the Renaissance today.

Another exhibition, organised by Carol Plazzotta and also in the National Gallery, centred on the topically millennial painting by Botticelli, *The Mystic Nativity.* This painting, with its strange apocalyptic message written above the stable in Greek, raises some of the same questions, as well as different ones – to do with the subject matter of paintings, who chooses it, and does the precise historical and religious context of paintings matter to understanding and enjoying them. At the same time, Professor Richard Goldthwaite, author of *Wealth and the Demand for Art in Italy, 1300-1500* (Baltimore, 1993) came through London to raise another set of questions to do with consumerism and the economic basis of the Renaissance. Renaissance economic man was *almost* a modern capitalist and consumer, he suggested, but not quite, because the market was still led by supply rather than demand.

So instead of being glad I was no longer teaching, I began to regret I no longer had any students to take round the exhibitions and to the talks – which I know they would have

'The Mystic Nativity'. Reproduced with kind permission of the Trustees of the National Gallery.

enjoyed, both aesthetically and critically. Last year when I visited the National Gallery with them, I was surprised to find they all responded much more enthusiastically to the fifteenth century Burgundian paintings than to the Italian, and especially the Florentine ones, which they found cold and intellectual. What, I wondered, would they have made of 'Florence in the 1470s' and *The Mystic Nativity* in its millennial context?

The Renaissance is as good a subject as any for teaching all the modern revisionist approaches that supposedly mark the jump from school to university. And what better way to understand these approaches, not from text books of Marxist theory and literary criticism, but from the artistic achievement of Renaissance artists themselves. This, at least, is a firm starting point.

We are so familiar with the concept of consumerism that we don't perhaps think of it as a new approach to the Renaissance. One way of discovering what is really new is to see whose hackles rise highest when they read about it. In the case of Richard Goldthwaite's path-breaking book, it was Nicholas Penny, one of the curators in the National Gallery, who was shocked by the way it talked about altar-pieces and their paintings as part of the 'liturgical apparatus' of the church. By 'liturgical apparatus', Goldthwaite meant the objects needed by the clergy to perform their liturgical function — 'reliquaries and monstrances; utensils, such as chalices, patens, caskets, pyxes, candlesticks, bells, ewers, cruets, ladles, cloths, and holy books; furnishings, such as altars, thrones and lecterns; the accessories of the participants, such as ... umbrellas, fans ....', the list goes on. Luxury was involved because they were all symbols of power, 'designed to command reverence and obedience.' Panel paintings became fashionable from the thirteenth century onwards – when the reform movement that rebuilt and enlarged churches reached 'boom proportions' – so they too became part of the boom.

There was one specially interesting object in the 'Florence in the 1470s' exhibition, a panel from a set of liturgical vestments commissioned from the Merchants' guild for use in the Baptistery on major feast days (illustrated in the catalogue, *Renaissance Florence*, eds. P. Rubin and A. Wright, Yale U. P. for the National Gallery, 1999, no. 48). The vestments were designed by Antonio Pollaiuolo, one of the leading artists of the day, and according to Vasari they took 26 years to make – not only was the investment and devotion of the guild 'extraordinary' in commissioning such a magnificent piece of work but so were the perspective skills of the designer and the executive skills of the weavers and embroiderers. So they illustrate the sort of consumerism that Goldthwaite describes, as well as the more intangible virtuosity of the artists and artisans who designed and made it.

Three years after Goldthwaite's book was published, Lisa Jardine wrote a more popular version of the same thesis, *Worldly Goods. A New History of the Renaissance* (London, Macmillan, 1996), which argued that 'goods in profusion' was the necessary precondition of change. A year later Anthony Grafton reminded us, in his *Commerce with the Classics* (Ann Arbor, Michigan U.P. 1997), that commerce can also mean communication, or dealings, with someone and that it was used by humanists to mean the exchange of ideas between one mind and another. So it can also be used to describe the intellectual dimension of the Renaissance, not simply its material one – as Paula Findlen does in her *Possessing Nature. Museums, Collecting and Scientific Culture in Early Modern Italy* (Los Angeles, California U.P. 1994), or Dora Thornton in *The Scholar and his Study* (London, Yale U.P. 1997). And the same is true of another recent book on Renaissance consumerism, Jerry Brotton's *Trading Territories* (London, Reaktion, 1997), which uses material objects, Renaissance maps, as a means of mapping the intellectual as well as the political and economic interests of the early modern world.

The appeal of this approach is that it integrates two other models of explanation that were threatening to marginalise the intellectual dimension of the Renaissance, the so-called Marxist and Mentalities paradigms. Emphasis on history 'from below' and traditional mental outlooks provided a useful corrective to the elitism of Renaissance studies that concentrated on the ideas of a few outstanding individuals. It has helped to produce books like T. and E. Cohen's *Words and Deeds in Renaissance Rome. Trials before the Papal Magistrates* (Toronto, U. P. 1993), Robert Davis's *The War of the Fists. Popular Culture and Public Violence in Late Renaissance Venice* (Oxford, U.P. 1994), or Edward Muir's *Mad Blood Stirring. Vendetta in Renaissance Italy* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1993), all of which describe the social practices of ordinary people during the Renaissance period. Consumerism, too, was not limited to an intellectual elite but trickled down to involve quite modest workers and

artisans in the buying process, so the new emphasis on consumerism and the 'circulation' of goods and ideas has also helped to widen the scope of Renaissance culture, without limiting it to a purely oral or non-literary culture. Moreover, whereas Marxism assumed that both goods and ideas were produced for the advantage of one class at the expense of the other – the patron at the expense of the client – circulation suggests that the diffusion of this culture was a two-way process between buyers and sellers, or between writers and readers.

This in turn may affect our ideas about patronage, which for some time has dominated the Renaissance debate. The assumption that Renaissance patronage reflected the ideas and interests of the patron rather than the artist encouraged the notion of 'art as power.' In other words, patronage was used by the patron to promote his own ideas and values as a form of cultural imperialism, whether he was an individual like Cosimo or Lorenzo de' Medici, or an institution like the Church or a city commune. But in a market economy, it is the buyer who dominates the market, not the seller. Goldthwaite held back from saying that the art-market was demand-led in the Renaissance, but the growing evidence of paintings sold openly in markets instead of by commission suggests that change was on the way.

If there are advantages in discussing the Renaissance as the result of consumerism, there are also limitations too. Although historians have been slow to talk about art as propaganda, it is difficult to deny that much art does have the function of promoting the power of its patrons. Church paintings teach Christian doctrine and (in the case of the Sistine Chapel) the primacy of the Papacy; communal palaces (like the Room of the Nine in Siena) teach civic virtues and obedience; princely palaces (like the Gonzaga palace in Mantua) use imperial symbols and paintings of Caesar to raise the status of their *condottieri* owners. An example of this type of cultural imperialism in the Florence exhibition was Lorenzo de' Medici's jasper two-handled cup, or his cameo of Noah and his family *(Renaissance Florence*, nos. 5 and 6). Both were thought to be ancient, and by stamping them with his name, 'Laur.Med.' Lorenzo may have been claiming antiquity for himself by association.

Cameo of Noah and his family.
Reproduced with kind permission of the Trustees of the British Museum.

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Much more obvious is Bertoldo's medal commemorating the murder of Lorenzo's brother Giuliano in the cathedral on Easter Day, 1478 (no.2). By portraying the murder of Giuliano on the reverse and Lorenzo's escape from the assassins on the obverse, with inscriptions describing the brothers respectively as the source of 'Public Grief' and 'Public Safety', they clearly identify them with Florence's own salvation, its republican heroes and not, as the pope claimed, tyrannical usurpers of its freedom. As the French historian Roger Chartier says in the introduction to his *Cultural History* (Oxford, Polity, 1988), all such 'systems of representation', both written and visual, carry overtones of power – especially if they are engendered by official institutions, which are never neutral.

Bertoldo: the Pazzi Conspiracy Medal.
Reproduced with kind permission of the Trustees of the National Gallery.

The idea of representation is in turn closely related to the idea of plays and the theatre *(rappresentazione* is the Italian word for a play), which is another good way of entering the debate about power and representation in the Renaissance. The theatre, like the medals discussed above, usefully integrates two aspects of the Renaissance that are often discussed separately, art and language, since in plays visual and written images are equally important. Stephen Greenblatt has eloquently described the Renaissance theatre as the place where the charge of energy created by a work of art was transmitted by the players to the audience and back – suggesting that it too, like Renaissance commerce, is an interactive and circulatory process. But far from being an open two-way process of exchange, the Renaissance theatre was also used to exercise power by illusion, manipulating the audience by masks (masques) and deception. Are these two ways of describing the theatre as both interactive and as a means of exercising power compatible? And is it possible to talk about Renaissance art both as part of a consumer boom and as cultural imperialism, one freely circulating ideas within an open market, the other imposing them on its audience?

Although historians tend to favour one model of explanation or paradigm at a time – hence the current vogue for writing books about consumerism after a previous trend favouring *Art and Power* (by Roy Strong, Woodbridge, Boydell, 1973, repr. 1984) or Evelyn Welch's *Art and Authority in Renaissance Milan* (London, Yale U.P., 1995) – they are clearly not mutually exclusive. Whoever produces them and whatever their motives, once produced, objects can have a life and meaning of their own, whether they are paintings or books appropriated by 'rebellious and vagabond' readers who, like nomads or third-world travellers, poach their way across fields they did not write (in the words of Roger Chartier, quoting de Certeau, *The Order of Books*, Stanford, California U.P. 1984).

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But the question of patronage and production remains relevant. The French historian Michel de Certeau, referred to above, combined his interest in predatory readers with an interest in the wider social and cultural context of new ways of thinking which I find very relevant to the Renaissance. As I wrote in the introduction to my revised *Renaissance* (p.4), de Certeau explained an important theological shift that took place between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries in terms of social and economic change – 'the break-up of old social networks and the growth of a new specialised elite ("and new conceptual models to make it thinkable"), which in turn helped to marginalise those excluded from it.' What the Church did was to attempt to regain control by employing new visual and verbal techniques such as 'the monstrance' or display of the Host, processions, exorcisms and targeted sermons. This new emphasis on visual and rhetorical techniques was surely what also helped to produce Renaissance art and oratory, which were employed by secular elites in cities for the same purpose of control – though in their case the conceptual model was classical, Roman art and architecture and the persuasive language of Ciceronian rhetoric.

These were some of the questions I was thinking about when I revised my Seminar Studies book, influenced by new trends and the way they relate to earlier models of explanation. They won't in themselves make the Renaissance more accessible to students or provide a new way of teaching it. But by giving renewed importance to Renaissance artefacts, they do bring the period alive – as I experienced from the exhibitions I began by describing. Nor is it only paintings and objects that convey the novelty and excitement of the period. So do the writings of ordinary Renaissance people, when they describe their passion for books, their love of Ovid 'as a kind of door and teacher', their admiration for Brunelleschi's immense dome, 'broad enough to cover all the people of Tuscany with its shadow.' Or when they describe their excitement over re-discovered texts like Lucretius's *On nature of things*, ancient statues and the paintings in Nero's *Golden House*, and over genuinely new discoveries, like gunpowder, printing and the 'new-found' lands in America. Thanks to the new invention of printing, news of Christopher Columbus's discovery of America was produced in four different printing centres within a matter of months, and in Florence a priest translated it into Italian verse to be sung in town squares. This poem, like the newsy letters of Alessandra Strozzi, or the memoirs of merchants like Buonaccorso Pitti and Gregorio Dati, are all now available in translation for us to use 'as a kind of door and teacher' to the world of Renaissance people, women as well as men. This is surely the best way of introducing students to the wider historical and historiographical issues I have been brooding on, to do with consumption, patronage and where power lies.

This is why I began by describing the material objects in the recent Renaissance exhibitions. Consumption is something we can all identify with, and although it doesn't satisfy me as a total explanation of the Renaissance, it provides a good starting point for discussing the movement as a whole. And because the Renaissance is a wide and interdisciplinary subject, it also offers great scope for understanding the links between politics, religion, economics and culture, valid not just for this period but for other periods as well. One of the most difficult tasks I have faced as a historian is disabusing young 'beginning' students of their uncritical enthusiasm for 'The Renaissance' – which arises like Botticelli's Venus to rescue us from the gloom and doom of the Dark Ages – without destroying their love for the period. Perhaps consumption is the answer. Through beautiful Renaissance artefacts, can we encourage them both to love the period and to be critical of the baggage it brings with it – including competing models of explanation?

Enlightenment and its discontents:
Scotland in the eighteenth century

DR ALEX MURDOCH

Many years ago John M. Simpson wrote, to the bemusement of subsequent students, that 'perhaps the ultimate historian of early eighteenth-century Scottish politics will require to be a Mozart, and his work a *Così fan tutte*.'[1] Twenty-five years later I took the opportunity of asking him what he had meant. John replied that just as in Mozart's opera nothing is but what is not, so in eighteenth-century Scotland one is confronted with a history of modernisation and Enlightenment culture in the midst of a still feudal society dominated by the politics of Jacobitism and Whig political management, two worlds inhabiting the same space but incorporating a completely different set of preconceptions. Another teacher I encountered as a student described eighteenth-century Britain as a silk stocking full of mud, the glitter and aspirations of Enlightenment culture and commercial wealth obscuring the poverty and struggle for subsistence which still characterised the lives of the majority of the population. I think that we continue to face these contrasts and difficulties in assessing the legacy of the eighteenth century in Scotland at the end of the twentieth century, with seemingly limitless interest in Scottish Jacobitism and equally limitless references to the achievements of a Scottish Enlightenment that attracts more attention from students outwith Scotland than those within it.[2]

The most difficult aspect of this, to me, is the problem of how to make the history of Scottish politics after the Union appear as anything other than obscure or grubby domination by a corrupt clique of feudal landowners. There are those who would respond to this by stating that this is just what that history represents, semi-colonial domination under a native regime of Scottish landowners shamelessly on the make within an expanding British empire.[3] On the other hand, I have been associated with efforts to relate that political history to the changing nature of the country over the course of the eighteenth century as its economy modernised, its population grew, and its international reputation ceased to be based on the violence of its mercenary soldiers and the exceptional zeal of its presbyterian kirk, and became identified instead with the cultural achievements which made Scotland world famous in science, education and literature.[4] The term, Scottish Enlightenment, is a modern invention, but the eminence of Scots in the cosmopolitan culture of the European Enlightenment was not. Related to this problem is the question of how to study the history and culture of the landed elite of eighteenth century Scotland when so much of subsequent Scottish political history has been dominated by the struggle to overthrow the feudal authority of a class benefiting from what is still the most conservative system of land law in Europe. Yet the villains in the struggles of Gladstonian Liberals and twentieth-century Scottish socialists were at the centre of the modernisation of the country during the eighteenth century, and never experienced significant opposition to their authority for a century and a half. Indeed, their ability to raise private armies during the first half of the eighteenth century made Jacobitism uniquely associated with Scotland when its foundations in 1688 suggested that it would be Ireland, not Scotland, that would prove central to the Jacobite cause. As Allan Macinnes has emphasised, however, the traditional stereotypes of atavistic Jacobite versus forward-looking modernising Hanoverian Whig just cannot be sustained by the evidence.[5] Jacobites were agrarian improvers too.

We have now a literature from which it is possible to construct a political history of eighteenth-century Scotland, although there is evidence that readership of this literature has been small and its influence limited.[6] I have contributed to it, and my reading of it is positive. Scotland did not lose its sovereignty through the Treaty of Union, but it did lose an institution which might have made Scotland's remaining political and legal institutions more accountable and better able to reflect the dramatic social and economic changes which would overtake most of the country by the end of the eighteenth century. The history of the survival of Scottish political autonomy is not a democratic history, however, and when ideas of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness began to circulate amongst an ever-increasing proportion of the population, traditional Scottish institutions became

associated with the ruthless attempts of the traditional landed elite to preserve their own power and privilege in Scottish society.[7] By the end of the century the book which altered the political outlook of most Scots was written by an Englishman forever associated with the American and French Revolutions, Tom Paine's *Rights of Man*, rather than the great works of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* or Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*.

Yet this was a landowning elite whose minds had been captured by Enlightenment values of science, learning, tolerance and public responsibility which by the end of the century were no longer their exclusive intellectual property. Part of the challenge to the privileges of Scottish feudal society at the end of the eighteenth century consisted of a desire by ever-increasing numbers of men and women in Scottish society for access to the benefits and privileges of Enlightenment culture.[8] This may be the way forward in teaching the history of the Enlightenment in Scotland, moving away from more abstract aspects of the history of ideas in relation to Hume and Smith, and more towards study of the means whereby increasing access to printed literature in particular, and education in general, by more people in all classes of Scottish society brought Enlightenment ideas into the lives of the majority of the population. The most exciting recent research on the Scottish Enlightenment has related to its material culture and the use of leisure, as rising levels of wealth gave more people access to participation in the Enlightenment.[9] Yet in many ways the most brilliant research on the Enlightenment in Scotland published in the last ten years has related to its impact on the changing nature of Scottish identity and the significance of Scottish history for eighteenth-century Scots.[10]

The Scottish Enlightenment was an Enlightenment of an expanding middle class in the equally expanding urban areas of Scotland. It was an Enlightenment in which by the end of the eighteenth century women began to aspire to full equality within the republic of letters a full century before they acquired any formal status and the right to participate in Scottish politics and law.[11] It was not a secular Enlightenment, which is part of why an overwhelmingly secular Scottish society at the end of the twentieth century finds it difficult to engage fully with the legacy of Scotland's cultural achievements in the eighteenth century. Yet the Scottish Enlightenment produced many of the ideas in science and the social sciences that would contribute to the ideas that would contribute to the development of modern secular European society.[12] It did not contribute to the ideas on which European nationalism in the nineteenth century based itself – the rights of nations to self-determination – partly because at the centre of the Scottish Enlightenment was a willingness to let go of some sovereignty in search of the wealth and stability its leaders believed characterised a modern society. The Scottish Enlightenment was inherently elitist, no one can deny that, but its elitism was built on the idea of professional achievement rather than inherited privilege, and an increase of wealth (although not necessarily political status) for all members of Scottish society, rather than a determination to resist change in defence of the wealth and status inherited by the elite.[13]

That elite opposed political revolution, but the Enlightenment taught it to embrace social and economic revolution – the agricultural revolution, transportation revolution and industrial revolution so prominent in the traditional text books. By doing so they might have created a Frankenstein that destroyed them, as T.C. Smout has claimed, but certainly made it possible for large numbers of working people to leave the land, to earn an income independent of landowners through textile manufacture in particular, and to migrate within and without Scotland in search of a higher standard of living for themselves and their families.[14] Part of Smout's influence as a historian of Scotland has been his success in writing with tangible excitement of a Scottish 'people' embracing social and economic change during the eighteenth century. Subsequent work by Tom Devine and Chris Whatley built on this achievement, making available a rich literature analysing the pace and nature of social and economic development in eighteenth-century Scotland.[15] We now have published work on many aspects of the Scottish economy during the eighteenth century, from the tobacco trade to coal and salt production, and from fundamental reorganisation of agriculture to the development of textile manufactures. The latter in particular created the employment that made it possible for people to leave the land and thus helped to ensure that Scotland did not experience the demographic collapse that Ireland experienced in the nineteenth century.

Devine and Whatley have been less ready to make the connection between political union and

social and economic change than were historians of Smout's generation. They have been concerned to write the history of a Scottish economy rather than a British economy of which Scotland was a part. They have contributed to a history in which Scotland and the Scots were active and creative participants in social and economic change rather than passive recipients of social and economic benefits as a result of political and economic union. The approach has been industry/trade led rather than regional or local within a Scottish framework, and has not been characterised by discussion of the British context of the Scottish economy. This is partly a result of the nature of the sources. The Scottish customs and excise authorities gathered tax within Scotland on a nationwide 'Scottish' basis before remitting revenue and documentation to London, but Scottish trade with England and Wales was conducted within a British common market and thus free of the supervision and documentation so useful to historians of foreign trade and domestic manufacture. Nevertheless, this can create a misleading image of an autonomous national Scottish economy when of course nothing of the sort existed.[16] It was the access to wider markets through the Union that brought Scotland and the Scots into more and more contact not only with England and Ireland, but also the West Indies, North America and India, in a way that we do not yet fully understand. For example, Devine's excellent book, *The Tobacco Lords*, contains only two references to slavery, the source of labour that produced the commodity whose re-export to European markets via Glasgow produced so much wealth for Scotland.[17] This insular approach is beginning to change, partly under the influence of Devine himself at the new Research Centre of Irish and Scottish Studies at the University of Aberdeen, where the emphasis is on the Scottish diaspora overseas and the effect of access to overseas empire on Scottish development during the eighteenth century and beyond.

The most important part of the Scottish economy in the eighteenth century was agriculture, which even at the end of the century was the largest employer and largest creator of wealth. It was also pursued nationally and of course internationally (in the sense that it was part of the economy of every country) in a way that the tobacco trade or even textile manufacture were not. Yet the almost infinite variation in the pattern of estate agriculture requires research on a local as well as national basis. The folk memory of lowland clearances does not form a part of Scottish history as do the Highland clearances, but that central fact emphasises the importance of a local and regional approach to the most fundamental aspect of Scottish economic development during the eighteenth century. Each estate had its different history, and because of the nature of archival survival, it is inevitable that we will know most about agrarian change on the largest estates.[18] Research in the future using the Sheriff Court records in the National Archives of Scotland might enable us to learn more about those parts of Scotland not dominated by large landowners and about small landowners and tenant farmers living in localities dominated by big estates. Whether they will enable us to learn more about the overwhelming majority of the population who were cottars in the farmtouns with no more than customary right to residence on the land remains to be seen, but this much is clear; agrarian change in Scotland during the eighteenth century was about moving people around rather than getting rid of them, in the highlands as well as the lowlands. Urbanisation was increasing in eighteenth century Scotland, and Devine's work emphasises the rapidity with which this occurred at the very end of the century, but Scotland was very much a rural country to the end of the eighteenth century and beyond.[19]

One area neglected in the study of eighteenth century Scotland has been the effect of war on the country, which was as distinctive in a Scottish context within a British state as was Scottish economic activity within a British free market. Scotland may have acquired worldwide reputation by the end of the eighteenth century as a centre of cultural achievement, but it remained a major source of soldiers, the services of whom increasingly came to be monopolised by the British state. The Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745 were carried out because large numbers of men, particularly in the highlands, continued to have access to arms.[20] They also resulted in significant numbers of men entering the services of France after the failures of the rebellions, although the French regiment Cameron of Lochiel received as his reward after the failure of the Forty-five appears to have consisted of Frenchmen officered by Scots.[21] Linda Colley's influential study of the creation of British identity in the eighteenth century has emphasised the importance of war in creating that identity.[22] Scottish regiments came to be increasingly associated with British wars, not only through Highland regiments but also through regiments recruited elsewhere in Scotland. There is an opportunity now to transcend the traditional

perception of the Scottish military through regimental history by turning our attention to the social history of military recruitment in Scotland during the eighteenth century, including the disproportionate use of Scottish regiments in the British attempt to retain its American colonies that led Thomas Jefferson to write in his first draft of the Declaration of Independence that one sign of the despotic nature of the British king was his willingness to send 'Scotch and other foreign mercenaries' against his American subjects.[23] The last decade of the eighteenth century was characterised by accelerated recruitment of men all over Scotland for the navy as well as the army, for home defence as well as overseas service.[24] Was this a sign of increasing patriotism, as Colley has claimed for Britain as a whole, or was it as widely resisted as other have implied?[25]

Despite the plethora of recent publications on Scottish Jacobitism and the insatiable curiosity it arouses among so many people, we have no serious study of the end of the significance of Jacobitism in Scotland during the eighteenth century and the question of why it was a cause that led so many to risk so much in 1745 and 1746, but which attracted no support at all during the war with France from 1756 to 1763 and even less so in the remainder of the century. With France at war with Britain from 1744 to 1748, the Jacobite rebellion in Scotland became a vital means of diverting British resources away from America and the continent at the height of the war. By 1759 many Jacobite soldiers who had survived Culloden in 1746 were fighting with Montgomery's and Fraser's highlanders in South Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania and Quebec. One of the brothers of the famous Jacobite general Lord George Murray became the first British governor of Quebec after leading the Black Watch there, although he had remained loyal himself fifteen years previously. Fraser's highlanders were commanded by the very son Lord Lovat sent 'out' at the head of his clan in the Forty-five, who became a general as a result of his efforts with his British regiment of highlanders when war with France resumed, and lived to raise another regiment on the Lovat estates to fight in America in 1776.[26]

Highland history is thus not peripheral to the history of Scotland during the eighteenth century but central to it. It is not a history of clearance but a history of agrarian improvement that appeared to be part of, rather than separate from, the economic development of the rest of Scotland. It was only in the nineteenth century that the idea of the Highlands as a natural wilderness incapable of supporting a large population emerged, although even at the end of the eighteenth century the government, encouraged by Henry Dundas, perceived its importance to be as a source of soldiers rather than economic wealth on a significant scale. Government after government throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, therefore, sought to prevent emigration rather than encourage it.[27]

New perspectives on Scottish History during the eighteenth century published in the last decade thus incorporate not only the social and economic history of a modernising economy, but the preservation of a distinctive political and social culture that gave rise to a genuinely Scottish Enlightenment based not on ethnic identity, but a concern with civil society. It was a civil society that at its best focused across emerging class divisions on the question of how to generate increasing wealth for all members of Scottish society and at the same time bring about the political and social stability necessary to encourage the population of Scotland to shift its concerns from sectarian disputation and martial valour to economic and cultural achievement in the world at large.[28] Of course this vision was overtaken by an accelerating pace of economic and social change by the end of the century that served as a prelude to a devastating postwar depression after 1815, but all over the world Scotland is still known for its early efforts to come to terms with the problems of the need to modernise a traditional society without sacrificing its cultural identity. This was not a problem unique to Scottish society in the eighteenth century, but the Scots were one of the earliest societies in Europe and the world to face it.

NOTES

1   John M. Simpson, 'Who Steered the Gravy Train, 1707-1766?' in N.T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison, eds., *Scotland in the Age of Improvement* (1970, reprinted 1996), p.48.

2   Murray Pittock, *The Myth of the Jacobite Clans* (1995); M. Pittock, *Jacobitism* (1998); Richard Sher and Jeffrey Smitten, eds., *Scotland and America in the Age of Enlightenment* (1990); T.M. Devine and J.R. Young, eds., *Eighteenth Century Scotland: New Perspectives* (1999); see the website of the Eighteenth-Century Scottish Studies Society at <www.angelo.edu/~ecsss/>

3   John Stuart Shaw, *The Political History of Eighteenth Century Scotland* (1999).

4   John Dwyer, Roger A. Mason and Alexander Murdoch, eds., *New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland* [1982].

5   Allan Macinnes, *Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788* (1996), chapters 6-8.

6   Alex Murdoch, 'Management or Semi-Independence? The Government of Scotland from 1707-1832', Institute for Historical Research, University of London, Electronic Seminars in History <http://ihr.sas.ac.uk/ihr/esh/manage.html>

7   John Brims, 'The Scottish Democratic Movement in the Age of the French Revolution' (Edinburgh University Ph.D. thesis 1983); and his published articles cited in E.W. McFarland, *Ireland and Scotland in the Age of Revolution* (1994).

8   Alex Murdoch and Richard Sher, 'Literary and Learned Culture' in T.M. Devine and R. Mitchison, eds., *People and Society in Scotland, Volume I: 1760-1830* (1988); A. Murdoch, *British History 1660-1832* (1998), chapter 7; Dror Wahrman, *Imagining the Middle Class* (1995).

9   Stana Nenadic, 'Middle-Rank Consumers and Domestic Culture in Edinburgh and Glasgow, 1720-1840', *Past and Present*, 145 (1994); S. Nenadic, 'Print Collecting and Popular Culture in Eighteenth-Century Scotland', *History*, 82 (1997); S. Nenadic, 'The Enlightenment in Scotland and the Popular Passion for Portraits', *British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 21 (1998).

10   Colin Kidd, *Subverting Scotland's Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689-c.1830* (1993); Colin Kidd, *British Identities Before Nationalism* (1999).

11   Elizabeth Sanderson, *Women and Work in Eighteenth-Century Edinburgh* (1996) may lead to different conclusions, but read it with John Dwyer, *Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland* (1987) and J. Dwyer, *The Age of the Passions: An Interpretation of Adam Smith and Scottish Enlightenment Culture* (1998).

12   Christopher J. Berry, *Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment* (1997); Alexander Broadie, ed., *The Scottish Enlightenment: An Anthology* (1997); John Robertson, 'The Scottish Contribution to the Enlightenment', Institute for Historical Research, University of London, Electronic Seminars in History <http://ihr.sas.ac.uk/ihr.esh/scot.html>

13   Berry, *Social Theory*; Michael Ignatieff, 'Smith, Rousseau and the Republic of Needs' in T.C. Smout, ed., *Scotland and Europe 1200-1850* (1986); Nicholas Phillipson, 'The Scottish Enlightenment' in Roy Porter and M. Teich, eds., *The Enlightenment in National Context* (1981).

14   T.C. Smout, 'Scottish Landowners and Economic Growth 1650-1850', *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, 11 (1964).

15   Although this work is reflected in the relevant chapters in Tom Devine, *The Scottish Nation* (1999), his pattern of research can be accessed in more detail in T.M. Devine, *Exploring the Scottish Past: Themes in the History of Scottish Society* (1995). Christopher A. Whatley, *The Industrial Revolution in Scotland* (1997) and forthcoming work.

16   Maxine Berg, *The Age of Manufactures 1700-1820: Industry, Innovation and Work in Britain* (Second Edition 1994); Pat Hudson, *The Industrial Revolution* (1992).

17   T.M. Devine, *The Tobacco Lords: A Study of the Tobacco Merchants of Glasgow and Their Trading Activities c.1740-90* (1975, reprinted 1990), pp. 59 & 62.

18   T.M. Devine, *The Transformation of Rural Scotland: Social Change and the Agrarian Economy 1660-1815* (1994, paperback 1999).

19   T.M. Devine, 'Urbanisation' in T.M. Devine and R. Mitchison, eds., *People and Society in Scotland, Volume I, 1760-1830* (1988), reprinted in Devine, *Exploring the Scottish Past* (1995).

20   Bruce Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen 1650-1784* (1984, paperback 1995), chapter 9.

21   Helen McCorry, 'Rats, Lice and Scotchmen: Scottish Infantry Regiments in the Service of France, 1742-62', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 74 (1997).

22   Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (1992).

23   Andrew Hook, *From Goosecreek to Gandercleugh: Studies in Scottish-American Literary and Cultural History* (1999), p. 21.

24   J.E. Cookson, *The British Armed Nation 1793-1815* (1997), chapter 5.

25   Kenneth J. Logue, *Popular Disturbances in Scotland 1780-1815* (1979), chapters 3-4.

26   Lenman, *Jacobite Clans*, pp. 165-8, 178-9; for the broader context see Andrew Mackillop, 'Military Recruiting in the Scottish Highlands, 1739-1815' (University of Glasgow Ph.D. thesis 1996), which will form the basis of a forthcoming monograph.

27   Alex Murdoch, 'Emigration from the Scottish Highlands to America in the Eighteenth Century', *British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 21 (1998); Bernard Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West: Emigration from Britain to America on the Eve of the Revolution* (1986).

28   T.C. Smout still has the clearest vision of this: 'Where had the Scottish Economy Got to by the Third Quarter of the Eighteenth Century?' in Istvan Hont and M. Ignatieff, eds., *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment* (1983); 'The Improvers and the Scottish Environment: Soils, Bogs and Woods' in T.M. Devine and J.R. Young, eds., *Eighteenth Century Scotland: New Perspectives* (1999).

New Approaches to the Political History of Nineteenth-Century Britain

DR MICHAEL J. TURNER

The 1990s have seen a dramatic revival of interest in the political history of nineteenth-century Britain, and as we enter the new century it seems appropriate to take stock of recent historiographical developments and to identify some of the new directions in which historians are taking their research. Important publications of the 1990s have thrown up at least four major topics to be addressed in this review: elite politics and the purposes and scope of government; controversies surrounding the 'fiscal-military state'; the workings of the electoral system; and the nature and content of popular (non-elite) politics.

Among the most significant recent contributions to debates about the ruling elite and the government they provided, have been those of Peter Mandler and Jonathan Parry.[1] According to Mandler, the early Victorian period saw a reassertion of aristocratic power and the rise of an interventionist and populist governing style. These were the main consequences of reform agitation and the perceived shortcomings of liberal economics and rational radicalism, and whereas governments before 1830 had maintained that legislation could do little to improve social and economic conditions, after 1830 Whig aristocrats acted upon their belief that the natural duty of noble magnates was to rule for the people. Therefore Whig aristocrats were willing to listen to demands for reform, since this was part of their role and identity as aristocrats, and their general purpose was to demonstrate that in their hands the state could be made more useful and responsive. In this sense the Whigs were attempting to make aristocratic government acceptable and necessary to the people. At first they succeeded, suggests Mandler, and a range of reforms were implemented by the ministries of Grey, Melbourne and Russell between 1830-34, 1835-41 and 1846-52. Confidence in the aristocratic state increased. Conditions changed, however, and as Whig reforms satisfied various influential groups in society, there no longer seemed to be any need for government to act on the people's behalf. As reform agitation dwindled, public opinion no longer welcomed state intervention so warmly. Liberal and individualistic principles came to the fore, and older notions of aristocratic responsibility and active government became less relevant and more objectionable politically. Mandler argues that this change began during the late 1840s.

Parry's paradigm, 'liberal government', is rather different. He contends that from 1830 governors pursued clearly-defined 'liberal' ends: they wanted to harmonize the different interests in British society, to strengthen the people's attachment to the state and the law, and to shape individual character 'constructively'. These goals typified Whig and Liberal rather than Conservative administrations, Parry explains, but 'liberal government' collapsed in the 1880s because of Gladstone's populist style and the failure to conduct an Irish policy in keeping with constitutional, economic and political harmony. Gladstone, who did not really belong to the 'liberal' tradition as Parry understands it, clearly emerges as the villain of the piece, undermining strong and stable government with his managerial politics, popular appeals, narrow theology, authoritarian leadership, crusading zeal, and willingness to treat Ireland as a special case.

