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EDITOR: ANDREW HUNT

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Contributions, editorial correspondence and books for review should be sent to the Editor, Andrew Hunt, 35 Carrongrove Avenue, Carron, Falkirk FK2 8NG.

Correspondence about subscriptions should be sent to Robin Fish, History Department, Robert Gordon's College, Aberdeen, AB10 1FE.

Cover: Bruce v. de Bohun at Bannockburn, 23rd June 1314

Illustration taken from Tales of a Grandfather *by Sir Walter Scott (Published by Blackie, the 1924 edition)*

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

DR MICHAEL PENMAN is a Lecturer in Scottish History in the Department of History at the University of Stirling. He has published several articles on aspects of the Bruce dynasty in fourteenth-century Scotland and is the author of *The Scottish Civil War* (2002). He will publish the first detailed monograph on the reign of *David II, 1329-71* in 2003. His future research interests will include Scottish medieval piety and chivalry, Scottish historiographical reputations and a full-scale study of the reign of Robert I.

DR DAVID MOON is Reader in Modern History in the Dept of History at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow. He is a graduate of the Universities of Newcastle upon Tyne and Birmingham, and previously taught at the Universities of Texas at Austin and Newcastle. His most recent book is *The Abolition of Serfdom in Russia, 1762-1907* (Seminar Studies in History) (Longman, 2001). He is also the author two other books and several articles on the Russian peasantry and related issues. His current research is into the environmental history of Russia.

DR KEVIN McDERMOTT is Senior Lecturer in Political History at Sheffield Hallam University. He is the author of *The Czech Red Unions, 1918-1929* (1988); co-author of *The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin* (1996); co-editor of *Politics and Society under the Bolsheviks* (1999); and co-editor of *Stalin's Terror: High Politics and Mass Repression in the Soviet Union* (2003). He is currently preparing a study entitled *Stalin: The Limits of Tyranny.*

DR MARIA DOWLING is Senior Lecturer in History at St Mary's College, Strawberry Hill. She has taught at institutions in London and Budapest. Her latest publication is *Czechoslovakia,* a volume in the Brief Histories series published by Arnold (London, 2002).

DR NEIL GREGOR is Reader in Modern German History at the University of Southampton. His study *Daimler-Benz in the Third Reich* (Yale University Press, 1998) was awarded the Fraenkel Prize for Contemporary History and shortlisted for the Longman/History Today prize. He is the editor of the historiographical study. *Nazism. A Reader* (Oxford University Press, 2000), upon which the reflections in his article are based. He is the author of numerous articles on the social and cultural history of mid-century Germany and is currently writing a book entitled *War, Memory and Urban Culture: Nuremberg and the Nazi Past after 1945.*

DR JOHN WESTE graduated in 1988 from the University of Adelaide and spent 1989-1991 on a Japanese Ministry of Education Scholarship at the University of Tsukuba, Japan. Following a Phd at Cambridge, he became the 1993-95 Daiwa Research Fellow in Japanese Studies at Downing College, Cambridge. Since 1995 he has been lecturer in Japanese Studies in the Department of East Asian Studies at Durham University.

Editorial

ANDREW HUNT

Firstly and foremostly, my thanks as Editor, on behalf of all SATH members, to the six academic contributors to this issue of our Year Book. Too often I've left my thanks until the end of my piece, but my appreciation was never meant as a footnote. Over the last 15 years, the ready willingness of a wide range of academics in different specialities, to respond to my appeal to write articles has always gratified; and just occasionally surprised me. By 'surprised' I simply mean that none of them get paid for it, and the Year Book isn't a peer-assessed journal, so articles in it don't count towards the academic research points that seem to matter so much nowadays in universities. Also, you can take it as read that I've got no 'pull', so none do it as a favour to me. No, the simple fact is that altruism and professional interest win out in this case. It is due to a combination of enthusiasm, a strong sense of good will towards all those who bring young people up through the study of History, and also a concern that their area of academic expertise gets a wider airing; that all the contributors have put forward their articles.

I also want to record a note of appreciation to the reviewers. Wearing my other hat as Reviews Editor for SATH, I receive an enormous number of publisher's review copies each year to pass out to SATH's reviewers. As SATH members would know, these reviews normally get published in our twice-yearly *Resources Review*. However, some of the books, especially when they relate to Higher or Advanced Higher themes, simply intrigue the reviewers into a lengthier-than-normal review, and these deservedly find a place at the end of this Year Book. Read them, and see the quality of thinking for yourself.

This issue of the Year Book doesn't have an over-riding theme. It clearly contains articles on key areas of our upper school teaching; after all, it is difficult for me to put the needs of Advanced Higher History out of my mind! However, I've been told that there is life beyond Advanced Higher, and there are plenty more areas of historical study to stimulate our interest and thought, other than the 12 fields which, from 2004, will be in the Advanced Higher syllabus. So, I sought out a few of these and I'm glad they get a showing in this Year Book.

