



HISTORY TEACHING REVIEW YEAR BOOK

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EDITOR: ANDREW HUNT

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Cover: Nazi Poster (used in the Reichstag Election of November 1932)

Illustrative of the image the Nazis projected before 1933 of the NSDAP as a 'People's Party' transcending the class divide of German Society.

Caption: Adolf Hitler has brought you together in the last 13 years! German Workers of the Brain and Fist! German Farmers! Don't let your self be ripped apart! Vote National Socialist List 1

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Alison Ewin is a lecturer in the History Department of St. Martin's College, Lancaster. She has researched into the history of the archaeology of Hadrian's Wall and has published a book and various papers upon the subject.

Dr Tim McHugh is Assistant Professor of Early Modern History at Trent University, Peterborough, Canada. He is a graduate of the University of London and has taught on both sides of the Atlantic. He is the author of several articles on the subject of hospitals and society in during the reign of Louis XIV. His monograph *Hospital Politics in Louis XIV's France* is due to be published late in 2002.

Dr Paul Flenley is Principal Lecturer in Politics and Coordinator of Postgraduate European Studies at the University of Portsmouth. His first degree was in Russian Studies from St. Andrews University. He gained a Ph.D. from Birmingham University for a study of the labour movement in the Russian Revolution. He has published work on the Russian Revolution, Russian national identity, the Russian media and Russian foreign policy. He is currently writing a book on the Origins of Stalinism as well as working on a longer-term project on Russian national identity and foreign policy. He is co-editor of the *Journal of European Area Studies*.

Dr Detlef Mühlberger is Senior Lecturer in Modern German History in the History Department at Oxford Brookes University. He has published numerous articles on Nazism and is author of *Hitler's Followers. Studies in the Sociology of the Nazi Movement* (Routledge, 1991). His two volume study on the *Völkischer Beobachter* is to be published later this year by the Peter Lang Verlag. He is currently working on a book entitled *The Social Bases of Nazism, 1920-1933*, to be published by Cambridge University Press.

Dr Joseph Harrison graduated in Economics from the University of Sheffield. At present he is Senior Lecturer in Economic History at the University of Manchester. He previously taught at the University of East Anglia. His publications include *An Economic History of Modern Spain* (Manchester University Press, 1978), *The Spanish Economy in the Twentieth Century* (Croom Helm, 1985) and *The Spanish Economy from the Civil War to the European Community* (Cambridge University Press, 1995). Along with Alan Hoyle, he edited *The Spanish Crisis of 1898: Regenerationism, Modernism, Post-Colonialism* (Manchester University Press, 2000). Dr Harrison is currently preparing a book with David Corkill entitled *Spain: a Modern European Economy*.

Dr David Rolf was a Lecturer in Education (History) at the University of Birmingham before taking early retirement and is now an Honorary Fellow in the Department of Modern History. He has taught since his retirement at University College, Worcester and is a Research Associate there. He specialises in military history and his most recent book is *The Bloody Road to Tunis: Destruction of the Axis Forces in North Africa, November 1942- May 1943* (Greenhill Press, 2001). At present, he is undertaking research for a book on the Balkan campaign of 1940-41.

Editorial

ANDREW HUNT

Once again the target for this year's issue of the Year Book was to provide additional reading for students and teachers in Advanced Higher fields of study. There has been a drying up to a dribble of any more support materials [and bibliographies] coming out of HSDU, so we shouldn't hold our breath waiting for very much more from that source. There may just be the odd thing 'pending'. So.. where is anything else to come from? The answer seems to be journals like this. In any one Year Book we can't do a whole course .. after all, any single set of HSDU course support materials was around about 100 pages and the Germany bibliography alone was 156 pages! So, what this Year Book attempts to do is offer a collection of short, snappy, topical reviews of some issue or question in a field. Any young student reading it will be exposed to new ideas, a well constructed and argued piece of work, some decent source references to pursue and quote, and the knowledge that the piece was written by someone who is at the top of their field. Over the years, it is hoped that a collection of successive Year Books will [especially for some fields!] provide a wide'ish range of decent resources to turn to as additional provoking reading, on top of any standard texts.

By the time of the issue of this Year Book, all candidates will have sat their Advanced Higher History exam. 2002 will be the first sitting where it takes the full cohort, where there is no CSYS. This could well amount to almost 1000 candidates, which will be good news for History teachers as a sign of their success in interesting students in this highest level of school-based History examination. It is only as the new course and its assessments 'bed down' that we can learn the lessons, and appreciate the marking conventions and the rulings which will help us get the best performance out of our candidates. Some lessons are already clear and were highlighted in the first Principal Assessor's Report. One of them was the need for competence [or better] at historiography. The best candidates were not just the ones who had covered the course; they were the ones who had studied it. Advanced Higher History puts greater weight than the old CSYS on preparation for the exam itself [now worth almost two thirds of the total mark]. This means doing the deep and wide reading, since not only is some reference to different historical interpretations obligatory in the essays, but the best grades in the essay marks schemes are reserved for those who show '*clear understanding of the views of different historians*'. In the sources questions also, whilst historiography is not exactly pencilled in as mandatory; it is difficult to imagine how the recalled issues which help contextualise the sources can be fully dealt with without reference to the reading done of the historians who wrote on those issues. After all, if there is no attempt at historiography in the source answers, is it only supposed to be length that distinguishes a good Advanced Higher one from a good Higher one? It is hoped that the SQA CD Roms containing the marked annotated papers from the 2001 examination will soon appear and help provide guidance to all presenters on how the Examining team's minds were thinking about differential rewarding of a range of source answers.

My note of thanks to all contributors and reviewers should maybe start coming at the beginning of my Editorial, rather than at the end, but it is sincere nevertheless. All contributors were in touch with me about the progress of their articles; they appeared in good time and all on disc. The printers and typesetters had an easy job of it again. In my view we can't do without this constant academic input into our teaching at this level. It's just as important at the setting stage of the exam, where academics and teachers work together in every case to prepare the paper, as it is at the teaching stage, where the academics contribute towards a range of journals, university VI year conferences, and through their books. Taking these Advanced Higher courses forward to the level they should be, isn't just about recycling our last 20 years worth of CSYS teaching notes; it's about constantly refreshing and reviving our teaching with discussion of the latest issues, gained from contact with the academic work of the 'refreshers'. I hope this Year Book will have done something towards achieving that aim.

Hadrian's Wall: the Final Frontier?

ALISON EWIN

'Relics render the past more important but not better known'

D. Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country*

Hadrian's Wall is probably the largest and certainly the most complex monument in Britain. There are Roman frontier works in other parts of the Empire from North Africa to the Rhine, however none are as extensively researched or as well preserved. Part of the fascination of the Wall lies in the fact that, for scholars, the more it is studied the more it remains an enigma. For the population as a whole, few other structures have the power to generate such powerful images of the past. The combination of dramatic scenery and picturesque ruin has inspired many flights of fancy involving Italian soldiers, sodden with rain, writing home to Rome whilst sheltering from the climate and marauding Picts and Scots, from behind battlemented watch-towers. The imagery owes much to such as Rudyard Kipling who, in 'Puck of Pook's Hill' describes the Wall.

"Just when you think you are at the world's end, you see a smoke from east to west as far as the eye can turn and then.....houses and temples, shops and theatres, barracks and granaries, trickling along like dice behind – always behind – one long, low rising and falling, and hiding and showing line of towers. And that is the Wall".¹

Hadrian's Wall is a 'monument'. The Latin roots of the word, meaning 'a reminder', provides a means of defining its significance in a number of ways. It is a reminder that Britain, for the only time in its history, was once part of a great empire. For Kipling and his readers the Wall was an icon whose power lay in its evocation of an empire whose imagery, ideology and monumentality had meanings for a British Empire which was then at its height but still needing to define itself. It also, like Rome, had its own frontier problems, particularly on the Afghan border with India.

The Wall should also be a reminder that not all of Britain was part of the Roman Empire. It represented a division which, I would like to suggest, had implications which are still of relevance today. Thus there are two underlying themes to this article. The first is concerned with the structure of, and indeed what constitutes, the limits of empire and how they should be defined.² Secondly I would like to consider the long-term legacy of imperial frontiers and suggest that Scotland's current preoccupation with nationhood and identity has roots as far back as Rome.

When addressing these big issues a fundamental consideration has to be an analysis of the riddle of the original purpose of the wall, an issue inexorably tied in with an investigation of how its structure informs us of its intended function. In other words, "What is it for and how did it work?" In order to address this it would be useful to discuss what it actually is.

Documentary evidence is of little help here. Hadrian's biographer says that Hadrian had a wall built from sea to sea 'to separate the Romans from the barbarians'. This statement is shrouded in ambiguity but is all we have. For the rest we have the evidence of the physical remains as revealed and interpreted by archaeologists. Interpretation, in the context of Hadrian's Wall, is a fluid, ever changing business in which previous certainties are exploded and new ones rise from the ashes. It stands to reason that each generation of scholars are the product of their cultural environment and bring their own preoccupations to bear on how they interpret the evidence they find, and, more importantly, on the choice of site they wish to investigate. Thus the Victorian antiquarians and archaeologists were much concerned with the nature of the military and strategic context of the Wall. Their concern with the physical outline and structures of forts and other military installations reflects perhaps what has previously been said about identity with current issues concerning Britain's military role in its expanding empire. Modern archaeology has tended to change its focus by investigating the nature of civilian life and the relationships between the military and native communities. Unexpected discoveries can also change the whole agenda of research. The best example of this being the Vindolanda writing tablets

which have revealed a unique and intimate view, as through a key hole, into regimental life in one fort just prior to the building of the Wall.³

The accumulated scholarship of the last one hundred and fifty years on Hadrian's Wall reveals how misleading a name can be. Firstly the term 'wall' is a misnomer. The entity that is usually referred to as Hadrian's Wall is, in fact, a military zone. It comprises a complex of ditches and fortifications running, not only from the Tyne to Solway but also running south down the western coast for a substantial distance. It further includes forts, bases and roads to the north and south of the line of the curtain wall. Secondly, 'Is it Hadrian's?' It was only generally attributed to Hadrian in the 19th century, having previously been referred to, simply as, the 'Roman Wall'. Of what is seen today there is probably little left that is Hadrianic. A much more probable period of derivation is that of rebuilding undertaken in the reign of the Emperor Severus in the early third century. The most visited central section of the Wall has sections referred to by modern archaeologists as 'Clayton Wall' after a Victorian landowner and antiquary, John Clayton, who is responsible for much of the excavations done on the central sector of the wall. For these early archaeologists the distinction between excavation and reconstruction was a fine one and much of what is upstanding today, particularly around Housesteads Fort, though the stones may be Roman, is the creation of Clayton's workmen.

Superficially the archaeology reveals an original design given a spurious coherence by its symmetry. The master-plan, maybe conceived in Rome, seems to have consisted of a line from the Tyne to the Solway consisting of a stone curtain wall defended by a small fort or 'milecastle' every Roman mile and a watchtower or 'turret' every third of a mile. A ditch running parallel to the north of the wall for its entire length completed this rational scheme. The negotiation of the granite outcrops of the Whin Sill, the crossing of three large rivers and other frequent alterations in terrain presented complex engineering problems. These were solved, with remarkable imagination, by Roman engineers and surveyors in order to create the imposing edifice we can still see today. On closer examination, however, the master-plan, when translated to the ground, seems to have been something of a muddle.

The evidence of compromise, change of plan, improvisation and the odd quick fix is all around.⁴ Whilst the foundations, which were probably constructed before the curtain wall was erected, are ten feet wide, the wall which was subsequently built on them can be anything from ten to six feet wide. (The standard height of the wall is unknown as nothing remains to its original height, however evidence from the remains of a turret would indicate fifteen feet to a parapet of approximately five feet). The western half of the wall was of turf and only later replaced by stone. The garrison, housed in barracks in the milecastles, would seem to have been supported and supplied by pre-existing forts to the south of the Wall such as Vindolanda. These then seem to be supplanted by forts built on the line of the wall, such as Housesteads and Chesters. The plan of these forts varies. Whilst all have gateways north and south, some are astride the wall whilst others adjoin the wall and lie entirely to the south. The greatest puzzle of all is the motive behind the decision to add an entirely new defensive system running the length of the wall in the form of the 'vallum'. This feature is misnamed as it is, in fact, a ditch rather than a wall. It is of huge proportions compared with the original ditch but this time, most significantly, it lies to the south of the wall. These workings must have required as much time and effort to construct as the wall itself.

Having discussed what is there, queries jostle for position in any analysis of why the Wall is there.⁵ Do the changes of plan imply problems with the original conception or are they symptoms of reactions to a changing local situation? There is no way of knowing the situation on the ground, either at the commencement of the building or of how it developed as the work proceeded. It is notoriously difficult to align scanty documentary evidence to the archaeology when it comes to events. There is no real evidence of attacks upon the Wall but then it is very hard to distinguish between accidental damage and wilful destruction. Hadrian's biographer's idea that the wall was to divide the barbarians from the Romans is contradicted by the location of the wall which probably passed through the territory of the tribe of the Brigantes. They had a history of contact with the Roman administration as a client- state which eventually became absorbed by the Empire. Maybe divide and rule was the name of the game.

What is clear is that the wall was not a defensive barrier signifying an impregnable line, in other words it was not a Roman Iron Curtain. Roman weaponry and fighting tactics were unsuited to such

strategy. The Roman army was designed to fight in the open not from behind a defended line. Forts had more in common with modern police stations than medieval castles. Those to the north of the Wall were as much a part of the frontier as the Wall itself. The size and frequency of the gates through the wall at both milecastle and fort would indicate a barrier designed to control rather than repel. It is perhaps better to envisage Hadrian's conception of the edge of Empire as a fluid realm where control might be indirect and based on the possibility of the application of military might when a destabilising situation required it. It must be admitted however that the addition of the Vallum to the frontier works, by restricting the movement of people even further, rather undermines this argument. David Shotter has put forward the view that 'the vallum might conceivably represent a corridor for covert communication'⁶ in that troops could pass along the bottom of the vallum without being seen from north or south. This suggestion does emphasise the important function of the wall as a line of communication. This was graphically illustrated in an episode of Adam Hart-Davis television series 'What the Romans Did For Us?' which experimented with Roman technology's ability to send messages over long distances.

So far my interpretation of the Wall's purpose has emphasised its possible role in the physical control of a 'barbarian' population. Whenever I visit the Wall, however, there is always a nagging voice in my head which says, "This is a sledge hammer to crack a nut". The size, complexity and mass of the monument seems to far outweigh its purpose as a strategic demarcation line. No other frontier in the Empire compares with Hadrian's Wall. Possibly the threat to security in Britain was greater than elsewhere. This is possible but hard to prove given the lack of documentary sources. But then I remember that I have called this a 'monument' i.e. a reminder. Maybe it is more about psychological control than physical control. What, to a military historian, might appear as a strategic structure, to a modern cultural historian might be seen as a piece of rhetoric. In other words Hadrian, in ordering such a gigantic frontier-work, was making a statement about the power of the Roman Empire. This appears particularly plausible when the Wall, in the central sector, is seen from the north, looking south. Sitting squarely on top of the crags of the Whin Sill it is, even today, an imposing sight. If battlements, watch-towers and a wall, possibly whitewashed, are added then the impact on the landscape and on the psyche of the local population must have been enormous. The Roman Empire is, in effect, saying it with stone and the message is 'so far and no further'.⁷

This all sounds quite feasible till we take into account the indisputable fact that this, in the short term, was *not* the final frontier. Another wall, built 20 years later, was built on the orders of the Emperor, Antoninus Pius. Hadrian's original inspiration would seem to have been overwhelmed by the construction of a further frontier. This frontier, like the first, it was built from sea to sea however, this time, it crossed the narrowest part of Britain from the Forth to the Clyde. This northern line was shorter and would therefore seem more logical. The Antonine Wall is little known in comparison with Hadrian's. Being built of turf and wood, little has survived and much has been engulfed by lowland Scotland's industrial heritage. This development compels a rethinking of any interpretation of the Hadrian's Wall's purpose. It becomes a springboard for further advance. It is relegated to a temporary holding line.

The contradictions inherent in this change of direction only make sense if considered in the context of imperial politics rather than military strategy. Antoninus Pius, as many emperors had done before and were to do again, possibly used the furthestmost edge of his empire, the only province across an ocean, as a pawn in a much bigger game of power politics. Antoninus was not noted for his militarism, hence his name, 'Pius'. There was no escaping the fact, however, that, as emperor, he was head of the Army and in his legions lay both his power base and also the greatest threat to his power. To maintain the loyalty of his legions, he needed to establish a military reputation. A campaign in Britain, which meant basing his troops as far away from Rome as was possible and then keeping them further occupied building a wall, would have had much to commend it. That this was probably short term political expediency is confirmed by the decision to withdraw back to Hadrian's line within about twenty years. Despite later campaigns against the northern tribes there was no further recorded attempt to alter the status quo.

Any discussion of the vacillating nature of Roman policy when it comes to the location of the

British frontier inevitably raises the fundamental question, “Did the province of Britain need a frontier at all?” After all, it was an island. Logic might dictate that the simplest solution would be the conquest of the whole island. One Roman historian, Dio Cassius says that the Emperor Claudius who initiated the original invasion of AD43 had, on leaving Britain following his army’s capture of Colchester, ordered that his governor should ‘take the rest’. If this were to be interpreted as the whole island then any intention of establishing a frontier other than the sea itself was out of the question. It took around forty years for total conquest to be a feasible proposition but, in the end, Governor Agricola’s defeat of the combined forces of the Caledonian tribes at the battle of Mons Graupius around AD83 provided a realistic opportunity. Tacitus tells us that Agricola took the island and it was then “immediately let go” by an emperor who resented Agricola. This is probably not the case, however the fact remains that, by AD121 and Hadrian’s arrival on a quest to rationalise the Empire’s frontiers, the whole island was not seen as an option. The legionary fort at Inchtuthil, which would have constituted a major show of military strength in Caledonia, seems to have been systematically dismantled, never having been completed, around AD87.

The fate of Britain needs to be seen in the context of the chess-board that constituted the Empire. The legions might be compared to pawns moved by an emperor trying to optimise his strength. One of the rules was possibly that no emperor was willing to commit four legions permanently to Britain. This would have been well over one tenth of the entire army. The bind was that three was probably not enough to hold the whole island. The alternatives would be to abandon Britain with all the loss of face that would entail. Like the United States in Vietnam, getting in was a lot easier than getting out. The only alternative was to build a barrier. The choice of the Tyne-Solway line might not be the most obvious but this was the one finally vindicated. By 160s the garrison was back on Hadrian’s Wall. Supervision of the southern Caledonian tribes was achieved by maintaining some forts and roads to the north.

In the long term the whole strategy seems to have worked. The final denouement being Emperor Severus’s abortive campaign of the early 200s which resulted in his death and the restoration of Hadrian’s Wall. Other emperors, including Constantine in 337 campaigned to hold the frontier against the northern tribes referred to as the Picts and Scots but with little evidence of any desire to assert direct Roman rule over Caledonia. The Wall continued, with only limited modification, to define the boundaries of the Empire. The archaeological evidence suggests it was garrisoned to the end, never having succumbed to direct attack. It ceased to have meaning only when a collapsing centre heralded the end of the Western Empire.

The British frontier can possibly be seen as a case study reflecting the dilemma facing all ancient empires. In a world without modern maps, how can the physical extent of an empire be defined and are there any criteria for deciding where its boundaries should be located? The first emperor, Augustus, envisaged an empire without limit covering all of the known world. For Hadrian, this vision came to an end amongst the peat bogs, ‘loughs’ and crags of Northumberland. Hadrian’s Wall ‘is essentially a monument to failure: the failure of the Roman Empire to expand and conquer the known world.’⁸ (Breeze, p.161)

It is also a monument to division. Whilst a peaceful Britannia seems to have been on the whole achieved by Rome’s artificial frontiers, it came at a price as far as Britain’s posterity is concerned. The Wall also created a Caledonia on the outside looking in. How the northern tribes reacted to the existence of the Wall is impossible to know. Should we view them as marginalised bystanders looking on with envy, resentment, perhaps indifference or see in this division a new unity? ‘The presence of a monolithic state in the southern part of the island, with well-defended frontiers, led to a reaction in the north and the creation of a nation capable of challenging.....the might of Rome’⁹ It is hard to know but what is sure is that the Wall’s existence had profound effects on how Britain sees itself and these ambiguities are alive and well today. For good or ill a demarcation line, a by-product of imperial rule¹⁰, has dogged the history of the British islands. The Roman Empire has left a legacy of division which has much to say about the way we, on both sides of the Border, conceptualise the British Isles today.

NOTES

- 1 Kipling, R. (1906), *Puck of Pook's Hill*, London
- 2 This is discussed in Whittaker, C. R. (1994) *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, (London, Johns Hopkins University Press). His argument concerns theoretical models for the whole empire but has much to say of relevance to Britain.
- 3 They were first discovered in 1973 however excavations continue to reveal more. Further information on these is published by the Vindolanda Trust.
- 4 The most accessible discussion of this is in Breeze, David J. (1982) *The Northern Frontiers of Roman Britain*, (London, Batsford).
- 5 David Breeze's book is useful here as is Johnson, Stephen (1989) *Hadrian's Wall*, Bath, Batsford , p.59-70
- 6 Shotton, David. (1996) *The Roman Frontier in Britain*, (Carnegie, Preston, p.66).
- 7 Jim Crowe of Newcastle University discusses this in front of the Wall in a video made by Border Television and published by 'Striding Edge' Productions entitled *Edge of Empire – A Journey Along Hadrian's Wall with Eric Robson* (1995). This is an excellent introduction to the Wall and includes interviews with most of the scholars currently researching the Wall. See also Woodside, R and Crow, J. (1999) *Hadrian's Wall An Historic Landscape*, (The National Trust).
- 8 Breeze, David J. (1982) *The Northern Frontiers of Roman Britain*, (London, Batsford, p.161).
- 9 Ibid. p.161
- 10 Hingley, Richard (2000), *Roman Officers and English Gentlemen*, (London, Routledge), discusses the impact of the British Empire on the nineteenth and twentieth century scholarship of Roman Britain.