The Mandler and Parry interpretations can be questioned on a number of points. Mandler appears to cast doubts on his own thesis, indeed, for while he insists that the Whigs believed in active government and had a clear idea of its goals and responsibilities, he also admits that they were amateurish, haughty and detached. Mandler refers repeatedly to a governing *style*, not a programme or ideology. Some may find his definition of this style rather vague, and it could be argued that 'aristocratic government' consisted not of one style but several. Whiggism combined progressive and conservative sentiments. Were not some Whig ministers reluctant reformers, moreover, rather than willing and purposeful, and did not the Whigs' weaknesses as a parliamentary party (especially in terms of numbers, leadership, unity, organization and discipline) impose limits on what ministers tried to do? Mandler believes that the Whig approach was reformist and responsive because this

accorded with concepts of aristocratic duty, but some measures may have been timely concessions, forced upon ministers by public opinion or political opponents, and made in order to safeguard aristocratic privilege and status. Whig leaders, it could be concluded, engaged in the politics of survival and did not act upon any distinctive or unifying philosophy.

Did aristocratic Whig governments really reform, centralize, intervene and serve the people as successfully as Mandler thinks? It is not clear that a predilection for social regulation dominated Whiggism; *laissez faire* preferences were growing stronger even before the late 1840s (Mandler's watershed). Furthermore, to be appropriate and effective, intervention required not only ministerial will and parliamentary approval, but public pressure, and these elements did not always coincide (which weakens the idea that the 1830s were truly a 'decade of reform'). Whig measures between 1830 and 1852 were vulnerable to obstruction, amendment and defeat in the House of Lords, where the Conservatives had a majority, and it is not easy to establish that the Whigs had a clear mandate (perhaps Mandler could have investigated more thoroughly the popular foundations of Whiggism and 'aristocratic government'). The Whigs' share of seats in the Commons declined after the 1832 general election. There were substantial losses at the general elections of 1835, 1837 and 1841 (the Whigs and their allies, chiefly radical and Irish, fell from around 470 MPs in December 1832 to 291 in July 1841).

As for Parry's 'liberal government', this cannot have existed in a vacuum, and it is a pity that he did not pay more attention to the role of rival political ideologies, especially Conservative and radical, and to actual measures (how 'liberal government' worked in practice). Parry's main interest is in leadership and parliamentary affairs, which means that public opinion, constituency support and grass roots liberalism enter only fleetingly into his analysis. This is far from the only problem with his definition of 'liberal government'. Some Whigs and Liberals fall outside his criteria, and to suggest that Liberals adopted a British perspective while the Conservative Party was an English party is surely an exaggeration. Conservatives believed in the legislative union with Ireland and continued to defend it even after Gladstonian Liberals had opted for Home Rule, and the Conservatives regularly won a majority of Welsh seats at general elections between 1835 and 1865. Parry's strictures against Gladstone also seem excessive. The Grand Old Man made positive as well as negative contributions to Victorian liberalism, and electorally his popular appeals were very useful. According to Parry's line of argument, moreover, the Liberal Party was no longer 'liberal' after the split on Home Rule in 1886. Yet it would be perverse to deny that at least *some* Liberal peers, MPs, party workers and voters continued to share the 'liberal' goals identified by Parry.

Notwithstanding these observations, Mandler and Parry have greatly enhanced our understanding of politicians, parties and government between the 1820s and 1880s. They have provided new perspectives, original insights, and highly promising avenues for further inquiry. The same can be said of recent studies of the 'fiscal-military state'. Interest in the nature of the British state after the 1780s was considerably increased by John Brewer's work on the eighteenth century.[2] Britain spent almost half of the period between 1688 and 1783 at war, and Britain's emergence as a great power entailed a dramatic change in government as increasing military commitments promoted heavier taxation, a rise in public borrowing to fund the national debt, and the growth of a central administration capable of managing the fiscal and military activities of the state. The relevance of Brewer's findings for the nineteenth century are clear enough in view of the great war of 1793-1815, but there has been some disagreement about the precise causes of government growth and the consequences in terms of political power and the framing of policy. Peter Jupp suggests that the main cause of government growth was the need to adapt to social and economic changes associated with the industrial revolution. As poverty, factory conditions, health and trade became more important, government's sphere of responsibility and action expanded, and though the landed elite retained its control over decision-making, there was increasing reliance on non-landed 'experts' whose administrative talents and practical information gave them a crucial role as advisers and bureaucrats. Jupp also remarks that the number of MPs from non-landed backgrounds grew considerably during the first half of the nineteenth century. He suggests that these MPs tended to be the most active and influential men in parliament, and the implication is that landowners were somehow less able to deal effectively with the complex social and economic issues that were now coming to the attention of government and legislature.

Jupp interprets the period between 1760 and 1850 as one of 'adaptation' by the landed elite. With this broad conclusion Philip Harling and Peter Mandler are in agreement, but they do not accept Jupp's detailed explanations. They attribute government growth (as Brewer did) to the administrative and financial demands imposed by the need to win wars. Social and economic developments do not feature prominently in the Harling-Mandler account. Furthermore, this is an account in which the greater professionalism and efficiency in government after 1815 are viewed as reactions *against* government growth, not its result, and Harling and Mandler argue that in time, government growth was halted to create the Victorian 'minimal' state. Politicians and public alike wanted to dismantle the 'fiscal-military' state because they came to regard it as expensive, wasteful and unnecessary. As for the agents of this change, Harling and Mandler deny that non-landed 'experts' and MPs from commercial backgrounds wielded great influence. The landed elite preserved its authority, and the characterization of landowners as uninterested in or incapable of understanding the new social and economic problems of the age is, insist Harling and Mandler, very misleading.[3]

The debate about government growth and the nature of the state will no doubt continue, and it is likely that any comprehensive explanation will have to borrow from both the Jupp and Harling-Mandler interpretations. An exclusively political/administrative account is no more helpful than an exclusively social/economic one. We need a thorough and informative synthesis. It is interesting, though, that an analytical approach employed by Brewer to investigate the nature of the eighteenth-century state has been found so useful to historians of nineteenth-century Britain. A similar trend is developing with respect to the electoral system. The work of Frank O'Gorman and John Phillips on the eighteenth and early nineteenth century electoral system has indicated that it was not as closed, corrupt and easily manipulated as has often been assumed. In fact in many constituencies there was continual negotiation between voters and patrons (who did not have everything their own way), and varying degrees of voter independence. Levels of politicization, participation and partisanship were high.[4] Of course electoral behaviour varied from place to place, and it should be noted that the work of O'Gorman and Phillips is based only on particular *samples* of constituencies (mostly English boroughs). Their insights into the workings of the representative system before the Great Reform Act, however, have certainly been of interest to historians concerned with the consequences of electoral reform and the influences which determined voter preferences during the mid- and later nineteenth century. In a recent collection of essays edited by Jon Lawrence and Miles Taylor, for example, David Eastwood has argued that a 'politics of participation' prevailed in some counties between the 1820s and 1860s, and that the deference and clientage normally associated with rural electorates do not tell the whole story. There was no simple correlation between landlord power and voter choice, Eastwood concludes, and it is no longer possible to interpret electoral behaviour primarily in terms of a distinction between bustling boroughs and quiet counties. In the same volume of essays Miles Taylor points out that individual voter choice should not be exaggerated. The reformed electoral system between 1832 and 1867 was not designed to enhance individual choice but to represent interests, and this was how contemporaries understood the act of voting. They voted as members of a group or community. Taylor also comments that the influence of occupational identity, religious allegiance and local issues was probably not as great as previous pollbook studies have suggested. These studies tend to focus upon a voter's motives, making electoral behaviour seem more private and individualistic than it actually was.[5]

This work on the electoral system typifies the new focus on agency and participation, the rejection of strict social and economic determinism, and a growing interest in the political and constitutional contexts for particular events, ideas and forms of behaviour. Such concerns have also informed some notable books dealing with popular (non-elite) politics. Edward Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*, first published in 1963, linked plebeian radical reformism with class consciousness and argued that the working class had been 'made' by 1832. The nature of popular radicalism, and the presence – or absence – of 'class' in nineteenth century Britain, have been the subjects of much contentious debate since the appearance of Thompson's book, and perhaps the most important recent development in the controversy has been the advent of the 'linguistic turn', an attempt to recreate the intellectual framework behind the formation of political programmes and vocabulary. The 'linguistic turn' began to fascinate historians after Gareth Stedman Jones argued that

the language of Chartism was not, as had often been supposed, a 'class' language. While the Thompson school maintained that language reflected social reality, and that working-class radicalism reflected the deleterious impact upon labouring people of the industrial revolution, the 'linguistic turn' suggested that language could actively *constitute* reality and experience. Stedman Jones explained that the language of Chartism did not reflect the workers' experience of economic and social change. It was a language of political exclusion, and its appeal, employment and purchase depended on political identity rather than class consciousness.[6] The primacy of *political* as opposed to other identities has also been asserted in Dror Wahrman's study of the meaning of the term 'middle class'. For Wahrman, material conditions, social structure and economic interests mattered less than political change, and 'middle class' was used as a tool in political debate. It was taken to identify 'responsible' public opinion, the repository of political wisdom and virtue, and when a politician, party or campaign claimed to have 'middle class' support they were really making claims about the legitimacy and merit of their intentions.[7] For all the ingenuity of Wahrman's argument, some obvious problems present themselves. Clearly there is a need to connect economic and social status more closely to political rhetoric, action and organization. If it is reasonable to suggest that some historians should abandon their over-reliance on social and economic determinism, it is also possible that the pendulum can swing too far the other way. To divorce terms like 'middle class' (or 'working class' for that matter) from contemporary social conditions, and to deny that they could have been used both subjectively and objectively, seems too extreme. Surely historians can still ask questions about who exactly *was* middle-class, and who *thought* of themselves as such, during the nineteenth century. Wahrman may have a point when he suggests that the term 'middle class' became more meaningful because of political struggle, but this is not to deny the importance of social and economic change. The ruling elite must have realized that social and economic conditions made the concept of 'middle class' support plausible, and perhaps Wahrman should have tried harder to identify the *type* of people politicians and writers had in mind when they used the term. Wahrman does not concern himself with the ways in which social and economic change directly affected politics, ideas about the composition of the middle class, the significance of other polemical terms, and the contexts in which 'middle class' language made sense to contemporaries, though he does accept that politicians who used 'middle class' language often had close links with particular commercial and professional interests.

James Epstein's work on popular radicalism combines an investigation of language, symbol, behaviour and political identity with an assumption that class consciousness *was* important. Epstein shows how political contention and class conflict could be merged together; if he is right then there seems little point in trying to separate them or to play down one at the expense of the other. To establish the importance and existence of class consciousness requires convincing evidence, however, and there are plenty of historians who will remain sceptical. If we wish to use class descriptions in our examination of the past, we should explain how and why we are using them.

Epstein's belief in class in no way decreases the value of his observations about radicalism. One of his chief contributions is that he demonstrates the power and appeal of popular constitutionalism, the dominant idiom within which radicals argued and operated. The constitution was the 'master-fiction' defining the nation. As a shared cultural inheritance its meaning and history were hotly contested by radicals and conservatives, and to make any advances the radicals had to appropriate the language of their opponents, to explain why the constitution should be interpreted in more libertarian ways, and to offer an alternative version of Britain's political development. Radicals made their case with ritual, symbol and display, with songs, dining toasts, banners and the 'cap of liberty', and with public speeches and writings. These inclusive activities drew people in and gave them a sense of agency, creating the idea that the common people really could shape their own future. Radical mobilization and discourse extended to take in the courtroom. Many reformers were put on trial for their political beliefs and behaviour, and courtrooms tended to be places where elite authority and 'official' speech and history dominated, but Epstein argues that radicals created 'linguistic space' in the courtroom. They defended themselves by offering their own detailed accounts of historic popular rights and the participatory constitution, subverted in the past by corruption and oligarchy.[8] James Vernon has also noted the importance of the constitutionalist idiom, and like Epstein he stresses that vocabulary, symbols, identities and rituals were flexible and contingent rather than fixed or stable. Vernon delves

deeply into the visual, oral, printed, linguistic, iconic and organizational aspects of popular political culture during the nineteenth century. He concludes that identities were not dependent on class consciousness (since politics did not simply reflect social and economic experience), and that politics became *less* rather than more democratic after 1832. This latter claim, of course, contradicts the general assumption made by generations of historians that the Great Reform Act opened politics up to non-elite interests. Yet Vernon does point to some highly significant developments: how makeshift banners were replaced by more expensive and durable models which could no longer be constructed quickly by amateurs; how newspapers became cheaper and more widely available, so that communal reading and discussion were superseded by home-based, privatized reading; how the secret ballot privatized the act of voting; how the provision of more polling booths at election time reduced the influence of crowds at the hustings, and how canvassing by post also excluded non-voters and prevented them from posing questions to candidates at election meetings; how political assemblies moved indoors and how admittance was restricted to those with entry tickets. In these and other ways, it appears, politics did become less participatory, and Vernon believes that this was exactly what the ruling elite wanted. Hence the decisions to reduce stamp duty on newspapers, to link political rights more explicitly with property, and to redefine the public sphere with legislation affecting assembly and display.[9]

The work of Epstein and Vernon will certainly influence future historians as they frame and seek to answer questions about nineteenth century popular politics in Britain, not least because it has usefully identified the pitfalls of determinism and the shortcomings of an emphasis on impersonal forces in history. Epstein and Vernon stress the sense of agency, and it is vital that historians remember how important this was, and how vocabulary, policy, symbol and identity could be used to create or prevent a sense of agency. Nevertheless, some of the findings presented by Epstein and Vernon are rather problematic. If there was so much ambiguity in radicalism, for instance, how is it possible to understand and attach meanings to it now? Epstein describes how radicals could challenge the establishment by using a common language and political culture, but how exactly did different people feel able to use these resources in different ways? It is likely that ambiguity presented a dilemma for radical leaders. They could have mass appeal by exploiting inclusive, flexible methods and meanings, yet to achieve its goals radicalism could hardly remain ambiguous for ever. With respect to Epstein's idea that the courtroom offered important discursive opportunities, moreover, the logic of the radical argument about corruption and injustice only made sense if radicals were convicted by reactionary judges and packed juries. Some defendants were in fact acquitted, or convicted by *unpacked* juries. Furthermore, popular constitutionalism may have been a dominant trope, but other ideologies were also important, most notably the rationalism and republicanism associated with Thomas Paine, Richard Carlile and their followers. Epstein offers a useful discussion of the relationship between these two modes of thought, but much more is needed on intellectual continuities and differences.

Conflicts about the constitution, asserts Epstein, were really class conflicts, and to emphasize only the radicals' sense of political identity is too partial. In view of his remarks about the importance of ambiguity, however, one might ask how Epstein can be so sure about this. Though there *were* matters that concerned workers as workers (social welfare and the standard of living, for instance), it is not clear that the constitutionalist idiom had much relevance for those who were concerned most about their social and economic circumstances – *unless*, as Stedman Jones suggested, problems were traced to a political source. This would have made the system of government wholly relevant. According to this line of argument political identity mattered more than class, a point with which Vernon would agree. On the other hand, if class did not exist, why did Victorians use class language? Clearly we need to try and understand what they meant, and we cannot discount social and economic contexts so easily. Victorian Britain was still a hierarchical society, but it was also experiencing urbanization and industrialization. All this must have affected political ideas, goals and tactics, and to suggest that the forces of conservatism won (as Vernon does when he minimizes change and maintains that politics did not become more democratic after 1832), is to offer a static and narrow vision of nineteenth-century Britain. Vernon's work evinces little appreciation of diversity and transformation. Nor does it explain how and why people became radical or conservative.

Vernon has good cause to reject old teleological paradigms such as 'the transition to democracy', but he does so by stressing a closure of politics, which he thinks became less participatory. There were gains as well as losses, however, as may be seen in the expansion of the electorate, the opportunities for non-elite interests to shape policy (the Anti-Corn Law League is the best example), direct representation for large towns which had only been represented as part of their respective counties before 1832, and the continued ability of non-voters to be politically active in extra-parliamentary associations and, at election time, to influence outcomes through such means as exclusive dealing. Oral and visual aspects could still be important in politics after 1832, and it is important to remember that radicals *wanted* a cheaper press and vote by ballot. They did not view these developments as popular losses. Vernon implies that there was an elite conspiracy to make politics less democratic. Perhaps he pushes this argument too far. Even if it was possible for the elite to control everything, which is debatable, it should not be forgotten that the dominant figure in later Victorian politics, Gladstone, thought and said that the people had a crucial role to play in public affairs.

The freshness and originality of these new approaches to the political history of nineteenth-century Britain bode well for the future of the discipline. The different analytical processes and areas of interest noted above provide an essential bedrock of scholarship upon which future researchers must seek to build. Continuing debates about elite politics and the purposes and scope of government, the 'fiscal-military state', the workings of the electoral system, and the nature and content of popular politics are throwing up new ideas and information, and this can only be to our advantage. Our awareness of the contact points between high and low politics, of agency and identity, of the formation of policy, vocabulary and principle, and of the wider contexts within which political life existed has been considerably enhanced by the works examined in this review, forcing us to ask new questions and to identify areas for inquiry that were formerly neglected. Whether or not it was their principal aim, the historians mentioned above have succeeded in reminding us that we need to reassess what we thought we knew about nineteenth century Britain.

NOTES

1. P. Mandler, *Aristocratic Government in the Age of Reform. Whigs and Liberals, 1830-1852* (Oxford, 1990); J. Parry, *The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain* (London, 1993).

2. J. Brewer, *The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (London, 1989).

3. P. J. Jupp, 'The landed elite and political authority in Britain, 1760-1850', *Journal of British Studies*, 29 (1990), pp.53-79; P.Harling and P.Mandler, 'From "fiscal-military" state to laissez-faire state, 1760-1850', *Journal of British Studies*, 32 (1993), pp.44-70.

4. F. O'Gorman, *Voters, Patrons and Parties. The Unreformed Electoral System in Hanoverian England, 1734-1832* (Oxford, 1989); J.A.Phillips, *Electoral Behaviour in Unreformed England. Plumpers, Splitters and Straights* (Princeton, 1982), and *The Great Reform Bill in the Boroughs. English Electoral Behaviour 1818-1841* (Oxford, 1992).

5. D. Eastwood, 'Contesting the politics of deference: the rural electorate, 1820-60', and M.Taylor, 'Interests, parties and the state: the urban electorate in England, 1820-72', both in J. Lawrence and M.Taylor (eds), *Party, State and Society. Electoral Behaviour in Britain since 1820* (Aldershot, 1997).

6. G. Stedman Jones, 'Rethinking Chartism' in his *Languages of Class. Studies in English Working Class History 1832-1982* (Cambridge, 1983), pp.90-178.

7. D.Wahrman, *Imagining the Middle Class. The Political Representation of Class in Britain, 1780-1840* (Cambridge, 1995).

8. J. Epstein, *Radical Expression. Political Language, Ritual and Symbol in England, 1790-1850* (Oxford, 1994).

9. J. Vernon, *Politics and the People. A Study in English Political Culture, 1815-1867* (Cambridge, 1993).

Slavery and the American Civil War: The Current State of Play

DAVID BROWN

One hundred and thirty-five years since the surrender of Robert E. Lee at Appomattox Court House in 1865 the American Civil War continues to capture the attention of professional and amateur historians alike. The importance of events between 1861 and 1865 hardly needs emphasising. Rapid territorial expansion, unprecedented immigration, and clear ethnic and religious differences, had led many Europeans to question the ability of the United States to survive. With the restoration of the Union, the fragile basis of the American nation was finally assured. Slavery was abolished and four million African Americans became U.S. citizens.

If the consequences of the war are generally agreed upon, the causes remain contentious. One might think that most avenues of inquiry have been exhausted but as many, if not more, books and articles were written about the American Civil War in the 1990s than in any previous decade. Military accounts of battles, generals, and regiments continued to appear at an astonishing rate. This genre, described by Peter Parish "as the what-did-Robert E. Lee-have-for-breakfast-on-the-third-day-at-Gettysburg school of military history," has a seemingly endless fascination for trivia but began to make connections to other fields. Most notably, increasing attention was paid to the home front, as the lives of ordinary soldiers were placed within the context of the families they left behind. Social, political, and economic historians examined the effects of war upon the Confederate and Union states, discussing questions of morale and of the civilian contribution to the war effort. In particular, the important role of women in both societies was acknowledged as traditional gender relations were disrupted by the exigencies of war.[1]

It is noticeable, however, that most of this literature does not directly address the origins of the Civil War, nor move any closer to a generally accepted theory of causation.[2] "The irony is that disagreements of interpretation persist in the face of a greatly increased body of historical knowledge," wrote Eric Foner in 1980.[3] This comment, itself paraphrasing an earlier remark by David Potter, seems even more apt in the present day. Did slavery cause the Civil War? As late as August, 1862, sixteen months after the outbreak of hostility, Abraham Lincoln told Horace Greeley that his "paramount objective" was "to save the Union and is not either to save or destroy slavery."[4] Although it is true that conflict was initiated over the question of secession — the South's attempt to leave the Union and the North's refusal to let them go — one cannot contemplate the causes of the Civil War without considering slavery. This article will review the differing explanations historians have given, suggesting that although there were a variety of contributory factors, slavery was the single most important cause of the Civil War.

Slavery and Morality: The Single Cause

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the 'moral' explanation was uppermost. James Ford Rhodes declared that "of the American Civil War it may safely be asserted that there was a single cause, slavery."[5] Other historians, mostly northerners, concurred with Rhodes, depicting a righteous crusade to rid the nation of an institution which was an embarrassing anomaly. Slavery contradicted democratic principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Lincoln was portrayed as the great saviour of the slaves who would not have been freed without northern intervention, whilst southerners were the villains of the piece.

This view reflected an era in which the United States had finally settled its continental boundaries, enjoyed victory in its first major war of the modern era (with Spain in 1898), and was rapidly becoming an economic super power. Such circumstances vindicated beliefs in liberty, equality, and manifest destiny as America looked confidently toward the twentieth century. The 'moral' interpretation was hardly analytical in approach but basically confirmed the Civil War as a struggle between good and evil. The North and the South held incompatible views regarding slavery. Slavery's extension into the

West, as new states were admitted to the Union, became the central problem of the antebellum era. According to Rhodes, "it seemed well nigh impossible to hit upon the common ground of opinion which was a necessary antecedent to compromise" and made conflict if not inevitable then a strong possibility.[6]

Economics: The Irrepressible Conflict and the Second American Revolution

A more sophisticated approach was apparent in the work of Charles and Mary Beard in the 1920s. Whilst not Marxists, they focussed upon differing modes of production in the North and South, suggesting that each had mutually incompatible economic systems. "Within each section of the country the necessities of the productive system was generating portentous results," they wrote. "The periphery of the industrial vortex of the Northeast was daily enlarging, agriculture in the Northwest was being steadily supplemented by manufacturing, and the area of virgin soil open to exploitation by planters was diminishing." Conflict was the result of differing economic aspirations. The Civil War was a "social cataclysm in which the capitalists, labourers and farmers of the North and the West drove from power in the national government the planting aristocracy of the South." Thus, the agrarian South and its planter ruling class was defeated by the industrial North driven by the needs of merchant capitalists.[7]

For the Beards, the Civil War was nothing less than a second revolution, as important an event in American history as the French Revolution had been in determining the future of France. They revived William Seward's famous declaration of an "irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces."[8] The Civil War settled a longstanding tension rooted in the two fundamentally antagonistic outlooks of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton envisaged a nation based upon commerce and industry in which central government played a leading role in nurturing business by subsidising railroads, initiating protective tariffs, and acting as a national bank. Jefferson was wary of the consequences of industrialism, preferring an agrarian republic of yeomen farmers in which government played a limited role. The Beards argued that these competing scenarios for future development voiced in the 1790s were finally resolved in 1865. Drawing upon the increasingly important application of scientific theory to history, they posited economic determinism as the key to the outbreak of war.

Politics: Natural Limits and the Needless War

The irrepressible conflict idea was quickly attacked by historians who minimised moral and economic factors and highlighted political problems. Revisionists, as they were known, held sway between the 1930s and the 1950s. They rejected Beard's thesis that conflict was inevitable and in fact argued the opposite — that it was a foolish mistake which could and should have been avoided. Revisionists argued that differences between the sections had been exaggerated. The North and the South shared a common language, legal system, polity, and Revolutionary heritage. Moreover, their social outlook was also similar, based upon Protestantism, republicanism and white male supremacy. The Civil War broke out, Avery O. Craven explained, because "a generation of well-meaning Americans... permitted their short-sighted politicians, their overzealous editors, and their pious reformers to conjure up distorted impressions of those who dwelt in other parts of the nation."[9]

Revisionists did not believe in irreconcilable sectional divisions. James G. Randall described the issue of slavery's extension into the territories as "almost a fabricated issue" which "produced quarrels out of things that would have settled themselves were it not for political agitation."[10] It was not slavery that was the problem, but a "blundering generation" of politicians who could not maintain consensus and allowed the situation to grow out of control. By 1852, the elder statesmen of American politics — Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, John Calhoun — were dead, leaving a new generation of young, inexperienced politicians. Less adept at compromise and conciliatory politics, they were incapable of dealing with routine matters and political conflict escalated. Some deliberately used the situation to their advantage, making political careers out of inflammatory attacks upon their rivals.

Primary responsibility for the war lay with the Presidents of the late antebellum period. Allan Nevins displayed more sympathy for James Buchanan than other revisionists, but believed a

succession of weak Presidents had allowed a bad situation to become worse. Buchanan, elected in 1856, was unable to reverse that trend. "In a line of mediocre Presidents, not one of whom would be esteemed fit today to lead a large corporation, bank or university, he had more ability than Taylor or Fillmore, more steadiness than Pierce, and more civil experience than the three combined," stated Nevins. However, Buchanan "was as ill-equipped for a supreme test as they," he concluded.[11]

Underpinning the notion of a needless war was the belief that slavery had reached its natural limits by the 1850s and was set upon a course to its peaceful demise. "It seems evident that slavery had about reached its zenith by 1860 and must shortly have begun to decline," wrote Charles Ramsdell. Therefore, "those who wished it destroyed had only to wait a little while" but instead its demise came "at a frightful cost to the whole country."[12] Influenced by the horrific casualties of both World Wars, the revisionists reflected a disillusionment with war as an instrument of diplomacy, frustration with belligerent patriotism and nationalism, and an exasperation with politicians who had allowed Civil War to happen.[13]

Whilst challenging the revisionists' position, practitioners of the 'new' political history in the 1960s also focussed upon the realm of politics. They analysed voting statistics which suggested that slavery was not a key factor in the preferences of the northern electorate. Indeed the question of slavery and its extension into the territories was not of any real significance. Northern voters were far more concerned with local rather than national issues, and more influenced by ethnic and religious affiliations rather than sectional considerations. Thus, issues of temperance, nativism and anti-Catholicism were the key agents of voter realignment in the 1850s. This volatile situation weakened the second party system, allowing the emergence of third parties such as the Know Nothings focussed upon single issues, which eventually led to its collapse. In its most extreme form, the ethnocultural thesis presented the Civil War as a clash between the reform minded Republicans determined to morally rejuvenate American society in the image of New England Puritanism and Democrats determined to uphold personal liberty and individual choice.[14]

Two Societies: Modernisation and the Civil War as a Cold War

It is not so long since the collapse of communism to remember images of the USSR as, in Ronald Reagan's words, "the evil empire." The Cold War was fuelled by propaganda on both sides which accentuated differences and exaggerated potential threats. Perhaps unsurprisingly, historians in the 1970s portrayed a similar scenario to explain the coming of the Civil War.

Abolitionist and pro-slavery advocates greatly influenced public and political opinion creating two contrasting stereotypes of each region. Abolitionists presented the South as "the Slave Power," led by a small conspiratorial elite determined to extend slavery into the West, whilst southerners responded by reference to northern "Black Republicans" determined to end slavery without compensation. They helped to create a sectional mentality which divided the Union into North and South in the minds of antebellum Americans.[15]

The most famous abolitionist was William Lloyd Garrison whose first editorial in the *Liberator* newspaper set the tone of the abolitionist attack: "I am in earnest - I will not equivocate - I will not excuse - I will not retreat a single inch - AND I WILL BE HEARD." That uncompromising message bluntly stated that slaveholding was a sin and called for immediate emancipation. Garrison was supported by free blacks, philanthropists and wealthy reformers who tirelessly spoke against slavery and distributed literally millions of anti-slavery pamphlets. Whist by no means a unified group, abolitionists had a divisive influence on American politics by the 1850s, as they refused to allow politicians and parties to ignore the question of slavery.[16]

Southern Fire-Eaters, determined to protect slavery even if it meant secession, were at the forefront of opposing the abolitionists. The majority of southerners seemingly rallied behind slavery's defence as a siege mentality developed in the 1850s. A powerful pro-slavery argument presented a comprehensive justification of the peculiar institution and, in some cases, promoted slavery as a social system. Because slaves carried out essential manual labour, it was suggested, white southerners enjoyed an elevated status which generated equality and harmony, in contrast to the social unrest and frustration

of the North. Slavery was the cornerstone of southern society, and to attack it was an affront to the southern way of life.[17]

The logical extension of the Cold War thesis was to suggest that two different and incompatible societies did indeed exist side-by-side within the antebellum United States. The Civil War was best understood as the inevitable outcome of a modernisation process which could not accommodate an agrarian system alongside an industrial capitalist system. Evidence for this thesis could be found in the basic characteristics of each section.

Industrialisation was well under way in the North. A working class population concentrated in great cities, such as Boston, New York and Philadelphia, included both native born Americans and immigrants. They worked for wages, were highly mobile, and believed in the superiority of free labour as the market revolution changed the character of northern society. A dynamic culture sprung up, which stressed individuality, education and reform. Technological advances enabled an increasingly literate public to read cheap novels and newspapers. Recreational activities became more important as the divide between 'home' and 'work' was established.[18]

The South, by contrast, retained an agrarian economy and culture which seemed to have changed very little since the Revolution. Slavery tended to hinder industrial development as profits were ploughed back into buying more land and slaves. Urbanisation was similarly stunted and by 1860 the South had just five cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. Most white southerners seemed to prefer it that way as they did not want factories and urban squalor in their midst. Poverty, social conflict and the impersonality of materialism contrasted with a stable, hierarchial southern society characterised by honour, family, and independence.[19]

Advocates of modernisation suggested that material and idealistic differences between the North and South had become so great that two disparate civilisations existed within the United States by 1860.[20] Regional trends pointed to substantial divergence between the North and South, with slavery as the fundamental cause.

Conclusion

In recent years few historians have been prepared to commit to a single cause. The most forceful exception to this rule is John Ashworth's contention that the Civil War was a "bourgeois revolution" which "can only be understood in terms of the differences between capitalist and slave modes of production."[21] This interpretation revives elements of the Beards' irrepressible conflict, combined with the two societies thesis, but adds considerable sophistication in the way in which it addresses political issues. Ashworth discusses how the abolitionists and the proslavery advocates led each section to the brink of war in defence of what they perceived to be the best interests of their sections. Drawing upon studies of slavery which have emphasised the importance of the peculiar institution to southern society, Ashworth posits immutable differences between the North and South which inexorably led to war.

Whilst not going so far as Ashworth, most historians reject the revisionist thesis of a needless war fought over false issues. "The territorial issue was not an abstraction," Michael A. Morrison wrote "Rather, it was central to political life in the 1850s."[22] This is not to say, however, that all historians subscribe to the notion of two societies. Many still look to the political arena to explain the coming of the Civil War. Michael Holt has recently restated some elements of the revisionist case; most especially, the importance of politicians and political decisions in bringing on secession in contrast to the working of inchoate historical forces, or public opinion within the North and the South.[23] Of great importance here is the need to explain why the Whig Party disintegrated leading to the collapse of the second party system. For political historians this seems to be the key to understanding the Civil War. William E. Gienapp wrote that "it is no exaggeration to say that the creation of the Republican Party, and its emergence as a powerful political organization, was one of the most crucial links, if not *the* most crucial link, in the chain of Civil War causation."[24]

One can accept differences between North and South without subscribing to an irrepressible conflict, of course. It is undeniable that politics was vitally important in explaining the onset of war,

particularly the timing of secession. The Constitution failed to provide guidance upon the key political issues of the day. Could Congress control the slave trade under its power to regulate interstate trade? Who had the authority and obligation to return fugitive slaves? By what process were territories to become states and who decided upon the issue of slavery? And, of course, the fundamental problem of the federal system was the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between the states and central government. Even Lincoln's contribution to the outbreak of war has recently been put under the microscope. Politicians and political parties cannot be held solely responsible for the Civil War but their responses to events were critical in determining the actions of the North and the South in the late 1850s.[25]

However, it was the question of slavery's expansion which created the problems, not weak politicians or a weak political system. It is difficult to believe that a major war would have been fought if slavery had not existed in the South. One of the most promising avenues of new research has explored the African American contribution to the outbreak of the Civil War. Black abolitionists played a part, but more importantly, the testament of escaped slaves changed public perceptions of slavery in the North. "The best of the slave narratives were 'jeremiads,'" wrote David Blight, "warnings about the impending doom of American society because of the evil of slavery and, at the same time they were anguished appeals to the American creeds of liberty and justice." Ashworth also noted that slave resistance in the South was instrumental in destabilising the region, forcing southern politicians into an increasingly belligerent defence of slavery.[26]

The 1990s was characterised by increasing uncertainty in the capacity of historians to explain events. Postmodernism posed severe questions for those positing overarching explanations of causation. Just as previous interpretations were influenced by the temper of the times in which they were written, this has inevitably constrained exploration of the origins of the Civil War. Thus, it is difficult to state unequivocally that slavery was the single cause, as James Ford Rhodes did many years ago, and perhaps we can only point to a variety of factors. None the less, establishing the causes of the American Civil War cannot ignore slavery and the unique influence which it exerted on the development of the United States in the nineteenth century.

NOTES

1. Peter J. Parish, *The American Civil War* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1975) p. 12. On the motivation of ordinary soldiers see James M. McPherson, *For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). On women and the Civil War see Drew Gilpin Faust, *Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). All aspects of the war's military, social, economic, and political impact are considered by twelve different authors in James M. McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr., eds., *Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998).

2. With three notable exceptions: John Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic: Vol. 1 Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1995); William W. Freehling, *The Road to Disunion, Volume 1: Secessionists at Bay* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Michael A. Morrison, *Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). Kenneth M. Stampp, ed, *The Causes of the Civil War* (New York: Touchstone, 1991) remains the best starting place to consider this question.