However, I can't escape making a few comments on Advanced Higher; and by the time this Year Book is published, candidates will have sat their 2003 Adv. Higher History examination; the third that has been offered. It seems to have bedded down fine and it's pleasing that there has been a need for little more than 'fine tuning' of a few little aspects of it, and 'prepping' people as to what the exact required routines are, in order to keep the confidence high that this is an exam that our best candidates can aspire to. The Principal Assessor's Report remains essential reading to help all presenting teachers get into the minds of the Examining Team and markers and see what it is they are expecting. Then, to help them further, the marked annotated papers eventually came out on the CD Rom to every school, and although they didn't cover every field or every grade level, a close reading of the scripts themselves plus the markers' comments gives a clear flavour or what it is that markers are looking to reward in terms of style of argument, presentation/structure and depth of detail. The next forthcoming delectable morsel that will be of absolutely invaluable assistance in preparing candidates will be the **revised** NABs, [and sources marks schemes] which should be available before next session. As with some other subjects and other levels of History [eg Int 2] the fact that the NABs originated from HSDU and yet the exams came out of SQA, meant that we started off with a degree of mismatch between the NAB expectation and the demands of the actual operational exam. Rectifying this is all in hand and the boldest of pundits [ie me] will go so far as to say that people will be pretty pleased with the way the revisions have meant that the two have been pulled into line so that the NABs now become a genuine *simulacrum* of the real paper. So, whatever else will people now think they still need to be provided with to do a good job of teaching Advanced Higher.... issuing full marks schemes, release of component marks???

After *that* Movie: recent work on the Scottish Wars of Independence, *c.*1286-*c.*1400

DR MICHAEL PENMAN

As the co-ordinator of a third-year undergraduate course on the Wars of Independence, *Scotland in the Age of Wallace and Bruce, c.1286-c.1346*, I have found the Oscar-winning film, *Braveheart* (1995) to be both a useful ice-breaker and teaching tool. Of course, Holywood's take on Blind Harry's epic poem, *The Wallace*, of *c.*1474-8, is shot through with its own layers of historical inaccuracy and contemporary agenda (and is perhaps all the more interesting to analyse in class as a result).[1] But certain of that movie's scenes are especially rewarding for students to consider, for example: Edward I's juicily cynical speech to his court about 'breeding out' the Scots and buying off their nobles with English lands; Wallace's patriotic call-to-arms to the ordinary footmen of the Scottish army while the nobles prevaricate before the battle of 'Stirling' (1297, Mel left out the bridge); and Robert Bruce's angst-ridden rant to his leprous father about Wallace's ability to inspire men whilst the Bruces politic and swap camps to back England at the battle of Falkirk (1298) so as to protect their kingship claim – 'I will never be on the wrong side again!' Above all, each of these vignettes can prompt debate about many of the key themes raised by new (post 1995-) and often revisionist research on aspects of the wars, most especially matters such as national identity, familial loyalty, propaganda and the reality of the achievements and evolving reputations of iconic figures like Longshanks, Wallace and Bruce.

Most students interested in this period continue, understandably, to prefer a military or 'Great Man' approach: the gory course of battles and guerilla wars, the arms and tactics used, and the villains and heroes who drive the narrative.[2] However, archival historians have, of late, focussed instead – and, perhaps in part, by way of a reaction to the 'Braveheart effect' – upon both the wider and finer detail of politics. Their work has challenged a number of accepted views, rescuing peripheral figures and probing the reality behind famous incidents, singular documents and even whole reigns. Such accessible studies are thus an undeniable boon in encouraging students to really *think* about this period of history. Not least, these recent publications have very often involved reassessing and building upon conclusions first presented by the seminal and still-standard work on the wars – often treated unfairly as a 'textbook' - G.W.S. Barrow's *Robert the Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland*: this student's joy has at its heart the triumph of Robert Bruce and his regime in harnessing and directing the established collective identity of significant Scots to throw off English control.[3]

Barrow's original reviewer, A.A.M. Duncan, has most recently provided exemplary proof that careful re-examination of the documents of the period can throw up many new and vital conclusions.[4] *The Kingship of the Scots* traces developments in the royal succession in the Scottish realm from the ninth century and underlines the lack of certainty and established precedent in dealing with the designation of royal heirs in that kingdom as late as the passing of Alexander III (1286) and the Maid of Norway (1290), deaths which precipitated, as most scholars now call them, the wars of Scottish Succession. The various legal paths of succession to Scotland's throne possible after 1290 prompted a crisis which Edward I was well able to exploit (and later rewrite through the manipulation of the documentary record). This period was also surely marked by far stronger tensions within Scotland between rival claimants and their supporters than acknowledged by, say, Barrow or Alan Young. The latter's study of the Comyn family *c.*1212-1314 underlines the stability brought to the Guardianships of 1286-90 by that experienced governmental dynasty but perhaps underplays their exclusive, essentially factional dominance of power.[5] Duncan's study also reveals the pragmatic manoeuvering and complex documentary appeals of the Bruce family before and during the so-called 'Great Cause' of 1291-2: the elder Bruce was among the first to submit to Edward I as Scotland's overlord (John Balliol submitted last), a reflection of his weaker claim in law.[6]