Social Policy during the Reign of Louis XIV

TIMOTHY J McHUGH

While, in the popular imagination, Louis XIV is the epitome of the all-powerful and unchallenged seventeenth-century monarch, the most recent generation of historians has done much to challenge this view of the Sun King, replacing it with a more realistic picture of a ruler limited in his powers and goals. One aspect of the reign that has not undergone revising, however, is the relationship between the state and the poor. Many textbooks accord Louis XIV the initiative in the drive to imprison the poor in general hospitals founded by the state. A matter further complicated by the fact that the king himself claimed this was the case. One of the series of medallions commissioned to celebrate the events of Louis XIV's reign commemorated the 1656 foundation of the Hôpital Général of Paris and linked its origin to the king's wish to eradicate the problem of vagrancy.¹ From the eighteenth century onwards the line between royal patronage of the hospital and its foundation blurred, influencing the historiography of charity and poor relief during his reign. At the turn of the twentieth century, Léon Lallemand and Christian Paultre underlined the crown's leadership in organising the form of assistance during the early modern period. Later, Michel Foucault attributed the creation of the hôpitaux-généraux to an attempt by the urban bourgeoisie led by the absolutist government to segregate social deviants and force them to conform to the values of middle class society. More recently, historians such as Jean-Pierre Gutton, Cissie Fairchild, and Kathryn Norberg have attempted to re-integrate the religious motivations behind assistance ignored by Foucault; however they have accepted as fact the argument that the crown extended its control over the charitable institutions of the kingdom during the seventeenth century. Jean Imbert has argued that the monarchical state gradually assumed control over social welfare during the period between 1505, with the secularisation of the Hôtel Dieu de Paris, and the Revolution in 1789. In his opinion, the sixteenth-century state was too weak to impose its will over the localities, but the rule of Louis XIV was strong enough to implement a fully national legislation. He identified the edicts of 1662, which ordered the creation of hôpitaux-généraux in every town in the kingdom as a real attempt to impose a uniform national social policy. Most recently, Daniel Hickey has charted the resistance to royal edicts by administrators of small local hospitals, but he too assumes that legislation concerning the foundation of large confinement hospitals (which was in fact designed to allow the crown to help the municipal leaders of Paris finance and manage their hospitals) reflected an initiative of the central government.² Recent investigation into the foundation, administration and financing of poor relief institutions during the reign of the Sun King has argued that the crown was not interested in creating any substantial social policy beyond assisting powerful local elites provide care.³ The central government had little desire to extend its prerogatives into areas which had traditionally been local concerns particularly after the upheavals of the Frondes.⁴

Why have historians focused so much on the relationship between the state and the poor in seventeenth-century France? While the method of dispensing relief to the impoverished did change greatly in many important regions where new hôpitaux généraux (discussed below) were founded, for most of the kingdom, especially the rural majority, there was as much continuity with the past as change. It is right that the question of poverty and social welfare during Louis XIV's reign has become a debate among historians because it was a matter of grave concern to the ruling classes of France at all levels. There was a new concern among many economists and theologians during the early modern period about the poor. The interest of the elites in poverty reflected the fact that the number of poor was on the increase throughout the century. As the population of France recovered after the demographic catastrophe of the Black Death the agricultural base of the kingdom remained largely unchanged. This meant that, as the number of peasants grew during the sixteenth century, agricultural resources were divided into smaller portions.⁵ When the population reached its maximum sustainable levels in the seventeenth century, the greater part of the rural population was living on the knife edge of a subsistence crisis. Persistent poor weather after 1600, known to posterity as the mini

Ice Age, made matters worse, causing famines throughout the century that forced many to seek relief in the towns. This noticed increase in the number of poor in the towns was reflected in the condemnation by many about the tendency for beggars to seek alms on church porches before and after Sunday mass.

The Catholic church did not become concerned about the plight of the impoverished simply to keep up appearances and to isolate its wealthy parishioners from unwanted contact with the poor. During the seventeenth century, the issue of charity assumed centre stage in much of the thought of the Catholic Reform after the Council of Trent. Charity had been an important aspect of one's Christian duty throughout the Middle Ages; however, following the Reformation of the sixteenth century, one's ability to earn salvation through good works became more heavily emphasised for much of the Catholic church in order to highlight differences between it and its Protestant rivals.⁶ Even the Jansenists, who denied the ability of the individual to earn God's grace, believed that everyone had an obligation to imitate Christ by performing acts of charity.⁷

In the final decades of the sixteenth century many secular authors in France questioned the theory behind the granting of out-of-doors relief to the urban poor. Such writers believed that the able-bodied poor were idle by their very nature and that they avoided work in favour of an easier life begging for alms. Both Barthélemy de Laffemas and Antoine de Montchrétien, for example, posited that the character of the poor could be reformed into productive labourers if they were institutionalised and cured of their idleness through regulation and training.⁸ This sort of economic theory was to prove very appealing to later royal ministers such as Jean Baptiste Colbert. Forcing the poor to "give up their idleness" was a cornerstone of all Louis XIV's economic policies. The spread of such ideas to the local elites who were to implement them was accomplished not by the central government but by confraternities of the devout during the middle decades of the seventeenth century. Influenced by writers such as Laffemas and Montchrétien, the policy of confining the poor, or *enfermement*, became the cornerstone of the *Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement's* plan to reform the moral and religious nature of France. Founded in 1629 in Paris by the duc de Ventadour, the main goals of this secret society were to combat Protestants and to reform France into a *dévo*t kingdom.⁹ This group of men, who, over the decades, grew in number to include many of the senior members of the Parisian sovereign courts, as well as a broad selection of the social elites of the country, both lay and ecclesiastic, worked to spread their ideas long after its official suppression in the 1660s.

Who were these poor to whom the kingdom's elites turned their thoughts? Because the reign witnessed the foundation of many large urban charitable institutions, poverty has often been seen as a growing concern for the ruling classes of cities and towns. The diminution of agricultural profits during the period would suggest that peasants with little land were at the greatest risk of falling into destitution; however, at a time when even the slightest accident could result in a permanent injury rendering the sufferer incapable of work, former artisans were numerous among those seeking relief as well. Migrants from the countryside who had recently left their native parishes to seek work in towns and cities were the most likely to ask for support from municipal institutions. A pattern of occasional unemployment existed in many parts of the kingdom. For example, it was common for men in the Cevennes to seek work in the lowland region around Montpellier and during poor economic conditions the city's hospitals became congested with seasonal migrants seeking shelter before returning to their homes at the harvest. The lack of family and neighbourly support complicated matters greatly for the recently arrived. Seventeenth-century society saw the extended family as the primary source of social welfare. With few or no ties to the rest of the community, any disruption that interrupted paid employment could cause mainly unskilled manual workers or domestic servants to rely on municipal relief or to descend into beggary.

How were the poor perceived? The kingdom's ruling elites divided the poor along the lines of those considered deserving of aid and those undeserving. For the most part, this was a difference from the medieval view that the poor were all images of Christ. During the early modern period, the deserving poor (those who had an obvious hindrance to earning their keep, for example the very young, the elderly, and the physically handicapped) were still seen by many religious authorities as Christ's physical manifestations. The wealthy were instructed to offer alms to these poor as they would to Jesus himself. For those able-bodied poor, the picture was less rosy. Their poverty was seen to stem from their own laziness. Both religious and economic writers agreed that the only policy to

follow was to forbid the granting of aid to these individuals so that they might return to employment. The poor who 'refused' to return to work and who 'chose' a life of casual beggary threatened the social order, and as such these individuals ought to be isolated from the rest of society in order to be retrained as good worker and as good Christians. This attitude (which assumed that there were no broader economic factors preventing full employment in the kingdom) reflected the elites' negative perception of the lower orders in general. This general mistrust toward the lower order was made manifest in the heightened fear of vagrancy that most typifies seventeenth-century attitudes toward social welfare.¹⁰

The creation in 1656 of a general hospital of confinement in Paris was not the first attempt on the part of the nation's elites to solve the problem of vagrancy. Traditionally the long-term poor had been provided for in their own homes by their own parish (out-of-doors relief). This form of assistance was a cost effective method of caring for those who were deemed respectable by their community. In some municipalities during the sixteenth century, out-of-doors relief was secularised and centralised by local governments, for example in Paris where, in 1544, the city had reorganised municipal poor relief under the *Grand Bureau des Pauvres* which was responsible for distributing funds levied from a direct tax on the householders of Paris to the poor. However, the out-of-doors relief offered by many municipalities ceased eventually to be an effective way to care for the poor because of the disruption caused by the civil strife of the wars of religion during the later sixteenth century. Increasingly, there were concerns on the part of some about the effectiveness of supporting the poor outside the walls of an institution. However, while the seventeenth century witnessed a shift toward institutionalising the poor, out-of-doors relief granted to the respectable poor continued down to the Revolution.

One aspect of social welfare in the seventeenth century that has often been overlooked by historians is care of the ill poor. Local governments recognised that, for many, an illness could prevent individuals from earning their keep and could, as a result, place an intolerable burden on their family. The ill who could not afford to pay for their treatment could turn for shelter to the local Hôtel Dieu. Founded during the Middle Ages, most towns possessed one of these institutions. These hospitals were not the warehouses for the dying that eighteenth-century *philosophes* claimed. While many could only offer good food, shelter and the occasional visit by the local physician and surgeon until the patient recovered, some (most notably that of Paris which developed a large and highly skilled medical staff over the course of the century) could offer a high standard of care.¹¹ These institutions provided a social safety net for the labouring orders in towns. Both skilled and unskilled workers could turn to some form of free medical assistance when they fell ill.

The able-bodied poor were much more of a problem. The concurrence of thought between Catholic Reform and Mercantilist writers generated calls for the ending of vagrants' physical and spiritual idleness by confining them in institutions. This was a policy known as *enfermement*. The creation in 1612 of the *Hôpital de la Pitié* was an early attempt to put this confinement into practice in Paris. This hospital was organised by a number of the city's bourgeois under the patronage of Marie de Médicis; but, the plans to imprison all of the poor in the city within the institution quickly came undone due to a lack of financial support, leaving it limited to offering relief only to young women. The *Hôpital de la Pitié* failed as a hospital of confinement because a majority of the civic elites remained unconvinced of the need to support such a costly policy. While a failure in Paris, the *Pitié's* example was emulated in Lyon to a much greater degree of success.

The concept of *enfermement* took greater root among the elites of the kingdom through the work of the *Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement*. Throughout the middle decades of the seventeenth century the various branches of the Company petitioned central and local governments to found new hospitals throughout the kingdom. While the Company was largely unsuccessful in its goal, it did help spread the idea across the country, and it was influential in the foundation of the most important new hospital of the early modern period: the Paris Hôpital Général.¹²

The idea for the foundation of the Hôpital Général began to take shape among the members of the Company in 1640.¹³ The events of the years that followed seem to have convinced many of the Paris magistrates of the idea of confinement. In the late 1640s, the income of other charitable institutions in Paris, such as the Hôtel Dieu, fell while expenditure rose as the rural poor came into the city to seek assistance.¹⁴ The number of homeless in the city reached its peak in 1652 and by the next year the

influential *Premier Président of the Parlement*, Pomponne II de Bellièvre had initiated an investigation into the viability of reforming those charitable establishments which already existed into a new general hospital of confinement. Between 1653 and 1656 Bellièvre took control of the plans, appointing a committee, made up of men selected from the sovereign courts, to write the rules by which the hospital and its board of directors would work.¹⁵ The Hôpital Général, which opened its doors in 1657, set a model for the confinement of the able-bodied poor that was to be copied by many towns (albeit on a much smaller scale) until the Revolution. The hospital, which confined as many as 10,000 in crisis years such as 1694, provided two main services. Firstly, it offered relief to the long-term poor who had nowhere else to go in the city. This meant that the population of the hospital was dominated by the very old, the very young and the physically and mentally handicapped (all of whom fitted into the category of the deserving poor). Secondly the institution offered shelter for brief periods of time for the able-bodied during crisis periods. In both cases the lives of the poor were closely regulated by the staff of nuns. The poor were kept constantly busy, either at work or at prayer. Even those whose physical disability prevented them from work in the outside world were given tasks to complete however small. The life of the poor at the Hôpital Général was designed to cure those capable of labour from their idle ways and to reform those who could not into proper Catholics.

What was the king's role in social welfare? In theory, Louis XIV was, as the foremost noble of the realm, the father of his people. Tradition and practicality dictated, however, that each locality cared for its own poor. By the sixteenth century France had developed a system similar to that of Tudor and Stuart England. The poor were to return to the parish of their birth. Local magistrates and church officials were required to provide shelter for those travelling home, issuing them passports to the next stop on their journey in order to prevent fraud. During the Middle Ages, the crown assisted by acting as a link between the different localities whenever the system broke down. As the stability and support of Paris was the most important concern for the king, that municipality exercised a large amount of influence over royal decrees concerning the poor. For example, the earliest crown edict regarding the poor was the Edict of 1350 forbidding beggars from travelling to the capital. Neither the local elites nor the crown wished those suffering from the plague entering Paris.¹⁶ Royal social policy was primarily designed to reinforce and maintain local responsibility for poor relief. The foundation and financing of hospitals, however, was a different matter. Even before the seventeenth-century drive to create institutions designed to confine the poor, the central government was wary of the foundation of hospitals by any means other than private charity. Even charitable institutions often turned to the government for permission to collect local taxes whenever they ran up debts (which, in the early modern period was quite common). To prevent limited funds from being diverted from important matters such as the army, from the sixteenth century onward, the crown claimed the right to grant final approval for the foundation of any hospital in the kingdom. It did not, however, assert any control over those institutions already built. Despite arguments to the contrary, the campaign to end vagrancy in the kingdom after 1662 was not an attempt on the part of the central government to extend its prerogatives over social welfare.¹⁷

While the elites of Paris might have been convinced by the increase of beggars on the streets that the policy of *enfermement* was necessary to implement by the foundation of the Hôpital Général in 1656, the central government seemed to be indifferent. Members of the ministry left the implementation of poor relief up to the civic elites, a situation which had been traditional. It was prepared to offer some immaterial support to the Hôpital Général because this was a way for the crown to cooperate and demonstrate its usefulness to important citizens of the capital. An example of this royal assistance was the Edict of 1662 which has often been seen as a new French poor law.¹⁸ The financial situation of the hospital began to deteriorate as soon as it opened its doors to the poor in 1657. The founders of the Hôpital Général had made a grave error by seriously underestimating the number of poor which it would have to shelter. A substantial famine in the region around Paris in 1661-3 pushed the institution close to collapse. The hospital administration accused towns in the affected region of dumping their localities' poor on to the capital. Along with the directors of the city's other main hospital, the Hôtel Dieu, the administration asked the crown's assistance in preventing the rural poor from overloading its stretched resources by ordering smaller localities to live up to their traditional commitment to provide relief. The royal edict concurred with the hospital governors' views that the only means to provide meaningful assistance to the poor was through hospitals of confinement.¹⁹

However, besides offering localities the right to raise limited taxes in order to found new institutions, the crown took no action to enforce the edict. In effect the state had issued a warning to the kingdom that the traditional role of each locality to care for its own poor was still the law of the kingdom. Many devout individuals, who saw in confining institutions the perfect method to cure the lower orders of religious ignorance and heresy, and the governors of the Paris hospital, who believed that without a national system of hôpitaux-généraux towns would always be tempted to defray their own expenses by sending the poor to seek relief in the capital, were angered that the central government seemed indifferent to the fact that few towns saw fit in 1662 to build new hospitals.²⁰

In the 1670s there was a renewed effort on the part of both the devout and the Paris elites to establish new confinement hospitals elsewhere in the kingdom. Because of its interest in reforming the religious practices of the countryside, the Jesuit order was particularly concerned with the foundation of institutions where the poor could be stopped from wandering from region to region and taught to be good Catholics. During the 1670s the central government was willing to offer immaterial support in the form of circular letters sent to the bishops and *intendants* of the kingdom in 1671 and 1676 encouraging the foundation of new hospitals; however, it forbade the collection of local taxes and ordered that any hospitals created to fulfil the terms of the Edict of 1662 had to finance themselves only through private charity. The crown also gave its patronage in 1673 to a committee composed of board members of the Paris Hôpital Général that corresponded with concerned elites of other localities in an effort to promote the policy of *enfermement*.²¹ The increase in local interest in the building of new hospitals was carried out by the Jesuit missionaries Calloet-Querbrat, Chaurand and Guévarre.²² It was as a result of these men that the majority of new hospitals were founded during the reign of Louis XIV. However, as late as the turn of the eighteenth century, after a number of provincial hospitals had been established through the Jesuits' efforts during the 1670s, the directors of the Paris hospital continued to complain that the crown was ignoring the terms of the Edict of 1662 by discouraging localities from creating new institutions for fear of losing revenue and diminishing its rights, and as a consequence the central government was harming the financial health of the Hôpital Général.²³

Where the crown did take an active interest, was in ensuring that the revenues of defunct institutions were made useful. As leprosy became rare during the early modern period, many of the hospitals founded in the Middle Ages to isolate sufferers (and the estates left by charitable individuals to pay for their care) fell into private hands. Throughout the seventeenth century the central government initiated campaigns to close such hospitals and to seize their revenues. Often the governors of larger local hospitals were the petitioners who expected and received a large share of the recovered revenues. During the reign of Louis XIV, however, this campaign was used to benefit the crown's own clients. In 1672 the minister of war, Louvois, began the systematic suppression of disused hospitals and the redistribution of their properties in the form of pensions to retired army officers. As this was all done in the name of a religious order, that of Saint-Lazare, of which Louvois had himself named vicar-general, it demonstrates the lengths to which the government had to go in order to circumvent local complaints of interference in their prerogatives. The Order of Saint-Lazare did not long survive the death of Louvois in 1691.²⁴

Louis XIV had no coherent social policy beyond the crown's traditional responsibility to safeguard the local systems of poor relief. As with so many aspect of his reign, Louis XIV issued royal edicts concerning poverty as ad hoc measures. There was no attempt to extend the crown control over areas of social welfare. Government policy towards the poor, as reflected in the Edict of 1662, was dictated by the concerns of these important citizens of the capital. Local matters outside the royal prerogative were not areas with which the king chose to interfere unless asked to resolve a situation between competing interests. This was what happened when the central government issued the Edict of 1662 at the request of the directors of the Hôpital Général and Hôtel Dieu of Paris in an attempt to force other communities to live up to their commitments during a crisis.

The indirect support offered to the supporters of the *enfermement* movement during the reign demonstrates both one of the limitations and one of the strengths of Louis XIV's monarchy. The success of the regime rested on its manipulation of the traditional bonds that tied the elites of the country to the crown. The history of poor relief demonstrates, in a small but clear way, how the absolute monarchy worked in the second half of the seventeenth century to ensure stability within

the state. Showing support for the concerns of the kingdom's elites was a way for the crown to manifest the effectiveness of its leadership. By issuing royal edicts that upheld the tradition of each locality's provisioning of its own poor, Louis XIV emphasised that his was a responsible kingship. While the confining of the poor was new in seventeenth-century France, the organisation and legal responsibility for localities to care for their own remained as had been traditional. Those localities that desired to change the way in which the poor were controlled were offered royal support for new hôpitaux généraux. The central government, however, was not about to risk its relationships with cities and towns reluctant to implement *enfermement* by compelling them to build new hospitals, as long as some effort was made to prevent the poor from travelling to Paris.

NOTES

- 1 *Médailles sur les principaux événements du règne de Louis le Grand* (1702), p. 42.
- 2 See for example: L. Lallemand, *Histoire de la charité* 5 tom., (1909-12); C. Paultre, *De la répression de la mendicité et du vagabondage en France sous l'ancien régime*, (1906); M. Foucault, *Folie et déraison*, (1961); J.P. Gutton, *Société et les pauvres: L'exemple de la généralité de Lyon, 1534-1789*, (1970); C. Fairchilds, *Poverty and Charity in Aix-en-Provence, 1640-1789*, (Baltimore, 1976); K. Norberg, *Rich and Poor in Grenoble*, (Berkeley, 1985); J. Imbert, *Le droit hospitalier de l'ancien régime*, (1993); D. Hickey, *Local Hospitals in Ancien Régime France*, (Montreal and Kingston, 1997).
- 3 T.J. McHugh, 'The Hôpital Général, the Parisian Elites and Crown Social Policy During the Reign of Louis XIV,' *French History* Vol. 15 (2001), pp. 235-53.
- 4 For a revisionist interpretation of the limits of the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV see R.C. Mettam, *Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France*, (Oxford, 1988).
- 5 see E. Leroy Ladurie, *The Peasants of Languedoc*, (Chicago, 1974).
- 6 see R. Tavenaux, *Le Catholicisme dans la France classique, 1610-1715*, 2 vol., (Paris, 1980).
- 7 E. Jones, *Pierre Nicole, Jansenist and Humanist*, (The Hague, 1972), pp. 101-3.
- 8 see B. de Laffemas, *Lettres et exemples de la feu royne mere comme elle faisoit travailler au manufactures, et fournissoit aux ouvriers de ses propres deniers*, (1602); A. de Monchrétien, *Traicté de l'oconomie politique*, (1615).
- 9 A. Tallon, *La Compagnie du Saint-Sacrement, 1629-1667*, (Paris, 1990).
- 10 for a discussion on the perception of the poor see Fairchilds, *Poverty and Charity*.
- 11 see T.J. McHugh, *Hospital Politics in Louis XIV's France* (Toronto, forthcoming) cf. C. Jones, *The Charitable Imperative* (London and New York, 1989), pp. 31-47.
- 12 R. Poujol, *La naissance de l'Hôpital Général de Paris d'après des documents inédits*, (1982), p. 10. cf. R. Elmore *The Origins of the Hôpital Général of Paris*, (unpublished doctoral thesis, University Microfilms Edn., Michigan, 1975); J. Depauw, *Spiritualité et pauvreté à Paris au XVIIe siècle*, (1999).
- 13 Poujol, *La naissance*, p. 30.
- 14 Archives de l'Assistance Publique Hôpitaux de Paris, fonds Hôtel Dieu 868.
- 15 Poujol, *La naissance*, p. 31.
- 16 B. Geremek, *The Margins of Society in Late Medieval Paris*, (Cambridge, 1987).
- 17 Imbert, *Le droit hospitalier*.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 McHugh, 'Hôpital Général'
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 A.M. de Boislisle (ed.), *Mémoire de la généralité de Paris*, (1881), pp. 415-417.
- 22 see Hickey, *Local Hospitals*.
- 23 Boislisle, *Mémoire*, pp. 415-417.
- 24 see Hickey, *Local Hospitals*, pp. 43-68.