3. Eric Foner, *Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) p. 16.

4. Cited in Peter Kolchin, *American Slavery* (London: Penguin, 1993) p. 202.

5. James Ford Rhodes, *Lectures on the American Civil War* (New York: Macmillan, 1913) p. 2.

6. James Ford Rhodes, *A History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877*, 7 Vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1919) Vol. 3, p. 148.

7. Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilisation*, 2 Vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1927) Vol. 2, pp. 3-4, 54.

8. *Ibid*, p. 10.

9. Avery O. Craven, *The Repressible Conflict, 1830-1861* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1939) p.5. See also Craven's *The Coming of the Civil War* (New York: Scribners, 1942).

10. James G. Randall, "The Blundering Generation," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* Vol. 27 (1940) pp. 3-28.

11. Allan Nevins, *The Emergence of Lincoln*, 2 Vols. (New York: Scribners, 1950) Vol. 1, p. 64.

12. Charles W. Ramsdell, "The Natural Limits of Slavery Expansion," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* Vol. 16 (1929) pp. 151-171.

13. Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 237. For a critique of the revisionists, see Thomas N. Bonner, "Civil War Historians and the 'Needless War' Doctrine," *Journal of the History of Ideas* Vol. 17 (April, 1956) pp. 193-216.

14. This literature is best surveyed in three important essays: Joel H. Silbey, "The Surge of Republican Power: Partisan Apathy, American Social Conflict, and the Coming of the Civil War," in Stephen E. Maizlish and John J. Kushma, eds., *Essays on American Antebellum Politics, 1840-1860* (College Station: Texas A and M University Press, 1982); Silbey, "The Civil War Synthesis in American Political History," in Silbey, *The Partisan Imperative: Dynamics of American Politics Before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) pp. 3-12; Don E. Fehrenbacher, "The New Political History and the Coming of the Civil War," in *Lincoln in Text and Context: Collected Essays* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987) pp. 72-92.

15. William E. Gienapp, "The Republican Party and the Slave Power," in Robert Abzug and Stephen E. Maizlish, eds., *New Perspectives on Race and Slavery in America* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1989) pp. 51-78.

16. William E. Cain, ed., *William Lloyd Garrison and the Fight Against Slavery: Selections from The Liberator* (Boston: Bedford Books, 1995) p. 72. A good collection of the most important essays and some useful primary sources can be found in Lawrence B. Good heart and Hugh Hawkins, eds., *The Abolitionists: Means, Ends and Motivations* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1995).

17. Eric L. McKitrick, ed., *Slavery Defended: The Views of the Old South* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); David S. Heidler, *Pulling the Temple Down: The Fire-Eaters and the Destruction of the Union* (Mechanicsburg, PA.: Stackpole Books, 1994).

18. Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Charles Sellars, *The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

19. Eugene D. Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South* (New York: Pantheon, 1965). See also Bertram Wyatt-Brown, "Honor and Secession," in *Yankee Saints and Southern Sinners* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985) pp. 183-213.

20. The classic exposition of this thesis is Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

21. Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic*, p. ix.

22. Morrison, *Slavery and the American West*, p. 10.

23. Michael F. Holt, *The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). A similar view is given in Brian Holden Reid, *The Origins of the American Civil War* (London: Longman, 1996).

24. William E. Gienapp, "The Crisis of American Democracy: The Political System and the Coming of the Civil War," in Gabor S. Boritt, ed., *Why the Civil War Came* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 95.

25. Thomas B. Alexander, "The Civil War as Institutional Fulfillment," *Journal of Southern History* Vol. 47 (February, 1981) pp. 3-32; Gabor S. Boritt, "'And the War Came'? Abraham Lincoln and the Question of Individual Responsibility," in Boritt, ed., *Why the Civil War Came*, pp. 3-30.

26. David W. Blight, "They Knew What Time it Was: African Americans and the Coming of the Civil War," in Boritt, ed., *Why the Civil War Came*, p. 72; Ashworth, *Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic*, pp. 1-15.

Japanese History, 1850-1920: Contention and Progress

PROFESSOR JOHN CRUMP

Japan changed vastly in the period 1850-1920. In 1850 the official policy was still to maintain Japan's 200 year old isolation by 'closing the country' (*sakoku*). A rigid class structure of (in descending order of prestige) samurai, peasants, artisans and merchants was enforced, although among those at both ends of this spectrum the discrepancies between actual wealth and supposed status were often considerable. The economy was overwhelmingly agricultural, with the vast majority of the population labouring in the fields from morning till night. Taxes were extracted in kind from the peasants and funnelled into the local *daimyo's* (lord's) coffers, out of which the stipends of his samurai retainers were paid. Only samurai had the right to bear arms, but by this stage most wore their swords more as emblems of status than as serious weapons, since Japan had largely been at peace since Tokugawa Ieyasu's[1] victory in the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600. Political power was divided between the Shogun's *bakufu* government in Edo (the pre-Meiji name for Tokyo) and the daimyo in the provinces, each of whom was master in his own *han* (fief). The dual power nature of this arrangement was neatly captured in the *bakuhan* label (a compound of *baku* from *bakufu* plus *han*) that came to be used to describe the political system. As for the Emperor, he did not fit into this power equation at all, but was relegated to relative obscurity in the backwater of the old imperial capital of Kyoto.

Long before 1920, most of the foundations on which the 1850 structure had rested were undermined. The 'closed country' was the first to go, as Japan was forced by the naval strength of the imperialist powers to open up to overseas trade in the 1850s. Indeed, the inward-looking assumptions that underpinned the policy of 'closing the country' were soon converted into their very opposite as Japan sought to avoid the fate that overtook so many Asian countries by becoming an imperialist power in its own right. By 1920 territories such as Taiwan, Korea and the former German colonies in the North Pacific had been acquired in a succession of expansionist wars (primarily the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and the First World War) to lay the basis of a smaller imitation of the British and other Empires. The old class structure barely survived into the 1870s, culminating in the samurai being banned from wearing swords in 1876 and losing their stipends in the same year. Industrialisation was pursued vigorously and was propelled forward by each of the major wars in which Japan engaged. Symbolically, Japan went into the First World War with the bulk of its GNP still accounted for by agriculture and emerged with industry occupying the major proportion.

The upheaval of 1868-9 had not merely eliminated the Shogun, but marked a decisive step towards achieving a centralised state. The new leaders of Meiji Japan were keenly aware that, if Japan were to preserve its independent existence in the face of the imperialist threat, they needed to exercise unified control, in contrast to the dual power structure of the preceding Tokugawa regime. They also needed to lock Japan's entire population into the twin processes of industrialisation and empire building. This was where the Emperor institution came into the new political equation. Enormous effort was expended in creating a mystique around the ill-equipped, teenage boy who had been brought from Kyoto and installed into the former Shogun's castle in Tokyo as the new Meiji Emperor. Every Japanese soldier who died on the post-1868 battlefields had been told that it was all for the greater glory of the Emperor, just as every peasant and industrial worker who sweated in the fields or the factories was fed the same diet of uncritical Emperor worship.

It is worth noting that, despite the wave of change that swept over Japan in the period 1850-1920, there were elements of continuity too. The punitive land tax meant that many peasants were forced to sell their land, but most stayed on as tenant farmers under the thumb of often absentee landlords. Hence there was no mass exodus from the land, as frequently accompanied industrialisation elsewhere. In 1920s Japan, roughly half the entire workforce continued to work on the land, far outstripping the less than 20 per cent who were employed in manufacturing industry.

Historical controversy

This thumbnail sketch of Japan between 1850 and 1920 is relatively uncontroversial. Most reliable history books would concur with the broad outline of what has been written here. Yet Japanese history is far from being uncontroversial. Particularly since the Second World War, it has been hotly contested territory, with rival schools vying for scholarly supremacy and public attention. For as long as one cares to remember, Japanese history has been highly politicised. From the Meiji era (1868-1912) through to 1945, those in power saw the history taught in schools as a means of nation building and a device for binding the population to the regime's goals. Following defeat in the Second World War, the Occupation authorities viewed the school history curriculum in the same instrumental fashion, believing that it could make a major contribution to the process of raising a new generation of peace-loving Japanese imbued with democratic principles. Currently, this ambition is being challenged in its turn. As a recent study of the misnamed 'Liberal' (in fact neo-nationalist) school of history associated with Fujioka Nobukatsu put it: 'the tumultuous context of the 1990s, including the Gulf War, death of Hirohito [actually in 1989] and the fiftieth anniversary of defeat in 1945, have [sic] provided a fertile environment for arguments in favour of a more patriotic history education for Japanese junior and senior high-school students'.[2]

The reason why the history taught in schools is being so assiduously targeted by those seeking to influence public opinion in Japan is that its delivery via a relative handful of texts makes it ripe for manipulation. This paucity of texts derives from the arrangement that only those books which are authorised by the Ministry of Education can be used in publicly funded schools. History is a compulsory subject in Japan up to and including senior high school and the market is therefore a highly lucrative one. As a result, authors and publishers make great efforts to negotiate the process of scrutiny enforced by the Ministry of Education and break into a system where mass sales are virtually guaranteed. Yet, while many might have this ambition, few make it through the obstacle strewn course that leads to approval. To take the curriculum in the high schools as an example, this is divided into Japanese History A, Japanese History B, World History A and World History B. The distinction between A and B is that the former concentrates on modern history, while the latter covers earlier periods too. As of the academic year 1995-6, throughout the length and breadth of Japan, Japanese History A was catered for by four textbooks, Japanese History B by nineteen, World History A by nine and World History B eighteen. Even these small numbers of books fail to convey the narrow range of texts to which Japan's school population is exposed. Recently the Tokyo-based International Society for Educational Information wished to convey to readers overseas the kind of history Japanese schoolchildren are being taught and it therefore published two volumes of translated texts.[3] In order to represent Japanese History B, it translated excerpts from just two of the total of nineteen books that had received approval, on the grounds that these 'account for sixty percent of all Japanese History B textbooks used by Japanese high school students'.[4]

To return to our main point that Japanese history is contested territory, it is true that in the post-war period the hottest issue of historical controversy within Japan itself has been the nature of the Second World War. Even the term 'Second World War' is controversial, since those on the right wing of Japanese politics prefer to talk about the 'Great East Asian War', which began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937 and merged seamlessly into war in the Pacific following Pearl Harbour in 1941. As good an illustration as any of the politicising of history is provided by the debate which continues to rage about the Nanjing Massacre which followed the Imperial Japanese Army overrunning the city in 1937.[5] Some of the contributors to this debate have poorly served the causes they seek to champion. For example, Iris Chang's *The Rape of Nanking: the Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (Basic Books, 1997) is so inadequately researched that its Japanese translation provided an easy target for right-wing apologists of the Imperial Japanese Army and for those who deny that any massacre occurred at Nanjing.[6]

Although disagreement over the specific events of the Second World War and the overall meaning of this conflict have been top of the list of controversial issues, debate among Japanese historians has extended further back into the 1850-1920 period which the Advanced Higher course focuses on. In addition to the arguments that have occurred within Japan, scholars in the West have also put forward

different interpretations of various aspects of this crucial period in modern Japanese history. In an article of this length, one cannot examine all the issues that connect with the period 1850-1920. I have therefore chosen to concentrate on the following: the periodisation of Japanese history (including the differentiation between 'pre-modern' and 'modern'); the methods of state control; and the feminisation of Japanese history.

Periodisation

The Advanced Higher course specification lays squarely on the table the issue of how to periodise Japanese history with its section heading 'Japan: From medieval to modern state 1850s-1920.' Few historians would be happy with this characterisation of Japan in the 1850s as 'medieval'. In Japan, various methods of periodising Japanese history are in use. One of these methods derives from the fact that two calendars are in operation in everyday life. The current year is 2000 according to the Western calendar, and is identified as such on newspapers and other articles of everyday use, but alongside this date the tag Heisei 12 also appears, since we are currently in the twelfth year of the reign of the Heisei Emperor. Since 1868 each Emperor's reign has coincided with an officially proclaimed era of time, thereby producing the Meiji Era (1868-1912); the Taisho Era (1912-26); the Showa Era (1926-89) and the current Heisei Era (1989-). (Note the overlap, since one Emperor dies and another replaces him in the same year.) Historians of Japan have found these eras convenient as conceptual periods, particularly because they have generally been long enough to encapsulate more meaningful phases of development than shorter time spans, such as decades. Hence, Western writers on Japan have taken advantage of this system and used these eras alongside their Japanese counterparts.

In addition to these eras, historians have also identified much longer periods of time by labels which seek to convey the overarching characteristics of entire epochs. This form of periodisation was devised in conscious imitation of Western historiographical practice and hence some of the terminology mimics that found in Western languages. Thus the epoch prior to 1185 is referred to as *kodai* (ancient) and that from 1185 to 1600 (or some would say 1603) as *chusei* (medieval), which is expressed by *chu* [中], the character for 'middle', and *sei* [世], a character meaning 'age(s)' (as in Middle Ages). Note that virtually no historian (Japanese or Western) would regard the period of rule by the Tokugawa shoguns (1603-1867) as 'medieval'. In Japan, this period is generally referred to as *kinsei* rather than *chusei* (medieval). *Kinsei* is usually translated as 'early modern',[7] but the characters used to write it are more expressive than this rather inadequate English translation. *Kin* [近] is a character meaning 'close', while *sei* [世] has the same meaning of 'age(s)' as in *chusei*. Hence, far from being conceptualised as stuck mid-way between the ancient and the modern (as the term 'medieval' implies), the *kinsei* epoch of Tokugawa rule is identified by an expression which was coined so as to convey its proximity to us.

This concern with terminology is not simply a question of bandying about empty words. Particularly because of the meanings implicit in the characters in which Japanese is written, the word *kinsei* is pregnant with the sense of an epoch in which the medieval world had been left behind and many features of the modern world were already in place. These features included its high degree of urbanisation (in 1800 Edo was probably the only city in the world with well over a million inhabitants[8]) and the extent to which commercial relations had intruded into agriculture and town life alike. Tokugawa society was essentially civilianised, with the military gloss of samurai lifestyle reduced to little more than a facade. Patterns of government, both at the *bakufu* and at the *han* levels, were largely bureaucratic. Modes of thought and methods of investigation, at least at the elite level, were primarily rational, while society as a whole was characterised by order and stability. In short, Tokugawa society was well supplied with many of the prerequisites for rapid progress after 1868 and there were few of the entrenched barriers that the word 'medieval' would suggest.

Modernisation

As for the modern side of the medieval/modern dichotomy expressed in the Advanced Higher course specification, the timing and content of Japan's modernisation has been debated at length. In Japan,

post-Tokugawa history is normally divided into *kindai* ('modern'), which is a compound of the characters *kin* [近] (meaning 'close' again) and *dai* [代] (meaning 'period') and *gendai* ('contemporary'), where the same character *dai* ('period') is qualified by another character *gen* [現] (meaning 'present' or 'existing'). The dividing line between these two is commonly regarded as coinciding with Japan's defeat in 1945. Western commentators on Japan have not denied that Japan experienced considerable modernisation in the period 1868-1945, but have argued that the process was flawed by the lack of party political control over the military and government bureaucracy, which led ultimately to Japanese aggression in the Second World War.[9] Similar lines of thinking were evident in a number of academic conferences and resulting edited volumes in the 1960s and 1970s on Japan's modernisation.[10] Given the predominantly American composition of these gatherings and the Cold War climate in which they occurred, it was hardly surprising that Japan's modernisation was largely judged successful the more it approximated to American norms. By way of contrast, a recent conference and resulting edited volume on issues in Japanese culture and democracy in the period 1900-30 had the noticeably less assured title *Japan's Competing Modernities*.[11] Unlike its antecedents, this conference/volume focused much less on modernisation as an economic process and the state's role in achieving it. The net of modernity was cast wider, so as to take in questions of gender, high and low culture (for example, Christine R Yano's stimulating essay 'Defining the modern nation in Japanese popular song'[12]) and ethnicity. Hence we can say that a prominent feature of recent scholarship on Japan has been to see modernisation both in a far more holistic manner than previously and to recognise that it encompasses a variety of pathways and not merely the one patented by the USA.

State control

The ways in which the Japanese state has maintained control over its population have been another field of recent scholarly investigation. Among Japanese scholars, the most frequently employed conceptual model used to explain the authoritarianism of the pre-war state is 'the Emperor system'. This model incorporates many coercive and discriminatory elements, such as the highly intrusive policing of society, a military machine that was outside civilian control, a restricted electorate that disenfranchised many men until 1925 and all women until 1945, and the frequent locking up and occasional murder of opponents of the regime.[13] As the term implies, the glue which held all these unpleasant elements together was the symbol of the Emperor. For example, the Imperial Japanese Army justified its frequent flouting of government policy on the grounds that it was answerable only to the Emperor as Commander-in-Chief and not to the civilian Cabinet, whose authority did not extend to military matters. Yet, although 'the Emperor system' model undoubtedly does allow us to see that coercion, discrimination and an obscurantist ideology were important elements in social control, it does not really explain why so many Japanese put up with the coercion and discrimination and why they swallowed the ideology.

Sheldon Garon has recently offered an alternative model of 'social management' in order to answer this conundrum. His book *Moulding Japanese Minds: the State in Everyday Life*[14] provides a detailed account of the ways in which the Japanese state has continually intervened in society in order to shape its citizens' thoughts and influence their behaviour. He argues that state manipulation of this order goes way beyond the normal practices of liberal democratic countries, such as Britain or the USA, or even the more corporatist traditions of some European countries. To sceptics who might retort that even liberal democracies attempt to brainwash their populations, particularly in times of war, Garon invokes the striking image of Japan as 'a nation at war in peace'. In other words, 'the modern Japanese state has managed its society in peacetime much as Western democracies have done only while at war'.[15] He backs his argument with a number of case studies and those in the former half of the book cover the period 1868-1920 that concerns us here. They encompass the evolution of Japanese-style welfare, the defining of religious orthodoxy, the regulation of prostitution and illicit sexuality, and the integration of women into public life.

Thus far Garon's study may not seem to have broken new ground, but he puts forward the 'social management' model in order to argue that manipulation by the Japanese state has been more than just top-down social control. The case studies are used to demonstrate how the state cooperated with

favoured social groups (religious organisations, women's groups, campaigns for social welfare and so on) in order to mobilise the population and lead them towards the goals favoured by the authorities. Particularly thought provoking are his explanations of how 'progressives' and 'liberals' linked up with the conservative and authoritarian state when their reformist objectives coincided with the government's ambitions. Garon's book is thus a useful reminder of the subtle ways in which oppression can work. As he shows, Japan's history up to 1920 and beyond was not only the story of a powerful state dominating society. The process also involved sections of the dominated enthusiastically participating in their own domination and, even more so, in the domination of others. Such people might have believed that they were sticking to their 'progressive' and 'liberal' aspirations, yet, 'whatever their motivation, their active collaboration more often than not strengthened the state's capacity to regulate society to a greater degree than if a small cadre of bureaucrats had simply imposed its will from above'.[16]

Women

As in many other fields of historical investigation, Japanese historiography has been invigorated by an influx of female scholars over the past generation and by a re-examination of historical periods from a more sexually balanced standpoint. Earlier I mentioned the string of conferences and edited volumes on modernisation that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. Revisiting these projects today, one is struck by the overwhelming extent to which they were populated by male scholars. In contrast, the 1995 conference on *Japan's Competing Modernities,* to which I referred earlier, was the brainchild of two or three female scholars and the volume that resulted was edited by a woman, with eight out of its sixteen chapters contributed by female scholars.[17] It is a welcome sign of the times that, on a project that was not even overtly feminist in its subject matter, female scholars should have been so well represented.

In some senses, the slice of Japanese history on which the Advanced Higher course focuses had an inherently male orientation. The plotting and execution of the Meiji Restoration was carried out by samurai, a class which took the subjugation of women to extremes. Moreover, the fact that the Restoration involved armed conflict was another feature which had the effect of excluding women. As explained earlier, after 1868 the leaders of the new Meiji state endeavoured to focus the entire national effort on industrialisation and the military conquest of an Empire. Again, by their very nature, these projects worked to exclude women from leading roles. There were virtually no female industrialists and women were absent from the military leadership. It is true that among the peasant majority of the population, female labour had always played a vital role in agriculture, with women working in the fields alongside the men. As a result, while relations between the sexes were far from equal even among the peasants, the importance of female labour on the farms did work to moderate the degree to which women were suppressed, at least when measured against samurai standards. However, one effect of the universal basic education that was introduced in the Meiji era was to propagate in the classrooms quasi-samurai role models for all Japanese men and women. While men were induced to see themselves as loyal subjects of the Emperor, for ever ready to sacrifice themselves for him when the interests of the state demanded it, women were urged to embrace as their life's purpose the twin roles of 'good wife and wise mother' (*ryosai kenbo*). With women officially restricted to these private activities and forcibly prevented from participating in public spheres, such as politics, it is not surprising that the historiography of the period under consideration here was for so long refracted through a male prism.

The stepping onto the stage of a generation of female scholars has altered our perception of Japanese history, even if some of the male bias of the years 1850-1920 remains inherent in the period, no matter who examines it. The edited volume *Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945* is a multi-faceted investigation of the parts played by women throughout the entire modern epoch (*kinsei* and *kindai*) of Japanese history.[18] Even if it could not alter the fact that during the modern epoch the leading positions in Japanese society were monopolised by males, it has nevertheless successfully demonstrated that historiography which neglects women's contributions is like a man with a half-paralysed body. Likewise, even if the captains of Japanese industry have virtually all been male,

studies like Patricia Tsurumi's prize-winning *Factory Girls: Women in the Thread Mills of Meiji Japan* have drawn attention to the indispensable part played by women in Japan's economic advance.[19] Indeed, it is worth recalling that throughout the period on which this article focuses and beyond to the early 1930s, the bulk of Japan's industrial workforce was female. Even in the case of those activities which were furthest removed from the officially sanctioned image of the ideal female, there were women who did not flinch from participation. Indeed, there were some women who challenged the ultimate values that permeated society – capitalism, imperialism, militarism, Emperorism – and who paid the price for doing so.[20]

Conclusion

The study of Japanese history has advanced and deepened in recent years in numerous respects, only some of which has space allowed us to refer to here. If I may conclude on a personal note, for scholars of Japanese Studies in Scotland to continue to participate in the collective work of pushing back these intellectual frontiers will depend on the authorities adopting a less philistine and parsimonious attitude towards our work than has been the case in recent years.

NOTES

1. Japanese names are given in the customary East Asian order of family name followed by personal name.
2. R Kersten, 'Neo-nationalism and the "Liberal School of History"', *Japan Forum* 11(2), Autumn 1999, p. 191.
3. International Society for Educational Information, *Japan in Modern History* vols 1 and 2 (Tokyo: 1995).
4. Ibid., vol 1, p. 8.
5. For a sample of the arguments ranged on both sides of this debate, see *Japan Echo* 25(4), August 1998, pp. 48ff.
6. Ibid., pp. 52-7.
7. C D Totman, *Early Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
8. M B Jansen, *The Cambridge History of Japan* vol 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 62.
9. R A Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
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11. S A Minichiello, *Japan's Competing Modernities* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998).
12. Ibid., pp. 247-64.
13. K Inoue, *Tennosei* (The Emperor System) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1958); R H Mitchell, *Thought Control in Prewar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976).
14. S Garon, *Moulding Japanese Minds: the State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
15. Ibid., p. 13.
16. Ibid., p. 236.
17. S A Minichiello, *Japan's Competing Modernities,* 1998.
18. G L Bernstein, *Recreating Japanese Women*, 1600-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
19. E P Tsurumi, *Factory Girls: Women in the Thread Mills of Meiji Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
20. M Hane, *Reflections on the Way to the Gallows: Rebel Women in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

How Racist were the Germans?

DR MARTYN HOUSDEN

Human action must be explained by laying bare the motivation which stood behind it. This can be terribly hard to do. In his classic biography, Alan Bullock interpreted Adolf Hitler as an opportunist. More recently, Rainer Zitelmann characterised him as a variant of the Marxist revolutionary. By contrast, Gerhard Weinberg described him as a racial-ideological true-believer. Both Fritz Redlich and this author have portrayed Hitler as teetering on the brink of paranoid illness.[1] If there are so many ways to understand the life of just one man, how much greater is the challenge of interpreting the behaviour of a collectivity? The inner state of actors varies from person to person. The complexion of the group changes over time. 'Ordinary' people may leave behind only a limited record of their mental states. All these points warn us that to try to answer a question such as 'How racist were the Germans?' is to stretch the limits of what is knowable.

But group issues matter terribly, and especially here. Some non-Germans are still struggling to ascribe collective guilt for the crimes which occurred during the Third Reich. Others want to understand properly the historical context of the recent rise of anti-immigrant, radical right-wing groups in the German-speaking lands, for example the German People's Union in Germany and, more dramatic still, the Freedom Party in Austria. For Germans themselves, there is the intellectual need to 'come to terms with the past' and help shore up a solid contemporary national identity, not to mention the very human requirement of comprehending what an anomalous period of history meant for much-loved relatives who actually experienced it. The enduring need for Germans to deal with the racism of the Nazi period was reflected in the reception they gave Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners*. Shops stocked great piles of the book. Communications sent to Goldhagen gave rise to a separate German-language collection.

One man said, "the reactions to your book - especially those of the historians - show how necessary it is for this country that you have written it."[2] Another (a resident of Belgium) added, this "is the best work about this incomprehensible phase in the history of the German people that I have ever read - and I have read a whole bunch of books about this topic."[3] So what did Goldhagen say?

The basic thesis was not new. The idea that something was wrong with 'the Mind of Germany' was peddled by Lord Vansittart in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office during the Second World War. In the early 1950s, W.M.McGovern tried to identify a line of thought stretching from Luther to Hitler: Germans were said to be intrinsically authoritarian and anti-Semitic.[4] Daniel Goldhagen updated this approach. He characterised German society as permeated by anti-Semitism since Medieval times. In the second half of the nineteenth century, this became specifically eliminationist.[5] By the mid-twentieth century "a demonological anti-semitism, of the virulent variety" had become "the common structure" of the way "German society in general" approached life and death.[6] Such a significant proportion of the German nation was so consumed with murderous race-hatred that "the genocidal killing of Jews" became "a German national project".[7] Goldhagen coined an epithet: "no Germans, no Holocaust".[8]

This murder was strictly for its own sake; anti-Semitic beliefs alone were "the central causal agent of the Holocaust". They taught "that Jews *ought to die*".[9] The result was a genocide in which wrathful perpetrators ran amok in a way that was entirely voluntaristic. There was dreadful cruelty. No one had to cut the beards of orthodox Jews, old men did not have to be made to perform circus antics, there was no need to use dogs and whips all the time, people did not have to be burned alive in synagogues - but it all happened. No one compelled the Germans to liquidate the Jews with zeal and initiative: they chose efficiency over foot-dragging. Very few murderers were deterred by the sheer horror of their actions. In upshot, Hitler's Germany was a society as racist as any imaginable.

Some academics joined the correspondents quoted above and welcomed this interpretation. Colin Richmond said Goldhagen identified correctly a "self-righteous, self-vindicating, truculent and merciless hatred of The Jew".[10] The photographs of atrocities included in *Hitler's Willing Executioners* gave

the game away, there were "too many smiles on the faces of killers."[11] But not all letter writers appreciated the book. One from Hamburg described it as one-sided. He had never witnessed anti-Semitism in small towns in northern Germany before 1939. The few Jews who lived there were well-respected citizens.[12] Most academic commentators have followed this more critical path. Steven Aschheim accused *Hitler's Willing Executioners* of dealing in national stereotypes and merely confirming unsophisticated, 'common sense' interpretations of the past.[13] Hans-Ulrich Wehler termed the book a "demonisation" in which Germans replaced Jews as the incarnation of evil.[14] He also criticised Goldhagen for failing to provide a comparative perspective. There was no exploration of how German anti-Semitism compared to that found in other nations. The point has been underlined in Ruth Birn's sustained critique.[15] Goldhagen said very little about the eastern peoples involved in the Holocaust, for example the all-volunteer Arajs Commando from Latvia. Birn went on to accuse Goldhagen of failing to locate anti-Semitic atrocity in the general context of occupation policy. Horrors were committed against more than just Jews. The whole complex of evil called for an explanation in which anti-Semitism can be only one part. Perhaps most devastating of all, however, Birn said Goldhagen had interpreted his evidence selectively. He rejected as ephemeral, expressions of shame and disgust which actually feature frequently in the full record of the lives of the executioners. There is a strong case: *Hitler's Willing Executioners* has not provided the last word on anti-Semitism in Germany.

Hitler wanted to revolutionise old moral identities. He intended to redefine a new constellation of ethical imperatives which was supposed to hold sway across the nation.[16] But the Fuhrer could not eradicate traditional, often mundane non-Nazi ways and values as quickly as he would have liked. So when, on board a train in 1935, a Nazi sympathiser (by the name of Groß) intimidated a Jew by calling out: "This evening the Jews in Haßloch will all get their throats cut. They'll be strung up and smoked. You people, now you really will see something. When the train starts, a Jew will be thrown head first through the carriage window, and it will be Heinrich Heene from Langgasse in Haßloch", he was conforming to new expectations of public racism. But this was not all. For several years, Groß had owed Heene money.[17] In this racist incident, anti-Semitism flowed together seamlessly with a more normal motive for anger: financial frustration. There is a moral for us here. When, during the Third Reich, Germans conformed to racist patterns of behaviour, they need not have been acting monocausally. In fact, we can question whether racism for its own sake, when compared to more normal drives, really became a decisive motive among Germans at large.

Consider popular reactions to racial legislation. The Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour was promulgated on 15 September 1935 by Hitler at a Nuremberg rally. It banned extramarital sexual intercourse between Jews and Aryans. In March 1940, the Reich Security Head Office decreed public execution for any Polish forced worker found to have had sex with a German woman. Neither document indicated how the police, and specifically the Gestapo, could ever hope to regulate so private a sphere of life. This intrinsic difficulty was magnified by practical shortcomings facing the police. They had to worry about much more than just race crime, but still in 1937 the Gestapo in Essen had only 43 officers to deal with a population of over 650,000. Wuppertal and Duisburg, both with populations of over 400,000, had only 43 and 28 officers respectively. Even in 1944, nationwide the Gestapo only employed 32,000 people. Of these, 3,000 were administrative officials and 13,500 were general employees and workmen. 9,000 of the total were draftees. That the Gestapo lacked sufficient dedicated police officers to fulfil their tasks comprehensively is reflected in statistics for the Dusseldorf office. Altogether the Gestapo employed just 291 people there. They had to police 165 km of foreign border and supervise a population of 4 million which included active left-wing and Catholic movements as well as significant numbers of Polish and Jewish workers.[18]

The circumstances were reflected in the way policing proceeded. Centre stage was accorded to information provided by neither policemen nor their paid informers, but rather by the ordinary population. The spontaneous denunciation of German by German became so extensive that a system of 'autopolicing' grew up. Racial legislation became self-enforced by average citizens. Fully 50% of suspected breaches of the Nuremberg Laws in the Wurzburg area were reported to the Gestapo by 'normal' men and women. Why? 24% of denunciations were motivated by intrinsic loyalty to the system (which would have included racism). But fully 37% were sparked by personal grudges. In other words, in the Third Reich a neighbour was more likely to report your suspected sexual impropriety

because your dog had fouled his garden path rather than because he was a committed racist. Germans might have conformed to the demands of racial legislation and acted as if they were racist, but they did so on grounds that were many, varied and personal.

The notion of racist action growing out of a non-racist motive fits with interpretations of the popular support Hitler received as he campaigned for power. When he wrote *Mein Kampf,* Hitler conceived the *Volksgemeinschaft* (the people's community) as a racial construct, as a national unit structured harmoniously and cleansed of Jews plus the hereditarily ill.[19] Peter Fritzsche has maintained, however, that although during the 1920s Germans accorded the idea of a *Volksgemeinschaft* pride of place on their political agenda, they were completely out of kilter with the anti-Semitic, eugenic twist Hitler gave it.[20] The word appealed, but its exact meaning was lost. Germans wanted a nationalist, forward-looking, socially-inclusive society, but ignored the concomitant racism of Hitler. This interpretation fits analyses of why storm troopers entered the NSDAP in the 1920s. Only 13.6% of these 'rank and file' party members joined up because of anti-Semitism, but fully 31.7% were drawn by the idea of a *Volksgemeinschaft.*[21] For Fritzsche, the heart of the matter was the experience of August 1914. The outbreak of war had been accompanied by a mass patriotic uprising across the land. Nothing comparable had been seen before and it left an indelible mark on German national consciousness. Long afterwards, people wanted to regain this ideal. The success of Nazism lay in providing a vehicle which allowed everyone (bar Jews and the hereditarily ill) to imagine themselves part of a restored, militant community of the people as it had existed on the eve of the First World War.

The thesis that National Socialism won power by promising to forge a kind of community has additional support. From 1927, rural life in Germany was subject to mounting economic hardship.[22] Between that year and 1932, 27,000 farms were sold. Traditionally village life had been a co-operative affair in which farmers helped each other with the main annual tasks. The Depression destroyed this practice. Heightened competition between farmers made them loath to help a rival. As a result, the village fragmented. It was a change National Socialism parasitised. Local party organisations infiltrated rural communities and marketed aggressively Nazi images of a reconstituted organic community. There were frequent political meetings, sports club events, shooting tournaments and sundry outings; there were specially designed propaganda posters to encourage farmers to buy Hitler's vision. The result is well-known: the NSDAP picked up the backbone of its electoral success in the rural areas of northern Germany. Where community life had broken apart, the *Volksgemeinschaft* found its most ready reception.