Current work is very keen to debunk the sorry reputation of Balliol – really John I of Scotland (1292-6) – known for evermore as 'Toom Tabard' as a result of his seemingly spineless capitulation to Edward I's

invasion in 1296. For some historians, Balliol is still an uninspiring character who – if not a complete puppet of the English king – was controlled by the Comyn party. But Fiona Watson, and now others, has speculated that John may have been more involved in matters than previously acknowledged. Most open to question is the accepted fact of John's removal from power in Scotland in 1295 by a council of Scottish magnates who then forged the first of many alliances with France. But Balliol's deposition could in truth be later propaganda circulated by the English – this revolution is, after all, only reported in two contemporary English chronicles – or by rival claimant Bruce when king. The treaty with France certainly played upon the Picardy lands and connections of the Balliol family – with John's heir, Edward, promised a French royal marriage (a match he may later have traded in favour of an Italian noblewoman). The Balliol family still await the full published study of their lordship in England, Scotland and France which they deserve.[7]

Balliol's removal from the kingdom together with the realm's records, the inaugural stone of Scone[8] and other relics, left many of his subjects with a difficult choice – to submit or to fight, and, if the latter, what to fight for? Again, Fiona Watson has emphasised the fledgling nature of national identity at this time.[9] Most medieval Scots, if they fought the English forces *c.*1296-1304, did so for the return and restoration of their rightful king rather than the preservation of their own independent kingdom and its institutions: without the possibility of the king's return the collective resolve of the community of the realm crumbled quickly in 1303-4.

Scholarly studies of individual magnate kindreds or localities have also revealed the complex interaction of factors which determined just who fought for whom or sat on the fence, and when. Geography, past familial and marital associations, land-holding patterns, historic or opportunistic local rivalries and – above all – pragmatism, ambition, luck and fate determined the loyalties and actions of laymen of rank, not simply any growing or predominant sense of Scottishness or Englishness. Thus for some it was easy: the earls of March or Dunbar sided with England from the first because of their proximity to the border and their ancient English heritage and lands – only Edward II's failure in the north would see them rejoin the Scottish camp of Bruce and then switch back briefly to Edward III and Edward Balliol *c.*1332-5 (although the tenth earl's wife always fought for the Scots). In contrast, the unfortunate earls of Strathearn in central Perthshire struggled to play all sides and would be alive but politically bankrupt by 1340; the Comyns and their close associates fought for Balliol because that way lay their continued dominance of the Scottish political scene (as did their submission to Edward I in 1304); the Comyns' great neighbours in the north-east, the Strathbogies of Atholl, at first fought for Balliol (1296-1300), then submitted to England (1300-6), then joined Bruce (1306-7/1312-14) but became his sworn enemy in exile thereafter when no rewards came their way.[10] Robert Bruce's own vacillations and several attempts to hijack the Scottish cause have long been well known.

But if things were murkier and less certain for the elite of Scotland, it was also much harder for lesser Scots and apparently black-and-white figures like Wallace to operate in this context. Colm McNamee's earlier study of Wallace's invasion of northern England in late 1297 has revealed a fairly conventional military mind sometimes struggling to control his troops and their violent anti-Englishness or to make a significant impact as a lone general and Guardian without committed support from Scotland's nobility in the wings.[11] In more recent work, Wallace has also emerged even more so as a lesser noble capable of independent action but clearly given a strong lead by the key churchmen of the realm. As such, the crucial guidance of the bishops of St Andrews and Glasgow may have seen Wallace contemplate switching allegiances from Balliol to Bruce *c.*1299 as the only man capable of reviving the kingship: the handful of extant contemporary documents concerning Wallace's actions thus warrant close review.[12] Above all, though, since *Braveheart,* there has been renewed historical consensus and reflection upon Wallace's true achievement and legacy, that was achieved *after* his death through a cult of martyrdom and patriotism, forged and repeatedly recast to suit the political and spiritual needs of later generations of Scots right up to the present post-devolution age. Graeme Morton's study, indeed, presents a vital analysis of the creation of a myth beginning with the late fourteenth-century chroniclers and Blind Harry through to the world-wide web.[13] *Braveheart*'s key source itself can now be read in a republished edition of Sir William Hamilton of Gilbertfield's popular anglified version of 1722 with appropriate post-movie preface examining the Wallace cult since *c.*1474-8.[14]