Nationalism and the National Question in the Soviet Union: Problems of Interpretation

DR PAUL FLENLEY

Until the 1980s the topic of nationalities in the Soviet Union had been comparatively neglected. Generally speaking it was seen as an area of specialist interest rather than one which was central to understanding the nature of the Soviet system. A range of works had been published in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s which dealt with developments in the Soviet period in individual key national areas especially the Baltic States (see Ezergailis 1973; Page, 1959; von Rauch 1974) and Central Asia (Allworth 1967; Bacon 1966; Park 1957; Wheeler 1964). The overwhelming concentration was, however, on central institutions of the Soviet state, such as the Communist Party, elite politics and the economic system. In most mainstream works little or no attention was given to the national question; to the point that often the concept of Russia and Soviet Union were seen as interchangeable (see Fainsod 1963). Richard Pipes perhaps stands out as the historian who made an early attempt to see the central significance of the national question in the development of the Soviet state (Pipes 1964). Where sovietologists had made reference to the issue it was largely in terms of the success with which the Soviets had actually solved the national question. This view extended even into Gorbachev's Perestroika as ethnic conflict began to erupt. The initial tendency was to play down the threat that nationalist unrest posed to the fundamental viability and stability of the Soviet system.

The reasons for this lack of emphasis are several. Until the late 1970s the study of the national question suffered from the general approach to the study of Soviet history and politics. Emphasis in research was placed on the metropolitan centres of Moscow and Leningrad. There was little in the way of detailed studies of the provinces and localities in their own right. In many ways this was a function of access to sources. Where such local sources did become available then certainly use was made of them (see Fainsod 1958) but largely as an illustration of the central picture (Schapiro 1970: 634). In addition, the emphasis on central institutions and elites was a reflection of the so-called "totalitarian" approach to the study of the Soviet Union. Paradoxically historians of the Cold War tended to take at face value what the Soviet system said about itself. A Soviet ideology which said that the national question had been solved found itself reflected in a western literature which assumed largely that repression, central Communist Party control and assimilation had worked.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, however, scholarship began to challenge this view of the Soviet Union as a "totalitarian" state. Studies of social groups, the provinces and Soviet society "from below" began to reveal a much more complex society full of internal conflict. In particular they revealed the large differences between policy and perceptions in the centre and the realities in the localities. A number of studies were undertaken of the revolution among the national minorities and the way that related to the overall picture of the Russian Revolution (e.g. Ezergailis 1983; Swietochowski 1985). The complexities of the relationship between class and ethnic identity were examined. For example in some areas of the Caucasus ethnicity could reinforce class where there was a clear inequality between different ethnic groups. In other areas, however, ethnic identity and loyalty cut across the horizontal lines of social class (Suny 1983). Several key studies examined ethnicity and the national question from below across the Soviet period as a whole (Azrael 1978; Karklins 1986). Among these more general works that by Helene Carrere d'Encausse perhaps stands out as one which predicted the disintegrating effect that the nationalities issue would have on the Soviet system (Carrere d'Encausse 1979). The general failure by sovietologists to foresee the significance of the nationalities issue is perhaps understandable. In the Cold War period nationalism tended to be seen as an increasingly spent force, largely confined to the national liberation movements of the Third World and eventually to be reduced by the effects of modernisation.

The National Question and the Collapse of the Soviet Union

Not surprisingly as the explosion of nationalist unrest in the late Gorbachev period began to undermine the cohesion of the Soviet Union, more comprehensive studies of the national question as an issue central to an understanding of Soviet politics began to emerge (see Besancon 1989; Bialer 1989; Nahaylo and Swoboda 1990; Smith 1990). The accompanying implosion of Yugoslavia into ethnic conflict also contributed to making nationalism and ethnicity centre stage for the wider academic community. The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new states out of the former national republics further concentrated attention. Studies of the Soviet transition and the politics of the new Russia now placed nationalism at the centre of analysis (Fowkes 1997). Was the rise of nationalism the main factor causing the Soviet collapse? How far was the nationalist unrest of the late 1980s a result of long-held grievances which the Soviet system had held in check only to be released by Gorbachev's Perestroika? If, however, the national question had been solved, as Gorbachev himself had declared in 1985, then perhaps nationalism was an expression of discontent at the failure of Perestroika itself. Moreover, perhaps, nationalism was being cynically used and whipped up by politicians to survive the transition to democracy, as in Yugoslavia?

The nationalist movements which emerged after 1985 in the Soviet republics were not immediately secessionist even in the Baltic States. While the Popular Fronts in Estonia and Latvia did eventually call for independence by 1989, even as late as March 1991 70% of Soviet citizens who voted in a referendum wanted to maintain some form of union. In the Central Asian republics there had been unrest over such issues as the imposition of Kolbin, a Russian national as 1st Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party and there was inter-ethnic conflict in Uzbekistan but there was little support for secession from the Union. In many ways it was not apparent until right at the very end of 1991 that the Soviet Union was to collapse. Before the August 1991 attempted coup by conservative communists only 6 of the 15 republics of the USSR had declared their independence – the three Baltic States, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova. These were all peripheral republics whose secession would not have seriously undermined the future of the Union.

In examining the link between nationalism and the end of the Soviet Union attention has therefore been directed by some analysts not at the nationalism of the minorities but at nationalism at the core of the union i.e. among Russians (Dunlop 1993; Flenley 1996) and Ukrainians (Kuzio and Wilson: 1994). The Popular Fronts of the Baltic States certainly provided an example of what could be done elsewhere. Popular Fronts also appeared in Leningrad and Moscow as they had in Riga and Tallinn. However, for Russian nationalists the accusations of exploitation and russification thrown at them by Baltic nationalists provoked a reaction that Russians had also suffered under the Soviet state. Moreover it was claimed that at least the Soviet system had given some recognition to the national identities of the minorities in the form of institutions such as the Estonian Academy of Sciences or the Uzbek Communist Party. For Russians, however, their identity had been submerged into the concept of "Soviet". There had been no real separate Russian institutions. Moreover Russian culture including the Russian Orthodox Church had also been persecuted.. Even "democrats" within the Communist Party such as Boris Yeltsin began to champion the interests of Russia as opposed to the rest of the Union. Their argument was that the process of reform and democratisation in Russia itself was being held back by the burden of empire. In a highly personal way it was the election of Boris Yeltsin as president of Russia which began to undermine the authority of Gorbachev as Soviet president. He was instrumental in organising a coalition of republics against the Soviet centre for a reformed Union. It was in an attempt to stop such a reform in a new Union Treaty that the conservatives in the Communist Party staged a coup in August 1991. They wished to save the Union. However, in practice they facilitated the real coup by Boris Yeltsin and the "democrats" who used the opportunity to ban the Communist Party and bring all Soviet institutions on the territory of the Russian Republic under the control of the Russian government. This "russification" at the centre was followed by a rush for real independence by those republics which had so far failed to claim it. It could be seen then that if anything it was Russian nationalism which sealed the fate of the USSR. However, Boris Yeltsin and others in Moscow were still wedded to the idea of some form of union albeit non-socialist (Sakwa 2002; 36). What shocked even the Russian nationalists and effectively ended all ideas of a union was the overwhelming vote for outright independence in the Ukraine. Without the Ukraine, the largest

republic next to Russia, a continued union was not realistic. Ukrainian nationalism, except in the western part around Lviv, had emerged late in the day and even then was manipulated by the Ukrainian political elite for its own ends (Prizel 1998: 360-363). However, the prospect of a better life ruled from Kiev and perhaps integration into Central Europe, attracted even Russian speakers in the Ukraine and confounded the hopes of Russian nationalists in Moscow for a continued close union between brother Slavs. The Commonwealth of Independent States which succeeded the Soviet Union was turned by the Ukrainians more into a vehicle for managing the unravelling of the Union rather than, as Boris Yeltsin and the Russian government had hoped, a means of maintaining some form of integration (Szporluk 2000).

Soviet in Form, Russian in Content?

Ivan Dzyuba, a Ukrainian history teacher, had argued in the 1960s that sovietisation was simply a cover for russification of the national minorities (Dzyuba 1968). However, as seen above, the flight to independence by the Central Asian Republics at the end of 1991 was in some ways a reaction to the fear that any new union would now be overtly Russian-dominated at the centre. This perception in the national republics that the centre was now being “russified” under Boris Yeltsin in addition to the role that Russian nationalism played in the collapse of the Soviet Union, raises doubts about the idea that Soviet identity had earlier simply been just a cover for russification. It is true that for much of the Soviet period ethnic Russians identified with the whole of the Soviet Union as their homeland (Collias 1991: 87; Simon 1991: 3017-314) This built on the view in the tsarist period that there was no difference geographically between Russia and the Russian Empire. Not surprisingly therefore it was difficult for many Russians in the new Russia after 1991 to come to terms with the fact that Ukraine and its capital Kiev – the capital of old medieval Russia – were now “foreign”. Yet in many ways it would be mistaken to say that the concepts of Russian and Soviet were effectively interchangeable. In practice as the resentments of the Russian nationalists in the 1980s had shown, the relationship between Soviet and Russian identity had been complex (Szporluk 1997). At different times the Soviet system exploited, controlled and attempted to supersede Russian nationalist sentiment (Flenley 1996: 223).

The early Bolshevik state drew on Russian nationalism in order to galvanise support. The Bolshevik portrayal of a Russia dominated by international finance capital made the October Revolution appear to be something of a national liberation struggle. This was further strengthened during the Civil War when the Soviet state was left controlling the old Muscovite heartland of Russia. A largely Russian ethnic Red Army was pitched against White armies supported by foreign interventionists. Subsequently in the 1920s many nationalists identified Lenin and the Communists with the cause of saving the integrity of Russia (Carter 1990: 47). In the late 1920s and 1930s the policies associated with building Socialism in One Country further identified nationalism with socialism and drew on a strong sense of messianism in the Russian tradition. However, until the late 1930s the regime had not drawn on Russian nationalism explicitly. Indeed Lenin had been at pains to try to control and discourage its overt manifestations not least by the establishment of a federal USSR where key nationalities were given equal status with Russians. However, under Stalin this began to change. In the late 1930s history books were rewritten to applaud developments in the tsarist period. Russian imperialism was seen as a civilising agency (Tillet 1969 : ch.3). During the Second World War the survival of the Soviet Union and Russia were seen as identical. Victory gave a boost to Russian nationalism as the Russians were depicted as “the elder brother” among the nations of the Soviet Union. Instruction in the Russian language was promoted alongside campaigns against cosmopolitanism and bourgeois nationalism in the non-Russian republics.

While Khrushchev sought to rein back Russian nationalism there was some tolerance for a time under Brezhnev towards the articulation of Russian nationalist themes even in official circles. *Molodaya Gvardiya*, the official journal of the Young Communist League (Komsomol), for example, criticised the pro-western fascination of the intelligentsia (Dunlop 1983: 218-27).

This was part of a wider debate among the intelligentsia about the relationship between the concept of Russia and the Soviet Union (Duncan 2000). However, eventually this explicit Russian nationalism was also clamped down on by the leadership and the concept of “a Soviet people” promoted. For

many dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s such as Solzhenitsyn, the Soviet experience had actually been destructive of Russian identity. This argument, as we have seen, was taken up by the Russian nationalists under Gorbachev. As the novelist V. Rasputin argued in reply to the accusations of Baltic nationalists that they had been exploited by Russia – “The blame for your misfortune lies not with Russia but with that common burden of the administrative-industrial machine, which turned out to be more terrible to all of us than the Mongolian yoke and which has humiliated and plundered Russia as well to the point of near suffocation.” (Smith H. 1990: 386) For a time, in the arguments between Gorbachev and the nationalists of the republics no one seemed to be articulating the interests of Russians until Boris Yeltsin championed the cause of Russia.

Sovietisation and Imperialism

Alongside the debate about the link between russification and sovietisation has developed the view that sovietisation was simply a cover for old style imperialism and colonial exploitation. In part this analysis originated as a reflection of a general interest in decolonisation which developed as the British Empire began to dissolve in the post-war period. The Soviet Union was seen as an empire which cleverly hid its colonialism in a doctrine of anti-imperialism (Kolarz 1964; Conquest 1962). The collapse of the Soviet Union has if anything tended to enhance this view. With the development of new independent states, more specific histories and political studies of those emerging states have been written, particularly by scholars with connections to those new states themselves (Vardys and Sedaitis 1996). The history of the Soviet Union and the relationship between the republics has therefore begun to be written even more so from the vantage point of those states and their development. Thus collectivisation is seen as more than an economic policy which had devastating consequences for the Soviet peasantry. It was also a means of breaking the will of non-Russian peoples in areas such as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Soviet nationality policy is seen as a way of holding nationalism in check or even crushing it. However, there are problems in portraying the Soviet Union as the last empire. In classic colonialism there was a distinction made between the metropolitan area and its citizens. The Soviet regime, however, saw its interests linked to the whole population (Hirsch 1997; 204). The future success of building socialism was tied to transforming the population as a whole, creating New Soviet Man out of Russians just as much as non-Russians. In that sense while individual national minorities might have felt that specific features of Soviet policy were directed only at them, in the main they were directed in one degree or another at the whole population. Moreover, they were as enthusiastically carried out by non-Russian Communists such as Stalin and Mikoyan as Russian Communists like Molotov. The purges were certainly used as an opportunity to attack independent minded national elites in the republics. Terror and deportations were particularly systematically used against national minorities that were seen to be unreliable such as the Chechens, or a security threat such as Poles and Koreans who lived in border areas (Conquest 1970). The terror had a particularly devastating impact on the intelligentsia of the republics of the Ukraine and Belorussia. However, the purges were not purely ethnic (Gelb 2000) and cannot be explained simply in terms of colonialism or imperialist domination. They also cut a swathe through the Russian intelligentsia in Moscow and ultimately devastated the Soviet Communist Party itself at the core of the Soviet system.

Seeing the Soviet system as essentially colonialist in part derives from a particular perspective on the modernising agenda of Soviet socialism. The Soviet regime legitimised itself by claiming to be building socialism. It was a project where even “negative” consequences were justified by this modernising project. The problem was that modernisation is never culturally neutral. In the Soviet case it was transmitted through the Russian language and culture. This was reinforced by the fact that Soviet modernisation was essentially state-led which meant policy was imposed from Moscow largely via Russia officials who saw many national cultures and customs as backward. They tried to rebuild such cultures in their own “modern” image. What, from Moscow’s point of view were modernising public health programmes, involved state intervention in the personal lives and traditional cultures of Central Asia (Michaels 2000). Were Soviet campaigns against the Uzbek custom of female seclusion an example of russification and colonialism or part of the promotion of socialism and modernisation (Northrop 2000)? Just because modernisation is culturally biased does not necessarily make it the same as imperialism.

Another consequence of Soviet modernisation was the migration of Russians to the ethnic republics. This has been seen as colonisation under the guise of industrialisation. In Kazakhstan from the 1930s and even more so in the Baltic States from the late 1940s, substantial Russian minorities migrated to these areas on the backs of the growth of heavy industry. Whether it was a deliberate policy to undermine the independence of these areas or not, it was seen by the local populations as threatening to swamp the local culture (Keep 1996: 322-327). In Estonia and Latvia in particular, nationalism was fuelled by this fear of the effects of Russian “colonisation”. In the immediate post-Soviet period the existence of a high proportion of Russians in the new states has been seen as a threat to their independence.

Nation-building

One of the paradoxes of Soviet nationality policy which a “colonialism” approach tends to obscure is that Soviet policy also encouraged national and ethnic identity rather than just trying to control it. Largely in response to the dangers of Great Russian nationalism as seen in the behaviour of Moscow officials to the national minorities, Lenin sought to adopt a federal solution to the national question (Service 2000; 469-470). The ethno-territorial principle was to be used as the basis for administrative organisation of the Soviet state. Ethnic groups were allotted territorial units and degrees of autonomy depending on their size. Certain key ethnic groups were granted the status of a full union republic as part of the federal Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These republics were supposedly equal to the Russian republic and had the right to secede from the Union. Each republic had its own political institutions and even some ministries. However, it was all overseen by an All-Union structure including of course the centralised Communist Party. Whether Lenin had actually given up his earlier commitment to an integrated Soviet republic is questionable (Service 2000; 403-403). He saw his proposals of giving institutional and territorial recognition to ethnic identity as more likely to prevent the demand for outright independence than Stalin’s original view of autonomy within a single Soviet republic (Smith G.1990: 4-6). In this lies one of the apparent contradictions of Soviet policy. Giving open expression to national identity was seen as the most likely way of ensuring that ethnicity would eventually cease to be an issue and the Bolsheviks could get on with their real project of constructing a socialist society. Socialism would see the merger of the nationalities into a new single Soviet identity.

From 1923 onwards the policy of creating national units was added to by “korenizatsiya” (nativisation). This involved the deliberate promotion of non-Russians into leading positions in the Party and state, especially in the national republics. It was accompanied by declaring the equality of non-Russian languages and cultures with Russian (Liber 1991). In areas such as the Caucasus and Central Asia educational policy deliberately aimed at developing literary languages, alphabets and the promotion of a secular intelligentsia. This early Bolshevik nationality policy has been interpreted as generally geared to winning over the national minorities and defusing nationalism. However, in some ways the policy also helped positively preserve national identity where it may have eventually weakened. In the case of the creation of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, a rather weak sense of Belorussian national identity largely confined to the small intelligentsia had been bolstered by the fostering of a Belorussian identity among russified Belorussians who had not previously wished to identify themselves as Belorussian.

In some cases Soviet nation-building actually involved the creation of a national identity where none had existed. In Central Asia the population had tended to identify itself with Islam, the clan or the local town. Soviet policymakers deliberately embarked on the creation of European-type national identities through the construction of republics such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Recent research, however, has shown the speed with which the local population adopted and used the emphasis on national identity as a way of articulating their interests to Moscow (Hirsch; 1997). Perhaps a sign of the success of Soviet nation-building is that when the Soviet Union did unravel, it did so largely along the lines of the borders of the units actually created by Soviet policymakers.

Conclusion: The Paradox of Soviet Nationality Policy

Some recent writing has suggested that in its nationality policy the Soviet Union ended up being a victim of its own success. The nationalism which erupted in the late Soviet period was in many ways fostered through the Bolshevik nation-building efforts of the 1920s and 1930s (Brubaker 1996; Fowkes 1997; Simon 1991; Suny 1993). Nationalism provided a ready-made forum for the articulation of a whole range of grievances both relating to the repressions and injustices of the past and also the disappointments and the economic failure of Perestroika. There is a sense also that when the integrating mechanisms of the Soviet system and Soviet identity began to dissolve in the 1980s people turned to the only other collective identity which the Soviet system had actually promoted i.e. ethnicity. For the populations it provided some security of identity in the uncertainty and chaos of transition and for political elites it could be exploited as a convenient vehicle for surviving the transition to post-communism without losing power (Prizel 2000: 360-364).

One of the long-term negative consequences of the Soviet nation-building project was, however, that the boundaries of the different national republics did not accord conveniently with the actual distribution of ethnic groups. In a context where everyone was ultimately ruled from Moscow and officially everyone was a citizen of the Soviet Union this was not a great problem. However, as the Soviet Union disintegrated different ethnic groups found themselves in the “wrong” titular nation state. Moreover, this problem was added to with the collapse of Soviet identity and the increasing emergence of ethnicity as the main form of collective identity in the late Gorbachev period. Ethnic conflicts broke out in areas such as the Caucasus and Central Asia. There was intolerance to Russian minorities in the Baltic States and to non-Russians from the Caucasus living in Russia. This mirrored the consequences of the collapse of comparable integrating mechanisms and identities in Yugoslavia. However, in the latter the problems were much more apparent and disastrous. In view of the level of violence and the ethnic intolerance which accompanied the collapse of communism, perhaps in retrospect the views of earlier analysts mentioned at the beginning of this article were correct i.e. that the Soviet-type system had indeed provided a solution to the national question.

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Who were the Nazis? The Social Characteristics of the Support Mobilised by the Nazi Movement, 1920-1933

DR DETLEF MÜHLBERGER

The question of '*Who were the Nazis?*' in terms of the social characteristics of the membership and electorate of the Nazi Movement was first raised in the early 1930s when the NSDAP became a mass party. Establishing an accurate picture of the social types which carried Nazism was then – and has continued to be – of fundamental importance in our attempt to understand the phenomenon.¹ To the historian and social scientist the discovery of the social background of the supporters of Nazism is obviously not an esoteric exercise for it is only by identifying as precisely as is possible *who were the Nazis* that a meaningful answer can be given to another fundamental question, namely *why Germans joined the Nazi Party* in their hundreds of thousands, or voted for Nazism in their millions before Hitler was appointed chancellor by President von Hindenburg on 30 January 1933. The focus here is therefore on the social background of those individuals who *made a free choice* to support Nazism during the Weimar Republic.

Historiographical Aspects

After the Nazi electoral breakthrough in the *Reichstag* election of September 1930, when the NSDAP secured 18.3 per cent of the national vote, contemporary historians, political scientists and political commentators began tackling the question of the social bases of Nazism in earnest.² Two incompatible hypotheses about the social contours of Nazism were developed at the time which were based essentially on impressionistic assertions not substantiated by any meaningful or significant empirical data; hypotheses which continued to influence the debate in the post-1945 period, when the question of '*Who supported Nazism?*' was given new impetus following the revelation of the barbaric German behaviour during the Third Reich. The most enduring and widely supported theory of the social bases of Nazism developed in the early 1930s was the 'Middle-Class Movement' (*Mittelstandsbewegung*) thesis or 'Class-Party' (*Klassenpartei*) thesis of Nazism, which was the dominant, orthodox view until at least the 1980s. The 'Middle-Class Movement' thesis found wide support at the time of its formulation in the early 1930s, and surfaced before the Nazis seized power in January 1933. It is to be found in a number of articles published in *Zeitschrift für Politik* in the early 1930s by Werner Stephan, who analyzed the election results of 1930 to 1932 and pointed to the success of Nazism in predominantly middle-class urban and rural areas.³ Especially influential in popularizing the thesis in the post-war period was the American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, who argued that the ideal-typical Nazi voter was a self-employed middle-class Protestant living in a rural or small-town environment.⁴ The strongest advocate of the middle-class thesis since the 1970s has been the German-Canadian social historian Michael Kater.⁵

The hypothesis that the Nazi Party was a 'Peoples' Party' (*Volkspartei*), a mass party based on support from all segments of society, including – *critically* – significant support from the working class, also emerged in the early 1930s. It carried little weight until the 1970s when Paul Madden, in a pioneering study on the social bases of Nazism based on extensive *empirical* evidence drawn from the NSDAP Master File in the Berlin Document Center, argued strongly for the validity of the 'Peoples' Party' thesis.⁶ The data on the social contours of the Nazi membership published by Paul Madden,⁷ Detlef Mühlberger⁸ and William Brustein,⁹ and on the social geometry of the Nazi electorate by Thomas Childers,¹⁰ Richard Hamilton,¹¹ Dirk Hänisch¹² and Jürgen Falter¹³ have cumulatively undermined, and ultimately overturned, the old orthodoxy.