The challenge of explaining apparent racism by other means is particularly acute during the period 1939 to 1945. Most German troops fought on the eastern front and there is no doubting the truly dreadful racial carnage they inflicted there. Omer Bartov has not blamed this on anti-Slavic prejudice. Primarily it was a response to warfare undergoing a radical process of demodernisation. Within a month of Operation Barbarossa beginning, Army Group South was forced to replace half its trucks with horse-drawn wagons. By September 1941, two thirds of German tanks in the East were out of commission. As winter set in and Soviet offensives began, the physical and mental state of German troops deteriorated too. The fighting experience degenerated accordingly. As one officer put it, "Orders are not given any more.... Leadership has reverted to its original form." Life had become "a battle for survival" in which anything became permissible in order for a soldier to save himself, his comrades, his unit and, by implication, his race.[23] Brutalised troops became more susceptible to ideological indoctrination, but they also came to fear their own institutions. Military discipline became increasingly harsh as a means to steeling resolve at the front and consequently barbarised the troops further still. Bartov summarised the situation: "Fearful of their commander, and unable to defeat the enemy, the troops turned against the occupied civilians and prisoners."[24]

Coming full-circle, and returning to a documented case of the 'willing executioners', we cannot explain what they did in terms of brutalising wartime experiences. They had not killed before turning up at the site of their first massacre, but only 10-20% refused to participate. Christopher Browning has explained events in terms of the 'ordinariness' of the perpetrators of the Holocaust. At one point he observed, if "the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become killers under such circumstances, what group of men cannot?"[25] They were from the sort of working class and lower middle class

circumstances which, during the Weimar period, had generated Social Democratic voters. Aged 37 to 42 years, they were no longer impressionable youths. Since no one was ever punished for failing to kill a civilian, careerism cannot have been the motive. Only 25% were Party members in 1942, political indoctrination was too inconsistent to have been important and Browning found little evidence of anti-Semitism. So why did the men murder? The answer was peer pressure. The men had a deep fear of exclusion from the group for failing to conform. They became habituated into murder because, far from home and members of a nation at war, they felt unable to opt out of the collectivity.

This discussion certainly should not be taken to imply that Germany had only one or two die-hard racists.[26] A impressionistic survey carried out by Muller-Claudius in 1938 and 1942 showed that while by far the majority of people were either indignant or indifferent about the regime's Jewish policy, consistently about 5% approved.[27] But there is a strong case for saying that, as far as the significant majority of Germans were concerned, racist action only came onto the agenda when racism became coupled with a pressing personal need. In the context of the action analysed here (informing about race crimes, supporting a racist political party, carrying out racial atrocity during war and committing racist murder), even the most dreadful outcomes have been linked to readily comprehensible human characteristics: the bearing of grudges, a desire to belong to a community, the experience of brutalisation in war and a desire to be accepted.

But how are we to interpret this? Are we saying that the Germans of the Third Reich really were exactly like us? Or were they still somehow historically specific, maybe even pathological? While Goldhagen is wrong to turn Germans uniformly into eliminationist anti-Semites, nor can we take the work of Gellately, Fritzsche, Bartov and Browning as evidence that they were completely 'normal'. Even if racist action was only mobilised in association with other motives, it remains significant that this happened at all. So long as human beings have good mental health and are not subject to terroristic coercion, they do have the freedom to make independent choices. These historical actors lacked the moral insight to refrain from expressing their personal concerns in damaging ways. What is more, the multifarious inhibitions against racism we recognise today did not come into play in the society they inhabited.

In this connection, it is doubly important to remember that many individuals who eventually opposed Hitler also made unfortunate judgements in respect of racism.[28] In 1934, General Ludwig Beck organised lectures on racial hygiene for the War Academy. During the attack on Poland, Claus von Stauffenberg described the population he found there as "an unbelievable rabble, there are a lot of Jews and a lot of cross-breeds." After the fact, Martin Niemoller realised he had failed the central character test of the Third Reich: "First they came for the Jews and I did not speak out - because I was not a Jew. " In her memoirs, Christa Beilmann, who was at odds with Nazism for religious reasons, admitted that had she known of the mass killings of Jews, Russians, Poles and gypsies, she would not have been moved to really significant resistance activity. There was *something* different at that time and place which was linked to racism. And that *something* was not just a question of inhabiting a world not yet overshadowed by the Holocaust.

Jonathan Steinberg has compared the fate of Jews captured in southern Europe by the *Wehrmacht* and the Italian army. To his knowledge, every single Jew who fell into the hands of the former went to a concentration camp, whereas not a single one under the protection of the latter suffered a comparable fate.[29] The statistic is all the more remarkable given that in August 1942 Mussolini declared he had no objection to his troops handing Jews to his German allies. In October 1942 the German ambassador in Rome complained that the transfer was not taking place. He was rebuffed by the diplomat d'Ajeta who said Jews would be "regarded as Italian citizens, who had rights to the same protection as any other citizen." Steinberg concluded, "in their attitudes to Jews the two Axis allies inhabited different moral universes."[30] What exactly was the key failing of the popularly-held moral cosmos of Germany? Was it a deficiency in restraining general ethical rules which just happened to find its most obvious expression in the commission of racist acts? Or do we have to keep trying to identify, at a deep level of popular culture, a malignant conviction which deprived perceived non-Germans of important attributes of humanity and moral rights, and which predisposed hostility? Assuming that something other than Goldhagen's 'eliminationist anti-Semitism' lay at this deep level, what precisely was it? For

that matter, what exactly were the dynamics of the interplay between the National Socialist revolution and the pre-existing ideas-world of average Germans? This is the point at which our knowledge stops. Fifty five years on, we are still awaiting a compelling, comprehensive and unifying map to lead us safely through this particular mental and moral minefield.

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NOTES

1. A. Bullock *Hitler: a Study in Tyranny* (London, 1952); R.Zitelmann, *Hitler. Selbsverstandnis eines Revolutionars* (Munich, 1998); G.Weinberg, *Germany, Hitler and World War II* (Cambridge, 1995); F.Redlich, *Hitler. Diagnosis of a Destructive Prophet* (Oxford, 1999); M.Housden, *Hitler. Study of a Revolutionary?* (London, 2000).

2. *Briefe an Goldhagen* (Berlin, 1998), p.28.

3. Id,p.89.

4. W.M. McGovern, *From Luther to Hitler* (New York 1953).

5. D. Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (London, 1996), p.375.

6. Id, pp.392-3.

7. Id,p.7 and 11.

8. Id,p.6.

9. Id, *p.9 and* 14.

10. C. Richmond, '*Acceptable Atrocity'*, Immigrants and Minorities 15 (1996), p.271.

11. Id, p.277.

12. *Briefe an Goldhagen, p.* 112.

13. S.E. Aschheim,'Archetypes and the German-Jewish Dialogue: Reflections Occasioned by the Goldhagen Affair', *German History* 15 (1997), p.240.

14. H-U. Wehler,'The Goldhagen Controversy: Agonizing Problems, Scholarly Failure and the Political Dimension', *German History* 15 (1997), p.84.

15. R.B. Birn, 'Revising the Holocaust', *Historical Journal* 40 (1997), pp.195-215.

16. J. Glover, *Humanity. A Moral History of the Twentieth Century* (London, 1999), p.349 and 360.

17. See M. Housden, *Resistance and Conformity in the Third Reich* (London, 1997), pp.142-3

18. This section draws on R. Gellately, 'Surveillance and Disobedience:Aspects of the Political Policing of Nazi Germany' in F.R. Nicosia and L.D. Stokes (eds.), *Germans against Nazism* (New York, 1991) and R. Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society. Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-1945* (Oxford, 1990).

19. M. Housden, *Hitler,* chapter 2.

20. P. Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), pp.183-4 and 208.

21. P.H. Merkl, *The Making of a Storm Trooper* (Princeton, 1980), pp.303-4 and P.H. Merkl, *Political Violence under the Swastika* (Princeton, 1985), p.31 and 453.

22. K. Wagner and G. Wilke, Dorfleben im Dritten Reich: Korle in Hessen' in D. Peukert and J. Reulecke (eds.), *Die Reihen fast geschlossen. Beitrage zur Geschichte des Alltags unterm National sozialismus* (Wuppertal, 1981).

23. O. Bartov, *Hitler's Army. Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich* (Oxford, 1991), p.27.

24. Id, p.61.

25. C.R. Browning, *Ordinary Men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York, 1993), p.189.

26. For a detailed study of one, see M.Housden, *Helmut Nicolai and Nazi Ideology* (Basingstoke, 1992).

27. See M. Housden, *Resistance and Conformity,, p.* 147.

28. The following examples are assembled from M. Housden, *Resistance and Conformity.*

29. J. Steinberg, *All of Nothing The Axis and the Holocaust 1941-43* (London, 1990), p.8.

30. Id, p.219.

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Social Conflict and Political Polarization in Spain.
The Origins of the Spanish Civil War

FRANCISCO J. ROMERO SALVADÓ

The study of the Spanish Civil War remains today a fresh and still vast topic of analysis and debate. Sixty years on, the constant flood of publications and the polemic surrounding the subject testify to its enduring impact.[1] Indeed, there is a strong case to view the Spanish Civil War as 'the last great cause'. For thousands of men and women, it represented the last-ditch stand against the seemingly invincible forces of Fascism and political reaction that had swept the continent in the inter-war years. It was this unique appeal to common people who were prepared to fight as volunteers in a distant and unknown country that provided this conflict with special nostalgia and romanticism.

Yet the Spanish conflict was essentially a fratricidal struggle between two diametrically opposed views of the country's future. The war was thus a battle to settle crucial issues that had divided Spaniards for generations: questions such as agrarian reform, the recognition of the identity of the historical regions and the role of army and Church in a modern secular state.

The fact that specialists on Spain have concentrated, albeit very understandably, on the Second Republic of 1931-36 or the Civil War of 1936-39, means we still lack a long-term analytical perspective of the internal social and political fissures which were the key to that war. These arose from the inability of the politicians of Spain's Liberal monarchy to initiate reform from within, something which, had it been possible, could have facilitated a gradual transition to a modern democratic model. Consequently, this article seeks to explore the origins of the war by examining the social conflict and political polarization that, inherited from the earlier regime, the Liberal Monarchy, finally exploded in the 1930s during the Republic.

The Discreet Charm of Spanish Liberalism

The Restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy in December 1874 represented the consolidation of Liberalism in Spain. The new ruling order conceded freedom of expression and association, political parties and trade unions were allowed to exist, and in 1890, universal male suffrage was introduced. However, despite all these constitutional trappings, the Liberal system was far from democratic. In fact, it was an oligarchic system in which two monarchist or dynastic parties, Conservatives and Liberals, monopolized real power. They were groups of notables connected with the land-owning classes, the big state companies or the dominant banking and financial concerns.[2]

The system was founded on the so-called *'turno pacifico'* or the peaceful rotation in power of both dynastic parties. The *turno* of parties in office served to maintain a fiction of political competition as well as providing the governing élites with a safe mechanism by which they could share the spoils of administrative graft. Elections were just part of the constitutional fiction as in practice, the Minister of the Interior (*Ministro de la Gobernación*) manipulated the results so that the governments always obtained a working majority.[3]

At the top of the Liberal edifice was the Crown who ensured the smooth functioning of the *turno*. Any politician to whom the king gave the decree of dissolution of parliament knew that the new elections would inevitably give him an overall majority to rule comfortably. At the bottom, the *caciques* or local bigwigs were the kingpins of the entire system. Helped by a reality of cultural and socio-economic backwardness and widespread popular apathy, they delivered the votes of their areas and in return were allowed to run their localities as private fiefdoms.[4]

The fiction of the *turno pacifico* meant that large land-owning and financial interests dominated national politics. Thus the oligarchic Liberal order failed to address Spain's deeply rooted agrarian and social problem and was thus unable to produce any meaningful change in the lives of the citizens.

This failure led to social conflict and political polarization, as the only choice left for the masses was apathy or violence.[5] By the end of the century, there existed growing signs of despair: uprisings in the poor southern countryside, urban terrorism in industrial Barcelona and revolts in the colonies.[6]

It was the colonial issue that proved a watershed. Spain's obsolete overseas administration was faced in the 1890s with an insurrection in Cuba and the Philippines. Following US intervention in 1898 the Spanish government had to accept the loss of the overseas empire. The defeat had an immediate effect on the peninsula. Demands for overhauling of the political system gained momentum. Leading intellectuals denounced the Liberal system as the epitome of all that was wrong in the country: *caciquismo*, backwardness and decline. The labour movement, although divided between Socialist and Anarcho-Syndicalist rival camps, was fiercely united in their opposition to the Liberal status quo.

The dynastic parties gradually began to lose ground in the larger cities where an increasing number of Republicans were elected. Simultaneously, Nationalist parties were created in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Catalonia, the economically most advanced area, was the first to destroy the grip of the *caciques*. In 1901 the newly established *Lliga Regionalista*, representative of the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie, obtained a sweeping victory.[7]

Also an over-staffed officer corps blamed the corrupt and incompetent liberal politicians for their defeat. Extremely sensitive to any civilian criticism, the military became increasingly alienated from the rest of society, developing an ideology in which they identified themselves as being above politics and the guardians of the sacred values of the fatherland. As guarantors of national unity and social order, army officers were likely to clash with the emergence of the organized labour movement and regionalist parties. In the process, the army began to consider the existing constitutional practices as inadequate to crush the 'pernicious effects' of nationalism and class conflict.[8] They found an ally in the new king, Alfonso XIII. On the throne since 1902, the monarch not only sided with his officers in their disputes with the politicians but also took advantage of his constitutional prerogatives to appoint Prime Ministers and further aggravate party factionalism.[9]

The pursuit of a new imperialist adventure in Morocco was the spark of anti-militarist riots in Barcelona in July 1909. During the so-called 'Tragic Week' barricades were erected and churches burnt down. The army finally crushed the revolt with great violence, resulting in a high casualty rate.[10] The short-term consequences of the Tragic Week proved crucial. The Socialist Party (PSOE) formed an electoral alliance with the middle class Republican groups. However, a significant part of the proletariat who rejected parliamentary politics created a nation-wide Anarcho-Syndicalist trade union in October 1910, *La Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT).

Yet it was the First World War that finally brought about the final crisis of authority of Spanish Liberalism. Spain did not enter the war, but the war entered the country and its political and socio-economic impact eroded the ruling system's fragile foundations that so far had been based on widespread apathy and popular demobilization.

A fierce political debate on the issue of neutrality divided the nation between *Germanophiles* and *Francophiles*. The main *Germanophile* voices in the country were those of the privileged social groups: the clergy, the aristocracy, the court, the army, and the land-owning oligarchy. They regarded a German victory as a guarantee of social stability and traditional values such as monarchism, discipline and a hierarchical order. *Francophiles* were the intellectuals, the professional middle classes, and those political groups against the existing status quo—Republicans, Socialists and Regionalists. They believed that the triumph of the Entente would bring about democracy and political freedom throughout Europe. The quarrel between the partisans of the Allies and the Central Powers generated such a violent debate that it almost acquired the moral quality of a civil war: 'a civil war of words'. It represented a verbal clash between the two Spains which was a portent of the real civil war which still lay a generation in the future.[11]

Parallel to that ideological polarization, the war produced dramatic social and economic changes that undermined the fragile structure that had supported the dynastic administrations. Spain's neutrality resulted in sudden economic expansion in terms of the volume of exports and trade. However, in social terms its impact was devastating. Whereas fabulous wealth poured into the coffers of the propertied

classes, for the majority of the population this was a period of worsening living standards produced by inflation, food shortages and rapid demographic changes as thousands left the countryside for the cities in search of jobs.

Both the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie and the organized labour movement saw their position strengthened by these structural changes and sought a new political realignment of forces in the country. The objective of the *Lliga Regionalista*, the party of the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie, was to translate the new economic reality into political terms. They wanted to end the political monopoly enjoyed by the centralist land-owning oligarchy in Madrid and establish a new decentralized system which would promote the growth of a modern capitalist economy based on the Catalan model. In May 1916, they initiated a campaign to obtain Home Rule for Catalonia followed soon by an effective obstructionist strategy in parliament to block all the economic initiatives of the governments.[12] At the same time, the hardships, shortages and inflation persuaded Socialists and Anarcho-Syndicalists to seal the historical labour pact of July 1916. They agreed to join forces to force the governments to implement measures which could alleviate the distress of the working classes. Both organizations subscribed in March 1917 to a manifesto in which the ruling system was accused of being the cause of the widespread distress of the population and threatened its overthrow by means of a general strike.[13]

It was, however, the attitude of the army that precipitated the all-out revolt against the ruling system. With inflation eroding their living standards and incensed by governmental attempts to introduce reforms to cut the vastly over-manned officers corps, they began to create, from the second half of 1916, *Juntas Militares de Defensa,* a military version of trade unions. The *Juntas* became a powerful critical voice denouncing the corruption and nepotism of Liberal politics. Attempts to dissolve them were met with refusal and then open insurrection in June 1917.[14] This provoked the fall of the existing administration and opened a period of constitutional crisis that encouraged the Catalan bourgeoisie and the labour movement to make their bid for renovation.

On 19 July, in open defiance of the authority of the government in Madrid, the *Lliga* with the support of Republicans and Socialists organized an Assembly of parliamentarians in Barcelona. Reminiscent of the early days of the French Revolution, they demanded the end of the old system and the summoning of a Constituent Parliament convened by a national government whose members should represent the real will of the nation.[15]

Largely provoked by a desperate government trying to claim the role of guardian of the social order[16], but also due to over-confidence and optimism, the Socialists led a General Strike on 13 August with the objective of implementing the programme laid out by the Assembly. After the previous events of the summer, they believed that they could count on the support of the bourgeoisie and at least the neutrality of the officers.[17] This initiative represented the baptism of fire of the organized labour movement, and of Socialism in particular, as a leading force on the political scene.[18] However, they paid a heavy price for their badly organized revolutionary endeavour. The General Strike failed to spread beyond the main urban centres and with the exception of Asturias, was easily crushed in less than a week by the authorities. Any hopes that the army would refuse to defend the regime were soon dashed. The military response was shocking for its unexpected brutality. The official figures released by the authorities confirmed a total of seventy-one dead, two hundred wounded and two thousand arrested. The reality was probably two or three times those numbers.[19]

The repression of the General Strike closed the opportunity opened by the Assembly to bring about political democracy. However, the two dynastic parties, increasingly divided into rival factions, never regained their previous hegemonic position. They were unable or unwilling to meet the growing demands generated by the social mobilization and political consciousness brought about by the war.[20] Furthermore, the constitutional order was slowly but effectively subverted as officers and king increasingly acted as an anti-constitutional party with power of veto to make and topple cabinets. The result was social conflict, political instability, and in the end, the destruction of the political system.

News of the Bolshevik triumph in Russia and the post-war economic recession intensified the class struggle leading to growing popular unrest and social conflict. A small Communist Party was created after a split in the Socialist movement.[21] Yet, in general, the Anarcho-Syndicalist CNT was in charge of

the offensive. Between 1918 and 1923, short-lived governments in Madrid were unable to control the increasing violence which reigned in the country. Starving peasants rose throughout southern Spain demanding 'land and bread'. Syndicalists paralysed the industrial centres, in particular Barcelona, with their massive strike action. Industrialists hired gangs of thugs and in co-ordination with the army sponsored para-military groups. Leading Syndicalists were killed and thousands of militants arrested. Anarchist groups responded in kind, assassinating employers, overseers and strike-breakers.[22]

The final blow to the ailing regime came from the under-funded and almost forgotten campaign in Morocco. In the summer of 1921, the country was shocked when news arrived of a major rout at Annual where over 12,000 Spanish troops had been massacred. Following the success of anti-Liberal movements on the continent, particularly the Fascist take-over in Italy in October 1922, calls for an authoritarian solution became deafening.[23] It was in this climate of political vacuum, social warfare and economic dislocation that the Captain General of Barcelona, Miguel Primo de Rivera, staged a coup d'état on 13 September 1923.

The surprise was not that a military uprising took place, but that it arrived so late.[24] Spain's authoritarian solution was part of the general pattern of anti-constitutional reaction that swept Europe during the inter-war years. It was the response of the frightened dominant classes in a society in transition between oligarchic and democratic politics.[25] Indeed, the army revolt of 1923 introduced a dangerous precedent. The officers no longer seized power as the representative of a political faction but claimed to be above partisan politics and defenders of the sacred values of the nation endangered by the corruption and mismanagement of politicians. The army thus became both the symbol and the pillar of national unity and regeneration from above. Ironically, praetorian intervention in Spain not only destroyed the old oligarchic system but also produced a profound split within the army that eventually led to the fall of the Monarchy and the proclamation of a genuine democratic system.

In fact, Primo de Rivera was above all an improviser and an amateur in politics. His regime lacked ideological coherence and solid political foundations. In an attempt to turn his rule from a military into a civilian based system, Primo founded in 1924 a political party, *Unión Patriótica* (U.P.), and one year later several civilians joined the government. His experiment did not really get off the ground. It lacked the dynamism, the creative vitality and the mobilization of the fascist movements. U.P. was clearly an artificial imposition from above only joined by careerists and people thirsty for jobs and official protection.[26]

As political uncertainty mounted, widespread use of censorship, constant arbitrary decisions and a clear favouritism towards the Catholic Church led to growing opposition to the regime and a dramatic flood of support for the Republican movement. Also sectors of the army enraged by Primo's attempts to cut down the military budget and deal with the promotion system began to conspire against the dictatorship. Most of these plots, involving politicians of the old regime, were easily dismantled. Yet they revealed the glaring divisions within the army, the ultimate foundation of the ruling order.[27] Even the King by then had grown tired of a regime in which he played a secondary-role. Alfonso certainly was aware of the military intrigues against his government and was searching for a excuse to get rid of the dictator.[28] The onset of the economic depression added to the army's discontent provided Alfonso with the excuse to exert pressure on Primo to retire quietly. A sick and isolated Primo de Rivera finally resigned on 28 January 1930 and left Spain.

In vain, did the Crown seek to disassociate himself from the authoritarian experience. Alfonso seemed to have forgotten that the Dictatorship had basically been established because the oligarchic system could no longer work. Thus the attempt to reconstruct the old Liberal order as if nothing had happened proved ludicrous. Fragmented and in crisis before 1923, the old dynastic parties were in total disarray in 1930. Moreover, only some of the monarchist notables responded with enthusiasm to their sovereign's call to save the throne. They soon engaged in their traditional petty squabbles and returned to old clientelist practices. However, many others either joined the Republican camp or avoided backing a king who had identified himself for years with a regime that denigrated and vilified them.[29] By contrast, Republicans allied with Socialists excelled at the new reality of mass politics attracting thousands of people to rallies and meetings in which the King was continually accused of perjury by violating his own constitution and supporting the Dictatorship. A Provisional Government

was set up in October. In order to dissipate the fear among the middle classes that a Republican take-over would mean a thorough social revolution, the crucial posts of Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior were allocated to two formerly Monarchist leaders, Niceto Alcalá Zamora and Miguel Maura respectively.[30]

The local elections of 12 April 1931 shocked the country. Turned into a popular plebiscite on the Monarchy, practically all the major cities returned a Republican-Socialist majority. It was not so much Republican strength as Monarchist defeatism that proved decisive. During the crucial twenty-four hours following the results, the artificial foundations of the regime simply disintegrated. The bewildered Monarchists, lacking willpower and baffled by the electoral outcome, conceded defeat and deserted *en masse*. Abandoned by his politicians and with an army opposed to stepping in as in 1923, Alfonso fled the country.[31] Without opposition the jubilant masses proclaimed the Second Republic.

The Second Republic. From Hope to Frustration

The establishment of the Republic meant the victory of popular will over royal sovereignty. However, the arrival of mass politics only increased the polarization and traditional divisions of the country. In fact, democracy could not have arrived at a worst moment. It was against a background of worsening economic conditions following the world depression and the successful march of political reaction in Europe that the new regime was born. Within this context, the reformist programme espoused by the Republic was bound to incense the traditional ruling economic classes. Now, new political parties represented them. Largely influenced by the emergence of European Fascism, they were authoritarian, nationalist and rabidly anti-democratic. Simultaneously, the Republic also failed to maintain the fervour among the masses as at a time of international depression it was impossible to find the capital to finance an ambitious programme of reforms. Thus when the rising expectations in traditionally aggrieved groups were not matched by reality, popular disenchantment began to replace the previous enthusiasm.[32]

For the first time in history, a coalition of left-wing parties controlled the apparatus of the state. The introduction of constitutional and social measures intended to modernize the nation and to protect the jobs and salaries of the lower classes was perceived by the vested financial interests as the antechamber of Bolshevism. It was the rural oligarchy above all that became the main bastion of opposition to the new regime.[33] It counted on the enthusiastic support of the Catholic Church, itself threatened with the end of its privileged position in society. Its powerful media echoed and inflated the vitriolic attacks of the Catholic hierarchy. The Republic was portrayed as the embodiment of anti-Spain: godless, satanic and evil. Vast resources were employed to mobilize the large numbers of Catholic farmers in Northern Spain and persuade them that they shared the same interests as those of the large landowners, the defence of private property, family and religion. That campaign was accompanied by subtle propaganda to win over the officer corps. The concession of autonomy to Catalonia was described as the beginning of the break-up of the fatherland and military reforms to professionalise the armed forces were made to appear as an attempt to crush the army. [34]

The first warning shot against the Republic was launched in August 1932 when General Sanjurjo rebelled in Seville to 'rectify' the revolutionary character that the regime was adopting.[35] The quick quelling of the coup produced the emergence of a new right-wing political coalition, the Spanish Confederation of Right-Wing Autonomous Groups (CEDA). Sharing the anti-Republican agenda of other right-wing groups, the more pragmatic CEDA believed in a legalist strategy: play the democratic game, build a mass party with which to win elections and then once in government destroy the regime from within.[36]

It was not only the concerted offensive from right-wing quarters that threatened the Republican administration. After a long internecine struggle, the hot-heads of the Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) emerged in control of the CNT. For them there was hardly any difference between Monarchy and Republic. If anything, the new political system was worse since their bitter rivals, the Socialists, were now represented in the government. Thus the FAI preached a policy of implacable hostility towards the new regime practising the so-called 'revolutionary gymnastics' or continuous violent urban and

rural uprisings in preparation for the final revolutionary offensive. A wave of revolts and wild-cat strikes were launched throughout the country causing numerous casualties and brutal retribution. Unconsciously, with their activities the Anarchists not only weakened the coherence of the Republic but also played the game of the Right whose media was enthusiastic to accuse the Republic of being a regime of chaos and disorder.[37]

More threatening in the long-term were the divergences that emerged within the ruling coalition and the subsequent toll they took on the firmest foundation of the new regime, the Socialist movement. The first cracks in the government in the autumn of 1931 were caused by the contentious article twenty-six banning religious education. The Catholic Prime Minister Alcalá Zamora resigned his position. Somehow, the rift was patched up when with the final approval of the constitution in December, Alcalá Zamora was elected first President of the Republic. Impossible to solve, however, was the growing hostility between the Radical Republican Party and the Socialists.

The Radicals could claim in 1931 the mantle of being the senior Republican Party. However, if they had abandoned their former revolutionary position of the early years of the century, they could not erase a past dominated by a shady reputation. Indeed, their rabid and fierce Jacobin stance had been tainted by all sorts of financial scandals in the running of municipal politics in Barcelona, double-deals and even allegations of being funded by monarchist governments in Madrid. In 1931 the Radical leader, Alejandro Lerroux, had been appointed Foreign Minister only because the others believed it was the Ministry which gave him fewest opportunities for embezzlement. Due to his seniority and having the largest Republican minority in parliament, he believed after Zamora's resignation that the position of Prime Minister belonged to him. Yet the Socialists instead lined up behind the young and energetic Minister for War, Manuel Azaña, leader of a small Left Republican Party. The Radicals abandoned the government and an embittered Lerroux gradually began to plot his come-back at whatever price. In this process, his party moved further to the Right as many former monarchists joined the Radical Party in order to disguise their past under the cover of 'republican respectability and historical prestige'. [38]

By 1933 frustration was beginning to replace the hope of the Republic's first days. It mainly affected the trade-unionist sector of the Socialist movement headed by the Labour Minister, Francisco Largo Caballero. Anger at the successful delaying tactics and massive propaganda of the Right was followed by despair as the Socialists realised that even as legislation was approved in Madrid it remained little more than hope on paper as it was often ignored in the provinces. Anarchist activities also placed them in the unwanted position of being part of a cabinet that could be accused of repressing the working class. They were aware of the growing class struggle in the countryside, the radicalization of the socialist rank and file, and the danger of losing ground to the CNT. Finally, Socialist bitterness was exacerbated by the manoeuvres of some Republicans to oust them from the government. Indeed, the Radicals had been wooing away small parties under the idea of 'returning control of the Republic to the Republicans'. The Radicals then tabled a motion of confidence in September that was won by the government with only a narrow majority. Using his presidential powers, Alcalá Zamora, mounted a constitutional coup and appointed a Radical cabinet without majority support in the chamber. Parliament thus had to be dissolved and new general elections ordered.[39]

The Slippery Road to War

Left republicans and Socialists made a colossal blunder in the elections of November 1933. The electoral law had been designed to reward majorities as a relatively small difference in votes meant huge swings in terms of seats. Largely due to Caballero's sector's growing frustration, they went to the polls presenting separate lists. Through tactical alliances, the CEDA and the Radicals emerged victorious. The CEDA with 115 seats had the largest parliamentary minority in parliament. Lerroux's party, with half the number of votes of the PSOE, obtained almost twice as many seats, 102.[40]

In December, the political deadlock was broken when Lerroux was confirmed Prime Minister in a Radical-dominated cabinet with the support of CEDA votes. To explain the Radicals' initiative as a

noble attempt to 'republicanize' the Legalist Right is not borne out by the events of the following two years. On the contrary, the Radicals became the Trojan Horse through which the Right won back the state machinery. For the CEDA, the Radicals were mere pawns in its long-term strategy. For the time being, they could be allowed to enjoy the spoils of office but in return they had to reverse the legislation introduced in the previous years. Furthermore, Radical administrations were short-lived affairs as they were continually held to ransom, dropping ministers or proposals not to the CEDA's liking. The objective was to foster political instability (there were eleven governmental crises in less than two years), split the Radicals and leave Lerroux more dependent on right-wing votes, until finally the CEDA could rule on its own, destroy the Republican constitution and create an authoritarian state.[41]

At the peak of the economic crisis in the country, the dismantling of the social reforms of the previous period produced the radicalization of the working classes. Yet exasperation turned to panic when the CEDA demanded for the first time in September 1934 to join the cabinet. In the light of contemporary events, where both Mussolini and Hitler had accepted a minority of portfolios in coalition governments and then easily destroyed democracy from within, many feared that Spain was heading a similar way. Even more recent and frightening was the Austrian example where Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, leader of a Catholic Party ideologically very similar to the CEDA, had staged a coup in February 1934 and established a dictatorship after the brutal repression of Socialists. Thus the announcement in October of a new administration in which the CEDA held three portfolios sparked a Socialist-led insurrection.

Foreshadowing the civil war, in October 1934 a state of war was declared throughout Spain and the army was given free rein to put down the rebellion. In a few days, the revolt had been quelled with enormous brutality everywhere but in Asturias. There the miners held out for almost a month. Their resistance was finally subdued by the use of troops from Africa. With the crushing defeat of the Left, a vicious and retaliatory counter-revolution began in earnest. About 40,000 Republican and Socialist militants languished in prisons with many others having to go into hiding or abroad. With unemployment soaring, wages were slashed, trade unions disbanded, peasants evicted, town councillors overthrown and replaced by nominees of the local *caciques*, the church restored to a prominent position, and Catalan autonomy suspended and its government replaced by a Governor-General appointed in Madrid. Spain was back to the worst times of the Monarchy.[42]

The aftermath of the October Revolution seemed to prove right the CEDA's legalist strategy. Its leader, Gil Robles used and abused his position to make and dismiss cabinets and gradually acquire more power. In the cabinet reshuffle of May 1935, the CEDA emerged, for the first time, as the single strongest party in the governmental coalition, with five portfolios. Gil Robles seized for himself the crucial post of War Minister. In that position, he transformed the army into a counter-revolutionary bulwark. Liberal officers were purged and their places filled by hard-liners. Yet the ultimate prize, the capture of the Premiership and the revision of the constitution escaped his grasp. A series of scandals in the Autumn of 1935 forced the Radicals out of office. Yet the President of the Republic refused to appoint a CEDA cabinet headed by Gil Robles and instead dissolved the chamber.[43]

The elections of February 1936 took place in a frenzied atmosphere with the country divided into two warring camps. Both sides fought the electoral contest as a question of survival. The Right, on a platform of defending the traditional values of Christianity against the perils of Bolshevism, established on a regional basis a National Bloc of the so-called forces of law and order. Due to Caballero's intransigence, it was more difficult for the Left to establish a nation-wide coalition. He had to give way as he was bypassed by the Communists and Anarcho-Syndicalists who backed the formation of an alliance or Popular Front of all the progressive forces in the country.[44]

The electoral results were very close. The centre was practically wiped out returning 51 Deputies (the Radicals only obtained four seats). The Popular Front won by a narrow margin; 4,654,116 to the Right's 4,503,524. Yet due to the electoral system, it meant a huge swing in terms of seats (the Right returned 124 Deputies, 88 belonging to the CEDA, and the Popular Front 278, 99 of them Socialists).[45]

With the CEDA's legalist tactic shattered by the outcome at the polls, the initiative passed to the advocates of violence. The Right began to put all its efforts into military insurrection. The Left, back

in power, was under heavy pressure by the radicalized masses to speed up reforms. With their expectations revitalised by the electoral victory, workers engaged in a wave of industrial strikes, demanding pay increases and better conditions while thousands of landless peasants began to occupy landed estates. The country sank into a climate of terror as right and left-wing extremists engaged in a orgy of political killings. This climate inevitably benefited the Right whose powerful media magnified and exaggerated every small incident in order to incite the army to end a republic of lawlessness and disorder.[46] Finally, the pretext for a coup arrived on 13 July, when following the pattern of tit for tat retaliation, a leading right-wing politician, José Calvo Sotelo was murdered. On the night of 17 July the army uprising began in Morocco and spread during the following days to the mainland.

It was not, however, the growing disintegration of public order, largely orchestrated by right-wing groups, or the fear of social revolution, as the Francoist historiography would have us believe, that led the Right to concentrate on a violent solution. The coup had been carefully planned immediately after the electoral defeat of February 1936 to prevent the new government introducing wide-ranging social and economic reforms.[47] At no time, had the conspirators anticipated massive popular resistance. They were confident that their uprising, in a country with a long tradition of military intervention, would lead to a relatively swift take-over. However, in contrast to other European countries whose constitutional regimes in the inter-war years were overthrown with hardly a struggle, Spaniards fought back. The insurrection only succeeded in their strongholds, that third of Spain that voted for the Right in February 1936. It was thus not the Republic but the military coup that turned out to be a failure and which in turn led to the civil war. Indeed, the Republic was 'failed' only after the internationalization of the conflict and thirty-three months of vicious struggle which effectively became a defining moment on the road to the Second World War.