However, if students now find that Scotland's resistance of England was due much less to the role of individual Scots than they might have expected, recent scholarship also provides them with a wider range of explanations for Edwardian failure both in the short and long term. The importance of Scottish diplomatic efforts – especially *c.*1298-1302 – has long been recognised by documentary scholars. But now Scottish embassies and key diplomatic texts, as well as the military efforts of men like Wallace, Andrew Murray and the Comyns and their party, can be placed alongside English practical difficulties in conquering and re-conquering Scotland. Fiona Watson's study of Edward I's occupation regimes and invasions has underlined the harsh realities of life for small, underpaid, hungry and ill-motivated English garrisons (1,000 to 1,500 men at most), and their reluctant captains. These forces were little helped by a hard-headed king who struggled both to pay for their upkeep (at £10,000 to £20,000 a year) and to find time free from truces with France (which also embraced the Scots) so as to launch a decisive campaign. Despite these complex problems, Edward I came close in 1305 to learning his lesson from 1296 by settling re-conquered Scotland in a fashion more sympathetic to Scottish governmental sensibilities.[15] But the same logistical and fiscal problems can be mapped onto the subsequent military efforts of Edward II and Edward III in addition to their own political distractions. More generally, a number of studies of wider European relations *c.*1250-1400 serve to underline the degree to which relatively small, poor and peripheral Scotland was able only to react to events dictated by the greater powers – England, France and the Papacy – rather than to determine her own fate: most obviously, Scotland often faced English domination in the wake of French military and diplomatic defeat (1302, 1346, 1356-7).[16]

This picture of heightened uncertainty and of unpredictable and competing forces at work in Scotland *c.*1286-1305, sharpened by this recent scholarship, arguably makes it all the more understandable that Robert Bruce's final decisive bid for the throne in 1306 should have begun so messily and nearly foundered within a matter of weeks. Barrow's King Robert is certainly a convincing figure who must use all his resolve, guile, military genius, patronage and lay and clerical allies to recover his cause from near destruction and exile and to seize the national platform from his Scottish and English enemies: this was a long, bloody civil war as well as a patriotic conflict given God's blessing at Bannockburn (23-4 June 1314) and underlined by Bruce's ostensible forfeiture of his Scottish opponents a few months later (although, key Scottish nobles and prelates would be permitted to enter his peace at a price for years to come). However, Barrow – like the author of *The Bruce*, John Barbour, archdeacon of Aberdeen, writing *c.*1371-5 – gives only condensed coverage and neat closure to the fifteen years of Robert I's reign which followed Bannockburn: this is the model structure followed too by most popular biographies of Bruce.[17] More recently, though, scholars have focussed on the problems Bruce's regime faced in this period .

Most obviously, scrutiny has been given – as first urged by A.A.M. Duncan – to the levels of support which Bruce commanded at various dramatic stages of his reign. Rather than being feudally 'conservative' and mostly pardoning and patronising key regional families throughout Scotland after *c.*1308-9, several studies now argue that Bruce's resettlement of lands and offices moved gradually towards the creation of a very different Scottish political community than that which would surely have emerged under a Balliol/Comyn or English regime. New men were elevated over other nobles and Bruce encouraged local rivalries as a method of divide and rule. However, Bruce's lordship in doing so requires close examination, beyond merely the rewards to his big three or four 'lieutenants' (Edward Bruce, Thomas Randolph, James Douglas, Walter Steward).[18] In many localities of Scotland Bruce's patronage did not begin in earnest until the 1320s and even then required time for the recipients to enforce their presence on the ground. The Bruce resettlement, indeed, is a topic which still awaits a full study. But it is clear that in some regions Bruce's necessary patronage had a destablising effect. Bruce's favour to some of his key supporters in south-west Scotland after the death in late 1318 of Edward Bruce, created earl of Carrick and lord of Galloway before Bannockburn, provoked an angry reaction from former Comyn and Balliol supporters in that region, several of whom conspired to assassinate Robert: this 'Soules conspiracy' was smashed ruthlessly by Bruce in 1320. Yet just before his death Bruce betrayed his awareness of the vulnerability of his settlement, making a pilgrimage through the south-west in 1329 and taking the opportunity to grant out further lands there in return for military and naval services.[19]

Although crushed, the 'Soules conspiracy' also exposes, in part, another crack in the veneer of the unanimity behind 'Good King Robert'. As Roland Tanner in particular has shown, at moments of internal and external crisis Bruce's regime very often sought to exploit the apparent consensus of the 'community of the realm' in parliament so as to inflate the level of support Bruce actually commanded and to test the loyalty of key subjects to the usurper monarch and his dynasty.[20] The need to engineer such public affirmations of legitimacy and popular authority was prompted both by English and Papal diplomatic overtures and grave doubts about the Bruce succession. Thus when Bruce's full title was ignored by foreign powers and he was threatened with excommunication for his murder of John Comyn in 1306, or when his subjects feared the consequences of Bruce's daughter, Marjorie, succeeding before his adult brother, Edward, then public documents were drawn up and nobles and prelates required to attach their seals to such statements of the party line thus enshrined in law. However, the cold reality was that in stage-managing parliaments for the purposes of manufacturing such declarations of the nobility (1309, 1320) and clergy (1309-10) or acts of succession (1315, 1318, 1326), the Bruce regime made free use of the seals of important individuals who were often not present or had been forfeited or coerced, or were un-rewarded by, or at odds with, the new king. Most graphically, the death of Robert's designated heir, Edward Bruce, in Ireland in October 1318, prompted an emergency parliament at which another act of succession recognising the king's infant grandson, Robert Stewart, as royal heir presumptive was passed together with injunctions against sedition. But this did not stop the so-called Soules conspirators from concocting their plan in concert with England and Edward Balliol: the latter, indeed, is now known to have arrived in the southern kingdom within weeks of Edward Bruce's demise. Robert I's attempts in early 1320 to ward off excommunication by dispatching the celebrated letter of the nobility – the Declaration of Arbroath – to the papacy, must also have involved a round of seal abuse provoking further unrest which the royal government did its best to destroy and conceal at a time of extreme vulnerability for the sonless king.[21]