Early Empirical Data on the Membership of the Nazi Party

In retrospect, given the tremendous strides made in the last two decades or so on the question of the social characteristics of Nazism, the paucity of evidence on which the *Middle Class v. Peoples' Party* debate was conducted until the 1970s is astonishing. For decades there was virtually nothing to analyse beyond the limited amount of membership data gathered and evaluated by the American sociologist Theodore Abel in 1933.¹⁴ His data was based on replies by 687 Nazis who responded to an essay competition entitled 'Why I became a National Socialist', which Abel had organised at the outset of the Third Reich. On the basis of his unrepresentative sample – the bulk of the respondents lived in *Gau* Hesse – Abel concluded that the NSDAP was a lower-middle-class affair.

Before the 1970s the only comprehensive analysis of the social strata on which the membership of the NSDAP rested was the *Partei-Statistik*, a census of its members undertaken by the Nazi Party in 1934, which was published for internal party use only by the Reich Organisation Leader Ley in 1935.¹⁵ Marxist and non-Marxist advocates of the 'Middle-Class Movement' thesis have usually argued that the *Partei-Statistik* represents little more than an attempt by the Nazis to falsify the social base of the party, questioning in particular the veracity of the percentage given in the census for the working-class membership. In the census, which provides an insight into the social structure of the NSDAP's membership as on 1 January 1935, there is evidence to support the assertion which had been made by the Nazis long before they acquired power that their party was a 'Peoples' Party', a trans-class party:

Table 1: The Social Structure of the Nazi Party according to the *Partei-Statistik*, 1925-30 January 1933 (*Frequency*: 849,009)¹⁶

Working Class	31.5%
Middle Class	57.9%
Others	10.6%

Their own data demonstrated to the Nazis something which they were undoubtedly aware of before the census returns were analysed, namely that the middle class (*Mittelstand*) was over-represented and the working class under-represented within the membership of the Nazi Party. This class imbalance was acknowledged by the Nazis in the preamble to the *Partei-Statistik*. The census data at the regional (*Gau*) level also demonstrated to the party hierarchy the wide variations in the social structure of the Nazi membership in various parts of Germany, as reflected in the level of working-class supporters active in the party before 1933, which ranged from a low of 24 per cent in Goebbels' stamping-ground, *Gau* Greater Berlin, to a high of 43.8 per cent in *Gau* Westphalia-South.

What utility does the *Partei-Statistik* have? Obviously one hesitates to accept the Nazi data at face value. Its major limitation is that it only records those Nazis who had joined the NSDAP at some time between 1925 and January 1933 and had never left it. The problem here is that while the Nazis issued approximately 1.5 million membership numbers before 30 January 1933, only 849,009 individuals were still in the party at the time of the census according to the *Partei-Statistik*. The party data cannot tell us anything about the *circa* 650,000 Germans (and Austrians, also enrolled via Munich) who had joined the Party before 30 January 1933 and subsequently left it again. However, despite this real limitation, it would seem that the *Partei-Statistik* does represent a genuine attempt by the Nazis to get an insight into the social background of their membership. What sways one towards that view is the fact that the data was never published during the Third Reich and never used for propaganda purposes. Moreover the Nazis admitted that workers and farmers were under-represented within the party. These social groups were to be encouraged to join the NSDAP once the bar on recruitment (in place from 1 May 1933) was lifted. If – as many a historian has suggested – the Nazis were intent on distorting the facts, they did not do a very good job of it. It would have been relatively easy for them to have massaged the figures for the various social groupings present in the party to bring them more in line with the social structure of German society.

As long as empirical evidence on the occupational and social background of the membership of the NSDAP was basically confined to the disputed data available in the *Partei-Statistik*, the generally

accepted notion of the Nazi Party as a *Middle-Class Movement* and the marginalization of the working- (and upper-) class presence in the party was relatively easy to sustain. Obviously the major problem for those comparatively few scholars who supported the thesis that the NSDAP was indeed a *Peoples' Party* transcending the class divides of German society before 1933, was the need to furnish proof showing that working-class and elite elements were present in the Nazi ranks in significant numbers.

Old and New Sources

The turning point in the debate on the social characteristics of Nazi support came in the 1970s when two developments occurred which ended the *data* drought and placed the controversy surrounding the social characteristics of the Nazi Movement onto an increasingly firm *empirical* footing. Developments in computer technology facilitated the use of a *known* source, the around 10 million or so NSDAP membership files housed in the American-controlled Berlin Document Center after the Second World War.¹⁷ A large sample taken from this source, and analysed through the use of computer technology, formed the basis of Paul Madden's doctoral work submitted in 1976. Michael Kater also took a comparatively small sample from this source in the mid-1970s. The same source has more recently again been used by William Brustein and Jürgen Falter.¹⁸ From the 1960s onwards, researchers working in various German archives also began to gradually unearth an increasing mass of membership fragments and branch membership lists of the Nazi Party, including those relating to its formative years of development. Parallel to the rapid expansion of data relating to the party, historians also began to use existing or newly discovered material relating to a number of the more important Nazi specialist organisations, which provided additional perspectives on the social make-up of the Nazi Movement as a whole.

Methodological Issues

Before turning to the results obtained through the computer analysis of the old and new sources it is important to look at the methodological aspects involved in its processing. Far from allowing historians to reach a consensus view on the sociology of Nazism, the use of the growing volume of empirical data from the 1970s onwards has produced some lively debates about methodological problems involved in handling data of variable quality and provenance.¹⁹

Two major aspects created difficulties. Firstly, there are limitations inherent in the very nature of the data from which conclusions about the social characteristics of Nazism have been drawn. Virtually all analyses depend on membership lists and party cards which involve self-assigned occupational descriptions, on the basis of which an individual's position in social space has to be determined. That is a problem in itself, one compounded by the fact that the most frequently encountered occupational descriptions are terminologically imprecise, such as 'worker' (*Arbeiter*), 'farmer' (*Landwirt*) and 'businessman' (*Kaufmann*). The available data, in which one finds the name of the members (from which obviously the gender can be deduced), the place of residence, and usually also the date and place of birth, does not provide the sort of information required for contemporary class analysis. We have little evidence – except in the more detailed SA and SS membership records – about the family background of individuals, their education, income level and financial situation.

The second major problem, and an area given to even more theoretical and conceptual conflict, relates to the methods used in the assignment of various occupations to specific occupational groups and the placement of these into social class groupings. Quite different results have been obtained by scholars who have undertaken statistical analysis of the membership of the NSDAP depending on which specific occupational groups they have assigned to which particular social class. Illustrative of the radically different results which can be obtained from the same set of data are the use in his work of two quite different class models by Michael Kater:

Table 2: Kater's Two Class Models (*Frequency*: 2,186)²⁰

Old Model [pre-1977/78]		New Model [post-1977/78]	
WORKING CLASS:	16%	WORKING CLASS:	41%
MIDDLE CLASS/ELITE:	75%	MIDDLE CLASS:	50%
ELITE	9%	ELITE:	9%

In a series of articles published in the early and mid-1970s, Michael Kater used a very narrow definition of what constituted the working class, which he limited to unskilled workers. His placement of semi- and skilled workers and artisans into the lower-middle class significantly inflated the size of the *Mittelstand* membership of the NSDAP. In his revamped class model employed in his work since the late 1970s, Kater followed the approach used by contemporary Weimar government statisticians by including dependent artisans in the working class. Once Kater had decided on this approach he was faced with a difficult task: how can one determine whether an artisan has dependent or independent status. Kater's solution to this problem was to automatically assign 36.6 per cent of all artisans to the *Mittelstand* on the assumption that they were of independent status.²¹ In his important contributions to the debate on the social configuration of the membership of the NSDAP Paul Madden has always used Kater's pre-1977/78 model.

Modern Empirical Data on the Membership of the Nazi Party

Turning to the data made available since the 1970s on the Nazi Party's membership, the information now at hand is extensive. The first data to be published tended to relate to the formative years of the Nazi Party, the period 1919 to 1923. By November 1923 the Nazis had issued just over 55,000 membership cards, though we do not know how many of these were still in the NSDAP by the time it was banned nationally following the abortive Munich Putsch. A large fragment of the central membership index of the party for late 1923 has survived, along with a collection of branch membership lists, the bulk of the latter being mainly from Bavaria. The largest sample on the early Nazi Party which we have is that provided by Paul Madden, which – given Madden's use of the early Kater model – suggests that the middle class dominated the party's membership in its early years:

Table 3: Nazi Party Data for 1919-1923 analysed by Paul Madden (*Frequency* 8,144):²²

WORKING CLASS:	21.7%
MIDDLE CLASS:	68.5%
ELITE:	1.8%
OTHERS/UNKNOWN	8.0%

The analysis by Michael Kater of a large fragment of the NSDAP's new members recruited on the eve of the Munich Putsch, suggests that virtually the entire membership was middle class:

Table 4: Individuals joining the Nazi Party, Sept.-Nov. 1923 analysed by Michael Kater (*Frequency*: 4,454):²³

WORKING CLASS:	9.5%
MIDDLE CLASS/ELITE:	90.5%

As noted above, both of these scholars did not include dependent artisans in the working class, which resulted in part in the low working-class values, exacerbated in Kater's case by his insistence before 1977/78 that only unskilled workers constituted the working class. On the basis of their respective results, Paul Madden and Michael Kater reached quite different conclusions as to the nature of the Nazi Party. Professor Madden argued the case that the Nazi Party was a *People's Party*, whereas

Professor Kater cited his figures as proof of the validity of the then orthodox view of the Nazi Party as a 'lower-middle-class phenomenon'. My own analysis of the same list in 1987, in which I assigned dependent artisans to the working class if they did not indicate that they had acquired their 'master' (*Meister*) title, resulted in much higher working-class value and a correspondingly lower percentage for the middle class:

Table 5: Individuals joining the Nazi Party, Sept.-Nov. 1923 analysed by Detlef Mühlberger (*Frequency: 4,786*):²⁴

WORKING CLASS:	33.1%
MIDDLE CLASS:	51.5%
ELITE:	5.2%
STATUS UNCLEAR:	9.9%

We should not be surprised at the strong presence of the middle class in the early Nazi Party. It was primarily a South German, mainly a Bavarian phenomenon before 1923, a party which recruited predominantly in a region which was not significantly developed in economic terms, one which was less industrialized and more agrarian than other parts of Germany. Although in its infancy the mainstay of the Nazi Party's membership was provided by the middle class, which was clearly over-represented within the party in comparison with the social structure of German society. The under-representation of the working class within the NSDAP should not blind us to the fact that even in its formative years between one-quarter and one-third of its membership came from this class, giving it a heterogeneous social profile.

The new data on the Nazi Party's membership for the period 1925 to January 1933 which appeared in the 1970s and 1980s became increasingly impossible to fit into the old 'Middle-Class-Thesis' approach. Looking at the data produced by Madden, Mühlberger and Brustein-Falter – and even Michael Kater! – from the 1970s to the 1990s it becomes increasingly obvious that the Nazis were able to secure very broad social support after the party's re-formation in February 1925, especially during its major surge in the years 1930 to 1933, when the Nazi Party became a mass movement. For the period following the re-formation of the NSDAP in 1925 to the time of Hitler's appointment as Reich chancellor at the end of January 1933, we now have four sets (indeed five, if one includes the *Partei-Statistik*) available on the social structure of the Nazi Party at the macro level. Three of the data sets are based on samples drawn from the Berlin Document Center, namely a large sample by Paul Madden, a very small sample by Michael Kater, and another large sample by Professors Brustein and Falter.

Despite his staunch advocacy of the *Peoples' Party Thesis*, the middle class looms very large in Professor Madden's sample, given his placement of all artisans into the middle class:

Table 6: Individuals joining the Nazi Party between 1925 and 1932 analysed by Paul Madden (*Frequency: 47,438*):²⁵

WORKING CLASS:	27.6%
MIDDLE CLASS:	65.1%
ELITE:	1.4%
OTHERS/UNKNOWN	6.6%

In Professor Madden's sample the 65.1 percentage for the *Mittelstand* includes an 18.5 per cent strong artisan occupational sub-group. The bulk of the latter could – and I would argue must – be assigned to the working class. If this transfer is made, the percentage difference between the working and middle classes is significantly reduced. For if one re-calculates the Madden data using Michael Kater's method (used after 1977/78) of automatically assigning 63.4 per cent of all artisans to the working class – and that in itself is a conservative approach – the figure for the working class in Paul Madden's large sample would increase to 39.1 per cent.

Now this figure is in line with the 41 per cent working class content found among the admittedly very small sample for the same period provided by Michael Kater:

Table 7: Individuals joining the Nazi Party between 1925 and 1932 analysed by Michael Kater (*Frequency*: 2,186):²⁶

WORKING CLASS:	41.1%
MIDDLE CLASS:	49.6%
ELITE:	9.2%

By the late 1970s, this chief advocate of the *Middle-Class Thesis* of Nazism had, in the light of the criticism which his first class model had received, significantly altered his class and occupational model. Ironically, this change of approach resulted in Michael Kater producing statistical evidence which seriously undermined his own position as the champion of the *Middle-Class Thesis*. However, his new classification system did not deter him from continuing to advocate the old orthodoxy.²⁷

My own contributions to the debate strongly reinforced the argument advanced by Paul Madden. Unlike the 'macro' data based on sampling the BDC material, my discovery of extensive Nazi membership data at the regional level allowed me to analyze the social composition of the Nazi Party in six distinct regions of Germany, for two of which I was lucky enough to find an almost complete record of newly enrolled members joining the Nazi Party over time. What strikes one when looking at the summary of the data for the six regions, is the high percentage of workers attracted to Nazism:

Table 8: Nazi Party Membership relating to the period 1925 and 1932 analysed by Detlef Mühlberger (*Frequency*: 52,579):²⁸

WORKING CLASS:	41.9%
MIDDLE CLASS:	45.9%
ELITE:	4.6%
STATUS UNCLEAR:	7.6%

A recent additional sample taken from the Berlin Document Center by William Brustein and Jürgen Falter also puts the working-class content among the Nazi membership at around the 40 per cent mark:

Table 9: The Occupation of NSDAP-Joiners, 1925 -1932, analysed by Brustein and Falter (*Frequency*:39,812):²⁹

WORKING CLASS:	40%
WHITE-COLLAR	21%
INDEPENDENT	32%
NO OCCUPATION:	7%

Bearing in mind the differences in the methodology used by different scholars, the evidence on the social configuration of the membership of the Nazi Party made available since the 1970s demonstrates that the party was indeed, in social terms, a *Peoples' Party*, with sizeable sections of support drawn not only from the middle class (marginally over-represented in the party), but also the working class (marginally under-represented), as well as the elite (significantly over-represented). A party with such a class structure, a party with a working-class content of around 40 per cent, cannot be accommodated within the framework of a 'Middle-Class' thesis.

The Social Structure of two important Nazi Specialist Organisations: the SA and SS

As in the case of the Nazi Party itself, it was only from the 1970s that work began to appear which looked at the social characteristics of two important Nazi Party's specialist organizations, the SA

(Storm Section or *Sturmabteilung*) and SS (Protection Squad or *Schutzstaffel*). In the 1970s Michael Kater, on the basis of material provided by Conan Fischer (primarily relating to Munich and Frankfurt), argued that the SA was essentially a petit-bourgeois phenomenon, elements of the middle class making up between 70 and 80 per cent of its membership before 1933.³⁰ Conan Fischer evaluated the same material that he had provided Michael Kater with, supplemented by a few additional sources. Professor Fischer came to radically different conclusions.³¹ By using a more realistic class and occupational model, in which skilled and dependent artisanal workers were included in the working class, 62.6 per cent of Professor Fischer's sample of 1,312 SA members enrolled before 30 January 1933 were deemed to be 'workers'. In the 1990s Conan Fischer and I combined material which we had found in numerous archives over the years, data relating to diverse regions of north, west, east and south Germany, to Catholic, Protestant and mixed confessional regions, to urban and rural areas, in sum a data set which is about as diverse as the existing sources allow. We think that the data which we have gathered has now settled the issue of the social base of the SA, the class configuration of which is very unlikely to be altered to any meaningful extent by the discovery of additional membership data:

Table 10: Individuals in the SA 1925-30 January 1933 analysed by Conan Fischer and Detlef Mühlberger (*Frequency*: 2,643):³²

WORKING CLASS:	56.5%
MIDDLE CLASS:	32.9%
ELITE:	5.8%
STATUS UNCLEAR:	4.3%

It is clear that the rank-and-file of the SA was significantly more working class in its composition than the Nazi Party itself.

On the rank-and-file membership of the SS before 1933 there is virtually nothing beyond the limited data presented here:

Table 11: Individuals recruited into the SS between 1929 and 30 January 1933 analysed by Detlef Mühlberger (*Frequency*: 496):³³

WORKING CLASS:	43.9%
MIDDLE CLASS:	47.9%
ELITE:	4.0%
STATUS UNCLEAR:	4.0%

It seems that in its sociological structure the SS represented a sort of half-way house between the NSDAP and the SA in the sense that it was not as dependent on middle-class support as was the former, nor did it recruit the relatively large working-class element present in the latter.³⁴

The Social Geometry of the Nazi Electorate

Another dimension which explores the social contours of Nazism from a different, though related, perspective to that of membership analysis is the nature of electoral support gathered by the Nazis before 1933. Although this does not deal with the committed, hard-core of the Nazi Movement in the way that membership analysis does, it throws additional light on the nature of Nazism. As in the case of the debate about the membership of the Nazi Movement, analysis of the Nazi electoral constituency goes back to the pioneering work of Stephan, who pointed to the 'middle-class' profile of the average Nazi voter before 1933. This view was also reflected in the conclusions reached in the first meaningful analysis of the Nazi Party's electorate undertaken by Samuel Pratt in the late 1940s.³⁵ The first modern quantitative computer analyses appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s, namely those by Thomas Childers, Richard Hamilton, Jürgen Falter and Dirk Hänisch.³⁶ Whereas Thomas Childers emphasized the not insignificant working class support secured by the Nazi Party before 1933, Richard Hamilton

pointed out how strong upper-class support for Nazism had been before 1933. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s a series of articles came out by Jürgen Falter's research group, which evaluated various aspects of the Nazi voting pattern and provided extensive statistical evidence of a constant strong working-class vote secured by the Nazis in the final years of the Weimar Republic. A summary of Professor Falter's work underlines the marked social mix reflected in the Nazi vote:

Table 12: The Social Composition of the Nazi Electorate according to Jürgen Falter:³⁷

	1928	1930	July 1932	Nov. 1932	1933
Working Class	40*	40	39	39	40
New Middle Class	22	21	19	19	18
Old Middle Class	37	39	42	41	42

* The figures show the percentage of Nazi voters in each category

Conclusions

The cumulative result of all the new studies which have appeared in the last two decades or so has been the erosion of the acceptability of the 'Middle-Class Party' hypothesis to the point at which the validity of the alternative 'Peoples' Party' thesis can no longer be seriously questioned. From being the minority view, much decried in the pre- and post-war period, when the fashionable 'Middle-Class Thesis' of Nazism marginalized the 'Mass Party' approach, a series of scholars have produced empirically based statistical data during the last three decades or so which points overwhelmingly in one direction: that the NSDAP was indeed what the Nazis claimed it to be, a 'Peoples' Party', not a class or middle-class phenomenon.

NOTES

- 1 For a general discussion of the material published up to the mid-1980s on the social configuration of the Nazi vote (though he also touches on the sociography of the Nazi membership) see Stephen G. Fritz, 'The NSDAP a Volkspartei? A Look at the Social Basis of the Nazi Voter', *The History Teacher*, 20 (1987), pp. 379-99. For brief recent summaries of the sociology of the membership and electorate of the Nazi Party see Jeremy Noakes, 'Who Supported Hitler', *Modern History Review*, 6 (1995), pp. 28-31; and Dick Geary, 'Who Voted for the Nazis?', *History Today*, 48 (1998), pp. 8-14.
- 2 An overview of the historiography of the debate on the social characteristics of Nazi support is provided by Detlef Mühlberger, *Hitler's Followers. Studies in the Sociology of the Nazi Movement* (London/New York, 1991), pp. 5-11. For an extensive summary of the debate and a thorough review of the published evidence (up to 1990) see Peter Manstein, *Die Mitglieder und Wähler der NSDAP 1919-1933. Untersuchungen zu ihrer schichtmäßigen Zusammensetzung* (Frankfurt am Main/Bern/ New York/Paris, 3rd. ed., 1990).
- 3 See especially Werner Stephan's first article on the theme, 'Zur Soziologie der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei', *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 20 (1931), pp. 793-800.
- 4 Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1960).
- 5 Michael Kater, *The Nazi Party. A Social Profile of Members and Leaders 1919-1945* (Oxford, 1983).
- 6 J. Paul Madden, 'The Social Composition of the Nazi Party, 1919-1930' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1976).
- 7 Paul Madden, 'Some Social Characteristics of Early Nazi Party Members, 1919-23', *Central European History*, 15 (1982), pp. 34-56; *idem*, 'The Social Class Origins of Nazi Party Members as Determined by Occupations, 1919-1933', *Social Science Quarterly*, 68 (1987), pp. 263-80.
- 8 Detlef Mühlberger, 'The Sociology of the NSDAP: The Question of Working-Class Membership', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 15 (1980), pp. 493-511; *idem*, 'The Occupational and Social Structure of the NSDAP in the Border Province Posen-West Prussia in the early 1930s', *European History Quarterly*, 15 (1985), pp. 281-311; *idem*, 'Germany', in Detlef Mühlberger (ed.), *The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements*