NOTES

1 This has been eloquently shown in Britain by the recent controversy caused by Ken Loach's film *Land and Freedom*, the polemic caused by Laurie Lee's memories of his role in the Spanish Civil War and the attraction awakened by the visit of the surviving Commander of the Lincoln Battalion of the International Brigades, Milton Wolff.

2 M. Tuñón de Lara, *Poder y sociedad en España, 1900-1931* (Madrid, 1992), pp.109-14, 208-11.

3 The classical study on the foundations of the Liberal system is J. Varela Ortega, *Los amigos políticos: Partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración, 1875-1900* (Madrid, 1977).

4 J. Varela Ortega, 'Los amigos políticos: funcionamiento del sistema caciquista', J. Romero Maura, 'El caciquismo: tentativa de conceptualización', and, J. Tusell, 'La descomposición del sistema caciquista español', *Revista de Occidente*, no.127 (October 1973), pp.17-117; A. Robles Egea (ed.), *Política en penumbra. Patronazgo y clientelismos políticos en la España contemporánea* (Madrid, 1996), pp.1-40, 169-225; S. Cruz Artacho, 'Clientes, clientelas y política en la España de la Restauración', *Ayer*, no.36 (1999), pp.105-23.

5 F.J. Romero Salvadó, *Twentieth-Century Spain. Politics and Society in Spain, 1898-1998* (London, 1999), pp.13-4.

6 J.P. Fusi y A. Niño (eds.), *Antes del "desastre": Orígenes y antecendentes de la crisis del 98* (Madrid, 1996), pp.XI-XII.

7 Borja de Riquer, *Regionalistes i Nacionalistes, 1898-1931* (Barcelona, 1979), pp.42-9.

8 Romero Salvadó, *Twentieth Century*, pp.25-6.

9 A. Calero, 'El papel politico de la corona en el reinado de Alfonso XIII: criterios para una revision', in J.L. Garcia Delgado (ed.), *España 1898-1936: Estructuras y cambios* (Madrid, 1984), pp.271-84.

10 J. Connelly Ullman, *The Tragic Week: Anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912* (Harvard, 1968); P. Voltes, *La semana trágica* (Madrid, 1995).

11 G. Meaker, 'A Civil War of Words', H.A. Schmitt (ed.), *Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917-1923* (Charlottesville, 1988), pp.1-2, 6-7. F. J. Romero Salvadó, *Spain 1914-18. Between War and Revolution* (London, 1999), pp.8-17. Also see for division of the country into two camps, Public Record Office, *Foreign Office Record,* 371-2471/73.963. Secret Report (29 July 1915).

12   M. Cabrera, F. Comín and J.L. García Delgado, *Santiago Alba: un programa de reforma económica en la España del primer tercio del Siglo XX* (Madrid 1989), pp.369-424; F. Cambó, *Memorias* (Madrid 1987), pp.239-45.

13   Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Archivo Amaro del Rosal. *Records of the UGT's National Executive Committee* (AARD-IX; Year 1916). *EL Socialista* (28 March 1917).

14   J. Buxadé, *España en crisis. La bullanga misteriosa de 1917* (Madrid, 1918), pp.44-62; C.P. Boyd, *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain* (Chapel Hill, 1979), pp.61-8.

15   Real Academia de la Historia, *Romanones' Papers*, Leg.14, Exp.19 (The Assembly of Parliamentarians). F. Soldevilla, *El año 1917* (Madrid, 1918), pp.325-39.

16   The outbreak of a transport strike in Valencia in July coinciding with the celebration of the Assembly in Barcelona, gave the government the opportunity to regain the initiative. The plan was to provoke the labour movement into an ill-timed general strike in order to scare the bourgeoisie and implicate the officers in the repression. The Socialists went to painful extremes in order to avoid the expansion of the transport conflict, but they constantly ran into the intransigence of the company; an intransigence which was supported, if not inspired by the administration. See *El Socialista* (4-9 August 1917). Before the final rupture of dialogue had become inevitable, the Minister of the Interior, José Sánchez Guerra, was already giving instructions to the local Governors as if he knew for certain that there could be no negotiated solution. See *Archivo Historico Nacional*, Ministerio de Gobernación, Serie A. Leg.42A. Exp.1 (8 August 1917).

17   L. Simarro, *Los sucesos de agosto en el parlamento* (Madrid, 1918), pp.13-20, 50-1.

18   F.J. Romero Salvadó, 'The Organized Labour Movement in Spain: the Long Road to its Baptism of Fire', *Tesserae*, Vol.2, no.1 (1996), p.16.

19   Soldevilla, *El año 1917*, 363-98; J.A. Lacomba, *La crisis española de 1917* (Málaga, 1970), pp.257-71.

20   T. Carnero, 'Modernització, desenvolupament politic i canvi social: Espanya (1874-1931)', *Recerques*, 23 (1989), p.79.

21   Impatient with the moderation of the Socialist leadership, a majority of the Madrid section of the Socialist Youth decided in April 1920 to turn their organization into the Communist Party. The PSOE held an Extraordinary Congress in April 1921 to take a final decision over adherence to the Communist International. After an overall negative vote, a minority split forming the Communist Labour Party (PCOE). Under pressure of the Communist International, the two Communist parties were forced to merge in November 1921 forming the PCE. In the second half of 1924, they were joined by some Communist-Syndicalists from the CNT. However, the PCE remained a small force in Spanish politics until the outbreak of the Civil War.

22   On social violence see L. Ignacio, *Los años del pistolerismo. Ensayo para una guerra civil* (Madrid, 1981); A. Balcells, 'Violencia y terrorismo en la lucha de clases en Barcelona de 1913 a 1923' and F. del Rey Reguillo, 'Ciudadanos honrados y somatenistas. El orden y la subversión en la España de los años 20', both in *Estudios de Historia Social*, nos.42-43 (July-December 1987), pp.37-79, 97-150; E. González Calleja & F. del Rey Reguillo, *La defensa armada contra la revolución* (Madrid, 1995).

23   Fascist achievements were clearly hailed in the right-wing and Catholic press such as *La Acción, El Debate* and *ABC*.

24   M. Ballbé, *Orden público y militarismo en La España constitucional, 1812-1983* (Madrid, 1985), p.306.

25   J.L. Gómez Navarro, *El régimen de Primo de Rivera. Reyes, dictaduras y dictadores* (Madrid, 1991), pp.53-66.

26   S. Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above. The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-30* (Oxford, 1983), pp.127-60.

27   The Liberal leader Count Romanones and the Conservative J. Sanchez Guerra played a major role in these rebellions. See Real Academia de la Historia. *Natalio Rivas' Papers* (hereafter ANR), Legs. 11-8917-20.

28   Alfonso certainly knew of the military intrigue being organized in 1929 by General Batet, Military Governor at Cádiz, which counted on the support of many garrisons in the south and the sympathy of the Captain General of the region, Alfonso's brother-in-law. C. Navajas Zubeldia, *Ejército, estado y sociedad en España, 1923-1930* (Logroño, 1991), p.71.

29   For an excellent analysis of monarchist disarray see Ben-Ami, 'The Crisis of the Dynastic Elite in the Transition from Monarchy to Republic, 1929-1931', in P. Preston & F. Lannon (eds.), *Elites and Power in Twentieth-Century Spain: Essays in Honour of Sir Raymond Carr* (Oxford, 1990), pp.71-90.

30   M. Maura, *Así cayó Alfonso XIII* (Barcelona, 1995), pp.69-72.

31 The Prime Minister Aznar admitted openly this defeat. Asked by journalists if there was a crisis, he retorted honestly that there could be no bigger crisis than that of a country that went to bed monarchist and woke up republican. Maura, *Así*, p.153.

32 Romero Salvadó, *Twentieth Century Spain*, pp.70-1.

33 M. Cabrera, *La patronal ante la II República. Organizaciones y estrategia, 1931-1936* (Madrid, 1983), pp.274-9. The social legislation was far from revolutionary but if implemented could have crucial consequences, in particular in rural Spain. Salaries were increased and rents frozen. Arbitration committees to solve pending social disputes were established. The eight-hour working day was introduced to cover all types of labour. Finally, in order to solve unemployment in rural Spain, the Laws of Municipal Boundaries and Obligatory Cultivation were passed. The former meant that employers could not introduce outside labour until those in a given municipality had jobs; the latter that land had to be used for arable purposes or otherwise be expropriated. Apart from the pending threat of a thorough agrarian reform, the new laws meant that labourers now not only worked less hours but also that their wages were increased since owners were now forced to grant overtime pay whenever they required a longer workday, as they almost inevitably did during harvest. In the context of a world depression with agrarian prices and exports falling, it constituted a challenge to the land-owning class traditional sources of power and authority.

34 F. Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy. The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1975* (Oxford, 1987), pp.184-90; P. Preston, *The Coming of the Spanish Civil War. Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic* (London, 1994), pp.42-51.

35 See E. Ucelay-Da Cal, 'Buscando el levantamiento plebiscitario: insurrecionalismo y elecciones' in Juliá (ed.), *Política en la Segunda República*, Ayer n. 20 (1995), pp.71-2.

36 Preston, *The Coming*, pp.63-73

37 B. Martin, *The Agony of Modernization. Labour and Industrialization in Spain* (Ithaca, 1990), pp.310-25.

38 On Lerroux's shady past see ANR. Leg.11-8898. The Conservative González Besada declared: 'Only a man can lead a revolution in Spain, Lerroux, but as he can be bought, a revolution can never succeed' (27 January 1910); Liberal leader Count Romanones finances new Radical publications (1 February 1910). On Lerroux being mistrusted by other Republican ministers see Maura, *Así*, pp.85-8.

39 S. Juliá, 'Sistema de partidos y problemas de consolidación de la democracia' in Juliá (ed.), *Política*, pp.125-6.

40 M. Tuñón de Lara, *La II República*, Vol.2 (Madrid, 1976), p.11.

41 See for a positive view of the Radicals, S. Payne, *Spain's First Democracy* (Wisconsin, 1993), p.185. The opposite argument can be found in Cabrera, *Patronal*, p.22-5; and Preston, *The Coming*, 126-8.

42 Romero Salvadó, *Twentieth Century*, p.87.

43 Ballbé, *Orden*, pp.378-384; Preston, *The Coming*, pp.198-200.

44 By then the PSOE was divided between the sector led by Largo Caballero opposed to collaboration with Republicans and those for re-creating the electoral coalition of 1931 led by Indalecio Prieto. It was necessary for Jacques Duclos, the Comintern agent in France, to twice meet a stubborn Largo Caballero. The veteran trade unionist in the end gave way but with the condition of no ministerial responsibility. P. Heywood, *Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936* (Cambridge, 1990), pp.146-72.

45 Tuñón, *La II República*, Vol.2, p.166.

46 Preston, *The Coming*, p.254-8.

47 J.M. Gil Robles, *Memorias. No fue posible la paz* (Barcelona, 1998), p.697. On 8 March several leading army officers gathered at the house of the CEDA's unsuccessful candidate for Madrid, the stockbroker José Delgado, to organize a military coup.

Who Built the Soviet System? Lenin, Stalin and the Search for the Road to Socialism

DR CHRISTOPHER READ

In December 1991 the Soviet system, to use the conventional terminology, 'collapsed'. In a sense, however, the 'collapse' was one of the greatest non-events in history. Unlike earlier empires – Roman, Habsburg, Ottoman, British – the collapse had not been preceded by extensive violent struggles. Although plenty of consequences have flowed from it, the event itself caused little disruption to anyone's schedule. Everyday life continued the day after as it had the day before. There were no great celebrations of such an enormous event. Even the institutions at the heart of the collapsing system took the actual break in their stride. In the irony of ironies, the secret police, set up as the ultimate defence of the communist order, outlived the party and, in Vladimir Putin, has even produced an anti-communist President. The giant ministries – Internal Affairs; Foreign Affairs; those dealing with branches of the economy – simply changed their logos and continued as best they could. Central ministries became 'Russian', provincial ones 'Ukrainian', 'Estonian', 'Uzbek' and so on. Not a single civil servant lost her or his job, for the moment at least. What had, one day, been provincial branches of the Foreign Ministry began to deal with each other as representatives of foreign states, though not quite 'real' foreign states. They were designated 'the near abroad'. True, the new republics had been developing their own institutions alongside the All-Union ones with which they now merged but the point remains that, for such a major upheaval, there was remarkably little disruption of daily life which could be attributed directly to it. Even today, in the wake of the bloody war in Chechnya, the body count has been much lower than in comparable collapses.

Even so, processes of real disruption had begun before the collapse and continued after it. In contrast with the spectacular but, in the short term, painless political and institutional changes, the re-shaping of the formerly integrated economies of the new states was very different. In this area disruption continues and, arguably, given the extraordinary decline in life expectancy which has been its lugubrious barometer, has probably caused more 'excess deaths' than Stalin's Great Terror. These peculiarities of Soviet collapse have raised a multitude of questions. What exactly collapsed? Which factors were crucial to its demise, which peripheral? What does the experience tell us about planned economies? About socialism? About Russia? For the historian it also raises the issue of what exactly was the 'Soviet system' and where did it come from? In what follows I want to look at aspects of this question and reflect briefly on some of the implications for the other major questions.

By 1922 there had already been three (some would say four) 'Soviet systems' each of which represented, in part at least, a false start to the process of socialist construction. They also signify Bolshevik inexperience, unpreparedness for the task ahead and, of course, the complexities of transition to socialism for which no one had a blueprint. This is somewhat ironic in that one of Marxism's main claims to superiority over previous socialist philosophies was that it was 'scientific' while the others were 'utopian'. What was meant here was that while it was easy to raise visions of the socialist future only Marxism had a means of getting to it via proletarian revolution breaking the anticipated gridlock of capitalism once it ran out of exploitative opportunities. In fact, especially given the rudimentary nature of Russian capitalism, problems of transition were infinitely more complex than the party leaders had expected.

Looking back on Lenin's hazy ideas of April to October 1917 about what might follow on from a successful seizure of power one can only speculate about the degree of naivety or deception (perhaps self-deception) which they entailed. Despite the appalling economic and military problems facing the country Lenin argued that socialist transition would be 'gradual, peaceful and smooth.' Even more incredibly, he urged that only a political revolution would release the still immense 'reserves both material and spiritual' to enable Russia to fight off the Germans and control the counter-revolutionary elite. Some of Lenin's statements sound painfully naive – 'We shall take away all the bread and boots

from the capitalists.... and send them to the front' – even allowing for their symbolic and propagandistic content. Of course, Lenin did have a precedent. He was imagining the Bolsheviks as latter-day Jacobins ready to turn round the fortunes of Russia as spectacularly as his role models turned around the fortunes of revolutionary France in the Year II. How would the miracle be repeated? The banks were to be nationalised and the soviets would supervise the production and distribution of goods. Lenin seemed to expect that this would be enough to start the transition. Once political control had been taken, he argued, the old ruling class would realise the game was up and come quietly. The exemplary imprisonment of a recalcitrant few would make clear to the rest the futility of resistance to the overwhelming majority of the population. They could then, over an unspecified period of time, be coerced into socialism through the ever-increasing application of political pressure by the soviets.[1]

Sadly such dreams did not coincide with reality. Instead of co-operating with the new authorities, its more determined opponents struggled against it in a myriad of overt and covert ways. Among the most disruptive were strikes by administrators and flight of owners and managers. As everyone but Lenin had predicted, the October revolution added to the chaos of the country rather than, as Lenin had argued, reduced it. Lenin quickly trimmed his sails to the new winds and by early 1918 was being denounced by the party left for selling out not only over the issue of revolutionary war, which had been abandoned for the peace of Brest-Litovsk, but also for turning to a new policy of inequality in factories based on paying high wages to any managers and technical personnel prepared to stay on; breaking up factory committees and frustrating moves towards genuine workers' control and instead re-introducing one-person management. By the time he wrote 'The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government' in April 1918, a more foreboding discourse of 'iron proletarian discipline' and 'a big word' dictatorship had come to prevail. The second Soviet system – war communism – was under way.

It is not our task so much to depict the complexity of war communism as to point out its imprint in originating certain lasting features of the Soviet system. Indeed, the collapse of Lenin's initial transition plan already showed the emergence of one of the system's most enduring characteristics, productionism. In practice, this meant maximising economic, mainly industrial, output at almost any price. But it went beyond that. It had an important theoretical dimension. Given the absence of international revolution and the relatively backward state of Russian capitalism and hence of its working class, every effort must be made to expand industrial production. This would raise Russia's economic and social level to the point where socialism could be contemplated, since it was, in Marxist terms, only to be possible once capitalism had created the potential for economic 'abundance' but was prevented from realising that potential by its constricting social and economic relations. The imperative of productionism meant the abandonment for the foreseeable future of many socialist principles such as relative income equality, democratic management and so on, though there were limits. There was no question of wholesale re-introduction of private ownership of large-scale industry or of allowing widespread market principles or wage labour, although NEP disappointed many in the party by appearing to make further massive concessions in these directions.

In addition to productionism, the terrible twins of the administrative system – bureaucratisation and careerism – also made their debuts in the years of war communism. Once again, it is less their origin than their lasting influence which needs to be mentioned here.

In April 1917 Lenin had committed the Bolshevik party to the 'abolition of the police, army and bureaucracy' which would be replaced by various democratic alternatives. However, by 1919 Lenin was complaining that the revolution was being drowned in red tape. The emergence of a managerial elite is hardly surprising given the centralising tendencies of the party, the exigencies of civil war, economic collapse, the absence of owners and managers and the Bolsheviks' minority status in the country. What is, however, surprising is that none of Lenin's proposed countermeasures to bureaucratisation – limiting administrators salaries; introducing election and recall of officials; rotation of jobs throughout society – was ever seriously implemented either then or later.[2] Instead, by 1919 a party and state elite was emerging whose privileges were causing a scandal among ordinary Russians. For example, the Kronstadt sailors revolt of March 1921 was fuelled in part by the conspicuous relative luxury enjoyed by the Bolshevik commander of the base, Trotsky's ally Fedor Raskolnikov, and his partner Larissa Reisner.

Although, by capitalist standards, the fruits of office were meagre, none the less they were sufficient to attract people for their own sake. An unforeseen problem ensued. Hordes of uncommitted people flocked to party and state institutions simply in order to get better jobs. The Eighth and Ninth Party Congresses of 1919 and 1920 grappled with the issues but, apart from the rather contradictory policy of setting up yet more supervisory bodies to oversee the overseers, they did very little. There were also attempts to purge the party of unreliable elements. However, the unprecedented and ever-expanding supervisory role of the leadership was spreading into almost all areas of economic, social, political and military life causing a terrific, ultimately insatiable, demand for politically suitable qualified personnel. In the face of this, the attempt to purify the party was doomed. Those driven out were often recalled months later because they were desperately needed.

Bureaucratisation, careerism and productionism were *primary* consequences of the main structural elements of the Russian revolution – a revolution conducted by an avant-garde minority dedicated to an ultimately utopian transformation of a semi-developed country. By 1921 many other, more easily identified, *secondary* consequences arising from the primary ones had come into existence, notably a one-party state; censorship; secret police; political imprisonment and other longstanding features of the party dictatorship. These were more than just responses to the civil war as is shown by the fact that the ending of the civil war did not even raise the question of changing direction towards more recognised conceptions of democracy. In fact, in 1920-22 the third variant of the Soviet system, NEP, was formed.[3]

The core of NEP was the replacement of armed requisitioning of food products by a tax in kind and partial restoration of market relations. The arrangements surrounding NEP were Lenin's last effort at system construction and the evidence is clear that he thought he had providentially discovered a solution to the problem of transition, therefore we need to look carefully at what he expected of it.

NEP is often seen as a step towards liberalisation. However, under NEP many of the characteristics of the dictatorship were strengthened rather than weakened. The temporary political police became permanent. Censorship spread to include not only theatre but also music. Some observers even thought it was the beginning of a path leading to capitalist restoration. In particular, a group of émigrés and former Whites, known as National Bolsheviks, thought this was the case. The withdrawal of the state from small business and the peasant economy to what Lenin called 'the commanding heights' – mainly heavy industry; taxation policy; transport; international trade and so on – led them to believe that the Soviet government would be forced ever further down the path of 'normalising' post-revolutionary Russia. They were not alone. Many in the party, including Lenin, were aware of the, as they saw it, danger of sliding down this slope. To counterbalance the liberalisation of the economy, Lenin called for greater political 'harmony' and 'unity' in the face of a counter-revolutionary menace which, he informed the Tenth Party Congress in his opening speech, was 'in some respects more severe and more dangerous than before'. In order to implement the new line he severely attacked and outlawed the oppositions within the party – chiefly the Workers' Opposition but also the less threatening Democratic Centralists – and instituted a Ban on Factions to prevent the emergence of any further organised oppositions within the party.

As far as any legalisation of other parties was concerned Lenin was even more forthright. In his notes preceding the Tenth Party Congress of March 1921, which enacted the provisions on the oppositions, he jotted down 'Mensheviks – to be shot if they show their noses.' In fact, as recent views of the 'unknown Lenin'[4] have overlooked, such bloodthirsty rhetoric was rarely followed literally. No Mensheviks were shot. In fact, many senior Mensheviks became part of the economic planning apparatus, including N.N. Sukhanov whose ideas on the revolution Lenin was, as we shall see, ridiculing at that time. Even so, while non-Bolshevik individuals were tolerated, no mercy was shown to their organisations which were ruthlessly broken up. In one of Soviet Russia's first political show trials in 1922 a group of leading SRs were sentenced to imprisonment. Again some of them were initially sentenced to death but none was actually executed. Also in 1922, some 250 intellectuals were bundled into foreign exile at short notice and, not coincidentally, the university system, in which many of them had been employed, was brought more firmly under the thumb of the Bolsheviks.

The repressive aspects of NEP can be explained in part by the circumstances of its birth. It sprang

from a 'retreat', or rather defeat, occasioned by peasant resistance to war communist policies, particularly armed requisitioning of grain and in part by the Bolsheviks' continuing minority status. To democratise would have been suicide, even in the cities, so weak was their support. But that is not the whole story. In Lenin's view, not only was there no contradiction between greater economic freedom and greater political repression, they were mutually dependent. The political possibilities for opponents of the regime – kulaks, nepmen (traders) and *spetsy* (non-Bolshevik engineers, managers and army officers) – opened up by economic relaxation had to be countered by increased political and cultural vigilance. So how could this dubious looking compromise represent a viable road to socialism?

Lenin fell increasingly ill from late 1921 onwards and withdrew from day-to-day management of affairs into a slightly more distanced and philosophical role. In his writings of this last period he reflected on the current conjuncture and found it promising. 'All that was needed' to turn NEP into socialism was 'a cultural revolution' particularly among the peasants, by which Lenin meant that they should modernise their attitude to trade and switch on to science, education and the Bolshevik dream. In NEP, he argued, the party had stumbled into an ideal balance of private and collective interest. Propaganda and material progress would increasingly demonstrate the superiority of the collectivist interest. A dynamic would be set up leading the peasants, through pursuit of their own interests, to see socialism as the way forward and they would increasingly turn to it and abandon their outdated traditional practices. In this way, accompanied by parallel industrialisation stimulated by agrarian modernisation and the release of surplus rural labour, NEP would lead the peasants from the past to the future. It was on the back of these assumptions that Lenin was able to reply to the criticisms of the revolution expressed by the great diarist and eyewitness of 1917, N.N. Sukhanov, in his memoirs published in Berlin in 1922. Sukhanov argued that the Bolshevik enterprise was unmarxist and would fail because the preconditions for socialism – notably an advanced industrial economy and an abundance of highly educated, politically conscious, convinced revolutionary workers – were not met in Russia. What if, Lenin replied, one could actually seize political power first and then nurture those preconditions? The experience of the revolution opened up such a path and was worth more than the pontificating of a thousand Marxist pedants.[5] Arguably, practically the whole Soviet period went by with the government attempting to nurture the preconditions which should have brought it to power in the first place.

However that may be, there is no doubt that Lenin believed NEP was the way forward and would, through its natural evolution, lead on to socialism. In Lenin's view NEP was the transitional Soviet system. Yet only seven years after its adoption it was being replaced. Why was a fourth Soviet system necessary and what were its features?

Three closely related pressures combined to bring about the downfall of NEP. As early as 30 March 1925 the head of the Red Army, Mikhail Frunze, warned of the Soviet Union's lack of preparedness in the event of renewed foreign intervention.[6] Although he died shortly after, his warning was reinforced by the onset of a war scare in 1927. Many historians have seen the war scare as an event manipulated by the Stalin leadership to help assert control over the country. However, the case is not so clear cut. After all, Stalin did not manipulate the rupture of diplomatic relations with Britain which was one of the central aspects of the phenomenon.[7] In any case, certain facts were clarified. The Soviet Union was vulnerable.

Secondly, from the point of view of productionism, NEP appeared to be running out of steam by 1927-8. In 1928 grain supplies from the countryside had fallen to such an extent that rationing had to be introduced. The underlying cause was the famous scissors crisis. What this meant was that agricultural prices were falling and industrial prices rising in relation to each other. Like the blades of opening scissors, they were getting further apart. They had to be brought closer together in order to restore an incentive for peasants to sell grain since this was the fulcrum of NEP. Raising grain prices was a possibility but this would have the, from the party's point of view, undesirable consequence of transferring resources in the wrong direction – from industrial investment to the peasants.

Thirdly, there was a growing restlessness in the party at the slow pace of change. Having been excited by the heady victories of the revolution and civil war, many, particularly younger, party militants were impatient with the slow progress of NEP and intolerant of its hangers on – the petty

traders, kulaks and 'bourgeois' engineers and managers. They wanted to speed up Russia's transformation and, eventually, conquer the world for socialism not advance at 'the pace of the peasant nag' in the words of the chief architect of NEP, Nikolai Bukharin. Such a mundane prospect was not for them. Lenin's warning that pressuring the peasantry was inadmissible and the alliance between worker and peasant (the *smychka* in Russian) should be unbreakable, was forgotten. Bukharin was being left behind by events.

A fourth factor also impinged. It was only with the clear victory of the Stalin group over the United Opposition – which resulted in the expulsion of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev from the party in December 1927 – that there was an undivided leadership able to take action over the growing crises. Incidentally, the Fifteenth Congress that threw them out also took steps towards one of Stalin's first extensions of the Lenin system. It established the idea of a General Line in the party from which no one could dissent. It was a step beyond banning factions. In essence it made individual criticism of the party line practically impossible and marked a major step on the road to making the party merely the chief cheerleader for the leadership.

The link between the three pressures subverting NEP was that the answer to all of them was faster industrialisation. The consequence of the fourth factor was that the new direction would bear an indubitably Stalinist stamp. Essentially, this meant it would be undertaken crudely, brutally and in a utopian, workerist and voluntarist spirit. It also meant that the political dimension would be as prominent, maybe more prominent, than the economic. Stalin's triple whammy – collectivisation, rapid industrialisation and the terror – built on already existing foundations, notably the one-party police state introduced by Lenin, but added new features to complete the final Soviet system which endured until the Gorbachev era.

The chief outcome of these developments as far as building the Soviet system was concerned, was that they resulted in the emergence of the Command Economy or, as it was known in the Perestroika era, the Administrative-Command System. The effect of the Stalin revolution of 1928-32 was to centralise the economic system to an extraordinary and unprecedented decree. More or less every aspect of economic life – industrial, agricultural and service-based – traced its chain of authority back to a Moscow ministry and to the planning apparatus – Gosplan. Everyone, from weapons developer to ice-cream seller, worked to a centrally generated plan. It was the apotheosis of productionism and bureaucratisation. Far from being brought under control they were now the dominant features of the system with a powerful, unchallengeable political leadership at the centre. Finally, whether the purges were motivated by Stalin's self-aggrandisement or, as seems increasingly likely, by a genuine but paranoid fear that the country was threatened by enemies within[8], one major outcome was clear. The party was being turned from a political organisation, in any real sense of the term, into a managerial elite. Its task was to salute the leadership and oversee the implementation of central policy, first and foremost the Five Year Plan. There were further stages of consolidation resulting from the experience of the Second World War and of the ensuing Cold War, but they did not entail further major structural changes. Henceforth, the Soviet Union was dominated by a handful of institutions – the Internal Affairs Ministry with its political police force; the Defence Ministry with its armed forces; Gosplan and its associated economic ministries and last, and certainly least, at this point, the party. However, the Supreme Soviet and its Executive and, to a greater degree in the post-Stalin period, the party Central Committee were the arenas in which the big chiefs of these powerful organisations fought their battles and settled their differences. In Stalin's day, looming over them all, was the shadow of the leader propelled by the cult of personality and his personal dictatorship.

However, the apparently indestructible and immensely powerful system contained the seeds of its own demise. Fifty years ago Isaac Deutscher pointed out that the modernising elements of Stalinism, notably mass education to tertiary level, were incompatible with its restraints. Also it was to show itself to be increasingly inflexible and too arthritic to re-make itself once the initial energy behind it, and the impetus given by the Nazi invasion, had passed. But another massively corrosive force was at work. The third member of our trinity – careerism – was on the rampage and it was the triumph of careerism over revolutionary enthusiasm in the bureaucracy which corrupted it from within. Well before its final collapse, the system was breeding careerists much more successfully than it was

breeding socialists. Khrushchev tried to re-energise the revolutionary potential of the elite but Brezhnev's policy of 'stability of cadres' gave careerism the green light so long as privileges were not flaunted in too blatant a fashion, active loyalty was shown to the leadership and a designated minimum obeisance was made to the increasingly hollow official ideology. When Gorbachev opened the system up, the careerist bureaucracy, as we have seen in the last decade and a half, made a run for it, grabbing everything they could and turning themselves in the process from a partially constrained bureaucracy into a crude, pirate capitalist bourgeoisie.[9]

So, at the end of the day, the Soviet system should be seen, in large part, as the outcome of the structural peculiarities of the Russian revolution not just as the result of the whims of albeit powerful individuals, still less as a definitive model of a Marxist society or even as a 'typical' planned economy. However, this is not to say that the Soviet system was fully determined from the outset. Obviously, its development was influenced by contingent factors and by its leaders but they worked within a framework larger than themselves. Successive leaders made their own mark but, in the final analysis, the many peculiarities of the Russian situation – including a 'backward' population; the cultural survivals of serfdom; the clash between the utopian, mobilising tendencies of the Bolsheviks and their minority status; the peculiar relationship between the government and the peasant – limited what they could do and limited the significance of the Soviet system as a universal model of any kind.

NOTES

1   See Christopher Read *From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and Their Revolution 1917-21* London 1996 p.166-7 for a fuller account.

2   Provisions of this kind can be found in V.I. Lenin *The State and Revolution* and in Lenin's 'April Theses'. The controversy around the latter was excellently analysed by Patricia Collins in 'April Theses and April Crises: Lenin and the Leadership of the Russian Revolution' *History Teaching Review Year Book* volume 13, 1999.

3   Vladimir Brovkin argues that the proposed militarisation of labour in 1920 constituted a separate variant from war communism and played a significant role in provoking the disturbances of 1920. However, the proposals were transient and hardly implemented. See Vladimir N.Brovkin *Behind the Front Lines of Civil War: Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia 1918-1922* Princeton 1994 pp.272-299.

4   Richard Pipes (ed.) *The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archive* (Annals of Communism) New Haven, London 1996.

5   The two articles in question are V.I. Lenin 'On Co-operation' and 'Our Revolution (A propos of N. Sukhanov's Notes)' both written in January 1923.

6   M. Harrison and J. Barber (eds) *The Soviet Defence-Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev* London 2000 p.35

7   A British briefing of the period described it as 'a genuine, not a pretended fear'. Lennart Samuelson *Plans for Stalin's War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning 1925-41* London 2000 p.35.

8   F. Chuev, *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: Iz Dnevnika F.Chueva*, Moscow, 1991 translated into English as *Conversations with Molotov* and J. Arch Getty, Oleg V. Naumov *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939* (Annals of Communism) New Haven, 1999 illustrate the fear of enemies at the heart of the system.

9   This is confirmed by George Soros's graphic personal account of his dealing with leading ex-Soviet bureaucrats turned 'oligarchs' in George Soros 'Who Lost Russia?' *New York Review of Books* Volume XLVII, Number 6, 13 April 2000, pp.10-16.

Britain in the Second World War: issues and debates

ROBERT MACKAY

More than half a century after its ending, new perspectives and new information continue to make the Second World War a field of debate among historians. It ought to be said at once that some of the issues that are argued over are not strictly speaking the business of history at all (history, that is, as the interpretation of past events). Broadly, these fall into the category of 'counter-factual' enquiries of the sort that make interesting and entertaining television debates but which rightly are excluded from proper historical study, e.g. Would a coalition government in 1939 have averted the mistakes of the Phoney War? Was Britain wrong to refuse Hitler's peace offer in October 1940? Would a collaborationist government have appeared if Britain had been defeated in 1940? To the extent that the answers to such questions depend on speculation about what might have happened as opposed to what did happen then they are not our concern here. There are nevertheless many aspects of the war – the actions and experiences of leaders and led – that appear as unsettled issues in its history. The parlour-game questions may well be informed by the debates on these issues but they cannot be a substitute for them.

Diplomacy and strategy is the aspect of the war that has been most beset by the counter-factual tendency. It is also a dimension to which a 'British history" approach is problematical: since Britain had allies for most of the war, a distinct British policy is not always easy to discern, especially once policy formation has given way to political or military action. One might say this of the failure of Britain and France to follow their declaration of war with an attack on Germany. British policy had to work in harness with that of France; the French connection, therefore, insistently intervenes as a variable in the explanation of British policy.