Like the reputation of Wallace, the Declaration of Arbroath itself is perhaps more appreciated by recent studies – such as Edward Cowan's excellent new work - for its legacy and deep meaning to early-modern and modern Scots rather than any such mass sentiment felt in its own time of production.[22] As a manifesto of patriotic principle and popular sovereignty, embodying the subjects' right to police the behaviour of a king, the Declaration would have been appreciated by Scottish churchmen as a genuine statement of an ideal constitutional relationship designed to protect their institution within the kingdom. But, above all, it was recognised by Bruce as an invaluable political tool. It is uncertain, though, if the Declaration would have spoken, as yet, to the majority of Scottish nobles, or even to townsmen and farmers plagued since 1296 by English armies, as a statement of patriotic identity. It is, then, the propaganda value of such political behaviour that recent studies have debated. Bruce's attempts to win and shape his subjects' (and enemies') hearts and minds can also be read in his personal devotions before 1329[23]; in his funerary request for a pilgrimage to the Holy Land for his heart and interment for his body at Melrose Abbey on the border[24]; in chronicle write-ups of his reign in late fourteenth-century Scottish works (and contemporary French chronicles)[25]; and, of course, in Barbour's *The Bruce*. As well as trumpeting the triumph of Bruce and his great knight, Douglas, and others, over the auld enemy this epic poem is also very much a product of its times (*c.*1371-5) and a riposte to the pro-English sentiments of Bruce's son, David II (born 1324, ruled 1329-71): it was a work commissioned by Robert Stewart (who became Robert II, 1371-90) and the later Douglas earls.[26]

These latter lords were the true heirs to Bruce's other great legacy - inherent Scottish military aggression against England. Robert I's ongoing domestic difficulties with former Balliol-Comyn supporters and his succession unfolded against a background of relative Scottish military success against a distracted Edward II. Colm McNamee's groundbreaking study of the nature and impact of the Bruce regime's incursions into northern England and Ireland has argued convincingly that, at times, these campaigns threatened to amount to Scottish military 'hegemony' over the British Isles as a whole, endangering the security of England, Ireland and Wales. Yet at the same time, the long-term effectiveness of the Bruce Scots' invasions of English territory were limited. A remote English crown could ignore border breaches and no matter how violent and destructive the Scottish raids, northern English communities recovered relatively quickly, suffering more (as did Ireland) from a Europe-wide famine *c.*1315. The Scots' campaign in Ireland – a front Bruce had to open to satisfy his brother's

ambitions and because his English raids had not forced a peace after Bannockburn – produced similarly frustrating results.[27] It has fallen mostly to Irish historians to illuminate the great scale of both the Scottish presence and failure in that occupied province.[28] The English were worried and resources redirected but the Scots paid a high price for imposing Edward Bruce as high king of Ireland, ultimately the destabilisation of the Bruce succession *c.*1318-20. Between 1320 and 1323 the sonless Robert Bruce was obliged to seek longer truces and peace with England to allow him breathing space to put his own house in order. In the end, Bruce's two-front tactic was only justified in 1327-8 when simultaneous and unexpected incursions into northern England and Ulster forced the English government which had just deposed and murdered Edward II to sue for peace.

However, recent studies have also emphasised how the peace talks, largely dictated by Bruce at that time, exposed the potential tensions within the new Scottish kingdom and identity borne and nurtured by his seizure of power. The Bruce regime's leading noble supporters – those lords and their kindreds best rewarded since 1314 – were dominated by houses which had built their new fame and fortune upon a 'patriotic' war against England and at the expense of their Scottish enemies. This generation of war could thus not tolerate any peace treaty which might involve the return to their aristocratic community of nobles forfeited *c.*1314 also in possession of land in England (as was common before 1296) even if they in turn might be compensated with land in the southern kingdom. Indeed, work by Sonja Cameron and Alasdair Ross in reviewing the paucity of documents from *c.*1327-32 suggests that Robert I, far from sticking to the principle that no-one should ever again hold lands of both the crowns of England and Scotland and thus dilute their loyalties (as Barrow suggests), may in fact have at first agreed to a partial restoration to Scottish lands of the 'Disinherited' in exile in England but later fudged the issue. Aware that any restoration of forfeited lords would upset his settlement Bruce broke promises given 'in accordance with the treaty' of Edinburgh-Northampton (1328) after it was sealed and solemnized by the Pope, so anxious was he to secure some measure of firm closure before his own death and the accession of his minor son, David.[29]