- (London, 1987), pp. 40-139; *idem* (with Jürgen Falter), 'The Anatomy of a *Volkspartei*. The Sociography of the Membership of the NSDAP in *Stadt- and Landkreis Wetzlar, 1925-1935*', *Historical Social Research*, 24 (1999), pp. 58-98; *idem* (with Sonja Kreuz), 'Die Soziographie der Mitgliedschaft der NSDAP in Offenbach a. M., 1925 bis 1935', *Offenbacher Geschichtsblätter*, No. 44 (2001), pp. 126-45.
- 9 William Brustein, *The Logic of Evil. The Social Origins of the Nazi Party, 1925-1933* (New Haven/London, 1996).
 - 10 Thomas Childers, 'The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11 (1976), pp. 17-42; *idem*, *The Nazi Voter. The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933* (Chapel Hill/London, 1983).
 - 11 Richard Hamilton, *Who Voted for Hitler?* (Princeton, 1982).
 - 12 Dirk Hänisch, *Sozialstrukturelle Bestimmungsgründe des Wahlverhaltens in der Weimarer Republik. Eine Aggregatdatenanalyse der Ergebnisse der Reichstagswahlen 1924-1933* (Duisburg, 1983).
 - 13 Jürgen W. Falter has published numerous articles on the social characteristics of the Nazi electorate in the last twenty years or so. The results of his research are now available in his book *Hitlers Wähler* (Munich, 1991), probably the last word on the subject for the foreseeable future.
 - 14 Theodore Abel, *The Nazi Movement: Why Hitler came to Power* (New York, 1935).
 - 15 *Partei-Statistik. Stand 1. Januar 1935*. Herausgeber: Der Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP (Munich, n.d.), 3 vols.
 - 16 Calculated on the basis of data in *Partei-Statistik*, vol. 1, p. 70.
 - 17 Cf. George C. Browder. 'Problems and Potentials of the Berlin Document Center', *Central European History*, 5 (1972), pp. 362-380.
 - 18 William Brustein and Jürgen W. Falter, 'Who Joined the Nazi Party? Assessing Theories of the Social Origins of Nazism', *Zeitgeschichte*, 3-4 (1995), pp. 83-108.
 - 19 For an insight into the methodological problems surrounding the use of membership data see Herbert D. Andrews, 'The Social Composition of the NSDAP: Problems and Possible Solutions', *German Studies Review*, 9 (1986), pp. 293-318.
 - 20 See Michael H. Kater, 'Quantifizierung und NS-Geschichte. Methodologische Überlegungen über Grenzen und Möglichkeiten einer EDV-Analyse der NSDAP-Sozialstruktur von 1925 bis 1945', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 3 (1977), pp. 453-84, here p. 477.
 - 21 Kater, *Nazi Party*, p. 285, note 42.
 - 22 Madden, 'Social Characteristics of Early Nazi Party Members, 1919-23', p. 46, Table 3.
 - 23 Michael Kater, 'Zur Soziographie der frühen NSDAP', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 19 (1971), pp. 124-60, here p. 149.
 - 24 'Germany', in Mühlberger (ed.), *Social Basis of European Fascist Movements*, p. 63, Table 2.3.
 - 25 Madden, 'Social Class Origins of Nazi Party Members', pp. 272-3, Table 2.
 - 26 Kater, 'Quantifizierung und NS-Geschichte', p. 477.
 - 27 Kater's major study on the sociology of the membership of the NSDAP concludes with the assertion that one is dealing with a 'pre-eminently lower-middle-class phenomenon': Kater, *Nazi Party*, p. 236.
 - 28 Detlef Mühlberger, 'A "Worker's Party" or a "Party without Workers"? The Extent and Nature of the Working-Class Membership of the NSDAP, 1919-1933', in Conan Fischer (ed.), *The Rise of National Socialism and the Working Classes in Weimar Germany* (Providence/Oxford, 1996), pp. 47-77, here p. 54, Table 2.3.
 - 29 Brustein and Falter, 'Who Joined the Nazi Party?', p. 92, Chart 3.
 - 30 Michael Kater, 'Zum gegenseitigen Verhältnis von SA und SS in der Sozialgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus von 1925 bis 1939', *Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 62 (1975), pp. 339-79.
 - 31 Conan Fischer, *Stormtroopers. A Social, Economic and Ideological Analysis, 1929-35* (London, 1983), p. 26, Table 3.1.
 - 32 Conan Fischer and Detlef Mühlberger, 'The Pattern of the SA's Social Appeal', in Fischer (ed.), *Rise of National Socialism and the Working Classes in Weimar Germany*, pp. 99-113, here p. 102, Table 4.1.
 - 33 Mühlberger, *Hitler's Followers*, pp. 189, Table 7.1, column 15.
 - 34 However, preliminary results of work on the SS in the Main-Rhine-Mosel valley region (on which I am at

present engaged with my colleague Anne Becker) show a class profile for the SS which is more in line with that of the SA (the breakdown of the SS-membership sample analysed to date is: 55% working class / 42% middle class / 1% elite / 2% unclear): cf. Anne Becker and Detlef Mühlberger, 'Analysing the Sociography of the Membership of the *Schutzstaffel* [SS] in *SS-Oberabschnitt Rhein* using ACCESS II', *History and Computing*, 11 (1999), pp. 213-24, here p. 218, Figure 3.

- 35 Samuel A. Pratt, 'The Social Bases of Nazism and Communism in Urban Germany: A Correlation Study of the July 31, 1932, Reichstag Election in Germany' (MA thesis, Michigan State University, 1948). Pratt evaluated the electoral returns of 31 July 1932 for 193 towns.
- 36 For details of their major works see notes 10-13.
- 37 Jürgen W. Falter 'The First German Volkspartei: The Social Foundations of the NSDAP', in Karl Rohe (ed.), *Elections, Parties and Political Traditions. Social Foundations of German Parties and Party Systems, 1867-1987* (New York/Oxford/Munich, 1990), pp. 53-81, here p. 79, Table 2.9.

The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39

DR JOSEPH HARRISON

On Friday 17 July 1936, after months of planning, discontented army officers in the garrison city of Melilla on the north-eastern coast of Spanish Morocco staged a military rising against the democratic Republic which was elected at the polls in February of that year. By the following afternoon the rebellion had spread to the Iberian peninsula. The insurgents' plan was for the Army of Africa to secure Spanish Morocco before seizing control of key military installations on the mainland. Once this was achieved, the next step was to take over the leading provincial centres, including the Spanish capital Madrid, prior to establishing a military directory similar to that set up by General Miguel Primo de Rivera in September 1923 (Esenwein & Shubert 1995; Romero Salvadó 2000). In the Catholic heartlands of Navarre and Castilla y León, the rising enjoyed almost instantaneous success while, in addition, rebel officers soon triumphed over hostile populations in Oviedo, Vigo, La Coruña, Saragossa and parts of Andalusia thanks to a combination of surprise, trickery and the crushing of working-class resistance (Preston 1996).

Yet during these first critical days not everything went according to plan for the insurgents. For example, in Badajoz the military governor, General Castelló, managed to avert a rising. The municipal government in Bilbao intercepted telephone calls to and from the barracks, thereby removing the element of surprise from the rebellion. In Jaén and Málaga, local officials distributed arms to the people. However, the rebels' principal setbacks occurred in the country's two largest cities, Barcelona and Madrid. In the former, anarcho-syndicalist workers and Catalan federalists, led by loyal Assault and Civil Guards, retook the city on Sunday 19 July after General Fernández Burriel had occupied the main squares and public buildings. On the next day, thousands of armed workers in Madrid stormed the Montaña barracks, murdered the officers inside, and captured large quantities of rifles and ammunition before setting off to relieve the neighbouring cities of Alcalá de Henares, Guadalajara and Toledo (Jackson 1974; Thomas 1986). Thus, what had started as a military *coup d'état*, or *pronunciamiento*, was to develop into a bloody and costly civil war of nearly three years duration (Preston 1996).

The Opposing Camps: Republicans and Nationalists

By and large, the Republic relied for its support on the working class of the industrial cities, the urban bourgeoisie and that part of the rural labour force whose livelihoods had been improved by the Republican agrarian reform measures of 1931-33 and the Popular Front periods. For their part, the insurgents, soon to be led by General Francisco Franco, counted on the backing of business and financial interests, the landowners, most of the clergy, together with a majority of small peasants from Castilla y León and northern Spain (Vilar 1976).

After the first skirmishes between the two sides, the lines of battle were quickly demarcated. By early August 1936, the Republican administration in Madrid maintained authority *de jure* over an area of territory which contained 12.7 million inhabitants. Under its control were most Spain's large cities, including Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Bilbao. Among the big conurbations, only Seville fell to the insurgents during the early stages of the conflict. On the positive side, since the country's three main industrial regions – Catalonia, Vizcaya and Asturias – remained loyal to the democratically-elected regime, the Republic began the Civil War with four-fifths of the nation's output of minerals, iron and steel, metallurgical products and textiles. More negatively, to feed this large urban population as well as its sizeable army, the Republic counted upon the agricultural regions of Castilla La Mancha, the País Valenciano, eastern Andalusia and part of Extremadura, which together produced a relatively small proportion of the country's foodstuffs. Only in such items as citrus fruit, olives and horticultural products did the Republic enjoy a relative superiority over the rebel zone.

Nationalist Spain, as the rebel zone became known, with slightly fewer mouths to feed initially (12.3

million people in August 1936), was plentifully endowed with a variety of agricultural products. In normal years, the land in the hands of the insurgents produced two-thirds of the nation's wheat – the country's main staple – half of the maize crop (Galicia), over half the output of vegetables (Castilla y León), a similar proportion of potatoes, and nine-tenths of the country's sugar (Navarre, Aragon, Castilla y León and Andalusia). In addition, livestock production was also greater in the insurgent zone (Benavides 1972). Lacking an industrial base of any significance, the military authorities in Burgos, the seat of the Nationalist government, embarked in the spring of 1937 on a large-scale offensive in the north of the Peninsula, the objective of which was to capture the coalfield of Asturias along with the mineral, metallurgical and armaments sectors of the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa in the Basque Country. With the fall of Gijón in October 1937, Franco's forces controlled just over a third of the country's industrial production, including three-fifths of Spain's coal and nearly all the output of steel (Thomas 1986).

Paying for the War

The huge costs of conducting military campaigns on a number of fronts for nearly three years posed serious problems for the authorities of both zones. According to the Franco regime's own calculations, the combined costs of the two sets of operations, at 1935 prices, came to approximately 30,000 million pesetas. This figure represented more than six times budgetary expenditure in 1935 (4,558 million pesetas) and slightly less than the national income of Spain in that year (34,358 million pesetas) (Tamames 1973). Of the two zones, the Republic was in a better financial position to meet the challenge for two basic reasons. Firstly, those provinces which remained loyal to the Republic contributed 70 per cent of the budgetary income in 1935, compared with the 30 per cent from the provinces which fell to the Nationalists. Secondly, the bulk of Spain's substantial gold reserves, the fourth largest in the world, were located in the vaults of the Bank of Spain in Madrid (Harrison 1985).

From the outset, the Republican authorities set about raising revenue by the sale of Treasury bonds to the general public. After two years of mounting inflation, however, the public refused to subscribe to them. Thus the Republican Exchequer came to rely on loans from the Bank of Spain. The distinguished economist Juan Sardá (1970) calculated that the Treasury borrowed 22,740 million pesetas from that institution. In order to pay for the purchase of armaments and other vital materials from abroad the Republican authorities always intended to use Spain's considerable gold reserves. In order to prevent the reserves from falling into the hands of either the anarchists or the approaching Nationalist forces, on 13 September 1936 the Socialist Prime Minister Francisco Largo Caballero held a Cabinet meeting which authorised his Finance Minister, Juan Negrín, to transfer Spain's stock of gold, silver and banknotes from the vaults of the Bank of Spain to a place of greater safety. Although most ministers present at that meeting assumed that the gold would be removed to another location somewhere in Spain, Largo Caballero and Negrín soon concluded that the safest place for it to go was the Soviet Union, at that time the Republic's leading ally. As a result, at the end of October 1936, 510 tonnes of gold valued at 1,593 million pesetas (\$518 million) were transported by road to the south-eastern port of Cartagena. Contained in 7,800 boxes, this shipment was loaded on board a Russian vessel and sent to Odessa. According to Angel Viñas (1976), \$131 million of this money was spent on the purchase of weapons, \$46 million was retained by the Russians for charges for shipment, insurance and bank charges and melting down, and \$340 million was redirected to Paris to help the Republic and the International Brigades who fought alongside the Republican army. Gerald Howson (1998) charges the Soviets – and Stalin in particular, whom he accuses of 'barrow-boy behaviour' – of cheating the Spaniards over the arms sales by secretly manipulating the exchange rates.

The insurgents also attempted to finance their war efforts from internal sources of funds. The Nationalist Bank of Spain, founded in Burgos in September 1936, made loans to the rebel Treasury of 10,100 million pesetas during the conflict (Sardá 1970). On top of this, the Nationalist authorities tried a variety of schemes to raise further income. In January 1937, the regime imposed a 10 per cent levy on tobacco sales, visits to the cinema, theatre and bullfights, as well as consumption in cafes and bars. In March 1937, the insurgents called for all gold, foreign currency and foreign shares to be handed in to the authorities (Benavides 1972). Elsewhere, the rebels received a number of important gifts from

wealthy sympathisers. The millionaire tobacco smuggler Juan March is thought to have contributed £15 million before the rising and to have financed the Italian occupation of the island of Majorca, while ex-King Alfonso XIII gave \$ 10 million (Jackson 1965).

In the absence of a domestic source of arms production, during the first year of the conflict, of vital importance to the military rebels was the aid which they received from fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Mussolini, whose support for Franco was conditioned by strategic, political and ideological factors, sent the *Caudillo* a bill for 7,500 million lire (\$410 million) at the end of the Civil War, although Spain agreed to repay Italy only two-thirds of that amount over a period of 25 years. This debt, on highly favourable terms, was finally paid off in 1967 (Coverdale 1975; Thomas 1986).

Hitler's Germany also intervened on the side of the Nationalists; initially for a combination of ideological and strategic reasons (Viñas 1974; Bernecker 1991). Yet, as the conflict progressed, economic considerations became increasingly important. Above all, Germany, which was obliged to import three-quarters of its iron ore, needed Spanish ores to implement its second Four-Year Plan (Leitz 1998). The American historian Robert Whealey (1977, 1989) claims that during the conflict the Nazis provided Franco with 537 million reichsmarks (\$215 million). Of this, RM124 million went on direct deliveries to Spain and RM354 million on the services of the Condor Legion. By the end of the war, only RM74 million had been repaid to the Third Reich, either in the form of foreign exchange or barter. Spain later accepted a debt of RM378 million, plus a further bill for RM45 million for compensation to Germans who had suffered losses in Spain. These debts were paid off in full in the course of the Second World War by deliveries of vegetables, fruit, minerals and other goods, by the costs of the Blue division of the Spanish army which fought alongside the Germans on the Russian front, and by various settlements between Spain and the Allies in 1945 (Thomas 1986).

Finally, apart from Axis support, Franco's Spain also received \$76 million from the democratic powers. According to Whealey (1977), about 12 per cent of the insurgents war material came from sterling-dollar countries. Most vital to the Nationalists, the international oil companies kept their armies supplied with petroleum. The Texas Oil Company provided the rebels with oil at the outbreak of the conflict, while Texaco, Shell, Standard Oil New Jersey and the Atlantic Refining Company extended credits of at least \$20 million to purchase oil in the course of the conflict (Traina 1968).

Non-Intervention

As Paul Preston (1996) argues, to a large extent, the reaction of the foreign powers dictated both the course and the outcome of the Spanish Civil War. Without German and Italian aircraft, the insurgents would have found it impossible to transport their best troops to the Peninsula, while Soviet arms were to prove crucial in the defence of Madrid. Even so, the official international line on the worsening situation in Spain was that of non-intervention. The initiative for non-intervention came from the French Prime Minister Léon Blum whose administration was sympathetic to the Republican government and had signed an agreement in 1935 to supply the legal regime with arms. However, at a Cabinet meeting on 25 July 1936 Blum changed his mind and banned the export of arms and aircraft to Spain. The change of policy was partly due to pressure from the British. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, in particular, feared that French intervention south of the Pyrenees would provoke a war with Italy. Blum, meanwhile, was also influenced by rifts within his own Cabinet and by the potential threat of a civil war at home (Buchanan 1997).

The British government welcomed Blum's decision not to intervene in the Civil War as a way of preventing the polarisation of Europe and reducing the chances of a European war (Moradiellos 1996; Buchanan 1997). Tom Buchanan (1997) recounts that Baldwin's National Government feared that hasty French action in support of the Spanish Republic would result in Europe being divided into two opposing blocs with the unwelcome prospect of Britain being forced to take sides with the Soviet Union against the fascist powers. The British government, for its part, was also affected by the country's longstanding commercial interests in Spain, with sizeable investments in such areas as mining, sherry, cork, olive oil and textiles. Business interests in the United Kingdom strongly backed the insurgents, not least since they were convinced that militant left wingers would take over and collectivise foreign multinationals (Preston 1996).

On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States refused to give up the isolationist stance which had characterised American foreign policy since the end of the First World War. Democratic president Franklin D. Roosevelt, although personally sympathetic to the plight of the Republic, succumbed to domestic pressures, especially from the large and influential Catholic community. By enforcing an arms embargo against Spain, the US effectively backed the British and French governments in their endeavours to contain the crisis within Spain (Esenwein & Shubert 1995). Informed public opinion in the United States, moreover, was sharply divided over Spain. While liberal, left-wing and Protestant groups favoured the Republic, not only the Catholic Church but also big business and the political right championed the cause of the insurgents. Preston (1996) quotes a typical headline of 3 August 1936 in *The Journal*, part of the Hearst chain of newspapers, which announced 'Red Madrid Ruled by Trotsky'.

The Soviet Union was slow to come to the aid of the Spanish Republic and, as Preston (1996) reminds us, the guiding principle behind its policy was to prevent the spread of revolution. In May 1935, the Comintern formally adopted a radical change in Communist party tactics which led to the scrapping of its failed policy of attacking social democratic parties in Europe as 'social fascists'. It also called for the forging of alliances between the USSR and Western bourgeois states, while Communist parties were to propose joint action with Socialist parties. The prime concern of the Comintern was to safeguard the USSR from invasion. All too aware of the Soviet Union's lack of preparation for war, when civil war erupted in Spain, Stalin avoided any action which might provoke the *Führer*. Profoundly embarrassed, in Preston's words, Stalin sided with moderate elements in the Republic, fearful that a victory for the Spanish Left would lead to a thoroughgoing social revolution which would alienate the West and might very well have the unfortunate consequence of forcing Britain and France to ally themselves with the Axis powers against the Soviet Union. His calculated – some would say cynical – decision therefore was to supply just enough arms to the Spanish Republic to keep it alive, while instructing his agents in the Peninsula to minimise the revolutionary aspects of the struggle.

The International Brigades

By August 1936, several hundred antifascists were fighting alongside Republican troops, mostly French trade unionists as well as political refugees from Italy, Germany, Central and Eastern Europe. The idea of organising foreign volunteers to fight on the Republican side was first mooted in Paris in July 1936 where it gained the support of leading members of the Comintern including Maurice Thorez, secretary-general of the French Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti, his Italian counterpart, and the Yugoslav communist Josip Broz (the future Marshall Tito). In the following month, the Comintern launched a recruitment campaign when thousands of applicants were interviewed by Communist Party officials in the rue de Lafayette in Paris. Those chosen travelled on 'the train of volunteers' which left the Gare D'Austerlitz for Barcelona via Perpignan. From the middle of October 1936, they were sent to the IB's operations base in Albacete.

By the end of the conflict, over 59,000 volunteers from 53 countries had served in the International Brigade of the Republican army. Four-fifths of Brigaders came from the working class, most of them young men, although some German and Italian fighters were veterans of the Great War. Many volunteers were unemployed, especially among the French contingent, while a large number had experience of street fighting against the fascists in Paris, Berlin and London. In addition, the Spanish Civil War attracted the attention of a galaxy of well-known artists, writers and poets, among them Ernest Hemingway, Stephen Spender, George Orwell, Arthur Koestler and André Malraux, many of whom wrote eloquently of their experiences (Esenwein 1990; Thomas 1986).

Armed with rifles and other material purchased in the Soviet Union, Brigaders were not only better equipped than their Spanish counterparts but were also more effectively trained and organised. George Esenwein (1990) argues that they were soon regarded by the Spaniards as models of military efficiency and discipline. Those who enlisted in the IBs were forced to accept communist leadership or face severe punishment. A few others who participated on the Republican side, such as the British writer George Orwell, who served in the militia of the independent communist POUM, saw themselves as left-wing but anti-Stalinist. After the conflict, both veterans of the Brigades and historians of the

conflict debated the role of the communists within the Brigades. As Esenwein informs us, while some have contended that the strict discipline and political control of the Party in the course of the war was a necessary 'evil', others have bitterly condemned communist practices. That said, the International Brigades shouldered some of the heaviest burdens of the fighting between 1937 and late 1938 when the IBs left Spain, including the defence of Madrid and the Battle of the Ebro.

Collectivisation

One dramatic consequence of the collapse of the old order in the countryside was the formation of agricultural collectives in the Republican zone. Julián Casanova (1997) calculates that during the Civil War there were 147 collectives in Andalusia, 452 in Castilla-La Mancha, 353 in the País Valenciano, 95 in Catalonia, 122 in Murcia and 306 in Aragon. Most collectives were run either by the anarchist union confederation, the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), or the socialist Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) and in many cases jointly. Decisions were made by a council of an administrative council which, in theory at least, was responsible to a general assembly. To co-ordinate policy, each collective was linked both to a provincial and a regional organisation. It is difficult to discern to what extent individuals were forced to join the collectives. Coercing peasants into membership was against libertarian ideology. Moreover, there were alternative ways of ensuring loyalty. For example, the collective shop was the main outlet for the sale of peasant produce. If a farmer chose not to participate, he would find it difficult to dispose of his crop. Hence, large numbers of anti-collectivists sought membership in order to avoid hardship. Later, when the Communist Party took up the cudgels in the defence of small proprietors, independent farming received a boost (Thomas 1966).

It is a matter of considerable dispute whether the agricultural collectives can be characterised as an overall success. Available data, for example, show that wheat production rose by one-fifth in Aragon between 1936 and 1937, whereas in Catalonia and the País Valenciano, the main centres of peasant proprietors, it fell by one-sixth. However, the independence of the collectives was almost certainly a handicap to the performance of the Republican war economy, since it made the establishment of an overall plan of production virtually impossible. Although the collectives took it upon themselves to deliver food supplies directly to the front, these arrived at irregular intervals, while the inhabitants of towns were often treated less favourably (Thomas 1966; Bernecker 1996).

Counting the Cost of the War

Although measurement is not an easy exercise, there can be little doubt that the Spanish Civil War was to claim a huge toll in terms of the sacrifice of human lives and the destruction of physical capital. Estimates vary as to the number of deaths caused by the three-year conflict. Hugh Thomas puts the number of persons killed in battle or who died from their wounds at slightly more than 200,000 – one-tenth of all combatants. A further 130,000 murders and deaths took place behind the lines, while there were 10,000 deaths from air raids and 25,000 from malnutrition and disease arising from the conflict. In addition, 100,000 Republicans perished as a result of post-war reprisals, bringing the sum total of victims to approximately half a million. Furthermore, among defeated Republicans who went into exile during the first months of 1939, 300,000 preferred permanent emigration rather than risk victimisation in Franco's New Order.