The western allies' military inactivity has elicited various interpretations among commentators. With the bulk of German forces engaged in Poland an exploitable opportunity was there to be exploited, with odds on for military success against low grade, numerically inferior and poorly-equipped German defenders. An Allied victory at this point, moreover, might have encouraged Hitler's opponents in the German High Command to act against him. The most practical explanation offered is that the French were locked into a defensive strategy, physically represented by the Maginot Line, and were unwilling to adapt this, unplanned, for offensive operations (Lamb 1993). In any case, they were waiting until Britain had built up a mass army (at this point 90% of Allied forces were French) and this would take many months. A less negative view, and one that has taken the public statements of the leaders at face value (Taylor derided these calculations as 'fantasy'), is that Britain and France decided together that the most effective strategy was to play the 'long game', i.e. impose a blockade that would choke off Germany's external supplies and undermine Hitler's position at home, build up armaments and forces to out-match those of Germany, and meanwhile hold a defensive line at the French border. The war would be won possibly by blockade alone, since the German economy would collapse and the Nazi regime would implode (Howard 1993). Others give a more sinister interpretation: the real explanation for Allied inactivity was the persistence of appeasement. The 'men of Munich' were still in power and they still hoped to avoid all-out war by some sort of deal, if not with Hitler, then with whoever replaced him. Once a direct attack on Germany had been made, it was argued, the chances of achieving such a negotiated peace would have been much reduced (Ciencala 1989; Lamb 1993). In the event, popular sentiment was against further compromise, as the wide support for Churchill's defiant posture in June 1940 confirmed.

An aspect of Allied strategy with which Britain was particularly associated was the 'area bombing' of Germany, by which strategic targets were in effect absorbed into a more general attempt to wreck Germany's economy, and de-house and demoralize its civilian population. Few strategies have engendered more argument both at the time and since. The main historical argument is about the value of the strategy to the Allied war effort and its effect on the outcome of the war. At one extreme are

those who argue that it was a waste of valuable resources that might have been better deployed; that it harmed Britain more than it harmed Germany; that, in short, it was an expensive failure. The evidence used to support this view includes the rising volume of German war production until mid-1944, the holding up of civilian morale, and the huge cost in lives of aircrew and lost aircraft (Taylor 1965; Calvocoressi et al 1982; Parker 1989; Kitchen 1990; Keegan 1995). On the other side of the debate defenders of the strategy point to its morale-sustaining effect on the beleaguered British during the early years of the war and on the peoples suffering under the German occupation. They note, too, that the bombing had political value in helping to sustain the alliance with the USSR; that by forcing Germany to produce fewer bombers and more fighters in order to defend herself from air attack it took pressure off Soviet forces on the Eastern Front and off the civilians in Britain's cities; that the acknowledged successes of RAF Bomber Command in the last year of the war in hitting precision targets depended on the technical and operational experience of the relatively unsuccessful area bombing campaigns of 1940-43; that, expensive though it was, it absorbed only 7% of Britain's war effort. Although most historians rate mass bombing a failure, many nevertheless acknowledge the validity of one or more of these counter-arguments in its defence. One, Richard Overy, stands apart. For him Britain's area bombing operations had great value as part of 'one of the decisive elements in Allied victory'. According to Hitler's Munitions Minister, Albert Speer, he notes, the final victory of the bombers in 1944 was 'the greatest lost battle on the German side'.

After over thirty years of invisibility, Britain's policy towards the plight of the Jews in Europe is now a high profile aspect of her wartime role. Much of the comment has been critical, focusing on Britain's imposition of a quota on emigration of Jews to Palestine (ruled by Britain under League of Nations mandate) before the war; its refusal to take in wartime Jewish refugees from Axis persecution or to encourage neutral states to do so; its tendency to disbelieve the evidence of the mass killing of Jews; its dismissal of the suggestion that Allied bombers be used to destroy the killing installations at Auschwitz (Wasserstein 1979; Gilbert 1981; Kushner 1994). British leaders knew as early as 1942 about the mass killing of Jews, it is argued, but they refused to recognize its particularity, choosing to subsume it into a general condemnation of Nazi criminality, the only solution to which was the destruction of Hitler's regime itself. Some explain this in terms of latent anti-semitism in the British ruling establishment (Kitchen 1990; Gilbert 1981; Ofer 1994). Others put it down rather to the numbing effect of the violent experience of total war: the loss of life on a large scale was commonplace, and the capacity of people to show special sympathy for one particular group of sufferers when all were to some degree suffering, was limited (Parker 1989). Most commentators say that Britain could have done more or at least tried to do more for the Jews, but they recognize that in the circumstances only a marginal difference could have been made to the outcome. Some, like Keegan, underwrite the thinking of Churchill's government, i.e. that winning in the struggle against the enemy's armed forces was the only way to end its policies (Keegan 1995; Rubinstein 1997).

The domestic politics of the war, in which a decade of Conservative dominance gave way to coalition government and then to the return of Labour to power, have stimulated two related areas of debate: the 'swing to the Left' in popular opinion and the emergence of consensus among the political parties on a wide range of policy for welfare and the economy.

Labour's electability clearly improved dramatically during the war years; the landslide victory of 1945 could not have been predicted in 1939. According to some commentators the explanation for Labour's new popularity was the effect of the common experience of the war in radicalising the voters (Miliband 1972; Addison 1975; Morgan 1984; Hennessy 1992). Others single out the publication and public discussion of the Beveridge Report as the significant factor in this trajectory. Jefferys argues that the reactions of the political leaders were crucial to popular perceptions of the main parties (Jefferys 1991). The Conservatives, in cautiously emphasizing the cost of implementing Beveridge and the need first to put Britain's post-war finances onto a firm footing, were perceived as lukewarm and therefore less likely to implement Beveridge that Labour, whose attitude to the Report was altogether more positive and welcoming. Consequently, it is argued, opinion shifted leftwards behind the party most likely to bring in popular measures outlined in the Report. The implication that a more radical edge had been given to popular attitudes has been queried, however. Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo (1995) read the evidence as pointing to only a small minority of the population becoming

more radical. The priority of the majority, they argue, was to re-establish life at home and work on a civilian basis as quickly as possible. While no one wanted a return to the wretchedness of the 1930s there was very little interest in how politics might ensure this. Fielding argues elsewhere that Labour's 1945 success masked a general disaffection with political parties that had existed in the 1930s and had intensified during the war; Labour was more electable not because it was the great hope of the masses inspired by its ideals but because it was less unpopular than the Conservatives (Fielding 1995).

Debate about whether or not there was political consensus, growing out of cooperation within the wartime coalition and persisting into the post-war period, has been a prominent feature of British historiography. Paul Addison postulates that by 1945 the main parties were broadly agreed on the principles of social and economic reconstruction. On welfare reform, the maintenance of full employment, the retention of a mixed economy and conciliation of the trade unions, there was, he argues, little to choose between the parties; the issues that divided them, such as nationalization of industry, were outweighed by those on which they agreed. The proof was in the coalition white papers on social insurance, a national health service, employment policy and land use; and two large pieces of legislation – the 1944 Education Act and the 1945 Family Allowances Act (Addison 1975). In this analysis Addison has been broadly supported by Barnett (1997) Kavanagh and Morris (1994), Lowe (1990 and Dutton (1997). The thesis has been challenged, however. It is argued that the coalition concealed fundamental divisions on how post-war problems should be tackled and which should be tackled first. The white papers merely symbolized the areas of policy that needed to be addressed; they were a substitute for real action and even on paper avoided the detailed issues on which agreement was impossible (Harris 1986; Pimlott 1988; Jefferys 1991; Brooke 1992; Fielding, Thompson, Tiratsoo 1995). The white paper on a national health service was a case in point: in the year that followed its publication in February 1944 all attempts to give the proposals a concrete reality foundered. As the official historian of the NHS concludes: 'the fragile agreement between the coalition partners over the White Paper broke down. Thus in the last year of the coalition the two partners kept their separate counsels' (Webster 1988). A further thread in the debate about political consensus differentiates between the appearance of broad agreement on principles, which came from the political need of the ministers in the coalition not to be seen as rocking the boat of national unity while the war was on, and the less constrained attitudes of the PLP on the one hand and the Conservative 1922 Committee on the other, which, in the debates on the white papers, revealed ideological divergence at Westminster as strong and persistent as among rank and file activists of both parties in the country (Jefferys 1991).

For many years after its ending, one aspect of the war comfortably basked in historiographical consensus: national solidarity remained firm under the strains of total war, indeed, it was reinforced by them. The shared experiences of evacuation, bombing, war service and austerity served only to demonstrate that the well-known differences relating to region, class and status were in the end less important than the sense of belonging to a national community. The veracity of this rather cosy image of a nation united in the spirit of Dunkirk and the Blitz, cheerful, resourceful and unselfish, has been questioned in recent years. The revisionist view draws attention to some negative features of 'the people's war' that had previously been ignored or neglected: looters descending on bombed premises; crime flourishing under cover of the blackout; profiteering and bribery by manufacturers; black-marketeering and ration-book fraud; evasion of evacuation billeting obligations; class war and town *versus* country in the reception areas; absenteeism and low productivity in industry; confrontational labour-management relations; panic and defeatism after big air-raids; hostility towards refugees and ethnic minorities (Smithies 1982; Crosby 1986; Macnicol 1986; Ponting 1990; Fielding et al 1995; Ziegler 1995). Much of the argument in the debate revolves around the scale, and therefore the significance, of these negative features, and the relative weight of such statistics as are available against the factors of qualification and mitigation. Certainly the holders of the traditional view are not ready to concede that the evidence so far adduced reclassifies the 'spirit of the Blitz' as merely a myth created for propaganda purposes by an inspired government official in 1940 and perpetuated in popular memory by an unreflective and complacent public ever since. For them, the failings of the few are outweighed by the heroism, altruism and social solidarity of the many (Stevenson 1984; Thorpe 1992; Hennessy 1992; Clarke 1996; Mackay 1999).

An enduring theme of second world war historiography that has some common ground with the

'political consensus' notion referred to above, has been the relationship between the war experience and social reform. As early as 1950 Richard Titmuss postulated that the collective experience of the people in the war caused a profound change in public values. Evacuation, conscription, rationing and air-raids, so the theory goes, made the privileged aware of the condition of the poor. Egalitarian and collectivist communal values were strengthened and these helped to form and give legitimacy to the social and economic reforms begun under the coalition and continued and widened in scope under the Labour government. At the same time popular expectations about the role of the state were expanded: 'big government' had organized the nation for victory and it was felt this model could be adapted to organize peacetime society. Titmuss's thesis was for long broadly followed by historians and commentators (Taylor 1965; Runciman 1966; Fraser 1973; Barnett 1986). More recently, studies have queried its validity, one bluntly calling it a 'myth' (Macnicol 1986). On the particular question of evacuation as a stirrer of the middle-class conscience and generator of concern with social inequalities, Macnicol argues that the extension of milk and meals provision for school-children was merely the implementation of plans drawn up before the war and that the relaxation of means testing was the response to the practical difficulty of keeping track of a mobile population of children. This critique was supported by others (Digby 1989; Berridge 1990; Lowe 1990; Fielding 1997). On the supposed influence of the evacuation on educational reform, Thom maintains that the 1944 Education Act, which entrenched the socially-divisive tripartite system, owed very little to the perceived egalitarianism generated by the evacuation and reflected rather the thinking of the 1938 Spens Report. This case might serve to illustrate the general critique of the 'war as catalyst' thesis. Several studies of wartime social policy echo Thom's concern to restore the importance of the pre-war period in shaping thinking and in providing practical models. These studies have cast doubt on the idea that wartime social policy represented a sharp break with tradition and have pointed rather to the importance of continuities. Thus the incorporation of the old Poor Law principle of 'less eligibility' into the newly-established system for universal family allowances, and the orthodox fiscal and budgetary thinking that restricted the universal 'subsistence minimum' in Beveridge's Plan (Macnicol 1980; Harris 1982). The Titmuss thesis has continued to find adherents, however. Holman (1995), while conceding that the effects of the evacuation on social reform have been exaggerated, says it was nevertheless 'a shock all round,' and Welshman (1998) argues that the evacuation was instrumental in the reassessment of the work of the School Medical Service. Forty years of research and reflection have replaced what now seems the rather simplistic explanation of the social policy of the 1940s associated with Titmuss and the official historians with a more nuanced and complex picture of the stimulus of the wartime experience that sets it in its longer-term context and discloses the range of interests and ideologies at work in the process of reconstructing British society.

The impact and longer-term effects of the war on the role and status of women in society has been a subject of (often contentious) discussion among historians. Much of the discussion has focused on the additional opportunities for new roles in paid work that the war provided, and on the implication of this for women's traditional role of caring for home, husband and children and for the wider issue of sexual equality. Marwick maintains that the retaining or taking on of married women in occupations where previously there had been a marriage bar, together with the expansion of day nurseries for young children, decisively undermined the prejudice against employing married women (Marwick 1974). Smith, however, argues that this gain needs to be seen against the persistence of unequal pay and gender segregation of jobs in most sectors of employment. Within marriage, too, he suggests, the sexual division of labour remained unchanged (Smith 1986). Several commentators say that it had never been the intention of the government to disturb these traditions; on the contrary, official propaganda, while encouraging women into war work, took pains to emphasize that women's femininity and traditional role need not be damaged by work in the factories and uniformed services (Carruthers 1990). Newspapers, magazines and films, meanwhile, portrayed women's wartime employment as a temporary necessity and promoted the idea that when the war was over their return to the traditional family roles would be in the natural order of things (Kirkham 1995). Summerfield recognizes that the war permanently expanded the opportunities for older and married women to engage in paid work, but emphasizes that this work was, and has remained, mainly part-time and lowest in status and remuneration. She also argues that while the war enhanced women's self-awareness and accelerated the rise of the companionate marriage and the readiness to dissolve an unsatisfactory one, it did little or nothing to

disturb the basic division of labour on gender lines either in the work place or in the home (Summerfield 1988). The relative scepticism about the influence of the war on the role of women that has characterized recent research has served to re-establish the authority of the older view that, as with other aspects of social change, long-term trends are as important as ever to understanding. Dramatic though the war seemed in its disturbance to existing arrangements and attitudes, its longer-run effects were mostly in line with developments that were well-established even before the First World War. Then, women lived in a male-dominated culture and economy. By 1945, although greater independence and equality had been won, in part through the agency of war, this imbalance was still clearly evident.

In the area of the war economy two issues recur in the analyses of historians: the quality of economic performance (in terms of mobilization of resources, productivity and financial management); and the extent to which wartime controls initiated a shift in economic orthodoxy towards the ideas of J. M. Keynes.

About the expansion of the economy there is no dispute: between 1939 and 1945 National Income increased by two thirds; of the principal combatant countries only the USA surpassed Britain's increase in real domestic product. In labour mobilization, too, Britain was among the most efficient: only the USSR, with 54% of workers in war-related work did better than Britain with 45.3% (Harrison 1988). Commentators have found little to criticize, moreover, in the government's financial policies: post-war indebtedness was inevitable, given the huge cost of waging modern war, but no country matched Britain's achievement of finding 54.2% of government expenditure out of current revenue. Productivity, however, is an issue on which commentators have disagreed. In absolute terms, worker productivity was only 4% higher in 1945 than in 1939 and, as critics have pointed out, this is the worst performance of the principal combatants: Germany 12%, USA 25%, USSR 28% (Milward 1977). Varying weights have been given to several factors of explanation. Barnett places more emphasis than most on the failings of the workers: lethargy, absenteeism, an attachment to restrictive practices, an adversarial attitude towards managers and a readiness to strike over trivial issues (Barnett 1987). Others insist that a balanced view must take account of factors over which the workforce had no control: the disruptions to the supply of the material resources for production, the weariness caused by the long wartime shifts, the ageing composition of the workforce, the difficulty of maintaining skill levels and the general unreadiness of industry for a productive surge, which was the legacy of the Depression in many sectors (Thoms 1989). Britain's comparative inefficiency has, moreover, been seen to relate to something more fundamental than labour-management attitudes and traditions: the level of capitalization. The capital-to-labour ratio declined by 13.1% during the war. This contrasted with the massive capital inputs, particularly in the form of special-purpose machine tools, that went into the much more efficient American industry. In sum, earlier judgements on Britain's workforce have been shown to be unfairly harsh in the light of the mitigating factors that research has disclosed; a more complex, multifactoral explanation of underperformance is now the norm (Floud & McCloskey 1994).

Did the need to create a war economy usher in a 'Keynesian revolution' in policy-making? The landmarks for those who think so are the budget of 1941 and the 1944 employment white paper. Sayers argues that the budget was the first that aspired to regulate expenditure and control inflation. Its method was to forecast national income and expenditure and thereby decide on the correct level of taxation to achieve this (Sayers 1983). Monetary and fiscal policy, then, was influenced by the acceptance, at least in part, of the validity of Keynes's theory of the behaviour of economic aggregates (Booth 1984). Also, the white paper on employment was Keynesian in its acceptance of the principle that it was the task of government to secure a high and stable level of employment, even though, as Booth argues, the Labour government and Treasury officials only gradually over the first two years of the peace embraced macro-economic demand management (Booth 1983). Against this view Tomlinson argues that since the reason for the policies proposed or adapted after 1941 was mainly the curbing of inflation, it would be rash to assume there was official support for the whole Keynesian package. The high post-war employment levels were more the result of factors outside government control (increased exports and higher investment) than the use of public sector deficits to stimulate demand, advocated by Keynes; they should not therefore be seen as reflecting a 'Keynesian revolution' in the Treasury (Tomlinson 1984). Between these opposing views, however, there is a tenable middle position; this acknowledges that Treasury officials did not talk like converts to Keynes and used his ideas selectively

and often for the 'wrong' reasons, but which notes that its advisors *were* often Keynesian in outlook and that there was, moreover, a significant change in the general belief about what governments could and should do through economic management.

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Reviews and Perspectives

Using Place Names to Teach Historical Ideas to Student Primary Teachers in South-West Scotland

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Abstract: While etymological knowledge is well-established as valuable in learning languages and in adult-level historical research, its value as a tool for younger learners investigating local history is underdeveloped. This study explores the potential of placename evidence in the context of problem solving approaches to early Scottish history for student primary teachers. Though the results are provisional, they reveal evidence of raised interest levels in, and of increased engagement with, historical ideas.

1. Etymology and Education

Developing etymological knowledge and understanding has long been considered valuable in language teaching. In particular, adult learners are thought to benefit significantly by being able to use etymology as a tool for the translation and use of 'new' words.

Historians, especially those studying the pre and early historical period in Britain, have demonstrated the value of such knowledge[1,2,3,4,5], in conjunction with archaeological findings, to reveal the distribution and chronology of settlement, by different language/ethnic groups; patterns of land-use and ancient ways of perceiving landscape. However, the use of place name information to teach, as opposed to research, historical concepts is rare. This neglect is partly explained by the lack of good quality teaching resources but also by the intrinsic difficulty of interpeting place name data. Yet, a great opportunity to enhance the quality of historical teaching is being missed. The use of place name information can offer learners insight into the earliest periods of settlement in their local area and, most important, can transform mundane familiar settlement names into fascinating even magical traces of the ancient world. For example, in Ayrshire, the well-known Loudon Hill translated as 'lugudunon', 'fort of Lugus', reveals the home of a Celtic god.

2. Aim

The purpose of this study was to plan and to evaluate a learning experience for student Primary teachers, using place-name data as a resource for teaching about the ancient and 'dark ages' periods, in South-West Scotland.

3. Context and Subjects

South-West Scotland, in the period 500BC to 1000AD, like other parts of Northern Europe, experienced dramatic population movement and cultural change. Analysis of place names in the area reveals the arrival of P-Celtic (Britonic/Welsh), Anglian (Northumbrian), Scandinavian (Norse and Danish) and Q-Celtic (Gaelic) speakers over this period. The use of such data to reveal patterns of settlement is discussed in this paper.

Historical teaching in the region's primary schools tends to adopt a 'patch' approach to the study of key events, important people, technology and general lifestyle in a fairly small set of topics based on 'ethnic' groups prior to the emergence of the nation state of Scotland in the 10th Century AD (Romans, Vikings and Normans), the country's wars with England in the early Mediaeval Period, internal conflict in the late Mediaeval and early Modern period (especially the Jacobite Rebellions), the Victorian era and the mid-20th Century (especially the World War II period). The study of the region's early history, the Celtic influence or the use of place-name data, are extremely rare.

The study was carried out in 1998 and 1999, with around eighty-five second-year students.

4. Methodology

The study of place names data formed part of a pair of three-hour workshops on handling evidence. The workshops also featured the use of maps, aerial photographs, paintings and multimedia databases.

The class began with a presentation covering the importance and value of involving pupils in direct experience of handling and interpreting historical evidence. Each of the forms of evidence was discussed; uses, advantages

and potential pitfalls for interpretation were pointed out. The section of the presentation covering place name evidence, made the following specific points using examples from the local area:

1. Place-names offer us 'lost' or rare evidence of the peoples who settled Scotland in the prehistoric and especially in the early historic period. Figs 1 to 4 use examples of names given by the ethnic/language groups who were to form the Scottish nation in the 9th to 13th centuries. Study of the relative frequency and distribution of names from each language group combined with expert advice (Nicolaisen, 1986 and Watson 1993) can reveal the pattern and sequence of settlement or invasion.

2. Place names offer teachers and pupils local relevance and the interest, even magic, which results from the discovery of a meaning for a familiar perhaps mundane place, which becomes special because it reveals mystical, religious significance (Fig 5) or because it reveals a wider British and European significance (Figs 6 and 7). Also, the interpretation of less difficult Scots or Modern English names is of comparable value to the more complex Celtic, Scandinavian or Old English examples. For example, some of the schools of Ayr are 'Forehill', 'Castlehill', 'Newton', 'Braehead' and 'Mainholm'. The naming of the areas around these schools is revealing of how more recent ancestors saw and used the land.

3. Interpreting place names is not always straightforward. Names may be 'assimilated' into contemporary ways of speaking or suffer from 'hypercorrection' [6] (corrected unnecessarily). The following examples are illustrative:

Assimilation:

Kirkcaldy - not a church but a 'hard castle' (caer caled)

Gleneagles - no eagles but a church (eglais)

Phoenix Park (Dublin)- no firebird but clear water (fionn uisc);

Hypercorrection:

Falkirk - the speckled church (as the locals still say - faw kirk);

4. To minimise the risk of misinterpretation, the following attitudes and methods are useful:

Acceptance of Ambiguity: *Absolute certainty of interpretation for each example isn't possible or necessary.*

Knowledge of reliable 'generics' - dal, tun, etc: *These can be used with reasonable confidence.*

Access to reliable sources: *Early documents including maps may provide the context for the name.*

Listening to local pronunciation: *This may retain the original form.*

Making site visits and/or using maps: *To establish the sense of a name in its landscape setting.*

After the presentation on the use of place names information, students were set the task of identifying areas and names for teaching or for further research using maps (modern and 19C), the above advice, place names notes, the Ordnance Survey guide to interpreting place names (see Bibliography) and their own local knowledge of pronunciation. At the end of the workshop, each group reported on the area they had explored and discussed the interpretation of name meanings and possible uses with pupils.

5. Findings

The study did not involve formal measurement of outcomes but rather made use of observational evidence drawn from monitoring the practical activity and the reporting back by each group. What was apparent from both of these phases was:

(i) There was a very high level of interest in uncovering the possible meanings of place names. This was apparent from the intensity of debate.

(ii) The discovery of religious significance or that a particular placename element was also to be found elsewhere in Europe proved particularly interesting.

(iii) Searching for possible meanings of those place names which were most familiar to students and which they habitually pronounced or could pronounce differently, according to established local practice, and which were not featured in published sources, proved fascinating for them.

(iv) Every group identified an area of interest to them and found examples of placenames which were informative and which would fascinate local pupils.

(v) Most thought that pupil activity might have to be more structured than their classes so as to increase the likelihood of 'unearthing treasures' and to minimise frustration and confusion.

6. **Conclusions and Recommendations**

The use of place names evidence to enhance teaching about Scotland in the prehistoric and early historic period has great potential. This potential is based on the:

(i) provision of learning with local relevance;

(ii) enhancement of learning by involving pupils in an active process of discovery;

(iii) motivation of learners by revealing a world of mystical/religious significance, under their feet;

(iv) enhancement of the study of a period for which the shortage of written material is limiting.

At a time when the place of Scottish culture in the Scottish education system has a high political profile, there is a clear need to stress the significance of the period when the Scottish nation state was formed and to promote the use of place names analysis as a valuable strategy for learners to use in coming to understand that significance.

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6   Taylor, S., University of St Andrews,   Comments on draft version

Fig 1: Brittonic/Cumbric with the generics: tref (village), din (hill fort or mound), cair (fort) and trwyn (cape)

1. Ochiltree -*uchel tref*-high farmstead.
2. Terregles - *tref yr egluys* - church village.
3. Troquhain - *tref yr maen* - village of the rock.
4. Dumbarton - *din breatain* - fort of the Britons.
5. Dumfries - *din phris* - fort of the copse.
6. Caerlaverock - *cair leambreaich* - fort in the elm trees.
7. Troon - *trwyn* - cape.

Fig 2: Anglian/Northumbrian with the generics: wic and tun (farmstead).

1. Prestwick - *preost wic* - priests' farmstead.
2. Fenwick - *fen wic* - mud farmstead.
3. Straiton - *strat tun* - village on the street (the Roman Road into Scotland).
4. Symington - *Symon tun* - Simon's village.

Fig 3: Danish/Scandinavian with the generics byr (farmstead) and kirkja (church).

1. Busby - *Butrs(?) byr* - possibly Butr's farmstead or bush farm.
2. Sorbie -*saurr byr* -muddy farmstead
3. Lockerbie -*Lockhart byr* - Lockhart's farmstead.
4. Kirkcudbright - *kirkja Cuthbert* - church of (St) Cuthbert.
5. Kirkcolm - *kirkja Colm* - church of (St) Columba
6. Kirkoswald - *kirkja Oswald* - church of (St) Oswald.

Fig 4: Gaelic with the generics baile (farmstead), barr (hilltop) and cill (church or monastic cell).

1. Ballantrae - *baile an traighe* - farmstead on the shore.
2. Barr - *barr* - (farm under the) hill.
3. Barrhill - *barr plus English 'hill'* - hill of place called Barr.
4. Kilmarnock - *cill mo earnoc* - cell (church) of St Earnoc.
5. Kilwinning - *cill Finnian* - cell (church) of (St) Finnian.
6. Kilbirnie - *cill Brendan* - cell (church) of (St) Brendan.

Fig 5: Religion

Pagan/Celtic:
1. Loudon Hill - *lugudunon* - fort of Lugus, the Celtic Jupiter.
2. River Doon - *duion* - the Celtic black river goddess Devona
Early Christian:
3. Minishant - *muine seanta (Gaelic)* - the holy bush (There's a village called Hollybush nearby).
4. Clachaneasy - *clachan Iosa (Gaelic)* - the church (monastic cell) of Jesus.
5. Whithorn - *hwit erne (Old English)* - the white house [of St Ninian].

Fig 6: P.Celtic - The Britons (Welsh) and Picts

aber - the river mouth:
1. Aberdeen
2. Aberdour
3. Aberdare
4. Aberystwyth

pen - the head or hill(of):
5. Pencaitland
6. Penrith
7. Penarth
8. Penrose

Fig 7: Celtic Europe

The god Lugus:
1. Loudon in Ayrshire, Loudun and Lyon in France.

The bull (tarbh) village:
2. Tarves in Gordon District Turin and Tarbes in France.

The place by the streams (neint):
3. Tranent in East Lothian and Nantes in France.

The goddess Devona:
4. River Doon in Ayrshire, River Don in Russia and Aberdeenshire, River Don in Yorkshire, Devon and the River Danube in Europe.

The flowing (strong) river (perhaps pre-Celtic):
5. River Ayr in Scotland, the Ahr in Germany, Aar in Belgium, and Ara in Spain.

Britain in the Second World War A Social History   Harold L Smith
Manchester University Press   £14.99   189pp   Pbk   1995   ISBN 0 7190 4493 6

The old adage of not judging a book by its cover was never more justified than in Smith's excellent collection of documentary evidence on the extent of social change we may attribute to the Second World War. The somewhat plain exterior belies a volume rich in incisive comment and neatly structured in readily accessible topic areas for those more inclined to browse than devour. In other words, this would be an ideal source of comment and information for CSYS/Advanced Higher candidates pursuing the *Britain 1939-51* field of study [13] and even for Extended Essay material for Higher pupils attempting a title of a more searching nature relating to the origins of the Labour reforms 1945-51. The opening 27 pages offer the reader a succinct historiography of the warfare/welfare debate ranging from Titmuss to Addison and Calder. Alongside Calder's *The People's War,* this book does more to undermine the myth of the blitz than any other social commentary I have read. Whilst we may rejoice in the often rehearsed Dunkirk spirit argument and the common concept of enhanced social solidarity, Smith points out in rather stark terms that more recent research is inclined to show an alternative view. Grouping his chapters into documents on a series of topics covering class, gender, crime, race and ethnicity to name but a few, Smith leads us to a view of a society more ridden with class division and social strife than we might care to accept. The fact that crime increased dramatically during the early years of the war along with juvenile delinquency, anti-Semitism and industrial turmoil, not to mention divorce and racial intolerance, hardly fits the image of consensus, collectivism and solidarity. With workers and employers in some war factories appearing to view each other as a greater enemy than the Germans, and 42% of looting offences in London in the year after Dunkirk being committed by people in official positions, our vision of a nation united in the face of a common enemy begins to cloud. Further in the book, Smith scrutinises the view much favoured by Addison in his seminal work *The Road to 1945* that a political consensus emerged from the coalition government of 1940-45. His views on the Beveridge Report, the Butler Act and the formation of the NHS cast doubt over whether the two parties had much common ground over social and economic policy at all, certainly not at backbench level. As a welcome antidote to the more traditional overview of British social cohesion in this period, Smith's book is extremely valuable and would be an important addition to any departmental library.

J McDONALD

The Debate on the American Civil War Era   Hugh Tulloch
Manchester University Press   £14.99   255pp   Pbk   1999   ISBN 0 7190 4938 5

The Debate on the American Civil War is part of a series looking at issues in historiography. By its very nature, the books are designed for use by senior pupils and by university students seeking to deepen their understanding of these important events. This single volume more than achieves this criterion.

From the introduction, the reader is immediately caught by the way in which this topic is approached. The series editor, RC Richardson notes that *"Though historians address the past they do so in ways that are shaped – consciously or unconsciously as the case may be – by the society and systems of their own day and they communicate their findings in ways that are intelligible and relevant to the reading public consisting of their own contemporaries".* What better definition could you want of the issue of historiography.

The book is written on two levels. The first deals with the events – the existing slave order in the South, the Northern abolitionist movement, the causes of the Civil War, the issues arising from the war itself and the era of Reconstruction, in a chronological order, outlining the main findings in each section. More importantly, however, the chapters then proceed on to the second level, which deals

with the development of the historical perspective from those who were witnesses to the events, right up to the latest academic research. On both levels, the book is successful.

Tulloch makes no bones about his own position, He believes that the war arose out of the *"attempt to adjust the racial question in America to conform to the Principle of the Declaration of Independence that 'all men are created equal'. This moral dimension lies at the heart of the historiographical debate"*.

In his first chapter on *The American Historical Profession* the author outlines the role of this profession in American society. He outlines the "society and systems' which operated at the time of historical writing which in the immediate aftermath of the war saw it in terms of *"a tragic but noble struggle from which the reunited Union emerged, ultimately, strengthened and purified"*. The price for this consensual history was the ex-slave. Tulloch argues that this approach was reinforced by Supreme Court decisions in the period up to the beginning of the twentieth century which led, in the words of Ralph Ellison, to the black becoming *"invisible politically, economically, culturally and historically"*. Such a position was only challenged within the United States, with her entry into World War Two, where a segregated black army began to demand the rights guaranteed under the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth Amendments. Until the white academics took up this challenge after 1945, the burden of black history was carried by black historians and as Tulloch concedes, *"if, at times, they concentrated excessively on black achievements and black contribution, it can be excused on the grounds of their having to throw their own weight against an almost entirely white history written by white historians for a white audience"*. This White history was written almost exclusively from a pro-Southern perspective, dominated by the Ulrich B Phillips school which, in historical terms, tried to reverse the result of the Civil War in the period 1900-1940

The first stirrings of a counter-attack emerged in 1941, with U.S. entry into World War Two. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. argued that there were times, 1861 being one, 1941 another, when *"men had to be prepared to go to war to defend enduring moral values and die for them if need be"*. The re-writing of Civil War history began in the early 1950's, thanks to the pioneering work of the likes of Richard Hofstadter, writing in an era of suspicion associated with the McCarthy period, and the onslaught in the Supreme Court on the 'Jim Crow' laws, associated with *Brown versus the Board of Education of Topeka* which led to the birth of the civil rights movement. It was this era which saw many young academics defying pro-white authorities in the South with freedom marches, sit-ins, boycotts etc which, according to the author, *"led them to gain a fresh appreciation of the difficulties, tribulations and sacrifices made by the abolitionists... .or the radical Republicans"*.

The work of Hofstadter was followed by that of Kenneth Stampp and Stanley Elkins, Eugene Genovese et al. It was against this background that writing on the Civil War has been done in the United States.

The chapter on slavery traces the differing interpretations of this issue through the eyes of the American historical profession. The debate rages from the nostalgic romanticism of Ulrich B Phillips, attacked at the time only by black historians like Du Bois, the counter-attack in 1956 by Kenneth Stampp in *The Peculiar Institution*, and the controversial work by Stanley Elkins, *Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life* of 1959. The noteworthy contribution of Hugh Tulloch is that he does not just stop at this point. He goes through each of the interpretations, pointing out the weaknesses or strengths of the arguments and leads the reader to draw their own conclusions. When he condemns Phillips for writing *"insidious nonsense and historical duplicity"*, it is not with any thought of malice but the judgment of one professional on the research methods and false conclusions of another. Similarly, on the attempt by Fogel and Engerman to remove the debate on slavery from the literary world to that of the statistical, Tulloch produces a detailed critique highlighting the faults and false premises of their work. This chapter on Slavery is perhaps the best in the book.

The attempt to write the Abolitionists out of the era of the Civil War is corrected in Chapter Three. Once again, the author shows how in the late nineteenth century till the 1960's, the role of the abolitionists was both derided and denigrated by Southern historians. He goes into detail, in particular, concerning the controversial role of William Lloyd Garrison, attempting to answer the question of whether he was a help or a hindrance to the anti-slavery movement, illustrating the beliefs which

drove Garrison and his followers to such extreme conclusions. In addition, the role of the black in his own liberation is addressed, with works by Benjamin Quarles being highlighted. The result of this has been the recognition that, although not perfect, the abolitionists did provide an invaluable service at the time.