Pressure to finally alienate the 'Disinherited' must have come from the new great men of the realm and in this there is arguably a hint of a level of expectancy amongst Robert's nobility which he would have been hard pressed to contain had he lived longer than his fifty-five years. Work by Michael Brown has revealed Sir James Douglas's willingness to defy the crown over matters of jurisdiction affecting his massive regality of power south of the Forth in the 1320s.[30] Former opponents and allies like the earl of Ross and Macdonald of Islay respectively would also soon display their ability for independent empire-building outwith the royal heartlands.[31] And close kin like the Stewarts would hanker for greater lands and influence – perhaps as earls (of Fife?) – on a par with the Randolph earls of Moray. Moreover, the next generation of ambitious heirs of these lieutenants of Robert Bruce would be reared on war against England.[32]

It followed that on the one hand these aforementioned families would be the bulwark of Scottish resistance in David Bruce's name against renewed invasion by Edward III and Edward Balliol after 1332. But on the other hand, the demand of these houses to dominate the Scottish community had caused Robert I to compromise the peace treaty and to leave the unfinished business of the 'Disinherited' in the laps of the illegal English regime of Isabella and Mortimer and the humiliated Edward III. The Stewarts, Rosses, Douglases, MacDonalds and others would, moreover, regularly challenge the authority of David II, a child king unable to rule in his own name until 1341. When David resorted to political pragmatism and sought peace with England after his capture in battle in 1346 – a peace not too different from that sought by his father in 1328 – his plans would break hard against the will of these leading Scottish nobles who were committed with all their being to alliance with France against the auld enemy. These lords were well able to exploit the consultative powers of the community in parliament – which Robert I's regime had controlled rigorously *c.*1309-29 – to redirect David's policy. Thus, just as in Robert I's legacy lay the seeds of further war *c.*1332-57, so the necessary cost of bought support for the father's reign was a cold struggle for power and royal succession between the son and subjects.[33]

In sum, historical work published since *that* film has already challenged many of the accepted truths of the Wars of Independence and placed these events in a wider Scottish, British and European context, both in the fourteenth century and eras since. It is to be hoped that students will respond to

these valuable studies, that such work will continue and that the spirit of reassessment will be further directed to the thirteenth-century in which time the backgrounds and mind-sets of the key players of the Wars were forged.[34]

NOTES

1 See for example: T. Edensor, 'Reading Braveheart: Representing and Contesting Scottish Identity', *Scottish Affairs*, no. 21, Autumn 1997, 135-58; E. Hague, 'Scotland on Film: Attitudes and Opinions about Braveheart', *Études Écossaises*, no. 6 (2000), 75-89.

2 For recent work on military aspects see: K. DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge 1996), especially chs. iv, vi, ix and xiv; D. Rollason and M. Prestwich eds., *The Battle of Neville's Cross, 1346* (Stamford 1998); C.J. Rogers ed., *The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations* (Woodbridge 1999); idem, *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360* (Woodbridge 2000); P. Reese, *Bannockburn* (Edinburgh 2000); A. Nusbacher, *The Battle of Bannockburn*, 1314 (Stroud 2000).

3 G.W.S. Barrow, *Robert the Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland* (Edinburgh 1965, 3rd edition 1988).

4 A.A.M. Duncan, *The Kingship of the Scots, 842-1292: Succession and Independence* (Edinburgh 2002). This is a challenging but rewarding read for students building on some of Duncan's earlier articles: 'The Community of the Realm of Scotland and Robert Bruce', *Scottish Historical Review*, xlv (1966), 184-201 (a review of Barrow); 'The War of the Scots, 1306-1323', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th series, 2 (1992), 125-51; and 'The Process of Norham, 1291', in P.R. Coss and S.D. Lloyd eds., *Thirteenth Century England V* (Woodbridge 1993), 207-29.

5 A. Young, *Robert the Bruce's Rivals: the Comyns, 1212-1314* (East Linton 1997).

6 See also J.A. Kossmann-Putto, 'Florence V, Count of Holland, Claimant to the Scottish Throne in 1291-2', in G.G. Simpson ed., *Scotland and the Low Countries, 1124-1994* (East Linton 1996), 15-27.

7 F. Watson, 'Fighting for Independence' and 'Evaluating Edward I' in *Scotland's Story*, no. 10 (2000), 4-9 – this number also contains items on Braveheart, Wallace and Blind Harry; F. Watson, 'The Demonisation of King John', in E.J. Cowan and R.J. Finlay eds., *Scottish History: the Power of the Past* (2002), 29-46; A. Fisher, 'Balliol: Scotland's weakest link?', *BBC History Magazine*, Vol. 2 no. 10, October 2001, 24-8; A. Beam 'One Funeral and a Wedding: the Neglected History of Scotland's Forgotten Kings', *History Scotland*, Vol. 3 no. 1, Jan/Feb 2003, 16-23.

8 See now: P. Gerber, *Stone of Destiny* (Edinburgh 1997); N. Aitchison, *Scotland's Stone of Destiny: Myth, History and Nationhood* (Stroud 2000).