In terms of the destruction of physical capital, Spain's First Development Plan (1964-67) claimed that the Civil War led to the ruin of 250,000 dwellings, while another 250,000 were rendered unfit for human habitation. In 192 cities and towns over three-fifths of all buildings were destroyed. In addition, the railways suffered heavy losses; 41 per cent of all locomotives, 40 per cent of all freight wagons and 61 per cent of passenger carriages were destroyed. One-third of the merchant marine was also sunk. The Plan provided no detailed information on the loss of industrial plant and equipment. Yet the textile, chemical and metallurgical industries of Catalonia were hardly touched by the conflict. As to the Basque Country, the refusal of the Republican government to contemplate a scorched-earth policy, together with the Nationalists' desire to take over the region intact, meant that it too was spared the level of destruction that was inflicted on the industrial regions of Western Europe during the Second World War (Harrison 1985).

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‘Why not leave the prosecution of the war to Generals?’: Churchill and his Commanders in World War Two¹

DR DAVID ROLF

Winston Churchill's recognition of his particular destiny after an audience with King George VI on 10 May, 1940, when he was invited to form his wartime administration, is well known. In concluding the first volume of his war memoirs, he wrote: 'At last I had the authority to give directions over the whole scene. I felt as if I were walking with destiny and that all my past life had been but a preparation for this hour and for this trial.'² Published in 1948, the first of the author's six volumes of memoirs of the Second World War laid the basis for a number of enduring myths by carefully selecting and interpreting material, much of it unavailable to researchers until the introduction of the thirty-year rule governing the release of official documents at the Public Record Office from 1 January, 1968, under which records of the Second World War and the immediate post war period down to the end of 1945 were made available to public inspection as a block at the beginning of 1972. Although Martin Gilbert's monumental biography of Churchill in eight volumes³, the last appearing in 1978, enabled, amongst many other things, a more balanced view of Churchill's direction of Britain's fighting forces to be assembled, it is only in the past few years that historians have given serious attention to this aspect of his war-time leadership and begun to re-examine some of the elements of the general picture to which Churchill himself gave currency in his own post-war volumes.

Unable to resist interfering in purely military matters while he was First Lord of the Admiralty during the ill-fated Norwegian campaign in the Spring of 1940, Churchill agreed later that the Admiralty had kept too close a control upon the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes.⁴ Yet after his sudden translation into the posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence on 10th May gave him unrivalled authority, the more so indeed since there had been no attempt to define the scope and powers attached to the latter, Churchill could rarely resist direct intervention with the military conduct of the war. As a flamboyant First Lord of the Admiralty and, after service at the front, Minister of Munitions during the First World War, Churchill observed at first hand that Lloyd George, Britain's Prime Minister during the crucial years 1915-1918, had been hamstrung by the fact that he did not hold in his hands supreme power over military strategic decisions. He therefore decided well before gaining office in 1940 that he would never divorce military from political considerations and insisted when he came to power that the direction of affairs in both spheres remained in his hands. Thus, in his role as Minister of Defence, which was newly-created with the King's agreement, he retained the right to engage and dismiss the high commanders of Britain's armed forces. This was something for which there was hardly any modern precedent.

Apart from establishing the Office of Minister of Defence and a new Ministry of Aircraft Production, the Churchill government wrought remarkably little change in the structure of Whitehall and the machinery of administration.⁵ However, the former – what Churchill called his 'handling machine', about a dozen officers to do his bidding – was supplemented by a Defence Committee which replaced the former Ministerial Committee of Co-ordination. This new committee was comprised of two panels, the Defence Committee (Operations) and the Defence Committee (Supply). Churchill chaired them both and the Chiefs of Staff of the armed services always attended the Operations meetings. The point here is, as his personal staff officer, Major-General H.L. ('Pug') Ismay noted, the practical effects of the changes were revolutionary. In future, the Prime Minister was able to exert all the power and authority of his premiership through 'a personal, direct, ubiquitous and continuous supervision, not only over the formulation of military policy at every stage, but also over the general conduct of military operations.'⁶ If we add into this equation Churchill's own complex character and remarkable political and military background, then we may see how it was that the man who possessed the indomitable will and courage to wage war against the Nazi tyranny until it was wholly defeated, nevertheless could be misguided and at times plainly wrong about the direction of the war in both strategic and operational

terms.⁷ If modern military theory considers all levels of strategic and tactical direction in terms of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, there is normally a fifth dimension as well to the formula – Interference; and the higher the level of interference, the greater the potential for disaster.⁸ By virtue of temperament and experience and now opportunity, Churchill was by no means immune from exercising the latter, and disaster was, at times, not far in its wake.

While we are not concerned here with Churchill's overall war strategy, about which there have been many arguments as to its constituent elements as a blueprint for victory and, indeed whether or not such a strategy could have existed at all; part of his responsibilities as Minister of Defence involved not only picking but directing the Generals who led Britain's fighting forces. The inter-locking series of questions we need to try to answer, therefore, are did Churchill choose wisely, did he interfere too much in their direction of the war and so invite near disaster, and to what extent was his judgement generally superior to that of his military subordinates?

The uneven dialogue that Churchill established with his military commanders had its positive advantages. His insistence on detail, his drive, his colossal work ethic, his enthusiasm and unbounded optimism kept the commanders on their toes. There was a more brutal side to his character too which manifested itself in bullying, intimidation, unfounded criticism, sarcasm and short temper. '...Mr Churchill was often so ungracious and hasty,' complained the C-in-C Mediterranean, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, on receiving one of the Prime Minister's 'prodding' messages urging more aggressive action. 'As they implied that something was lacking in the direction and leadership, they did positive harm,'⁹ especially since Churchill could not always know all the difficulties and risks faced by the person on the spot. However, such adverse qualities also kept the commanders up to scratch; they were continually exposed to Churchill's withering scrutiny of military detail, often much to their resentment.

How far was Churchill adept at choosing his generals? In 1945 they secured, in conjunction with the Allies, an overwhelming military victory and so this might seem a superfluous question but it was, of course, a consideration of huge importance at the time. In one respect, there is no doubt that he secured the right man for the key post of Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Between 1939 and December 1941, General Sir John Dill had filled that post but was totally uncongenial to Churchill and was promoted Field Marshall, named Governor-designate of Bombay and packed off temporarily to Washington. There he made himself invaluable as Churchill's personal representative and eventually became senior British member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff committee. The Bombay governorship was quietly forgotten although Churchill conveniently overlooked this in his Memoirs and claimed sole authorship of the unexpectedly successful Washington appointment as a sign of his own perspicacity.¹⁰ His successor was General Sir Alan Brooke who had recent experience of commanding II Corps, BEF, in France and Flanders and was capable of standing up to the Prime Minister – an attribute very much in his favour. It was a sense of disputation in his appointees that frequently persuaded Churchill to offer them a position in the first place. He had little time for people who could not stand their ground – a problem with Dill – and Brooke was quite the opposite: 'When I thump the table and push my face towards him, what does he do?', remarked Churchill. 'Thumps the table harder and glares back at me. I know these Brookes – stiff-necked Ulstermen and there's no one worse to deal with than that.'¹¹ For the rest of the war, Brooke acted as the indispensable lightning conductor between the Prime Minister, those around him and the outside world as well as casting an experienced and cool eye over Churchill's more outrageous directives, though the toll, as judged from his diaries, was at times nearly unbearable.

Of the other generals who found favour during the war, few survived unscathed from Churchill's incessant, driving demands. Shortly before the collapse of France and the retreat of remnants of the BEF through Dunkirk – the 51st Highland Division was captured *en masse* at St Valery – General Sir Edmund Ironside paid the price of failure of both the France/Flanders and Norwegian campaigns and was moved from his post as CIGS to a newly created position as C-in-C Home Forces. He took this phlegmatically enough and Churchill was grateful, ensuring that he received a Field Marshall's baton in due course, though not so soon as to lead the public to think that it was merely a sop.¹² General Sir John Gort, C-in-C, BEF, was also an early casualty. His disastrous decision to move from his GHQ to

a forward Command Post when the Germans invaded Belgium on 10 May, 1940, was only the most obvious of his errors and when Churchill ordered him to return to Britain on 1st June rather than face death or capture with his troops, he believed that he was being made a scapegoat for others' mistakes. There were no field appointments for him after that and he long harboured the suspicion that Churchill's peremptory order had made it appear as if he had deserted his men.¹³

We have seen already that Dill, who Churchill appointed CIGS in Ironside's place, was removed after sixteen months in post but one of his earliest trials had been the spectacularly unsuccessful meeting between Churchill and General Sir Archibald Wavell, C-in-C Middle East in August, 1940, who had come to London to request more supplies to counter the Italian forces in East Africa and Libya. For his part, Churchill was under immense pressure from all sides and considered Wavell far too slow in seizing the initiative in the desert campaign. Wavell's taciturn and brooding silences infuriated Churchill who discussed with the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, the possibility of removing him and was only dissuaded from so doing by the lack of a suitable replacement. The subsequent General Directive issued to him caused Wavell to observe: 'It showed clearly that Winston did not trust me to run my own show and was set on his own ideas.'¹⁴ Thereafter, he was exposed to Churchill's constant 'prodding' even when events were moving well, as during Operation *Compass* which routed the Italians from the whole of Cyrenaica and advanced Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O'Connor's troops over 500 miles of desert to El Agheila by early February, 1941.¹⁵ When matters began to go seriously wrong in Greece and Crete together with the failure of Operation *Battleaxe* against Rommel's forces in June, Wavell was quickly and controversially relieved of his command. No man perhaps could have juggled the many competing demands made upon him by Churchill and he had, after all, taken 200,000 prisoners while conquering the whole of Italian East Africa while O'Connor, under his command, had bagged another 200,000 prisoners and had only been prevented from reaching Tripoli when his army was disbanded in order to take part in the Greek venture. Churchill considered Wavell 'tired and disheartened'¹⁶ and replaced him with the C-in-C India, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, despite Dill's misgivings. The CIGS, however, kept his doubts to himself since 'it is no use keeping Wavell as he has not got the P.M.'s confidence.'¹⁷

In direct contravention of Churchill's impression of Wavell, Auchinleck found him showing no signs of tiredness at all when he arrived in the Middle East and thought he had been given 'impossible tasks.'¹⁸ Unfortunately for him, Auchinleck was to labour under precisely the same kind of relentless pressure that had dogged his predecessor and was summoned to London only a month after taking up his command to explain in person to the Prime Minister why he refused to undertake an immediate desert offensive. He had already been warned by Dill that 'the Commander in the field will always be subject to great and often undue pressure from his Government... Wavell suffered from it. Nothing will stop it.'¹⁹ And nothing did. Although he resisted Churchill's demands to bring forward Operation *Crusader*, planned for November, 1941, he had found the meeting a bruising experience and when the slogging match in the Western Desert turned against the Eighth Army, was forced to replace its commander, General Sir Alan Cunningham and replace him, temporarily at first and then permanently, with Major-General Neil Ritchie. Matters were not helped by the fact that Auchinleck had appointed Cunningham against Churchill's wishes and did not take up the Prime Minister's suggestion to take command of Eighth Army in person. When Rommel pushed back the Eighth Army to the Gazala line in January, 1942, which in turn deprived Malta of air cover from North African allied bases, now lost, Churchill was sharply critical. Despite the fact that Auchinleck had been stripped of three Divisions, new equipment was sadly lacking and a large part of the Desert Air Force had been posted elsewhere, Churchill kept up the pressure for a new offensive to regain Cyrenaica which Brooke, as CIGS, was able to deflect for some time, finding it '...very exhausting, this continual protecting of Auchinleck, especially as I have not got the highest opinion of him!'²⁰

Methodically building up his forces so that he would be in a position to resume an offensive, designed to gain and hold territory by June 1942, was not something in Churchill's overview of Auchinleck's operations that appealed to the Prime Minister. After Rommel gained a clear advantage in driving the Eighth Army back to El Alamein and taking Tobruk in the process – its defence was incompetently handled – Auchinleck was forced to dismiss Ritchie and take command of the Eighth Army himself but was unable to push back the Axis forces, despite the fact that they had, as Rommel

observed, 'reached the limit of human endurance.'²¹ The result was the swift and somewhat brutal dismissal of Auchinleck, though Churchill told the M.P., Harold Nicolson, that 'It was a terrible thing to do...it is atrocious to remove a good General.'²² His replacement as C-in-C was Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Alexander with Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery commanding the Eighth Army, after 'Strafer' Gott, its commander designate had been killed in a plane crash.

Churchill had, by default, gained a team that would provide him with the success he craved and was determined to have in North Africa. 'He has the reputation of being an able and ruthless soldier and unspeakable cad' remarked Oliver Harvey, Anthony Eden's Private Secretary, of Montgomery.²³ Despite his breakout from El Alamein in October, 1942 – in which Churchill rejoiced at what he called '...a remarkable and definite victory, though warning his listeners, 'Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning',²⁴ – he was soon harrying Montgomery for his over-insured and cautious pursuit of Rommel, though much of the fault lay with Alexander, who was never firm enough with Montgomery, as Brooke admitted in June 1942 at the end of the Tunisian campaign. After recognising that Montgomery was a 'difficult mixture to handle,' being a brilliant commander in action, a fine trainer of men but given to gross errors in lack of tact and liable to tread heavily on other people's toes, he remarked that 'He wants guiding and watching continually and I do not think that Alex is sufficiently strong and rough with him.' But Alexander was one of Churchill's favourites, which explains in large part why he continued throughout the war to occupy high positions and yet was certainly limited in many of the arts of soldiering. Urbane, charming and the British Army's youngest general at the age of 45 in 1937, he nevertheless was, in Lieutenant-General Tuker's estimation, 'quite the least intelligent commander I have ever met in a high position,' while Eden questioned whether he 'carried enough brains to be C-in-C.'²⁵ Early defeats in the Second World War did not shake him; as Professor Reid has noted, the mud of failure did not cling to his immaculate uniform despite conducting retreats at Dunkirk and from Rangoon when the Japanese attacked. In North Africa he was promoted General in February 1943, on becoming C-in-C 18th Army Group and Deputy Supreme Commander to Eisenhower.

The amphibious landing of three British and American task forces in *Operation Torch*, on 8 November, 1942, at Algiers, Oran and Casablanca, brought a new dimension to that theatre of war and irrevocably tilted the balance of power between the Allies. Thenceforward, Churchill could no longer direct Britain's fighting effort quite as he wished and gradually had to play second fiddle to Roosevelt who, for practically the only time in the war, had overridden his Joint Chiefs of Staff in agreeing to the landings. However, the fighting in Tunisia, to where Montgomery's troops drove Rommel's Panzerarmee Afrika where it was eventually cut to pieces and destroyed by the British First Army and U.S. II Corps, was also the graveyard of several generals' reputations including Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson. After the Americans were severely mauled at the Battle of Kasserine Pass, in February 1943, Churchill demanded a searching inquiry and was 'not at all satisfied' with the way Anderson had handled First Army. It was only Alexander's dithering and Brooke's lack of clear evidence about the matter that prevented Anderson's removal although he never again commanded an army in the field.²⁶ Montgomery, on the other hand, emerged with a greatly inflated reputation and ego: 'In defeat unthinkable, in victory insufferable,' Churchill is supposed to have remarked.²⁷ Despite the later tragedy at Arnhem, Monty retained Churchill's confidence although there have been searching analyses of his leadership in Italy and Normandy as historians have sought to dismantle the myths created around the great war leaders during and after the war – often by themselves in their post-war autobiographies and personal memoirs.²⁸

In the Far East, General Wavell again stepped into the firing line after leaving his post as C-in-C India to take charge of American, British, Dutch and Australian forces (ABDACOM or ABDA for short) as Supreme Commander of all Allied land and air forces in the south-west Pacific. This was truly a poisoned chalice and one imposed upon him at the will of the Americans, against Churchill and Brooke's opposition, for it was clear that if anything went disastrously wrong, as seemed almost certain, the British Supreme Commander would have to carry the can. Given the fact that Churchill's advisers agreed with Brooke – 'The whole [ABDA] scheme [is] wild and half baked and only catering for one area of action, namely Western Pacific, and one enemy Japan, and no central control'²⁹ – and with the Japanese ready to move in force towards the south and west, there was little that Wavell

could in fact do. He was 'horrified by the complete lack of organisation, of military intelligence, and of planning generally to meet any Japanese attack' on Burma and complained of Singapore that the 'whole atmosphere was completely unwarlike, that they do not expect a Japanese attack.'³⁰ Subsequently, Wavell had to authorise General Percival – 'an uninspiring leader and rather gloomy' figure considered Wavell's Chief of Staff³¹ - to surrender Singapore on 15 February, 1942. Wavell had contemplated implementing Churchill's 'scorched earth' policy himself and fighting to the last but little would have come of this futile gesture and Wavell knew it. As it was, Churchill realised that the Malayan débâcle, culminating in the loss of Singapore, and the retreat from Burma had their origins in the lack of training, equipment, numbers and morale of the Allied troops and a complete underestimation of the enemy; such problems stemmed from decisions and attitudes that went far back beyond the war. While it is possible to criticise in detail some of Wavell's appointments, decisions and directives during these campaigns, probably no person could have done much more and for this reason Churchill was understanding when Wavell returned to Delhi as C-in-C India in the Spring of 1942. He was, too, uncritical of Alexander's conduct of the retreat from Burma, despite the fact that he had presided over what was undoubtedly an unmitigated military disaster: 'In this his first experience of independent command,' wrote Churchill, 'though it ended in stark defeat, he showed all those qualities of military skill, imperturbability and wise judgement that brought him into the first rank of Allied war leaders.'³² We have seen, above, how Churchill's confidence in him remained unabated, first in North Africa and then in Italy where, as Supreme Commander he consistently overestimated what his Army Group could do, including a plan to dash through the Ljubljana Gap to Vienna before the Russians could get there, thus compounding Churchill's faulty strategic policies.³³

At the *Trident* Conference of May, 1943, the second Anglo-American meeting in Washington to discuss matters of future strategy, Churchill urged greater drive and sense of urgency in the Far Eastern theatre of war. But after the policy of appointing an Allied Supreme Commander for South-East Asia (SEAC) had been established, the question arose as to who exactly was to take on this command. That it would not be Field Marshall Wavell (promoted in rank from 1 January, 1943) was evident from Churchill's meeting with him in London, late in April, when the Prime Minister bitterly criticised Wavell's poor handling of the Arakan campaign which virtually wrote off the 14th Indian Division as a fighting force. Yet Wavell genuinely believed that he was the man for the job; after all, he had appointed Orde Wingate to assume control of all guerilla operations against the Japanese in Burma. While Wingate has been a subject for much debate and disagreement between historians, his training of 77th Indian Brigade and direction of the 'Chindits' in Operation *Longcloth* in February-March 1943, provided a much-needed propaganda success against the Japanese, despite all the hardship and sacrifice involved in this unorthodox long-range penetration.³⁴ It was Wavell who had backed the Chindit operation and had sanctioned it in the first place and since he knew that Churchill apparently professed complete confidence in him, he assumed he was to be appointed Supreme Commander. Churchill, however, was dissembling and had decided to shunt him sideways, effectively ending his army career. He went off to be Viceroy of India with Auchinleck as C-in-C while Churchill revealed his choices to the Americans at the *Quadrant* (Quebec) Conference in August, 1943: 'It has been decided to appoint Mountbatten C. in C. of S.E. Asia Command with Wingate as a good second,' noted Oliver Harvey. 'People here are doubtful of M.[ountbatten] being up to this, but the P.M. and the Americans are het up on it. Mountbatten-Wingate is at least a refreshing contrast to Wavell-Auchinleck.'³⁵ These were exactly the kind of people Churchill encouraged and supported – unorthodox, maverick and outside the normal military establishment. Mountbatten certainly had energy and charm; appointed Chief of Combined Operations in April 1942 by Churchill, he was promoted Vice-Admiral and held the equivalent rank in the other two services. Additionally, Churchill also made him a *de facto* member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee which, for a young man, was an extraordinarily powerful position. Despite his part in mounting the tragic and costly Dieppe Raid (Operation *Jubilee*) of 19 August 1942, over which there is still much debate,³⁶ upon becoming Supreme Commander of SEAC he was promoted to acting Admiral – the youngest ever in the history of the Royal Navy.

Brooke had his doubts about Mountbatten, noting that 'He will require a very efficient Chief of Staff to pull him through!'³⁷ In fact, the steady influence of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall

was brought to bear by Alanbrooke with Churchill's agreement. Pownall had retained the Prime Minister's approval, despite being successively Chief of Staff to Gort and Wavell and, indeed, was one of the special advisers to the Prime Minister as he was writing his six-volume history of the Second World War. Although their relationship was not always entirely cordial, Pownall remained a loyal colleague and ran Mountbatten's HQ with great competence; he was, however, deeply critical of Wingate, whom he thought 'abnormal' especially when, unable to get his own way, he occasionally threatened to wire the Prime Minister directly.³⁸ After Wingate's death in an air crash in March 1944, he did not change his mind although Churchill without doubt felt this loss keenly, informing Mountbatten that he was 'deeply grieved and stricken' by the news and later famously referring to Wingate as 'a man of genius who might well have become also a man of destiny.'³⁹

On balance, Churchill's choice of first line commanders may at times have been capricious, as in his championing of Mountbatten and Wingate but it was usually grounded in a solid amalgam of political necessity and military needs. Mountbatten, for example, as head of Combined Operations seemed to have sound credentials as Supreme Commander when the British Chiefs of Staff and Churchill were thinking in terms of seaborne landings to take Akyab and Rangoon or the northern tip of Sumatra.⁴⁰ It could be argued that Churchill, driven by personal predilections, stuck by some of his favourites too long. Admiral Sir Roger Keyes whom he had appointed as Mountbatten's predecessor in August 1940 out of 'loyalty and affection' and in doing so 'much angered the younger men in the navy',⁴¹ was only sacked by him with great reluctance after Keyes had proved himself unable to work with the Chiefs of Staff. Conversely, General Slim was largely overlooked by Churchill when, as Commander of the Fourteenth Army he recaptured Burma and did not meet the Prime Minister until the summer of 1945. In Churchill's eyes, it was Alexander who had delivered the army out of Burma during the long fighting retreat of 1942, Wingate who had regenerated and inspired it in 1943-1944 and Mountbatten with Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese who had planned and executed the destruction of the Japanese forces in 1945. In fact, Leese, GOC Eighth Army, Italy, who was appointed C-in-C Allied Forces South East Asia in November, 1944, did not get on with Mountbatten and was relieved of his command in July 1945. Three months earlier, however, Churchill wrote to his wife: 'the advances have been wonderful...and Dicky, reinforced by General Oliver Leese, has done wonders in Burma.'⁴² There was no mention of Slim and, as has been observed, 'he had not been one of Churchill's generals.'⁴³ Escaping popular recognition until the publication of his *Defeat into Victory* in 1956, it was quite another thing when Britain's wartime leader knew so little of him. The reason was probably that until late 1944 Slim had very limited success and it was easier to attribute later victories to men newly appointed – Mountbatten and Leese. Moreover, Slim did not come from the usual social background of Churchill's generals; his father was a Birmingham ironmonger and he had been brought up in a lower middle class family in Birmingham. To give Churchill his due, however, when he eventually recognised Slim's qualities he made him C-in-C Allied Land Forces in South East Asia in July 1945, rather late in the day it is true but the appointment was secured.