The Causes of the Civil War chapter opens with the statement that *"partisanship has been so intense (over this issue) that historians have not even been able to agree on what to call the conflict"*. The chapter traces the debate from the starting point that the South and slavery were the causes of the war, through defences of the South's position written by ex- President Buchanan and Jefferson Davis, constitutional causes of the war, Marx's interpretation of the war that "free labour could never flourish until slavery was abolished", the influential writings of Charles and Mary Beard on economic causes of the tragedy, and the emergence of the pro-Southern revisionist school in the 1930's whose aim was *"to reverse the defeat at Appomattox and win the historiographical debate"*, associated with the writings of Craven and Randall. Hugh Tulloch highlights the weakness of this revisionist school when he states that, *"an all-pervasive air of unreality hangs over many revisionist historical writings because they are invariably trying to explain what did not happen – peace and further compromise – while simultaneously trying to explain away what did happen – the outbreak of war"*. Inevitably there was a backlash, associated first with Allan Nevins, and later with Eric Foner and James McPherson. The chapter concludes, where it began, with slavery now being regarded as the main cause of the war – clearly a case of 'what goes around comes around'.

Of the six chapters, the fifth, dealing with the war itself is perhaps the least satisfactory. This is not meant as a criticism of Hugh Tulloch. The reader just needs to glance along the bookshelves of any respectable bookstore to understand the vast array of historical literature on this topic. To attempt to synthesise this into about fifty pages is a Herculean task. The author looks at this topic from both a northern and a southern point of view. The argument rages between those who believe in the idea of "God and the mighty battalions" being on the side of the North, first outlined in Grant's *Memoirs*, through an appreciation of the commanders who fought the war, first developed by the British writer, JFC Fuller who did much to rehabilitate the reputation of Grant from that of a mere 'butcher', to the role of superior Northern morale as a deciding factor in the crisis summer of 1864 and the military role of Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief.

For the South, the story is one of missed opportunities, attacking when she should have defended and *vice versa*. Other interpretations cite the decentralised nature of Southern government in the period, associated with the states rights' school of thought of Frank Owsley, and Kenneth Stampp's theory on the collapse of Southern will to continue the fight. The role of Britain in the conflict is also addressed with the conclusion being that, although much Southern sentiment existed in Britain, her policy was *"motivated throughout by a cool calculation of benefits to Great Britain"*.

There is also much comment on the role of Lee and that of Jefferson Davis in the South, concluding that neither deserve either the high praise, or the opprobrium levelled at the Confederacy's only President.

The era of Reconstruction concludes the book. Again much of the focus is on the pressures at work at the time when accounts were written. The first came in 1877, the same year when 'home rule' was given to the South, with an attempt to absolve the Federal government of any responsibility for the failure of Reconstruction and leaving the black to the whim of the local white population. The emergence of the 'Jim Crow' laws at the beginning of the twentieth century were reflected in Southern writings about Reconstruction, when the issue was dismissed by white Southern historians as an aberration, and there was an attempt to rehabilitate the reputation of President Johnson for his heroic defence of the South against a white Northern dominated Congress.

The counter to this school of thought was led by black historians, foremost amongst whom was WEB Du Bois, but it was not until the late 1940's that white academics began to challenge the sway held by Southern white schools of historical thought, the works of David Donald and Eric Foner being highlighted as key points in the debate. As Foner concluded in his 1988 *Reconstruction*, *"this rewriting of Reconstruction history was accorded scholarly legitimacy – to its overwhelming shame – by the nations' fraternity of professional historians"*. As Hugh Tulloch concludes. *"atonement has been made"*.

The book contains a concise bibliography of selected reading at the end of each chapter which the student can use as a follow up to the chapter. In a single volume, Hugh Tulloch has summarised the main historical debate over the era of the Civil War and has illustrated the shifting interpretations of this conflict, which, to my mind, makes history a 'living subject'. Any department, which covers this period of history, should be ordering multiple copies of this book for use by students as a matter of urgency.

<div align="right">JIM McGONIGLE</div>

The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered   Gordon Martel (Ed)
Routledge   £15.99   Pbk   278pp   1999 (2ⁿᵈ Ed)   ISBN 0 415 16325 0

This is the second edition of the popular book first published 13 years ago. Five of the original contributions have been omitted, and all the other twelve articles have been revised. Many (most?) teachers of the Higher Appeasement topic will have come across this book, because it so clearly covers the ground necessary; and by the fact that since all the articles are linked into the theme of AJP Taylor's approach; the reader is therefore guaranteed a topical and argumentative coverage of the key issues. In a sense, [although the Editor denies it], this is a *festschrift* to Taylor; since the contributors are almost all taking the great man's views since 1961 and seeing how much they need up-dating as historical research has deepened. The general consensus, that [with reservations] there is still much that is valid from what he had to say then, is tribute enough!

Gordon Martel's opening piece is a lively discussion of AJP's qualities; his talent for challenging the confident old assertions and asking difficult questions. In fact, he did more than challenge assumptions, he turned them on their head, in a prose full of wit, sarcasm, crispness of comment and character assassination. He had a perversity where it may have been easy to mistake mischief for malice but he put the personalities back into history, but made them victims of circumstance. The fact that he was prepared to de-demonise Hitler naturally didn't make him everybody's friend at the time. AJP's long-term view that Hitler was a part of German historical continuity seemed too close to being an apology for how Hitler behaved. So, Martel argues that AJP's great work on *The Origins of the Second World War* was something akin to a morality play, covering a time of complexity and paradox, where accidents and blunders were more important in shaping history than plots and plans. This sort of introductory piece, written with something of the style and precocity of AJP himself, is a great way to suck you into a book like this and make you want to read what the next contributor has got to say.

That next contribution is from Sally Marks, whose own work on *The Illusion of Peace* also decorates the shelves of my school library but is maybe a little too taxing for all but the best Higher pupils. It's good to see that not every contributor to this volume felt they had to charge in and eulogise their subject. Sally Marks brings quite a crisp rigour to an investigation of how Taylor's views on the *'German problem'*, especially the early days of it, with the impact of World War 1 on German history, have stood up. She acknowledges Taylor's defects; the uncertain chronology, the contradictions, the providing of beautiful pieces for the jigsaw, but not always providing the linkages that pull them together. She detects a *'fatal cleverness'* amongst the persuasive prose. She feels he also saw things too much in *'absolutes, either/ors'*, which make good reading but.....! She observes that he misjudged Britain's long-term position, misunderstood the true involvement of USA, was good on Italy, but often wrote more with panache than accuracy. Like the Editor's opening contribution, this makes good reading; historians writing on historians bring the best in good honest criticism out of many of them. This article is also remarkably well footnoted, with the 20 sides of text being followed by 5 sides containing 96 detailed references.

Stephen Schuker's article covers Taylor's analysis of why the Treaty of Versailles broke down. As with the authors of both the first two contributions, Schuker is struck by Taylor's deft writing style.... *'the quintessential Taylor method; make an extraordinary claim then qualify it before objections are raised.'*, where he delivers a *'seamless web of aphorisms'*. This combination of wonder and

dismay in Schuker, comes out again and again in his article. He writes how *'Taylor presses onwards with his pellucid prose and opaque meaning'* but admits to having difficulty getting past *'the pyrotechnics'* of his prose, to the analysis. He feels that Taylor's view on reparations was a better judge of it in History (ie closer to Mantoux's) than JM Keynes' view, but that Taylor still perpetuates a lot of the old myths (such as believing Locarno was the major step in the dismantling of Versailles). Schuker is a reluctantly critical admirer, being forced on the same page to admit that Taylor *'doesn't always stand on firm ground'* and that he *'goes beyond the evidence'*.

The fourth article is Alan Cassel's discussion of the problems Mussolini got into conducting his foreign policy. This issue arises in this volume (which is largely centred on German diplomatic history) out of asking the question; 'Since German history has had to be re-written in the light of Taylor's influences, has anything similar needed to be done with Italy's?' So what the author does is to try and place Italian foreign policy in *la longue duree*. The major underlying Italian diplomatic assumption seems to be the seeing through of Mussolini's interest in a recreated Roman Empire in the Mediterranean. This idea is not new but is developed well here, with the author pointing out some of the contradictions this caused. For instance, the quite speedy move towards friendship with Germany (over about 2 years, from 1934 – 36) had to be accompanied by a refocusing of foreign policy away from Austria. Factors such as Britain and the League's role, Mussolini's personal dislike of Eden and an increasingly Social Darwinist slant in Italian diplomatic perspective are all assessed. (eg exemplified by Mussolini's view that the *virile* would defeat the *effete*). As Italy moved towards *ideological familiarity* with Germany, so too did Mussolini copy the Hitlerian characteristic of seeing the obtaining of foreign policy objectives as part of providence. This article provides a depth of diplomatic perspective *from the Italian* viewpoint that is not so easy to find elsewhere in such a condensed and readable version.

Robert Young's contribution discusses AJP Taylor's attitude towards the role of France in inter-war diplomacy. He starts with some complimentary comments on Taylor's style: *'one of the best exponents of paradox since Karl Marx'* but follows up with a sustained and well organised attack on Taylor's views which constantly down graded France's importance, by, for instance packaging them in with the UK. He also made *'too many entirely baseless claims'* about the French, possibly as a result of overlooking a large number of French sources which may have helped to give a clearer picture. In Young's view therefore, Taylor made *'a scattering of cryptic, unflinching, unsubstantiated, judgmental remarks'* about the French, which reflected his strong cultural bias. He was therefore *'not merely unpredictable, he was often unreliable'*. Young forcefully argues (with widespread quoting from *'Origins'*) that Taylor had a fundamental prejudice against the French; usually seeing them as *'craven'*, where any French success was accidental and, as a nation, they were only there to be outwitted by either the Germans or the British. Young feels that seeing as French foreign policy shared much the same mixture of pragmatism and principle as did Britain's, why should Taylor find that only France's behaviour should be judged *'ignoble'*.

What Young find more worrying is that Taylor's views on French inter-war decadence are widely held by other historians, both French and British! Young gives a three-page analysis of this before concluding that we need to look behind *'the blurring vocabulary'* of French decadence. He then finishes his rebuttal of Taylor with an analysis of the sorts of evidence now available, which shows how France was not quite as apathetic as Taylor made out, indeed, Young claims; *'French self-assuredness has been under-rated.'* This is quite a solid demolition job on Taylor; with Young in major revisionist form, being prepared to cut through the window dressing of Taylor's style and get to the fact and substance of Taylor's argument; which was then found to be severely wanting.

Richard Overy in the sixth article continues the searching questions. He asks whether Taylor's claim that Hitler was only a revisionist, not a seeker after war, can be supported. He tries to start off with the positive; illustrating what he thinks Taylor did get partly right. He supports Taylor's line of the continuity view, that Hitler was just an old fashioned Pan-German, that the Lebensraum dream was a part of this and that Germans did have a world view before Hitler gave them one. In other words, the pedigree of the Nazi programme pre-dated Versailles revisionism. Hitler therefore was a popular, radical nationalist; the only *'unique strand'* of his thinking was where his view of the east amounted to 'ethnic cleansing'. However, Overy has no time for the AJP's frivolous view that Hitler's policies had no more substance than Vienna café conversation; arguing instead that Hitler's views came from a respected pedigree of university and intelligentsia discourse, but took them a step further. In the

early part of his regime, Hitler was able to lock into the established team of career diplomats; all of whom were cautious revisionists, and play them along. They didn't like his violent methods, his risk taking and the broader scope, but Hitler shared enough similarities with them to be able to blur the differences.

Overy argues that Taylor's major omission is the under-estimation of the impact of domestic policy on Hitler's foreign policy; notably the ignoring of the significance of Hitler's 4 Year Plan memo in 1936 which was a detailed statement of policy. Now, my view to pupils was that this was best seen as a bit of Hitlerian scaremongering, whipping up the spectre of the Bolshevik bogeyman, rather than being a serious statement of policy. Overy however sees this, when linked into the replacement of the old conservative diplomatic and military elite by party appointments in 1936-37, as a crucial domestic watershed influencing foreign policy, that Taylor overlooked. By early 1938 Hitler had abolished the War Ministry (and created the OKW), and all the signs now were that Hitler could confidently pursue a military strategy with the full reins of power in his hands. In other words, the evidence from this, is that Hitler alone understood the nature of the grand tasks that were ahead, and was clearing the ground, since he was going to go for them since they had substance and were achievable. Now, if you are prepared to accept this sort of thing as evidence to show Hitler was indeed 'preparing the ground', then that does undermine the 'Hitler was just an opportunist' argument. Overy goes on that the evidence from the statistics of German arms build up is also entirely inconsistent with the opportunist's argument that Hitler was only interested in short local wars. So, overall, AJP got some things right but in the end, he misjudged Hitler; he overlooked the significance of the 1936 economic memo and the defence estimates. These show that Hitler had bigger and better prepared plans that AJP was prepared to acknowledge and he had them longer than AJP would care to admit.

The next article deals with appeasement and Taylor's view on it. It takes the line that since the sources available change, the questions historians are therefore able to ask change; therefore the answers they can come up with must consequently change. In the light of this, were any of Taylor's comments on the reasons for appeasement still valid? The answer must surely be only a conditional "yes", since the authors of this article rightly point out that more years have passed between Taylor's book being published and the present day, than there were between Taylor's book being published and the events he was writing about. If things haven't changed, then he was either a greater and more brilliant genius than we even gave him credit for, or historians since then, with the wealth of new sources, must have been pretty useless!

So, this article is quite a useful review of the sorts of reasons that are commonly given for pursuing appeasement. In terms of blaming appeasement on the personalities involved, the authors claim that AJP's comments on the lesser political or diplomatic figures have stood the test of time; there is still no redeeming Henderson or Halifax. However, they claim that Taylor's views on Chamberlain were too one-dimensional and that he was a more complex figure, driven by a greater range of influences than just the ability to be an unwitting bungler. Taylor doesn't cover much from the point of view of the feelings towards appeasement of the man in the street, but makes some good comments about the role of the press. More poorly covered are the influence of the military chiefs, the role of the Treasury and the position of the dominions. The authors claim that the evidence just wasn't available for Taylor to include reference to these. The article ends with the nicely balanced perspective that older historians tended to see appeasement as a shameful policy of surrender, Taylor portrayed it as a series of well meaning bungles, and modern historians maybe favour it as a natural and rational strategy in the light of Britain's weaknesses. Appeasement was all of these and should be understood and investigated as such.

Teddy Uldricks' article claims that AJP overlooked the importance and influence of Russia by tilting his analysis towards the west. To start with, he enormously under-estimated the Russophobia in the British governmental leadership and was *'disinclined to give weight to the ideological factors in international relations.'* For instance, in the 1920's, and by using hindsight, Taylor claimed that the Soviets never had reasons to feel insecure because the Great Powers never attacked them. Obviously the events of history have confirmed that this was the case, but that didn't stop the Russians feeling insecure right through that period, believing that there would be exactly such hostilities.

He thinks AJP is better on Russia in the 1930's, but still inadequate in his coverage. He agrees that Russia saw every diplomatic initiative which excluded them as a conspiracy, and he spots that British foreign policy was designed to exclude Russia from a role in European affairs. It was only after March 1939 and the German seizure of Prague that UK foreign policy turned towards a constructive examination of possible relations with Russia. Even then though, AJP is not convinced that this was anything too serious; believing that Chamberlain just wanted to *'chalk a big red bogey on the wall in the hope that this would keep Hitler quiet.'* In fact, Britain's view of Russia's part in any future war was very patronising, merely seeing it as a supply base, while the western allies, in a reprise of World War 1, would do the hard work. Russia did not see it that way. They predicted ultimate defeat unless the old Triple Entente was reconstructed for a concentrated hammer blow against Germany. Chamberlain however, just could not cope with the idea of the Red Army being any closer to Western Europe than the existing Russian borders (therefore he couldn't contemplate their use in possibly saving the Czechs or the Poles).

Uldricks is very unhappy with Taylor's treatment of Germany's relations with Russia and with AJP's less than critical coverage of Soviet diplomacy in the 1930's. The fact that AJP's bibliography for Soviet Russia listed *'Nothing'*, shows the lack of documentary evidence that was available to Taylor at the time of writing. He wonders, for instance, if Taylor would have changed his views if he had had access to the works of Evgenii Gnedin. At this point, this article starts to become a very useful historiographical review of what historians have said and developed since Taylor. It discusses whether Russia was just as much an appeaser as UK and France, and whether the views of Gnedin, Hochman, Haslam or Roberts, are now more valid. Most of these historians' views are not particularly discussed in relation to Taylor; it is more a freestanding debate on what the 1980's have thrown up as perspectives on Russian diplomatic behaviour. In the light of such debate, Uldricks is probably justified in ending his article with the critical comment that *'Future historians on the origins of the Second World War must pay more attention to the Kremlin than Taylor did more than 35 years ago.'*

The next article by Louise Young, on Japan and the Manchurian Crisis, is the first in the volume to have no reference to AJP Taylor. He must have missed out any contentious references to how far this crisis affected European affairs, so the author just pitches in with a discussion of how the Manchurian Crisis should be viewed. In conventional chronologies it is often viewed as the start of a new era in Japanese foreign politics; seen as the first step on the long road to war. The article therefore looks at the domestic impact of the Manchurian war on the Japanese people, the military history of the war and how it influenced the goals of Japanese foreign policy. In the old Higher syllabus, where questions on the Manchurian Crisis could come up big time, this would all have been intriguing stuff. Our modern syllabuses however have turned both Manchuria and Abyssinia into footnotes to the main plot. However, the author's coverage of such aspects as the behaviour of the government, the role of the press as propagandist in shaping public opinion, the role of Japanese intellectuals and the attitudes of the Kwantung Army, are all informative and thorough. The similarities between Germany and Japan keep coming out; the *'government by assassination'*, the military over-confidence that crept in and the influence of the prevailing fear of Communism. The author takes a very historiographical approach which focusses on which historians favour which lines of debate.

Brian Sullivan's article on Italy and the Ethiopian Crisis takes a look at one of AJP's bold claims and systematically demolishes it. Taylor claimed that Britain and France forced Italy into détente with Germany by their heavy handed approach to the Abyssinian Affair. Sullivan claims the evidence just does not support this view; although you have still got to explain the interesting paradox on why it was that the better the nations (like UK and France) treated Italy, the worse they were treated back; yet the worse a nation (like Germany) treated Italy, with its false promises and let-downs, the better Italy seemed to respond.

There is a long and very interesting section giving figures for all sorts of the costs of Italy's wars, both human and financial or material; and the way these realities shaped Italy's attitudes towards possible international friendships. These had a key effect on Italy's ability to make any sort of defence of her European interests (and therefore possibly oppose Germany) after 1935. Italy quickly came to see Germany as their only possible safety net. So, despite France keeping *'an almost humiliating*

determination to retain Italy.' and the British government maintaining its illusions about being able to separate the Fascists from the Nazis for far longer than was reasonable; Mussolini swung towards Germany. But, the author concludes, *'Mussolini's decision was carefully and consciously made; British and French policies had not forced him onto Hitler's side.'*

Mary Habeck's article on the Spanish Civil War compliments Taylor on the cogent 15 pages of succinct analysis that he offered, commenting that *'historians since have not bettered his interpretation of its significance'* and *'there is an enduring perception that Taylor was right'*. Because of the wide nature of the foreign interest/intervention in the war, this had led to historians shifting the war from its Spanish roots and trying to make it something else. It was easy to see it as a rehearsal for the Second World War. Indeed, some Spanish historians see it in the same way as we tend to see the Rhineland in 1936; as the last chance of the democracies to stop fascism. Taylor however, always argued that the Spanish Civil War started for internal reasons and was not part of some great international master-plan by the two main ideological sides, to flex their military muscles in a warm up before the main event. His view has been *'confirmed by the scholars over the past 30 years.'* In fact, the Spanish Civil War more showed just how far the democracies would go to preserve peace, rather than how far they would go to stick up for their other democratic beliefs. Most powers had as much to lose as gain, by intervention, so keeping out was not an entirely stupid idea. The article then goes into all manner of different questions that need looking into; Why did the other nations move so quickly to *'quarantine the war'*?, Why did Blum's government behave the way it did over what should have been *'its ideological partner'*?, Who were the dominant forces in UK pushing for non-intervention, and why was Italy so keen to follow such an independently strong line? This article is well worth adding into anyone's study of this topic at Advanced Higher, not just because of the typically excellent bibliography, but because of the probing analysis of the risk-taking strategies that all European governments were forced to follow over this affair.

The final article in the volume refers to Danzig but is looking at how AJP saw the Polish side of things. Taylor was hard on Josef Beck, claiming that British Foreign Office opinion of him was that he was *'a menace'*, which agrees with Taylor's view that Beck *'always possessed complete self-confidence though not much else.'* This article possibly required a more detailed knowledge of the complex workings of Eastern European diplomacy, than I have. However, even if I didn't understand all the answers, I recognised the pertinacity of all the questions: Why did the Poles have such difficulty coming to terms with the realities of German power?, Why did Britain (and Poland) so consistently over-estimate Polish fighting qualities?, How far was Britain prepared to offer Poland a 'blank cheque'? and How likely was a second Munich?

Since the opening article was a review of what Taylor stood for and how he saw things, a similarly written overall review of how the historians have made their adjustments, would have been a nice way to finish off; it would have pulled it all together. But, any criticism is carping; only someone like me would sit and read the whole thing through and then want to have it neatly rounded off. Much rather, this is a book to read as you teach these topic areas one by one. Almost all of it comes up at Higher in the Appeasement topic; read the relevant article as you come to it in the course, and re-ignite your teaching. Taylor at his best was unsurpassable; even 39 years later his work has not lost its edge. They were gems when he wrote them, they still are. Having seen and heard the great man at his (last?) Scottish appearance at Chambers Street (1980'ish was it?), I have to confess I've long been a fan. The natural sense of perversity, the linguistic verve and intellectual audacity are all features I recognise, admire and try hopelessly to copy. This book, and the way the 12 authors have handled their topics, has kept something of that style alive.

ANDREW HUNT

To the Bitter End: the Diaries of Victor Klemperer, 1942-45
Abridged and translated by Martin Chalmers

A recent review in SATH's Journal asked, 'What do we know of the Germans?' Fed on a costive diet of stereotypes, the hard tack of textbooks and the generalisations of axegrinders such as Taylor, the answer must be, 'Very little'.

The publication in 1998 of the first volume of Victor Klemperer's Diaries for 1933-41 earned huge critical acclaim (*I Shall Bear Witness* reviewed in *SATH Journal Issue 19*). Appalled by the installation of Hitler as Reich Chancellor, Klemperer had pledged to maintain a chronicle of events in Dresden and beyond. Against all the odds he succeeded in his determination to 'bear witness'. The result is a densely layered account of life in the Third Reich.

From 1920 to 1935, Klemperer was Professor of Romance Languages and Literature at Dresden Technical University. A rabbi's son, he had married Eva Schiemmer, a Protestant. This proved crucial, enabling him to survive the Nazi's successive culls of Dresden's Jews. In addition Eva acted as courier; fairly secure from Gestapo searches she was able to deliver Victor's testimony to a 'safe house'.

A host of characters people the pages of this second volume of Klemperer's Diaries. We are given an unforgettable series of vignettes of everyday life in the war society of the Third Reich, thumbnail sketches of Dresden's Jews and their tormentors. Here we meet Dr. Glaser, lawyer and collector of Expressionist art, and Jacobi the superintendent of the Jewish Cemetery, a man able to give Victor good advice on how to avoid ensnarement by Gestapo men such as the vicious Muller and the *'arrogant mountain of flesh'* Kohler.

Through the prism of Klemperer's journals we can tackle one of the twentieth century's crucial issues: the Holocaust. How did it happen? What drove people in the most developed stage of human civilisation to carry out such terrible acts? It is helpful to place the issue in the context of what Jonathan Glover calls *'the moral resources'* which enable and empower the individual to recognise and embrace human dignity. These resources might be religious or secular. (Glover is the author of *Humanity: a Moral History of the Twentieth Century* pp. Jonathan Cape, 1999).

It is almost a truism that in Hitler's Germany these *'moral resources'* were, from the outset, besieged. The first volume of Klemperer's Diaries relentlessly records the creation by the Nazis of their inhuman system. After 1939, Germany's wounds turned gangrenous. With the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union in June 1941 the country hurtled into chaos and barbarism.

The consequences of this descent into depravity are only too familiar to students of History, fuelling debate ... and litigation. Did the circumstances of total war sunder those social pressures which normally deter people from acts of cruelty? Were the moral resources of German society sapped by indoctrination so that entire categories of people became first pariahs then victims? What part was played by the apparatus available to the modern state in the control of belief and behaviour?

Hence the importance of Klemperer in Holocaust literature. The testimonies of Anne Frank and Primo Levi are known to us all. But what made Victor Klemperer unique was his continuous presence within the Third Reich. From the outset he was at the heart of the horror recording each act of evil, identifying both perpetrators and victims, gauging the impact of Nazism on Dresden and its people.

The cumulative power of his testimony is awesome. Through the Diaries we can trace how Dresden's Jews came to perceive the enormity of Nazism's crimes. *'Truly murder is horribly at our heels,'* wrote Victor on 27 October 1942. He faithfully records the competitive chaos that characterised the Nazi state in his account of the sacking of the Jewish workforce at the Zeiss-Ikon Plant:

'Previously the company resisted the Gestapo: the Jewish section was particularly familiar with the work, which must be maintained. In the course of last January's evacuation there was a dramatic about-face: first the Gestapo gave the order, then the company fetched back its Jews, who were ready to be transported. Now there is supposed to be a new Reich decree: No Jew can be employed in an armament plant any more. For the present, those dismissed are being employed elsewhere in Dresden. Katchen Voss cleaning carriages for the railways. But Poland looms'

Klemperer, Eva and their friends now lived in '*the constant dreadful fear of Auschwitz* '. Even in sleep there was no escape: *'Last night I dreamed, in great detail, that I had gone into a cafe without the star and was now sitting there afraid of being recognised'"* [14 January 1943].

On page after page Klemperer gives the lie to the protestations of 'good Nazis' such as Speer, that of the Final Solution they knew nothing.

This is a truly compulsive book, compulsive not in the sense that a reader will sit engrossed in it 'to the bitter end'. The texture of the diary entries does not allow this. Rather it is a book to which a reader will compulsively return. There is not a page that does not inform. Relentlessly, Klemperer describes the draining of Germany's moral resources as the country hurtles towards defeat. He writes with pain as a Great War veteran and as a former nationalist.

Plagued by eye trouble, Klemperer applied on 19 May 1944 for release from factory work and was examined by a specialist: *'We are at war, you are only 62, even the blind are working...Release from duty? Out of the question... Within the terms of the Reich Insurance, it is not an illness at all... Rest for a week... Heil Hitler!'*

By the late summer of 1944 the tension among Dresden's dwindling Jewish community was acute. Why was the allied advance so slow? *'There is a psychological reversal inside me,'* Victor wrote on 16 August, '*My mind hopes, but my heart is no longer capable of believing.'*

Knowledge of the allied air raids grew but the attitude of Klemperer was ambivalent. On the one hand, it was firm evidence that the destruction of the Third Reich was at hand. But what if the Gestapo embarked on a blood bath, after all it was their creed that the Jews were *'our misfortune'*? And what if the bombs killed them all?

The resolution of the dilemma came on 13 February 1945, the night of the Destruction of Dresden. By this date Klemperer's journal is filled with pessimism. It has been his task to deliver transportation orders to many of the remaining Jews. Theresienstadt awaits them. For the moment he is not among those ordered to leave.. then the bombs and firestorms strike. In a passage of searing intensity Klemperer records the ensuing turmoil. Miraculously Eva and Victor manage to find each other in the rubble of the city. They join the flood of refugees and Victor tears the star from his coat:

'*In the morning Eisenmann said to me: 'You must remove it. I have already done so'. I took it from my coat. Waldmann reassured me in this chaos and with the destruction of all offices and lists... Besides, I did not have any choice: with the star I would immediately be picked out and killed...'* (19 February 1945)

Klemperer and a handful of Jews, including the melancholy aesthete Dr. Glaser, had survived. Good fortune, the characteristic complexities of Nazism's 'Jewish laws' and their enormous moral resources saw them return to Dresden, liberated. The Gestapo building lay in ruins.

Yet there is a further twist to the tale. His academic status restored and now a citizen of the German Democratic Republic, Klemperer became, for a time at least, a tool of Stalinism, lending his voice to the tiresome eulogies of the General Secretary. More positively, his study of the language of the Third Reich appeared in 1947. His Diaries abound with references to, and examples of, what he abbreviated as 'LTP' (Lingua Tertii Imperii – The Language of the Third Reich). The diligent student of the diaries can trace the degeneration of language in Hitler's Germany, a further layer of terror in speeches, exhortations and commands.

Ironically Klemperer now became a minor casualty of the Cold War. In 1956 the West German daily *Die Welt* sneered: *'Younger academics don't read him anymore. Older scholars wave him aside.'* Once again it took destruction to save him. The fall of the Berlin Wall rescued Klemperer's reputation. Posthumously, he has become a literary superstar, and German television has prepared a 13 part series based on the Klemperer diaries.

We can but hope that the series is made available to British viewers. For make no mistake, first *I Shall Bear Witness* and now *To the Bitter End* are utterly essential texts for any serious student of Germany, 1933-1945. The translator, Martin Chalmers, has clearly performed a labour of love providing readers with a full introduction which ably locates context, while the explanatory notes accompanying the text of the Diaries are extremely helpful.

RON GRANT

A Lexicon of Terror (Argentina and the Legacies of Torture)   Marguerite Feitlowitz

Ever since the human race learned to draw and to write accounts, descriptions, natures and stories have been produced to record atrocities and 'War Crimes' in almost every region on earth. They range from the poetry of Homer[1] and The Old Testament [2] of centuries ago, to the investigations into the horrors of Rwanda and the Balkans today by the United Nations. Two classic examples from the Second World War come to mind: *The Scourge Of The Swastika*, which described the Nazis' brutality, and *The Knights Of Bushido* that dealt with the atrocities committed by the Japanese. Both were written in a meticulous way, free from exaggeration and rumour, by Lord Russell of Liverpool, no relation of his near contemporary Bertrand Russell, the mathematician-philosopher. Marguerite Feitlowitz has carried out a similar task concerning the activities of the Junta, or military government that held sway in Argentina during 1976-1983. The authoress is well qualified for such an undertaking as she is bi-lingual and holds a post at Harvard University in Massachusetts, teaching writing and literal translation.

Outside of 'democratic countries' and 'The West' it is almost standard practice for the Armed Forces to seize power, and depose civilian governments in the process. It would be pointless, also long-winded, to draw up a list of dictators of the 20th century. To take the 'country in question', the armed forces have seized power in Argentina on 7 occasions between 1930-76 (or 9 times, depending on how one counts the generals in power). The most famous dictator of this period was Peron, although he actually was chosen in 1946 in what has been rated as one of the few free elections ever held in Argentina. Ms. Feitlowitz points out that, in 1946, Argentina was ranked as the 8th wealthiest nation in the world, Juan and Evita Peron used this inheritance to spend large sums on welfare programmes for the *'descamisados'* – the workers; to nationalize the railways etc., also to line their own pockets at the same time. In 1955 mounting corruption and inflation had weakened Peron's position. The Navy rose against Peron who[3] fled via Paraguay to Spain. His fellow-fascist dictator, Franco, appears almost to have ignored Peron. By 1973 Argentina seemed to have forgotten his corrupt regime and the 'Prodigal Son' returned to become President. Some blood was shed: Ms. Feitlowitz quotes a figure of 200 people killed at the 'Welcome Reception' for Peron. An old sick man, Peron died in 1974, leaving his widow 'Isabelita' to continue as President. She was removed in 1976 by a coup d'etat. It may seem strange that many Argentines should wish for the return of Peron. Perhaps the passage of time had blurred the increasing harshness of his Government, the workers, *'Los Descamisados'* were remembering that Peron had 'a good side to him' and that he had shown concern for them, unlike previous Argentinian dictators. One may find examples of contemporary former tyrants returning to their country, even to positions of power. In 1971 Uganda's president, Milton Obote, just as guilty as Peron of corruption, was ousted by the coup d'etat of Idi Amin. After the Tanzanian army had evicted Amin in 1979, the Ugandan voters in 1980 chose Obote as President, in spite of his previous record. The increasing despotic and venial rule of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines led to his downfall and flight in 1986. Yet his widow, Emelda, was permitted to return, even though the Filipinos had been shown her 'Aladdin's Cave' of jewellery, expensive clothes and shoes, along with vivid portraits of Emelda, nude. No cause for mirth: the money spent on these pictures would have clothed and fed many of Manila's destitutes. Perhaps in these 3 countries it's a case of 'better the devil you know than the devil you don't'.

There appears to have been little opposition in March 1976, when the armed forces abruptly terminated 'Isabelita's' government. She had proved herself incompetent, had incurred a debt of one billion dollars for Argentina to shoulder, and 'Law and Order' had broken down. Ms. Feitlowitz points out that, during the 1970s, leftist groups had assassinated 697 people (including 400 policemen), which did give some justification for the 'military' to act. Unlike Emelda Marcos, Isabelita Peron was imprisoned for about 2 years. To come nearer to our time, one need only look at Pakistan in November 1999 when the Army seized power – not for the first time in the chequered history of Pakistan since independence in 1947. To judge by the comments and reports in the media, many Pakistanis had seen so much nepotism and corruption in the 1990's that 'democracy' was a joke: why bother about their

apparent loss of 'liberty'? The first photograph in this book shows the '3 Wise Men' or leaders of the 3 branches of the armed forces who had seized power in 1976. They put forward a plan, the 'Process For National Reorganisation' which may have sounded grandiose and pompous, but it did secure a large loan from the I.M.F (Ms. Feitlowitz does not give the actual sum). Probably Honduras and Mozambique are hoping that the I.M.F and the World Bank will treat them in the same way.