9 F. Watson, 'The Enigmatic Lion: Scotland, Kingship and National Identity in the Wars of Independence', in D. Broun, R.J. Finlay and M. Lynch eds., *Image and Identity: The Making and Re-making of Scotland Through the Ages* (Edinburgh 1998), 18-37.

10 E.g. A. Ross, 'Men for all Seasons? The Strathbogie Earls of Atholl and the Wars of Independence – Parts 1 and 2' in *Northern Scotland*, 20-1 (2001-2); C.J. Neville, 'The Political Allegiance of the Earls of Strathearn during the Wars of Independence', *Scottish Historical Review*, lxv (1986), 133-53.

11 C. McNamee, 'William Wallace's Invasion of Northern England', *Northern History*, xxxvi (1990)', 40-58.

12 M. Penman, *The Scottish Civil War: the Bruces, the Balliols and the War for Control of Scotland, c.1286-c.1356* (Stroud 2002), which provides a synthesis of recent work on the Wars [see pp. 11-14 and 52-4 for 1299]. See also E. King, *Introducing William Wallace: The Life and Legacy of Scotland's Liberator* (Stirling 1997).

13 G. Morton, *William Wallace; Man and Myth* (Stroud 2001). See also his 'The Most Efficacious Patriot: The Heritage of William Wallace in Nineteenth-Century Scotland', *Scottish Historical Review*, lxxvii (1998), 224-51; G.M. Brunsden, 'Aspects of Scotland's Social, Political and Cultural Scene in the late Seventeenth and early Eighteenth Centuries, as Mirrored in the Wallace and Bruce Traditions', in E.J. Cowan and D. Gifford eds., *The Polar Twins* (Edinburgh 1999), 75-113; P. Reese, *Wallace – a Biography* (Edinburgh 1996) chs. 10-1.

14 William Hamilton of Gilbertfield, *Blind Harry's Wallace*, introduction by Elspeth King (Edinburgh 1998)

15 F. Watson, *Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland, 1286-1307* (East Linton 1998) and idem, 'Settling the Stalemate: Edward I's Peace in Scotland, 1303-5', in M. Prestwich, R. Britnell and R. Frame eds., *Thirteenth Century England VI* (Woodbridge 1997); M. Haskell, 'Breaking the Stalemate: the Scottish Campaign of Edward I, 1303-4', in M. Prestwich ed., *Thirteenth Century England VII* (Woodbridge 1998).

16 R. Frame, *The Political Development of the British Isles, 1100-1400* (Oxford, 2nd edition 1995); A. Stevenson, 'The Flemish Dimension of the Auld Alliance', in Simpson ed., *Scotland and the Low Countries* (op. cit.), 28-42; J. Sumption, *The Hundred Years War: Vol. I – Trial by Battle* (London 1990) and *Vol. II – Trial by Fire* (London 1999); R.R. Davies, *The First English Empire: Power and Identities in the British Isles, 1093-1343* (Oxford 2000); N.A.T. Macdougall, *An Antidote to the English: the Auld Alliance, 1295-1560* (East Linton 2001); D. Ditchburn, *Scotland and Europe: the Medieval Kingdom and its Contacts with Christendom, 1214-1560 – Vol. I Religion, Culture and Commerce* (East Linton 2001).

17 See for example the structure of C. Bingham, *Robert the Bruce* (London 1998). 1,000 of Barbour's 13,000 lines of poetry cover events up to and including Bannockburn; Barrow covers 1314-29 in two thematic chapters in a fifteen chapter book.

18 Penman, *Scottish Civil War* (op. cit.), chs. 3-5; Lieutenants' lands illustrated in P.G.B. McNeill and H.L. MacQueen eds., *Atlas of Scottish History to 1707* (Edinburgh 1996), 103, which contains many other useful maps of the Wars.

19 M. Penman, 'A fell conuiracioun agayn Robert ye douchty king: the Soules conspiracy of c.1318-20', *Innes Review,* 50 (1999), 25-57.

20 R. Tanner, 'Cowing the Community? Coercion and Fabrication in Robert Bruce's Parliaments, 1309-18', in K. Brown and R. Tanner eds., *Parliament and Politics in Scotland: 1286-1567* (Edinburgh, forthcoming).

21 Penman, 'Soules conspiracy' (op. cit.). Most of these documents are reproduced in the excellent E. Carmichael, E. Hamilton and N. Shead eds., *Sources for the Study of the Scottish Wars of Independence, 1249-1329* (Scottish CCC Highers, 1998).

22 E.J. Cowan, *For Freedom Alone: The Declaration of Arbroath, 1320* (East Linton 2003). See also: idem, 'Identity, Freedom and the Declaration of Arbroath' in Broun, Finlay and Lynch eds., *Image and Identity* (op. cit.), 38-68; T. Brotherstone and D. Ditchburn, '1320 and A' That: The Declaration of Arbroath and the Remaking of Scottish History', in T. Brotherstone and D. Ditchburn eds., *Freedom and Authority: Scotland c.1050-c.1560* (East Linton 2000), 10-31.