There is no doubt that Churchill interfered – at times too much – in his generals' conduct of campaigns. Auchinleck was, for example, hounded to defend Tobruk which he thought indefensible and was denied flexibility in planning by the Prime Minister's obdurate pressure. The result was nearly 35,000 British, Indian and South African troops taken prisoner, public opinion gravely disturbed at home and Churchill's government faced a Vote of Censure in the House of Commons. But as Prime Minister Churchill had, of course, wider considerations than the day-to-day conduct of the war – though he took an extraordinarily detailed interest in that too. At this time he needed a success to reverse the dismal roll call of Allied (and especially British) reverses, not least to keep Russia in the war and fend off the challenge for 'Second Front Now.' He got it, eventually, at El Alamein. but his interference often stemmed from considerations other than those dictated by military belief and necessity.

When it comes to considering how far Churchill's judgement was superior to that of his generals, we must remember that he had one priceless asset. That was intelligence, offered him by Bletchley Park's cracking of the Enigma codes, resulting in a stream of 'Ultra' material, which Churchill referred habitually to as 'Boniface.' For nearly thirty years following World War Two, this was the missing dimension in writing about the period and it was only following the publication of Group Captain

Winterbotham's *The Ultra Secret*, in 1974, that historians were able to add in this vital ingredient.⁴⁴ One of the results has been a more rounded appraisal of Churchill's judgement in conducting the war. Unlike President Roosevelt, he wholeheartedly embraced Ultra and 'Sigint' (signals intelligence) information, although making no mention whatsoever of this in any volume of his war memoirs – which was in keeping with (the then) official secrecy of an absolute and lifelong ban on any form of disclosure.

Churchill took great pains to protect Ultra and Sigint information. Decrypts were revealed only to a handful of his Ministerial colleagues and Special Liaison Units were set up to pass Ultra to commanders in the field.⁴⁵ But Churchill, at home or abroad, insisted on reading for himself the original and most important intelligence information (including Ultra) and forming his own opinions on the material they divulged. This caused the British Chiefs of Staff many headaches for when the Prime Minister received decrypts directly from Bletchley Park, who was to intercede with competent military advice that would enable him to evaluate them correctly? Consequently, we can now see that Churchill's constant pressure on Wavell and Auchinleck to move urgently against Rommel in the Western Desert was based on a misreading from British intercepts of Enigma and Sigint signals. Rommel, who really was short of virtually everything in the desert, in trying to gain what he really needed constantly over-emphasised his demands for transport, supplies, ammunition, troops, aircraft and stores. But Churchill thought Ultra had revealed Rommel, on numerous occasions, to be in a truly parlous position and drove his generals on to precipitate action that they knew, from other more mundane sources, to be inadvisable and sometimes impossible.⁴⁶ Thus, Auchinleck saved the 44th Division from disastrous casualties in August, 1942 but put another nail in his coffin and was removed shortly afterwards. Montgomery suffering from just the same kind of pressure was able to stand up to it, partly through his temperament and partly as the victor of El Alamein. The possession of Ultra and Sigint information, therefore, was a two-edged sword so far as Churchill's generals were concerned. On the one hand, it provided them with priceless information as to the enemy's intentions but on the other allowed their chief to hound them unmercifully when he considered they were not pursuing the enemy with all urgency.

We have not been concerned here, other than in the case of Mountbatten, to examine Churchill's relationships with his naval commanders nor with the Royal Air Force, though much of what we have seen, above, can equally be applied to them. When all is said and done, however, Churchill conducted his war very differently from Hitler. Despite his many and undoubted faults, Churchill was clearly possessed of an unshakeable inner moral courage. Though he infuriated, frustrated and exhausted the members of his 'Secret Circle' and badgered his commanders unmercifully when they deserved it – and when they did not – ultimately he listened to what they had to say before making far-reaching decisions. Hitler, on the other hand, imprisoned and executed his commanders and took direct command of his armies in December 1941, with disastrous results. Churchill was well served by those closest to him; despite all the wild demands, the condemnation of his commanders in the field, the offensive comments and signals, none resigned – though his Chiefs of Staff came close to it in 1944 over Far Eastern strategy.⁴⁷ While Hitler debased the human condition Churchill above all ensured Britain's survival and then victory by 'a just exercise of power.'⁴⁸ Ultimately it is this that underpins our understanding of Churchill's conduct and direction of Britain at war between 1940 and 1945 and explains why he was simply irreplaceable.

NOTES

- 1 Quote from *Chips: The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon*, ed. Robert Rhodes James (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p.299, diary entry for 10 April, 1941.
- 2 Winston S. Churchill. *The Second World War, Volume I, The Gathering Storm* (Cassell, 1948), pp.526-7.
- 3 The first two volumes were largely written by Gilbert but carried the name of Churchill's son, Randolph, as the main author. When Randolph died in 1968 Gilbert took over the whole biographical project. Churchill's papers are now housed by the Sir Winston Churchill Archives Trust at the Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge. All 2,185 boxes have recently been completely catalogued and there is a useful

website, http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/churchill_papers/home.shtml, where a catalogue is available in a pilot internet version, as well as other information about Churchill, including a short biography, at http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/churchill_papers/biography/. See also Martin Gilbert, *In Search of Churchill: A Historian's Journey* (HarperCollins, 1994)

- 4 See David Brown, 'Norway 1940: the balance of interference,' in Patrick Salmon (ed), *Britain & Norway in the Second World War* (HMSO, 1995); also François Kersaudy, *Norway 1940* (Collins, 1990), esp. Ch.1, '...it must also be borne in mind that, with the exception of Winston Churchill, the War Cabinet ministers had not the slightest notion of strategy, and they knew it; as for Churchill's notions, they were highly imperfect – and he did not know it.'
- 5 Clive Ponting, *1940: Myth and Reality* (Hamish Hamilton, 1990), p.69.
- 6 *The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay* (Heinemann, 1960), p.159.
- 7 A typical laudatory view of Churchill can be read in Isaiah Berlin, *Mr Churchill in 1940* (John Murray, n.d. [1964]); see also John Ramsden, 'How Winston Churchill Became "The Greatest Living Englishman"', *Contemporary British History*, 12 (Autumn, 1998), 3, pp.1-40. For an early dissenting view see R.W. Thompson, *Generalissimo Churchill* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1973) and for more recent heavily revisionist views, which have themselves been questioned, see John Charmley, *Churchill: The End of Glory: A political biography* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1993), and his *Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-57* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1995) and notoriously, David Irving, *Churchill's War. Vol 1, The Struggle for Power* (Veritas, 1987) and *Vol 2, Triumph in Adversity* (Focal Point, 1994). A balanced, judicious, recent volume on Churchill that makes available many different facets of his life in well-organised themes is Ian S. Wood, *Churchill* (British History in Perspective Series), (Macmillan, 2000) but the best selling Roy Jenkins, *Churchill* (Macmillan, 2001) seems to be more about the author than his subject. Of the many older works it is a matter of personal choice. Henry Pelling, *Churchill* (Macmillan, 1974), is particularly valuable.
- 8 Brown, op.cit., p.26.
- 9 Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, *A Sailor's Odyssey* (Hutchinson, 1951), p.231.
- 10 Alex Danchev, *Very Special Relationship: Field Marshall Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance 1941-1944* (Brassey's, 1986), pp.10-11.
- 11 Quoted by Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, *War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001). This volume is absolutely essential for any student of the period and a very great advance on Sir Arthur Bryant's *The Turn of the Tide 1939-1943* and *Triumph in the West 1943-1946* (Collins, 1957, 1959), which emasculated the Alanbrooke diaries. See also David Fraser, *Alanbrooke* (Collins, 1982).
- 12 Colonel Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly (eds), *The Ironside Diaries 1937-1940* (Constable, 1962), p.335.
- 13 Brian Bond, 'Gort' in John Keegan (ed), *Churchill's Generals* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991). Gort is portrayed more favourably in Brian Bond (ed), *Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, Volume One 1933-1940 and Volume Two 1940-1944* (Leo Cooper, 1972 and 1974). Pownall was Gort's Chief of Staff and complained in his diaries about 'impossible' orders received by Gort from Churchill.
- 14 Quoted by Ronald Lewin, *The Chief: Field Marshall Lord Wavell, Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy, 1939-1947* (Hutchinson, 1980), p.43.
- 15 See Correlli Barnett, *The Desert Generals* (William Kimber, 1960); Barrie Pitt, *The Crucible of War: Western Desert 1941* (Jonathan Cape, 1980).
- 16 Quoted by Michael Carver, 'Churchill and the Defence Chiefs,' in Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (eds), *Churchill* (O.U.P., 1993), p. 363.
- 17 John Colville, *The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), p. 404, diary entry for 21 June, 1941.
- 18 See Barnett, op.cit., p.73.
- 19 The full and lengthy letter is quoted by John Connell, *Auchinleck: A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck* (Cassell, 1959), p.247.
- 20 Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, p.241, diary entry for 24 March, 1942.
- 21 B.H. Liddell Hart (ed), *The Rommel Papers* (Collins, 1953), p.261.
- 22 Nigel Nicolson (ed), *Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters 1939-1945*, (Collins, 1967), p.259, diary entry for 6 November, 1942.

- 23 John Harvey (ed), *The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1941-1945* (Collins, 1978), p.147, diary entry for 7 August, 1942. Churchill wanted to offer Gott command of the Eighth Army and when Brooke opposed this, offered it to him instead. Brooke was tempted but knew that his real duty was to remain as CIGS and so Gott flew out to North Africa, only to meet with an untimely death.
- 24 Martin Gilbert, *Winston Churchill: Volume VII, Road to Victory 1941-1945* (Heinemann, 1986), p.254, Mansion House Speech, 10 November, 1942.
- 25 Harvey, op.cit., p.147, diary entry for 7 August, 1942; 'Some Notes by General Taker,' 6 October 1945. Taker Papers, 71/21/6, Imperial War Museum. Taker was Commander of 4th Indian Division in the Western Desert. A less savage assessment of Alexander can be found by Brian Holden Reid, 'Alexander', Keegan, op.cit., Ch.6.
- 26 For the Tunisian campaign see Bruce Allen Watson, *Exit Rommel: The Tunisian Campaign 1942-1943* (Praeger, Westport, CT, 1999) and David Rolf, *The Bloody Road to Tunis: Destruction of the Axis Forces in North Africa November 1942-May 1943* (Greenhill, 2001).
- 27 Alan Moorehead, *Montgomery: A Biography* (Hamish Hamilton, 1946), p.158.
- 28 See *The Memoirs of Field Marshall the Viscount Montgomery* (Collins, 1958); *Normandy to the Baltic* (Hutchinson, n.d. [1947]); *El Alamein to the River Sangro* (Hutchinson, 1948). Also Ronald Lewin, *Montgomery as Military Commander* (Batsford, 1971); Brian Holden Reid, 'The Italian Campaign, 1943-45: A Reappraisal of Allied Generalship,' in *Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War*, ed. John Gooch (Frank Cass, 1990); Richard Lamb, *Montgomery in Europe 1943-45: Success or Failure?* (Buchan & Enright, 1983); Carlo d'Este, *Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign* (Collins, 1983).
- 29 Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, p.215, entry for 29 December, 1941,
- 30 Quoted by Lewin, *The Chief*, p.155.
- 31 Bond (ed.), *Chief of Staff, Volume Two*, p.76, diary entry by Pownall for 8 January, 1942.
- 32 Quoted by Nigel Nicolson, *Alex: The Life of Field Marshall Earl Alexander of Tunis* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p.149.
- 33 See W.G.F. Jackson, *Alexander of Tunis as Military Commander* (Batsford, 1971), pp.324-5. Brooke noted in his diary on 22 June 1944, '...a long and painful evening listening to Winston's strategic ravings!..[he was] supporting Alexander's advance on Vienna....', *War Diaries*, pp.561-2.
- 34 The most satisfactory biography is by Trevor Royle, *Orde Wingate: Irregular Soldier* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995). A volume that seeks to rescue Wingate's reputation from the official historian, Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan, Volume III, The Decisive Battles* (HMSO, 1962) is by David Rooney, *Wingate and the Chindits: Redressing the Balance* (Arms and Armour Press, 1994), esp. Ch. 10 and see also John W. Gordon, 'Wingate' in Keegan, op.cit. Ch. 15.
- 35 *War Diaries of Oliver Harvey*, p.286, diary entry for 24 August, 1943.
- 36 See Brian Loring Villa, *Unauthorised Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid* (OUP, 1989)
- 37 Alanbrooke, *War Diaries*, p. 437, entry for 6 August, 1943.
- 38 Bond (ed), *Chief of Staff, Volume Two*, p.112, diary entry by Pownall for 17 October 1943.
- 39 Quoted by Gilbert, *Churchill: Road to Victory*, p.717 and *The Dawn of Liberation: War Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill 1944*, compiled by Charles Eade (Cassell, 1945), p. 145, Churchill's speech to the House of Commons, 2 August, 1944.
- 40 Louis Allen, *Burma: The Longest War 1941-45* (Phoenix edn., 1998), p.156.
- 41 Colville, op.cit., p.234, diary entry for 31 August, 1940.
- 42 Quoted by Gilbert, *Road to Victory*, p.1283, letter of 6 April 1945.
- 43 Duncan Anderson, 'Slim' in Keegan, op.cit., Ch.16, on which much of my analysis is based. See also the rather uncritical Ronald Lewin, *Slim: The Standardbearer* (Leo Cooper, 1976) and Geoffrey Evans. *Slim as Military Commander* (Batsford, 1979). Slim's own *Defeat into Victory* was published by Cassell and was immensely successful.
- 44 F.W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974); see also Ronald Lewin. *Ultra Goes to War: The Secret Story* (Hutchinson, 1978), Ralph Bennett, *Ultra in the West: the Normandy Campaign, 1944-45* (Hutchinson, 1979) and *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy 1941-1945* (Hamish Hamilton, 1989), Michael Smith and Ralph Erskine (eds), *Action This Day* (Bantam, 2001). The standard work is F.H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations* (4 parts in 3 volumes, later volumes with others, HMSO 1979-1990), F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, *British Intelligence in the*

Second World War, Volume 4: Security and Counter-Intelligence, (HMSO, 1990), Michael Howard, *British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 5: Strategic Deception* (HMSO, 1990).

45 Christopher Andrew, 'Bletchley Park in Pre-War Perspective,' in Smith and Erskine (eds), *op.cit.*, p.5.

46 Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War*, p.191

47 A useful summing up is by Ronald Lewin, *Churchill as Warlord* (Batsford, 1973), Ch.11.

48 Quoted by John Strawson, *Churchill and Hitler in Victory and Defeat* (Constable, 1997), p.501. The phrase was coined by his son, Randolph Churchill. See Ch. 11 for an interesting comparison of Churchill and Hitler as military leaders and statesmen.

Reviews and Perspectives

Hitler and the Historians

Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris

Ian Kershaw

Penguin

£12.99

Pbk 1998

ISBN 0 14 028898 8

Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis

Ian Kershaw

Penguin

£10.99

Pbk 2000

ISBN 0 14 027239 9

Since Napoleon, philosophers and historians have wrestled with the issues provoked by the contemplation of the role of the individual in History. What place must be given to free will? What is the relative weight of individual genius? In *War and Peace*, Tolstoy asserted a dialectical treatment of the antagonistic forces of free will and determination:

"Man consciously lives for himself; but at the same time, he serves as an unconscious instrument for the accomplishment of historical and social ends.. when a man's activity coincides with others... it acquires historical significance. The higher a man stands on the social ladder, the more men he is connected with, the greater the influence he exerts over others – the more evident is the predestined and unavoidable necessity of his every action.. the King is the slave of history."

Historians' attempts to explain Hitler reflect these tensions. At one extreme we have the determinist view of Hitler, the tool of German capitalism, an image encapsulated in the photomontage, *The Meaning of the Hitler Salute*, created by the Stalinist John Heartfield. At the other, there is the intense and persistent fixation of a succession of writers on Hitler's personality, his psyche, his sexuality.. or lack of it, as an explanation of his actions.

In *Napoleon: For and Against*, the Dutch historian Pieter Geyl, surveyed one hundred and fifty years of writing on the great man, finding that: *"History is indeed an argument without end."* What will a successor to Geyl, writing a century hence, have to say in *Hitler: For and Against*? Such a study will certainly emphasise the importance of two British biographers of Hitler, Alan Bullock and Ian Kershaw.

If not in the front line, Bullock was an active participant in the war against Nazism, helping to build up the network of Allied broadcasts to Occupied Europe. Kershaw is a child of Hitler's war, the son of a fitter who helped tool up Lancaster bombers for raids on the Ruhr.

Both men are superstars. In conversation with Ron Rosenbaum, author of the eccentric, overlong but entertaining *Explaining Hitler* (Papermac 1999), Bullock estimated sales of his *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* at three million copies. Kershaw's two-volume biography remains firmly entrenched as a global best seller, with the author in constant demand as a lecturer.

Bullock came from a classical background to write his Hitler biography in the early 1950s; viewing Hitler as a modern form of classical tyranny. His work was given a particularly enthusiastic welcome by the formidable figure of Sir Lewis Namier. Bullock's 730 pages seemed to confirm to Namier many of his deeply held views on the German people, on the German national character.

Reviewing Bullock in *The Listener* (the essay is reprinted in Namier's *Personalities and Powers*, London 1955) he noted Hitler's talents as persuader, demagogue and leader of a mass movement:

"And it was again on the masses that Hitler drew: what was worst in the Germans, their hatreds and resentments, their envy and cruelty, their brutality and adoration of force, he focused and radiated back to them... he was the Prophet of the possessed; and interchange there was between him and them, unknown between any other political leader and his followers. This is the outstanding fact about Hitler and the Third Reich." (Lewis Namier, *Personalities and Powers*, London 1955, p143)

While Hitler was *"jobbed into office by a backstairs intrigue"*, *"as part of a shoddy political deal*

with the 'old gang'" (Alan Bullock, *Hitler*, London 1952, 1974 Edition, p253), Namier noted that "millions of non-Nazis showed no moral repugnance to him and his methods." (Namier, op cit p143)

Nigh on half a century later, the limits and inadequacies of such an approach to a biography of Hitler are pointed up by the work of Kershaw. He brings the rigour and craft of his apprenticeship as a medievalist to Hitler studies. But in addition, Kershaw is trained in sociology. Max Weber is his lodestar. This enables him to synthesise the conscious actions of Hitler the individual, with, in Tolstoy's phrase, "the men he is connected with."

How did such a social misfit, a crushing bore and lie-abed, with bad teeth and halitosis (Kershaw, *Nemesis* p222) come to exercise such enormous power and dominance over the German people? Kershaw's explanation is rooted in the 'functionalist' school of History, focussing on the institutions and networks of the Third Reich.

Kershaw thus puts the 'intentionalists' to the sword. These are mainly historians of the older generation. At the crudest level, an 'intentionalist' views the Nazi state as the implementation of Hitler's worldview. Deploying a vast amount of scholarship and sources, Kershaw subjects the Fuhrer's lifestyle, leadership and decision-making to immensely detailed analysis. He sweeps away the myth created by Hitler and his closest circle of an omniscient Fuhrer.

In actuality, Hitler was chronically idle. Grandiose architectural projects and compulsive viewing of schmaltzy movies were as important to him as affairs of state. He rarely surfaced before mid-day and a leisurely work pattern ensued. (Kershaw *Nemesis*, pp32-33) Chaos and gross inefficiency thus came to characterise the Nazi regime. But as Kershaw and Michael Burleigh (refer the *Third Reich: A New History*, Palgrave, 2000) both point out, this very chaos suited Hitler. The absence of a system of governance with clearly-defined channels of communication maximised the Fuhrer's personal power. His assent (he rarely signed documents) was essential.

Historians of the 'smoking gun' approach thus search in vain for Hitler's scrawl authorising crucial decisions, in particular the launching of 'The Final Solution'. This was not Hitler's style. Instead he set the agenda. A relentless babbler, his fixations and obsessions were after all obvious to his network of confidants. Rival Nazi notables then jockeyed for position and the Fuhrer's favour by advancing ever more radical policies in tune with his key ideas. A process of "cumulative radicalisation" was the result. From a scratch to gangrene, the Hitler state hurtled towards oblivion.

While Bullock had little grounding in German history before writing *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, Kershaw, from the early 1980s, was "working towards Hitler". A series of monographs and essays prepared him for the huge task of the biographical volumes. Clear evidence of his arrival as the British authority on the Third Reich came in 1997 when he acted as historical adviser to BBC tv's "The Nazis: a Warning from History."

These broadcasts and the supporting text by Laurence Rees (BBC Books 1997) bear the stamp of Kershaw's interpretation of Nazi history, particularly the concept of "Chaos and consent."

Two key testimonies were those of Fritz Wiedemann, one of Hitler's adjutants, and Werner Willikens, State Secretary of the Ministry of Food. Wiedemann tells of the lazybones Hitler, while Willikens is credited with coining the phrase "working towards the Fuhrer". Kershaw gives due prominence to both men in the ensuing *Hitler: Hubris*. The professor thus elevated these two minor Nazis to the status of the 'Stalybridge gingerbread vendors' of Nazi Germany. Over forty years ago, EH Carr introduced his listeners to the significance of the gingerbread vendor in the lectures that formed the text of *What is History?*; the staple fare of many a mercifully long-forgotten History tutorial.

Wiedemann and Willikens were small fry, not even worthy of a quiet hanging in the post-1945 roundup of Nazi war criminals. Yet these functionaries, obscure until discovered by Kershaw, are essential to his 'functionalist' dynamic. From an analysis of their testimonies Kershaw has constructed an explanation of how the greatest crimes of Hitler's regime were possible. It confirms the importance of radicals winning the war for Hitler's ear – Goebbels whispered "Do it", Kristallnacht followed; the dimwitted Ribbentrop plunged Germany into "the wrong war" and the fanatics Himmler and Heydrich willed the Final Solution. The moderate Goering [or is this an oxymoron?] was increasingly marginalised.