What did follow completely supports the authoress's title *"A Lexicon of Terror"*. All 6 chapters contain details of brutality, oppression and 'Man's inhumanity to Man'. A new word appeared, *"Los Desaparecidos"*: The Disappeared. Ms. Feitlowitz has met and interviewed many Argentines, both in the cities and villages and rural communities who have relatives and friends, *'en los desaparecidos'*. She does not shrink from grim reality and the cases and facts that she presents constitute harsh and unpleasant reading. Some prisoners were injected, drugged, put on aircraft which flew over the Atlantic Ocean, or the Plate estuary where the helpless victims were thrown into the sea. Others were imprisoned in filthy conditions, tortured with electric prods, then shot or released broken in body and spirit. Several of the torturers took almost an 'experimental interest' in their acts of misery, especially towards women. Concentration camps were set up, often with euphemistic names, such as "La Perla" ('The Pearl') in Cordoba, or "Sheraton" in Buenos Aires. Provincial towns were no safer than the capital city. The Argentinian phrase *"Noche y Niebla"* meant the same as the German *'Nacht und Nebel'* of Hitler's days; namely the "night and fog" methods by which the government prevented people from finding out where were, or what had happened to their friends and relatives. One of the disturbing features of all this repression, according to Ms. Feitlowitz, is that both France and U.S.A. stand accused of having trained many of the Argentine guards and 'interrogators' to fight against these 'subversives', training which just degenerated into torture without regard to age, creed, race or sex. Even today the real number of victims is unknown; the authoress quotes 'The Mothers Of The Plaza Of Mayo' who estimate a figure of 30,000 *Desaparecidos*.

Did no one either inside or outside Argentina oppose the Junta? The best-known group of protesters in Argentina, were, and are 'The Mothers Of The Plaza Of Mayo', who have been subjected to assaults and violence, illustrated in the book. Other protesters include several Roman Catholic bishops in Argentina and Jewish leaders from U.S.A. However both the Roman Catholic hierarchy and leading Jews in Argentina seem to have turned the proverbial 'blind eye' during 1976-1983 to what was happening as regards civil or human rights. The DAIA (Delegation of Argentine Jewish Organisation) and the Papal Nuncio are shown by Ms. Feitlowitz to have been more concerned with keeping out of trouble or quarrels with the Junta, than with protecting their own adherents. The authoress mentions that latent anti-Semitism has existed in Argentina throughout the 20th century. It is easy for people who live in a democratic society to condemn such attitudes. Those who had to live (and to survive) under similar contemporary regimes as Pinochet's in neighbouring Chile, or Duvalier's in Haiti, would understand why people kept their mouths shut, or 'I saw nothing'- a remark that was repeated by many Argentines to the authoress, even during the '1990s' when civilian governments were in power. No international coalition or organization was prepared to intervene, not even the O.A.S. (the Organization Of American States, very much under U.S.A's. control). One must remember that the United Nations are not permitted to alter a country's internal administration. They could expel Iraq's forces from Kuwait; they could not remove Saddam Hussein from running, or ruining Iraq, no matter how much 'The West' was yearning for his removal. Another reason for leaving the Argentinian Junta alone is that 'The West' was still confronting the Communist world or its threat in those days, and one of the main targets of the Junta were the Communists. In Latin America Fidel Castro and Che Guevara had cast long shadows so any government who was keen to curb their influence would be popular with the Western world.[4] Ronald Reagan was very uneasy about any maverick state in the New World, witness the American invasion of Grenada, a small island in the West Indies, in 1984. Britain registered no protest, though Grenada is a member of the Commonwealth, could not truly be classed as a communist power and is smaller than Rhode Island[5].

Rudyard Kipling wrote a poem about Trade and how it keeps the world going. During 'The Seventies', Israel was buying tonnes of wheat from, and selling arms to Argentina – good propaganda for the Junta. Next in 1978 the Association Football's World Cup was held in Argentina. Large sums had been invested in the World Cup – television, souvenirs, special travel offers etc. In Britain a petition had

been circulated and signed by many people (including followers of soccer such as myself), requesting Scotland to boycott the World Cup. By contrast, about 20,000 fans turned up at Hampden Park, singing (?) 'We're going to Argentine' to the tune of 'Those were the days my friend' and cheered the departing Scottish team. How many of this crowd either knew of, or cared about the petition or the Junta's oppression? By coincidence another petition had been presented to the British government in 1978, urging them to withdraw the proposed State Visit to Britain by Nicole Ceausescu, Romania's dictator. Ceausescu duly paid his State Visit, dined at Buckingham Palace and was given the 'Red Carpet treatment', even though his record of repression was well-known. If such a tyrant as Ceausescu could be welcomed, officially, in Britain why should Argentina be ostracised? For good measure Argentina won the World Cup, thus providing some reflected glory for the Junta. Many journalists did go to Argentina to cover the World Cup and several tried to ascertain what really was happening in the country as regards human rights. They were met with strong denials, no admissions of guilt or repression but a few photographs were taken of 'The Mothers of The Plaza De Mayo' to show to the outside world. In all the fuss over the football, these efforts were tiny or ignored and Ms. Feitlowitz reckons that nothing was achieved for civil or human rights in Argentina during the World Cup of 1978.

By 1982 some dissension was appearing in Argentina. The current general in power, Galtieri, tried the old trick of a 'short, victorious war' and invaded the Falklands, or *Islas Malvinas* – always a sore point with Argentina. His gamble failed and the Junta's incompetence was exposed, and 'Britannia ruled the waves' (or the Falklands). This fiasco also gave cartoonists a golden opportunity to portray Margaret Thatcher as pseudo-Britannia, in addition for jingoism to play a major part in the General Election of 1983 in Britain, just to add insult to Argentina's 'injury' of 1982. Civilian rule returned to Argentina with the election of Raul Alfonsin in 1983, followed by Carlos Menem in 1989. Both were expected to 'cleanse the Augean stables' left by the Junta: the *Desaparecidos* and casualties of the Falklands War loomed large in the minds of many Argentines.[4]

Here the authoress finds herself in a dilemma. She acknowledges that Alfonsin and Menem had to tread warily, definitely NOT to upset the chiefs of the Armed Forces, but she criticises their reluctance to bring to trial many known torturers and concentration camp guards. Though some of the " Top Brass" of the Junta have been brought to justice, including Admiral Massera, the most eloquent of the military leaders, too many miscreants and scoundrels are walking round Argentina's streets without hindrance or retribution. Ms. Feitlowitz cites 2 examples, both from the Argentinian Navy, the first being that of Alfredo Astiz who had operated as a sort of *agent provocateur*, tricking women into protesting against the government, then betraying them into harassment and arrest. Captured in the Falklands he could not be extradited to Sweden or other interested countries because he was classed as a P.O.W.[3] As late as 1997 Astiz was working for the Argentinian Naval Intelligence.

The other case involves Captain Adolfo Scilingo who, in 1995, confessed to having taken part in the 'death flights' mentioned previously. All of Chapter 6 deals with Scilingo, and his consequent fate. Menem's reaction was to describe Scilingo as a crook and he was dismissed from the Navy. In 1997, 4 uniformed thugs seized Scilingo, shoved him into a car then carved into his features the initials of the 4 journalists who were investigating Scilingo's story. It was a savage warning to anyone, or rather to any Argentine, who was wondering about poking his or her nose into the affairs of the Junta. Ms. Feitlowitz has been threatened but she may be protected by her American nationality or citizenship. To judge by certain remarks in this book, she has run her fair share of risks.

To misquote Nathaniel in John's Gospel, 'Can anything good come out of Argentina?' There's a parallel between South Africa's 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' and 'Condep' (Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared), set up in 1984. Unfortunately there is no Argentinian equivalent of Archbishop Tutu or even a De Klerk. On the credit side, in April 1995, the Chief of Staff, Martin Balza, broadcast on national television an apology for crimes committed by the Armed Forces against ordinary Argentines. Ms. Feitlowitz has interviewed General Balza since his broadcast and has found him unwilling to give any further apology or denunciation. Somehow the authoress is reluctant to accept that 'half an apology is better than no apology'. One cannot picture the Junta's contemporaries, Idi Amin or Pol Pot apologising in any way to the Ugandan or Cambodian victims of

their hideous regimes. As for putting dictators on trial today, the legal tangle and wrangle in Britain concerning General (or Senator) Pinochet has shown how honest attempts to secure justice for victims of blatant violation of human rights may become derailed in judicial proceedings. In the musical 'Evita' the best-known song is 'Don't cry for me, Argentina.' All 6 chapters in this book give numerous cases as to why many Argentines have just cause and reason to cry, either in frustration or in sorrow. There are the women who are still trying to find out what has happened to their daughters or grand-children, the men and women whose wives and husbands have vanished, with no graves to visit and put their minds at rest. These people may even meet or encounter the ruffians who had tortured and killed their relatives. To judge by their attitude and comments, these perpetrators seem untroubled by any regrets or remorse. Ms. Feitlowitz has met and interviewed several such unsavoury characters, including one of the worst, nicknamed 'Julian The Turk'. Part of his defence (?) is that 'I was acting for the Nation', (a variation on 'I was just obeying orders'). Where have we heard similar excuses before?

This is not a pleasant book to read, but the authoress has spent 6-7 years tackling this dire topic. Perhaps a more apt comparison with other books of this genre would be with Solzhenitzhyn's *The Gulag Archipelago* for the way in which The Junta twisted facts and phrases and words to an extent that 'The West' cannot really comprehend. Not that democratic governments always tell 'the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth'. Ms. Feitlowitz has met Argentines as late as 1998 who admitted that they would shudder, or feel threatened when they encountered people whom they knew to be guilty of crimes and outrages against their friends and relatives. Whether such brutes and ruffians will ever be brought to trial remains to be seen, but the prospects that this should come to pass were looking dim at the time of writing in 1998.

NRV BENZIES

REFERENCES:

Many of the sources used by Ms. Feitlowitz are to be found in U.S.A. or Argentina: not easy to obtain in Britain. Several are written in Spanish, a problem for many people in Britain. Moreover, in his book *Napoleon and His Marshals*, Archie McDonell stated that he was suspicious of large numbers of references etc., as few folk would look up so many. I shall follow Archie McDonell's example.

1   *The Odyssey* Book 22. Melanthius is a scoundrel, but the mutilation that Odysseus inflicts on him is hideous and without justification.

2   *The Old Testament*. Joshua, chapters 6-11. Whatever the religious motives may be, Joshua and his Israelite irregulars are no better than the Indonesian militiamen in East Timor during 1999.

3   *Murder and Madness*. Allan Hall. Blitz Editions. Hardback. 80 pages. Don't let the garish cover put you off. It describes the careers of the Perons and Alfredo Astiz. [along with other ruffians such as Bonnie and Clyde].

4   *Latin America; Its Problems and Its Promises*. Jan K. Black (editor). Westview Press. (a branch of Harper Collins Publishers). Paperback. 658 pages. This is a collection of essays written by lecturers at various colleges and universities, not only in U.S.A. By no means pro "Uncle Sam" or "The West", it is a first class mine and source of information on Latin America, worth every penny (£20) or cent.

5   *Grenada. Whose Freedom?* Latin American Bureau. (1 Amwell St. London EC1 1UL) An account of the invasion of Grenada by U.S.A. in 1984. This short but hard-hitting book (128 pages) was reviewed in *History Teaching Review* issue of October 1984.

Twentieth Century Spain. Politics and Society in Spain, 1898-1998

Francisco J. Romero Salvadó

At a casual glance this book could be dismissed as part of the wider trend, so apparent in the latter part of 1999, when almost every other book seemed to be dedicated to an analysis of some topic pertaining to the 20th century. However, in the case of *Twentieth Century Spain* the time scale, actually encompassing 1898 – 1998, is both logical and self evident. Indeed, given its central role in understanding 20th century Spain, it is especially appropriate that the book was first published in the year which marked the 60th anniversary of the end of the Spanish Civil War.

As with most writers, Romero acknowledges that an understanding of the period must begin with an examination of regional divisions created by geographic and historical influences. Therefore a comprehensive introduction is devoted to establishing the background. This is necessary, as without scene setting, much of the latter information would be less comprehensible for the beginner. The main text begins in 1898 with the loss of Spain's overseas Empire and traces the complex events of 20th Century Spain through two monarchies, two dictatorships, one republic, not to mention the civil war and culminates with an appraisal of Spain's current political position. Given the range of content, at 185 pages of text, this is a slim volume. Yet this is the beauty of this work. Originally conceived to fill a gap in the market and produce a general textbook for undergraduates, Romero has achieved far more than this. While being sufficiently rigorous in his treatment of the topic for his intended market, the clear, simple explanation and analysis makes the book easy to access. Thus, as a by-product of writing such a clear textbook, the topic is made accessible to the non-specialist reader. While History teachers will welcome such a book, it will also, by virtue of its simplicity, become a firm favourite with Higher candidates for extended essay research or Advanced Higher candidates embarking on the new field of study on the Spanish Civil War.

The text chronicles Spain's transformation from a backward and isolated society to a modern democratic state with a developing international profile. Few would quarrel with the basic premise that the Civil War is the central event in this dramatic story. Although the war was itself the culmination of events arising from the loss of Spain's colonies, and the economic, social and political dislocation created by the First World War, it provided the chance for Spain to settle its internal dilemma. Once and for all there was an opportunity to choose if military dictatorship or progressive democracy was to be the way forward. Given the interest and perhaps misunderstanding of both foreign powers and individuals, each with their own agendas and interpretations, Spain was not free to decide the ultimate outcome herself. Yet the resulting victory for Franco committed Spain to almost 40 years of authoritarian rule. Despite the fact that he died over twenty years ago this period still influences current events in the modern constitutional monarchy which has replaced it.

As one would expect in a general work of this nature, the history of the period is told in a chronological fashion. Despite the complexity of the topic, it does not appear daunting due to an easy to read style. Although there are the usual plethora of abbreviations, which accompany any work on this topic, they are kept to the minimum. In addition they are carefully explained, if not on the first mention, most certainly in the comprehensive list of abbreviations, which provides a brief pen portrait of each organisation. Even the complexities of the Civil War itself are admirably handled. This chapter is skilfully constructed so that each part flows into the next enabling the reader to follow the individual plots while at the same time linking them together to gain an overview of the whole event. By employing the strategy of dealing with each of the two sides in turn and providing separate information on the stance of foreign powers, a potentially confusing situation is dealt with in an unambiguous way.

The book can also be recommended for the way in which recent research and thought on the topic both Spanish and international, have been incorporated into the body of the text. This is either by including reference to it or more usually by footnoting. Extensive footnotes and references give thumbnail details and/or refer the reader to another authority. In many cases the reader, especially at school level, will not follow these up but may refer to standard works, for example those by Thomas or Preston, and as such the reluctant reader might be lured on to a more in-depth analysis. Alternatively references could prove to be the starting point of some more detailed up to date research for an Advanced Higher dissertation.

Clearly, although a comprehensive work in its own right, this can only serve as an introduction to a more in-depth study of specific areas. In addition it contains materials outwith the periods studied in Scottish schools. Yet Dr Romero's text is to be thoroughly recommended. The events of the Civil War cannot be fully understood without the background and this book does this task admirably. Furthermore it will serve as a good introduction for senior pupils to the non-textbook world. Its easy style makes it exceptionally reader friendly and accessible to those taking their first faltering steps away from purpose written school texts. The simplicity with which events of the 1930s unfold will be welcomed by many pupils. In addition the helpful maps create a clear visual plan to follow. Teachers too will appreciate the style as it aids the development of a deeper insight without becoming either turgid or time-consuming to read.

This work has all the hallmarks of being written by a teacher who has taught the materials and based on this experience, has written the book that his students require. As such it is a boon for anyone engaged in a similar process. Through his expertise, Romero is aware of the aspects of the topic that the students perceive to be the most complex and has written his book to explain them. As such both teacher and pupil can benefit from his knowledge. This is a very worthy book, which will earn its worth again and again whenever this topic is studied at either Higher or Advanced Higher.

ANNE M. McEWAN

Scotland's Roman Remains   Lawrence Keppie

When first I decided to teach the CSYS option on *North Britain, from the Romans to 1000 A.D*, I found the first edition of Lawrence Keppie's book to be an invaluable teaching aid. So reviewing the second edition was akin to meeting an old acquaintance. All the merits of the original work are to be found in the new edition. The author is an acknowledged expert in the field, who combines his expertise with a highly readable style of writing. For instance, sixth year candidates have found his explanation of archaeological terminology very accessible.

The book divides easily into two sections: one an overview of the Romans in Scotland and one a gazetteer of Scotland's Roman remains. The first part is largely unchanged from the original, and remains one of the best introductions to the study of Scotland's Roman past — a hiccup in Scotland's Iron Age, as the author himself explains. This section covers Scotland on the eve of the Roman occupation and then the various phases of Flavian, Antonine and Severan military campaigns. The Roman army, military installations, from fortresses to watchtowers, inscriptions, coins and pottery are clearly explained and supported by excellent illustrations. Readers unfamiliar with Roman Scotland would find these chapters particularly informative. The brief chapter on the rediscovery of Roman Scotland is particularly fascinating as it plots the contribution of past antiquarians' and archaeologists' contribution to our knowledge of Scotland's Roman past.

Part 2 is essential reading for anyone who intends to visit the remains in the field. This section is longer than the first edition as it includes more illustrations and the results of the last 12 year's excavation and research. There is for example, additional information on Newsteads, based on the research carried out by Bradford University and the promotional work of the Trimontium Trust. Likewise, further information on Crammond, including the much publicised lioness, is included. Directions and information on site access have been revised where necessary. Site plans, diagrams and photographs support the text. The bibliography has been revised and a number of related websites added.

The book was commissioned by the Council for British Archaeology to promote informed public opinion concerning the remains of Scotland's Roman past. Lawrence Keppie has certainly succeeded in that purpose and I would thoroughly recommend his work to any one with an interest in Scotland's Roman remains.

LAWRIE JOHNSTON

Freedom from Fear (The American People in Depression and War 1929-45)
David M. Kennedy

It is often the case that you stumble across something special when you are not looking for it. This was the case with *Freedom from Fear*. Having decided not to teach the American section of the Higher course this year, I annoyingly found reading this book both enjoyable and enlightening! Many of the great American personalities that are difficult to get across to pupils in the mass of AAAs and NRAs are vividly portrayed and the book offers interesting insights into the characters of people who shaped the planet's most powerful nation. If you do teach this section of the Higher then I would certainly recommend reading this weighty tome.

The story of depression and wartime America is told over 858 pages, not one of which does not hold narrative that is compelling, lucid and expertly crafted. You are constantly aware that the events unfolding are some of the most dramatic and contrasting in American history. The massive social, economic and political shifts that took place at this time are admirably explained and ideas about them are supported by a wealth of evidence ranging from intimate conversations at parties to excellent photographs from various periods of the narrative. I particularly liked the photographs depicting class war, something that is difficult to get across to pupils.

The first of the 22 chapters really helps the reader to understand the amazing confidence that was the norm in 1920s America. The dominant theme of the White House, even in September 1928 was how to manage the massively wealthy economy of America. Kennedy expertly lays before the reader the evidence of a President considering some intervention in the market as a means to offsetting downturns in the economic cycle. The irony of the situation is not lost to Kennedy and he milks it for all it is worth.

Something that is perhaps lacking in some of the Higher texts on America is the sheer size and speed of changes that had taken place in America in the first 20 years of the twentieth century. Kennedy certainly goes to town on this subject. I found myself in awe at the impressive facts and statistics that rolled before my eyes. Kennedy, however, does not get carried away with the positive. Negative phenomena, such as the Ku Klux Klan, are also commented upon and Kennedy takes time to make the reader aware that for all the marvels that were appearing in early twentieth century America, 45 million people still had no indoor plumbing by 1930!

One of the greatest strengths of this book is the way that is moves easily between narrative and character description. One moment you are reading about Hoover's attempts to solve the agricultural depression and the next you are deep into his background as an author of mining manuals. This rolling style maintains interest in the story and offers great opportunities to get stories to liven up dull classes! While touching on the subject of Hoover, it has been my experience that pupils get the impression that he was an inadequate man; someone who had no vision or drive. He was simply not up to the job of tackling the Great Depression. Kennedy manages to paint a very different picture. He cogently argues that Hoover was certainly not a radical in his thinking but that he was willing to intervene in the economy. He was faced, however, with a Congress in panic and a small Federal Government. Scope for action was limited and no matter how hard Hoover pushed, there was always something bigger pushing back. The way that Kennedy puts this idea is easily read and would be easily paraphrased for the use of pupils. I am not suggesting that pupils read the text as it stands but it would be worthwhile discussing its content if only to dispel the myth that the problems of the early depression came from the narrowness of Hoover's ideas.

As the chapters pass, Kennedy winds up the tension, bringing in storms from abroad, as Britain stops gold payments and Hitler is installed as chancellor of Germany. He even manages to liven up the Hundred Days. The usual list of New Deal Agencies is punctuated by the behind the scenes 'wheeling and dealing' that is often missed from other texts. This gives the impression that the New Deal was more than a plan but a breathing entity that took on a life of its own. Roosevelt is seen as a politician sensing the moment to be right, more than having a rigid timetable that he had to implement. Kennedy sees the Hundred Days as the crux of the discussion about New Deal politics and Roosevelt's

ideology. He admits, however, that the Hundred Days, *'have puzzled historians seeking neatly encompassing definitions of this prolifically creative era'*

My favourite chapter of the book is chapter 6. It is here that Kennedy looks at how the depression affected the American people. The determination of the Administration to do something is neatly described through a meeting between two members of the Federal Government. The first wants to know what the people are thinking about the depression and the New Deal. The latter is, therefore, being sent on a mission to find out. There are to be no statistics or reports. The task is to simply come back with honest impressions of the state of the county. This, if anything, sums up the amateurish nature of the growing Federal Government under Roosevelt. Going on 'gut feeling' alone is no longer possible in the age of computer generated statistics but Kennedy cleverly shows the reader that people in the Roosevelt Administration cared about the American people and did not want statistics but wanted to know the realities of poverty and unemployment.

Through the eyes of these administrators Kennedy shows the reader the statistics and the realities of life in depression America. The ups and downs of the New Deal are written about clearly and without bias. The striving for economic recovery is always in the background and Kennedy never lets the reader forget this. The section of the book on depression America ends by trying to sum up what the New Deal did. Kennedy does not fall into the trap of trying to sum up the success or failure of the New Deal but instead sticks to what is measurable. I agreed with this approach entirely. After reading over 350 pages I did not want to be confronted with the perennial argument over success or failure. Instead I wanted a clear exposition of the facts and this is what I got. Again, here is an opportunity to look at some well-explained points with a class. Chapter 12 would enable most pupils to understand the basics of the New Deal before going on to consider its success or failure.

The switch to looking at the build up to war is not a cleverly contrived link but simply returns the reader to part of the subject of the Prologue – 1918. Kennedy is, once again, determined to show the reader why he is writing this book. He certainly feels that this period transfers the world rapidly and uncontrollably, with people reacting to events rather than having even a chance of shaping them. He takes a large sweep across the world, looking at how World War I affected major countries. It is interesting to read an American view of this and equally interesting to read about the American attitude to the rise of Hitler. Most Americans, argues Kennedy, looked upon the machinations of post war European states with disgust. The thought that 50,000 American men had died for this was repulsive and there was no way that America was going to get involved across the Atlantic again.

Chapter 14 is an excellent chapter on the way that America helped the democracies while remaining neutral. I had not realised the difficult tightrope Roosevelt was crossing and the agony that some Americans must have been going through. I particularly enjoyed the sections on the correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt. The similarity between the swift action needed to start the New Deal and the swift action needed to support Britain is startling. Once again, Kennedy's narrative gallops along, taking the reader through most of the poignant moments of the war. The narrative, in this section, is clearly backed up by diagrams of key events such as Pearl Harbour and the attack on Okinawa. To someone who is a self confessed non-Geographer these were invaluable and added a great deal to the lucid explanations that Kennedy gives. The photographs in this section are also well chosen and add to the social, political and economic background of the war.

It is admirable that Kennedy never takes his eye off the ball. Throughout the book he comes back to the massive changes and challenges facing the American people. Propaganda and its effects on the American people are classic examples of the way that Kennedy focuses the attention of the reader on the American people whenever it is possible to do so. The major players, the huge events and the air of the uncontrollable are always reassessed through the eyes of the ordinary American people. This is certainly a great strength of the book.

Freedom from Fear is a mix of storytelling and incisive history. You are at all times aware that the period you are reading about is one of the defining periods of our modern world. As a read for the American section of the Higher course it is a must for teachers, and certainly classes could look at small chunks for discussion. I have to say, however, that it has not persuaded me to change back to teaching the American section myself; if only because this time next year I would be bound to find a key text on King John which I could then be using!

DAVID GREGORY

Freedom's War: The US Crusade against the Soviet Union 1945-56   Scott Lucas

One of the more bizarre American proposals for conducting psychological warfare against the USSR was the suggestion that extra large condoms should be dropped into the Soviet Union. Each condom would be labelled: "Made in the USA: Medium". Although the condom drop never took place, it is a story which illustrates well the values which underpinned CIA plans for covert operations in Europe in the early years of the Cold War.

In *Freedom's War*, Scott Lucas considers the contribution this commitment to 'American' values made to the development of US foreign policy between 1945-1956. He argues that the ideological commitment to 'freedom'; and to the 'liberation' of countries under communist control, was far more than a mere 'screen' for geopolitical and strategic interests: it amounted to a crusade against the perceived evils of Communism and, as such, it embraced both state and 'private' interests. Challenging the neo-orthodoxy of those historians who argue that issues of 'national security' alone determined US foreign policy, Lucas claims that ideology interacted with other considerations to define America's relations with the Soviet Union. In the years after 1945, the widespread belief in the US 'way of life', with its emphasis on 'freedom' and 'democracy', was mobilised in such a way that it made a vital contribution to the development of the Cold War.

The commitment to 'freedom' was, of course, most famously articulated in Harry Truman's speech to Congress on 12 March 1947. The contrast that he drew between a way of life 'based upon the will of the majority', and a second way of life 'based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority' presented East-West relations in ideological terms. Lucas argues that in less than twenty minutes, Truman had established the Cold War *'not as a clash of military values or a struggle for economic supremacy but as a contest of values'*. From then on, 'every aspect of American life from religion to sport or the wonders of consumerism had to become a beacon to the world while Soviet counterparts were exposed as the perversions of a system which impoverished and enslaved its citizens'. As Dean Acheson told the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1950, *'The world must hear what America is about, what America believes, what freedom is, what it has done for many, what it can do for all'*.

Having issued the call to arms, it was essential to win support for the cause. The American public must be 'persuaded' to support both the Truman Doctrine and the aid package to Europe which would have to follow. The selling of the Marshall Plan in America was carefully orchestrated. Even before Marshall's speech at Harvard, Acheson had asked for the machinery *'for intensive public education on the Marshall Plan'*. Given that the State Department remained sceptical about propaganda, the remedy lay in working through a network of 'private' individuals. The Citizens' Committee to Defend the Marshall Plan was born. By the end of the year the Committee had launched a multi-media campaign which helped to mobilise pro-Administration forces. At the same time, Europe was plied with favourable material so that US Labor Information officers could report: *'Hardly a day goes by without a good blurb in the papers and even shop windows are loaded with subtle US propaganda.'*

Nevertheless, the situation in Europe was not reassuring. The possibility of a Communist victory in the Italian elections of 1948 led to the decision to use 'private' groups to implement 'psychological' activities with covert State funding for the undertakings. The CIA funnelled some $3m per year to the Italian Christian Democratic Party. Perhaps as a result, the Christian Democrats increased their share of the vote from 37 percent to 49 percent. Most importantly, the National Security Council now acknowledged that propaganda had a vital part to play in Cold War strategy, and covert operations were sanctioned under the oversight of the CIA. And so, Lucas argues, by 1948, the ideology of freedom, the acceptance of propaganda and the existence of government machinery *'were converging to move foreign policy beyond 'containment'*. The USA's Crusade for Freedom was ready to go on the offensive.

The newly established Office of Policy Co-ordination was to plan the covert offensive. Staff were recruited among refugees and defectors, finance came from the five percent of funds under the

Marshall Plan which were reserved for the discretionary use of the US in Europe. The supply of money available was such that one OPC official stated: *'We couldn't spend it all...There were no limits and nobody had to account for it. It was amazing'*. By 1949 the OPC was using US aircraft to send personnel, supplies, dollars and gold into the Baltic states, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania. There were plans for the liberation of Albania.

Just as important, however, was the development of the state-private network in such a way that overt activities could have an acceptable private 'facade'. As a result, the National Committee for a Free Europe was set up in 1949 with men such as Lucius Clay, Dwight Eisenhower and Cecil B. DeMille on the Board. By 1950 the organisation for freedom's war was in place. Radio Free Europe was the major project undertaken by the National Committee for a Free Europe. Test transmissions began in July 1950, with new transmitters coming into service the following year. Money was not a problem: Radio Free Europe had an ideologically vital role for *'the purpose of RFE is to contribute to the liberation of nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by sustaining their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-co-operation with the Soviet-dominated regimes '*. At the same time, in America, Eisenhower launched the Crusade for Freedom, informing America about the activities of RFE. A Freedom Bell was christened with a ticker-tape parade in New York, praised on television by an actor named Ronald Reagan, and then carried across the USA on the Freedom Train as spectators signed Freedom Scrolls. Nor did the National Committee for a Free Europe stop there. Operation Brainwave sought to establish a 'Legion of Freedom' across Europe, with the slogan 'The Welfare of the Many vs. The Tyranny of the Few', and the Free European University in Exile was established in Strasbourg with its first group of 86 students granted $800 a year each in November 1951.

The funding of the 'private' facade had to be circumspect. While the Ford Foundation was willing to provide money for programmes to 'advance human welfare' much of the money for the 'private' network came through 'shell' foundations. Lucas shows just how much CIA money was involved. Out of a sample of 700 sizeable grants, 108 were partially or completely CIA funded. Indirectly, CIA funds supported a vast range of groups, from Olympic athletes to the Communist *Daily Worker ('because the Agency wanted to know where our enemy was ')*.

Wherever the money came from, the public took up the Crusade with enthusiasm and within a few years the state-private network had mobilised people at all levels of American society. Joe Public was fighting the Cold War. American universities provided valuable support for the psychological campaign. Professor Conyers Read, President of the American Historical Association, declared that *'Total war, whether it be hot or cold, enlists everyone and calls upon everyone to assume his part.... '*. . At MIT, Project Troy studied Soviet vulnerabilities while at Harvard the Russian Research Centre interviewed 3,000 escapees and refugees on the nature of the Soviet system. The CIA may have worked, directly or indirectly, with a total of more than 5,000 academics. The Crusade for Freedom targeted women specifically. One small group of New York women received a $25,000 subsidy from 'a friend'; over the next 15 years this group would receive more than $500,000 from the CIA, coming to them through the 'shell' Dearborn foundation. African-Americans were recruited to spread the American message to Africa and Asia, and to counter Soviet propaganda about racial discrimination in the USA. Freedom's message was so important that it required huge numbers of publications ranging from comic books to translations of *Animal Farm*. 'Front' publishers were established and the so called Arlington press printed government-subsidised 'private' books. Lucas points out that the CIA financed the British publication, the *New Leader*, which was a significant forum for British socialists such as Gaitskell, Crosland and Healey.

Such was the success of the State-private network that liberation from Communism, rather than mere containment, was the goal of many of those involved. Among those working for the Psychological Strategies Board, established in 1951, there were those who sought the early liberation of eastern Europe and who maintained that this could be achieved within three to five years; others were more cautious and predicted that this would take anything from ten to twenty years. And if President Truman and the State Department failed to back the proposals of the PSB, the election campaign of 1952 offered new hope since Eisenhower's Republican platform criticised 'containment'. Ike's election, and the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, seemed to offer great hope to all who

advocated liberation. After all, during his campaign, Eisenhower had appeared to favour 'liberation', declaring in August 1952 that 'the American conscience can never know peace until these people (of the Soviet bloc) are restored again to being masters of their own fate'. Moreover, the new Administration got off to a good start: the CIA was allocated a $100m budget for operations in eastern Europe and Eisenhower's chief psychological warfare officer in World War II, C.D. Jackson, was appointed to the new post of Special Assistant for psychological operations.

But those who placed their faith in the new Administration were in for a great disappointment. Lucas calls it 'A crusade of indecision'. Words were one thing; action was quite another. When Stalin died in March 1953 his death seemed to offer a variety of opportunities for destabilisation within the eastern bloc. However, there were serious differences between C.D. Jackson and the State Department and what emerged after five weeks of wrangling was not a 'crusade for freedom' but the State Department's strategy of a subtle challenge to the USSR emphasising the benefits of reduced military expenditure. In June the demonstrations in East Berlin presented the Administration with a second opportunity to exploit instability in eastern Europe. Radio in the American Sector broadcast five times a day to ferment discontent, supported by Radio Liberation, which targeted Soviet troops. The PSB drew up detailed plans for the National Security Council, urging that the US government should 'exploit satellite unrest' and 'encourage elimination of key puppet officials'. But again the Administration declined to take advantage of the situation, while not actually ruling out liberation, and, by failing to draw a firm line, they gave the activists an opportunity to pursue their operations. Thousands of tons of food were distributed in Berlin, twelve million leaflets were dropped on the Czechs, and Radio Free Europe continued to stir up discontent with claims like: *'Higher wages – lower prices: only the fall of the government can solve this problem'*. Some projects were far more alarming in their implications. C.D. Jackson's assistant, Walt Rostow, suggested that USAF planes should overfly the USSR to demonstrate US air superiority and to press political demands on the Soviets. If Moscow caved in, the USA would have won an important psychological point; if the Soviets tried to stop the aircraft, the US would respond with a nuclear attack! On balance, condom drops seem like a better idea.

The activists' hopes of imminent liberation were finally dashed in the autumn of 1956 when Soviet tanks re-entered Budapest and crushed the Hungarian uprising. The Administration distanced itself from all those who had hoped that this was the beginning of Freedom's war and Eisenhower declared that *'we have never in all the years that I think that we have been dealing with problems of this sort urged or argued for any kind of armed revolt which could bring about disaster for our friends'*. Liberation – in Eastern Europe at least – was no longer on the agenda.

In this fascinating account of the United States' pursuit of liberation between 1948 and 1956, Scott Lucas has demonstrated the extent to which US Cold War policy was shaped by a commitment to 'freedom'. In drawing our attention to the 'state-private' network which was forged in the 1940s, he shows how far the interests of officials and those of private individuals coincided in the crusade against communism. By focusing on the role of ideology in the formulation of foreign policy, rather than issues of national security or geopolitical and economic objectives, *Freedom's War* provides the reader with an insight into values which are recognised as being thoroughly 'American' and which have been successfully exploited by both Republican and Democratic Administrations throughout the last half century. It is a book which I would thoroughly recommend to all with an interest in modern America.

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