No one can detract from the monumentality of Kershaw's work. It displays the liberal values of

historical scholarship at their very best. Yet it is with his 'gingerbread vendors' that a nagging doubt begins. It is rather like looking at a Diego Rivera mural. Initially one is overwhelmed by the power and the passion, then flaws are spotted. The doubts accumulate....

It is then, instructive to turn to the writing of the other 'big hitter' among British historians of Nazi Germany, Michael Burleigh. He has persuasively argued that:

"What has been increasingly elevated into the explanatory master-key of Nazi rule, namely the mutually radicalising effects of competing agencies, may be both insufficient and less remarkable, as an explanation for the single mindedness with which Nazis went about realising their ideological goals." (Burleigh, op cit, p156)

In Geyl's phrase, History is thus "argument without end", a ceaseless polemical war dance performed by its practitioners. As he wrote the final sentence of *Nemesis*, had Kershaw promised himself a new gardening project or the purchase of a Sheffield United season ticket? Given the latter, perhaps a return to argument without end with one's peers is not too daunting an option. Teachers and students of History await with interest the next decade of his labours.

RON GRANT

Stalin and Khrushchev: the USSR 1924-64

Michael Lynch

Hodder £6.99 Pbk 153pp 2001 [2nd Ed] ISBN 0 340 78144 0

These *Access to History* books do certainly give everything a very clear outline! Although this is a book on Stalin; right from the start we are straight into the key issues of the nature of the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917. This lets us see just how you can approach a study of Stalin's later work once he was in power. Did he betray the revolution or fulfill its very ideals? We therefore have early scene-setting sections on the political, social and economic nature of the early Bolsheviks in power.. certainly valuable stuff for the 'Did the Bolsheviks impose a new identity...?' essay for Higher.

The section on Stalin's rise to power includes a readable two page biographic analysis of Stalin's personality and upbringing, before going on to a clear summary of the key ideas and issues needing to be addressed in his rise. Comments like 'The basis of Stalin's power had been laid before Lenin's death.' or 'Stalin may have lacked brilliance but he did not lack ability' or 'Stalin won because Trotsky lacked a power base' all demonstrate how good Lynch is at these nuggetty little summaries, and equally provide good topics for seminar discussion or essay titles!

If there is a danger.. and I've seen it remarked upon before by other reviewers for other titles in this series; these *Access* books are just a little too neat at providing ALL the main headings needed to be dealt with in many an Advanced Higher dissertation title. Through those devilish summary charts, they provide almost a ready made plan.. and indeed, the text then provides most of the source references! I fear I can see the day when some enterprising yet shameless candidate's dissertation plan on their NAB will simply read, *See Lynch pages....!!*

As far as further chapters go; they follow the same pattern of including a reasonable selection of mainstream sources inserted in the text.. and occasional references to historians. The thing is certainly not top-heavy on historians [cf. Kowalski's *The Russian Revolution*, where just about every point he makes is cross-referenced to the titles of about three other authorities!].

Chapter 3 on economic changes rightly shows how important economic factors were in underpinning the entire development of the Stalin's re-structuring of Russian society. Changes in industry and agriculture were fundamental to Stalin's view on how to a truly socialist society should develop, as what became known as 'the second revolution' or 'the revolution from above' took place. Lynch mentions that Stalin's economic policies – being state run and coordinated therefore 'stood Marxist theory on its head.' Now, while I've seen that claim made about Lenin's NEP [which restored a semi-capitalist economy within a so-called socialist state], I'm not that convinced about it being used on the 5 year plans and collectivisation of agriculture. I can't help feeling that centralized policy making and control [whilst admittedly against Marx's hopes for a governmentless society] nevertheless are

still a part of the true spirit trying to guarantee a socialist state in practice. There is nothing axiomatic in Marxism that says that an economy should be allowed to develop at its own pace... just that the political superstructure should reflect underlying economic factors. Why shouldn't Stalin's government, on behalf of the toiling masses, seek to control the speed, direction and effectiveness of their toiling? Why is that turning Marxism on its head?

Lynch offers a fairly pessimistic all round account of collectivisation; and is equally critical of the five year plans.. *'real planning was the key element missing from the First Five Year Plan.'* There is a good section on the Soviet war time economy and the Soviet union's *'prodigious response'*, leading to the view that the war both reinforced Stalin's paranoia against western influences, and convinced him further that the Soviet economic approach was the right one. This effectively meant no relaxation of the old pre-war, 'war-time economy in peace time' approach. Russia in the 1940s and 50's was therefore going to get more of the same as the 30's. In essence this meant a continuation in unbalanced economic growth for heavy industry, pretty well nil production of consumer goods, and a continuation of a crucified peasantry who were under-invested yet still expected to carry the economic burden.

The chapter on the Purges is full and detailed, following them through their different levels [from the early 'house-keeping' purges, through personal [Kirov *et al*], political, military etc] and putting each in perspective.

Chapter 5, on international relations, once again starts with a discussion of Lenin's views and pragmatism in foreign affairs, and shows what he handed on to Stalin... guiding principles of *'compromise and survival.'* The early parts of this long chapter go through relations with Britain and the west, Stalin's misguided role over China, his constant misreading of the situation over the rise of Nazism and the paradox of Soviet Russia's role in the Spanish Civil War. The sections on Munich and appeasement, the Nazi-Soviet pact *'which seemed to defy history and logic'*, the Grand Alliance and then the drift into the Cold War, all get a clear airing. Perhaps not as many other historians' views as I would put into my class notes, but a clear account and analysis all the same.

As the title demanded something on Khrushchev, he gets chapter 6. It asks what legacy Stalin passed on to him. There is a reasonable profile on Khrushchev and his background, plenty of detail on the power struggle, then a good section on de-Stalinisation covering both its motives and impact. The section on Khrushchev's economic policies continues the depressing story of the USSR being unable to make anything out of its economic resources but once again falling for their own propaganda on the value of grandiose schemes. The second half of the chapter gives a reasonable analysis of foreign policy issues, including the Berlin Wall, Cuban Missile Crisis and relations with China. The book ends with some telling perspectives quoted from Volkogonov, then with the pessimistic judgement that by the time of Khrushchev's removal in 1964, *"in those 40 years since Lenin's death, little had changed."* Quite a sad epitaph.

It's difficult to see how you can do without this sort of book at Advanced Higher. It's succinct but with enough depth to avoid the accusation of being skimpy, it's readable and tells a logical story, it breaks the topic down into rational issues as its section headings, and it then makes an attempt to offer assessment items of different types and levels of difficulty to see whether the candidate's study has been worthwhile.

ANDREW HUNT

The Scottish Empire

Michael Fry

Tuckwell Press & Birlinn

£30

580pp

Hbk

2001

ISBN 1 86232 185 X

This was one of the few history books to make the news rather than just the reviews recently when the news pages and letters columns of the Herald picked up on a sharply critical review by Tom Devine. The word is that the “Darth Vader of Scottish History” (anon. but definitely not Michael Lynch) is himself working on a book about Scottish emigration and/or Scotland’s imperial role, and that Fry had either stolen a march or spoil the pitch depending on your point of view. It is difficult to cast Fry in the role of a returning Jedi Knight in ‘The Scottish Empire Strikes Back’ but it certainly wasn’t the attack of the clones when the irrepressibly left-wing Scottish republican James D. Young sprang to the defence of his erstwhile right-wing sparring partner and Tory columnist Fry. But, true to form, Young was more intent on attacking the ‘unionist’ Devine’s best-selling *Scottish Nation 1700-2000* for allegedly playing down the Clearances and ignoring the Scots role in the slave trade than on defending the Tory nationalist Fry’s book (Fry is an even bigger revisionist when it comes to the Clearances and his book hasn’t got much to say about the slave trade either). The spurtle was back in the political porage when Alex Salmond reviewed Fry’s book for *Scotland on Sunday*. He had evidently enjoyed the tales of Scots world-wide derring-do and enterprise but was critical of Fry’s nostalgic tone.

There is no doubt this is a fascinating book and of particular interest to those doing the *Immigrants and Exiles* unit at Higher and/or Intermediate. Fry has immersed himself in a wide range of mainly secondary source material (one of Devine’s criticisms is the lack of original research; another being that Fry doesn’t deal with the role and contribution of ordinary Scots emigrants). It is also well written, each chapter starting with an inspirational or cautionary tale of Scots imperial triumph or disaster, achievement or atrocity. One particularly striking example is at the start of chapter 31 and concerns the Scots role in African Colonisation. In 1915, while hundreds of thousands of Scots were involved elsewhere in ‘the war to end wars’, William Livingstone, a kinsman of the famous anti-slavery missionary/explorer and manager of the biggest plantation in Nyasaland (itself owned by David Livingstone’s grandson), and another Scots manager of a neighbouring plantation were killed by native Africans inspired by the preaching of their black African minister, Rev John Chilembwe, educated by the Free Church and imbued with its egalitarian principles but frustrated by European treatment of blacks. The British response was swift and predictable; Chilembwe was killed, his church blown up and 20 of his followers executed.

While Fry does not try to hide the darkness at the heart of empire, and Scotland’s role as partner (of which he seems quite proud) rather than victim, he does try to have his Scottish cake as well as eating his empire biscuit. His thesis is that, while Scotland and the Scots played a disproportionate role in the British Empire, their preference was generally for a (less destructive, more benign/sympathetic?) commercial empire rather than an ‘English’ empire of conquest and settlement. This is the central refrain which occurs throughout the book (and which most, if not all, the more distinguished reviewers appear to have missed). It is hardly worth refuting since much of the evidence in the book itself contradicts it, and Fry can only sustain it by carefully selecting the points at which he brings it in. It would also require a detailed comparative analysis of the ‘English Empire’, if one even accepts that such distinctions are particularly meaningful, yet Fry makes almost no effort in that direction, contenting himself with assumptions and generalisations.

This brings us to what is perhaps the central problem with this topic of Scottish empire and emigration and the Scots role abroad: it is too big and complex for one book (as the reviewer found to his cost when he tried to write a text-book on the subject). In organising the great mass of material Fry proceeds chronologically through four ‘themed’ empires (Commercial, Christian, Contested, Crumbling) each sub-divided into about 10 geographical areas. There are almost inevitably significant omissions (Norman Macleod and the Scots settlement in New Zealand are mentioned, for example, but not the role of Scots in the Maori Wars) and, in order to assess the Scottish role/contribution, the comparative histories of a large number of countries and other migrant groups need to be examined, yet Fry focuses almost exclusively on the Scots. In addition he attempts, especially towards the end of the book, to assess the impact of the Empire on Scotland. This is commendable but can only be done

fairly superficially in such a wide-ranging book.

Previous books on the subject tend to fall into two categories: analytical/statistical works focusing more on emigration from the Scottish end such as the collection edited by Devine and books by Harper and Brock; or largely anecdotal works focusing on individual Scots abroad such as those by Donaldson and Hewitson. Fry's book falls more into the latter category and, although it attempts more in the way of analysis and synthesis, is less satisfactory in that respect than the collection edited by Cage whose contributors generally come from the countries concerned and are more aware of their limitations. It is, nevertheless, a useful and thought-provoking book which, by collecting together so much material on the Scots experience of empire, should help to dispel some of the hubris, myths and sheer ignorance surrounding the topic, despite the author's attempts to create some new myths of his own.

DUNCAN TOMS

The Young Oxford History of Britain and Ireland

Kenneth Morgan [Editor]

An Ancient Land – Prehistory – Vikings	Mike Corbishley	ISBN 0 19910828 5
Medieval Kingdoms – Alfred the Great – Henry VII	John Gilligham	ISBN 0 19910829 3
Crown and People – 1500-1700	Rosemary Kelly	ISBN 0 19910830 7
Empire and Industry – 1700-1900	Ian Dawson	ISBN 0 19910831 5
A Century of Change – 1900-2000	James Mason	ISBN 0 19910832 3

Oxford University Press £7.99 Pbk 75-101 pp 2001

First the moan – it is disappointing that a publisher as prestigious as OUP should refer to the monarchs of Scotland as Kings and Queens of Scotland, as it does in the royal family trees in each of the five volumes. Such a publisher should know that the correct title of the sovereign in Scotland is King or Queen of Scots.

Second the complaint – it is disheartening to read at the start of volume five, *A Century of Change*, that Queen Victoria had been on the throne for thirty seven years when she died in 1901. How can such a basic error escape correction at the several stages of proof-reading which goes on before the book is published. It does raise questions about how many other inaccuracies there are in the books. Admittedly, one may forgive the publisher for misspelling Linlithgow, abbreviated to Lithgow, but as every school child knows, Victoria holds the record for the longest reigning British sovereign. Tut, tut! Oxford!

It has to be said that I feared that the books would display only passing reference to Scotland, Wales and Ireland. After all how do you encompass the breadth of British and Irish history in about ninety pages per volume. However, I was pleasantly surprised to find many references throughout the volumes to parts of the country furth of England and that non-English examples were used, where appropriate.

In such an overview, it is easy to criticise what has been omitted. However, credit must be paid to the five authors who have provided the reader with a broad overview and sweep of British history, from the earliest beginnings to the present day. In this respect, anyone wanting to see the progression in British history would be well advised to start with this series. The books do not claim to be definitive reference works but rather act as an introduction to the reader and act as a springboard for greater exploration of themes elsewhere. For anyone considering a shot at 'Who wants to be a millionaire', there is a comprehensive list of all British Prime Ministers from Walpole to Tony Blair, as well as family trees of the sovereigns of the land(s), my criticism above notwithstanding. There is also a comprehensive index to each of the books.

Each book is self-contained and covers the specified period, alluding to the major developments of each period. It could be argued that the authors exemplify the Whig school of history, but that is a minor distraction. The books are there to provide facts, even if a few are inaccurate, not an update on

historical interpretations, as is correct for a children's book.

All of the books are lavishly illustrated with pictures and diagrams where appropriate. However, in volume four, *Empire and Industry*, there is a map showing the construction of roads in Britain in the period. Whilst the map shows Britain, the roads all stop at the Scottish border, showing that no roads were built in Scotland! Most of the volumes have what could be termed depth studies on a major theme or topic e.g. the Bayeux Tapestry, scientific discoveries in the 16th / 17th centuries, the country house etc, which give the reader the impression of what the significance of these studies was.

Perhaps I am being overly critical as the book was designed for children. So, it was put to the test of a 13 year old who reads avidly and loves history. Her comment – the books were “really interesting” and helped to “make sense of history”. So, there we are. As an adult, the books are open to criticism. From a child's standpoint they are worthwhile. Given that, it is important that OUP remove the errors from the volumes as published. Overall – one for the school library.

JIM MCGONIGLE

The Making and Breaking of the Soviet System

Chris Read

Palgrave

£13.99

259pp

Pbk 2001

ISBN 0 333 73153 0

This book sets out to and, in fact, does exactly what the title says. That this is accomplished in approximately 250 pages is no mean feat. Christopher Read manages to weave his way through the complexities of the Soviet system, clarifying the myriad of events and often distracting detail which can bombard students.

At the outset he addresses the notion of the Bolshevik Dream. The paradoxes of a peasant country married to the more complex and indeed stubbornly autocratic society have long been debated. As he considers this, Read notes how the 1860s reforms failed to ‘grasp the nettle’ (giving a real extension of representation) in the first place which allowed for dissent. Mind you he is quick to point out that establishing the so-called dream was by no means certain or established in anyone's consciousness during the period he aptly calls ‘*the innocence of inexperience*’. His evaluation of the thoughts and writings of Lenin is quite candid – he may have had the ideological vision but the father of the revolution was also aware that pragmatism would be the key to success. And so interim dictatorship became part of the evolution of the system and was built in virtually from the beginning. The false foundation had been laid. Significantly, Read highlights the vicious circle that would later occur as the system's tightening grip alienated rather than secured support.

He then considers the implications for the Soviet State and the problems in establishing a soviet system by looking at key issues during three key periods from 1917-1921. In discussing these he debunks some myths on land seizure; states that the heart of unrest was practical- jobs, hunger and only then freedom of expression; and his discussion of the Civil War summarises the main factors and gets to the essence of the conflict. As far as impact on the system goes, he notes that the Reds v Whites conflict hid a range of anti-Communist tensions which would only come to the fore in 1921. He brings the reader to the realisation that it is this stormy environment which will have a lasting effect on the evolving Soviet System. In War Communism, as in all else, Read accurately portrays the paradox of the intellectual coping with the pragmatic, making sense of the non-sense of the making of the system.

Using Evgenii Zamiatin's 1922 parable *The House of God*, Read sums up the impact of compromises made. Looking at the super-institutions he emphasises the Catch-22 of centralisation. The victim was soviet democracy which was, as he puts it, ‘*snuffed out*’. The key inhibitor at this juncture was the economy. It was the moment lost post Civil War.

And so the justification for NEP, that economic growth would be the measure of socialism's success. Read impresses on us the new beginnings with “100 flowers [being allowed] to bloom” but reminds us that there was only a toleration of those required. His appraisal of the NEP years is especially accessible summing up the economic, the cultural, the political and the personalities involved as the ‘*fully-*

fledged Soviet system was about to emerge'.

In Chapter 4 he is forthright in stating the similarities to the old regime – the 'top down' still existed and elitism surfaced with party favourites. But Read also draws our attention to the Russia/ Soviet State conflict, and the naivety of assuming that religion in Holy Russia could be easily replaced.

He then clearly addresses key questions regarding the period 1928-32 – how Soviet society buckled, how the apparatus increased, and how the political imperative was really about management not politics by this point. He affirms many of the beliefs regarding the extent of the system and the extent of the totalitarian regime under Stalin. He achieves his aims of presenting a nuanced and realistic view of Stalin. The themes of proletarian chauvinism, class dominating the issue of nationality, and the compromise of socialism in one country, all present a convincing commentary on the issues.

As he discusses high Stalinism, he describes how the main cultural and intellectual institutions were pulled closer into line. The 'how' is important, as Read, in very accessible language, leads the reader to the essence of totalitarianism, and persuasively presents all sides of the current debate that the 'New Soviet Person' cannot then be a 'Great Retreat'. It was a move forward. An interesting argument.

In a period where the mass of research can often overwhelm, for those studying the famine and terror, Read in his trademark clear manner presents up-to-date detail and the latest debates. Of special note is the clear and comprehensive account of the Purges.

For Read, persuasion of the masses in Leninist terms was limited. *'Once again the picture is one of a regime-orientated apparatus dominating a mass that was partly enthusiastic, partly indifferent and partly sullenly hostile'*. As a summary of the influence of the system it is excellent.

When Read looks at Soviet foreign policy he not only considers its defensive nature and the build up to war, but also the ideological contradictions in Soviet actions in Spain's Civil War and their eventual alliance with the west. He directs us to the practical effects of the war on the economy but more importantly assesses the impact on the system. Interestingly Read draws us back to his earlier comments when he notes that Stalin's influence on society becomes greater when he paradoxically abandons extreme methods. Here we see for the first time party institutions being mass institutions.

We have moved away from the revolution. In terms of legitimising the system, Read argues that the focus for the population would now be success on the battlefield.

Why did the soviet system collapse? For Read, the superpower was not able to cope with what it created. An educated population might accept a command economy but would never remain silent in a command society. In industry, enterprise equalled bulk and Read highlights the 'grotesque' waste which was the result. In the fields, peasants still starved. Elitism was ingrained, and influence seemed the preserve of the *nomenklatura* and the *Komsomol*. *'Comfort and privileges [are not] the ideological drive of building socialism,'* as he notes.

Read is pretty frank in his comments on the process of de-Stalinisation. He believes that Brezhnev's justification for his rule from above is less than convincing. By 1982 the last vestiges of high Stalinism had all but evaporated. In his analysis of Soviet society and its so-called system since the 1950s, he traces the changes through the convincing metaphor of a 'sleeper' who awakes at different times in the political journey. Through personal recollections, the debate over the demise of ideology is enlivened.

Dissolution is examined via the twin pillars of perestroika and glasnost and the demise of Gorbachev, and Read concludes with the presidency of Putin. While this may not yet be part of our examination it does provide useful insights into the mystery that was and is the Soviet Union and to its legacy by looking through the prism of the initial ideology that should have been its foundation.

While there may be more detailed works on specialised themes and issues, this book does something different. In a shrewd and deft manner Read offers a wider perspective on the ideological debate. It would certainly be one to have on the Advanced Higher shelf, useful for all parts of the course and in particular for dissertations. If you'll excuse the pun, it is a good read as well.

MD SHARP

Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for One World

Jo-Anne Pemberton

Pluto Press

£16.99

234pp

Pbk.

2001

ISBN 0 7453 16530

Although the title of this text may make some people instantly think ‘What has *this* to do with history?’, it is in fact a book that makes you look at and re-address the notions of political and cultural history during the strained inter-war years, amongst others. Jo-Anne Pemberton, a lecturer in Politics and International Relations, has taken the modern notions of globalization, couched in the advances of technology, and compared it with previous ideas of an interconnected world based in part on technology and ideas of cultural and economic interdependence. The scope of the text, and its close ties with specific periods of history, make it a very interesting account of our modern and postmodern world.

From the early reference to Magellan’s opening up of the global horizons to a developing Europe, through to the modern cold war and post Soviet collapse, the author delves into the notions of advancement and helps explain their relevance to historical development. The parallel movements of history and man’s technological and socio-economic advance are illustrated throughout a text rich in examples and inviting philosophical debate.

The increasing globalization of the world is dealt with not only through modern examples but also through the similar breakthroughs of technology and political development in the ‘Modern World’, a term, which can be applied from many different stages in history depending on your particular viewpoint. As the world expands culturally and technologically how do nation states deal with the issues of sovereignty and historical perspectives? If technology advances what role will man play in society, how far can advances alter our lifestyles – how much of our belief in, and reliance on, technological advance effect our judgement and how much of it is based on fantasy? If events can be explained through science and pure fact how do our perspectives of the world, and the people within it, change? Issues which have been raised throughout our past, not least in the 1930’s when science and technological advance influenced not only governmental thinking, but also national consciousness as evident in Europe in particular. This is where much of the book’s interest comes from – the historical references to the inter-war period.

The author argues, very successfully that the modern hopes for science, linked with the obvious fears, are essentially those which were raised by thinkers in the inter-war years. Quests for utopia and national unity are looked at, as are the hopes for a stable and secure world order – these are all investigated and argued. The thinking behind the League of Nations and the modern day United Nations are raised and rationalized within their historical context, as are the changes in society galvanized by technological moves.

Technological advance brings new opportunities and hopes; however at the same time it increases the opportunity for abuse on a different scale as was ultimately evident in the regimes of the mid-century European dictators. This text is a thought provoking account of the interconnected issues of technological advance, social change and historical perspective, and although it can be hard going in places, it does maintain the reader’s interest.

ROBERT ARBUCKLE