23 M. Penman, 'Christian Days and Knights: the Religious Devotions and Court of David II of Scotland, 1329-71', *Historical Research,* vol. 75, no. 189 (August 2002), 249-72, at 272.

24 G.G. Simpson, 'The Heart of Robert I: Pious Crusade or Marketing Gambit?', in B.E. Crawford ed., *Church, Chronicle and Learning in Medieval and Early Renaissance Scotland* (Edinburgh 1999), 173-86; S. Cameron, 'Sir James Douglas, Spain and the Holy Land', in Brotherstone and Ditchburn eds., *Freedom and Authority* (op. cit.), 108-17.

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26 See the latest edition by A.A.M. Duncan, *John Barbour – The Bruce* (Edinburgh 1997). See also M. Brown,"'Rejoice to hear of Douglas"; the House of Douglas and the Presentation of Magnate Power in Late Medieval Scotland', *Scottish Historical Review,* lxxvi (1997), 161-84.

27 C. McNamee, *The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-28* (East Linton 1997).

28 See now the collection of papers in S. Duffy ed., *Robert the Bruce's Irish Wars: the Invasions of Ireland, 1306-29* (Stroud 2002). Barrow gives only brief attention to Ireland in his 3rd edition.

29 S. Cameron and A. Ross, 'The Treaty of Edinburgh and the Disinherited (1328-1332)', *History*, vol. 84 (1999), 237-56.

30 M. Brown, *The Black Douglases: War and Lordship in Late Medieval Scotland, c.1300-1450* (East Linton 1998).

31 R.A. McDonald, *The Kingdom of the Isles: Scotland's Western Seaboard, c.1100-c.1336* (East Linton 1997).

32 M. Brown, 'The Development of Scottish Border Lordship, 1332-58', *Historical Research*, lxx (1997), 3-22; A.J. MacDonald, *Border Bloodshed: Scotland, England and France at War, 1369-1403* (East Linton 2000); and idem, 'Profits, Politics and Personality: War and the Later Medieval Scottish Nobility', in Brotherstone and Ditchburn eds., *Freedom and Authority* (op. cit.), 118-31.

33 M. Penman, *The Bruce Dynasty in Scotland: David II, 1329-71* (East Linton, forthcoming); idem, 'The Scots at the Battle of Neville's Cross, 17 October 1346', *Scottish Historical Review*, lxxx (2001), 157-80; S. Boardman, The Early Stewart Kings: Robert II and Robert III, 1371-1406 (East Linton 1996), ch. 1.

34 See for example the forthcoming papers in R. Oram ed., *The Reign of Alexander II* (Edinburgh).

Rethinking the Abolition of Serfdom in Russia in 1861

DR DAVID MOON

On 19 February 1861 Tsar Alexander II signed into law the legislation that set in motion a complex and long-term process that would lead in time to the complete abolition of serfdom in Russia. Over the subsequent decades, the ties that bound the former serfs and noble-landowners to each other were undone, and the newly-free peasants were enabled to purchase land from their previous owners, through the intermediary of the government, in what was in effect a nationwide mortgage scheme known as the redemption operation. The whole process was completed by 1907, when the government wrote off the small sum in redemption payments that was still outstanding from the former serfs and their descendants.[1]

Historians have given very different appraisals of the abolition of serfdom in Russia. All those writing since 1917 have been influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the knowledge of what happened in that year. In February 1917, the old tsarist regime collapsed in revolution and, in October 1917, Lenin and the Bolshevik Party seized power. Over the course of 1917, revolution spread to the villages, and peasants – many of whose parents and grandparents had been serfs – seized land that remained outside their control. This was the second peasant revolution in Russia in little over a decade. The failed revolution of 1905 had also been accompanied by uprisings in the villages. A further influence on historians of the abolition of serfdom has been criticisms of the reform that were put forward by radical critics of the tsarist regime after 1861. Indeed, criticism began as soon as radical Russians discovered the terms of the reform. In July 1861, Nicholas Ogarev concluded a polemical article in the emigré journal *The Bell* with the words: 'The old serfdom has been replaced by a new [serfdom]. In general, serfdom has not been abolished! The people have been deceived by the tsar!'[2]

In the light of the collapse of the tsarist régime in 1917, the peasant revolutions of 1905 and 1917, and the attacks on the 1861 reform by opponents of the regime, it is perhaps not surprising that many historians have given negative appraisals of the abolition of serfdom. It has often been argued that the legislation enacted in 1861 gave the freed serfs too little land and required them to pay too much for that land. The result, it is argued, was rural poverty and growing peasant discontent with the regime. Many scholars have also made a direct causal link between the alleged limitations of the 1861 reform and the peasant revolutions of the early twentieth century.[3] This argument was also made by Lenin who, writing as a revolutionary not a historian, asserted that '1861 gave birth to 1905.'[4] Some historians, on the contrary, have given more positive appraisals of the reform. Writing in 1968, the American historian Terence Emmons described the 'emancipation' of the serfs in Russia as 'probably the greatest single piece of state-directed social engineering in modern European history before the twentieth century.'[5] More recently, in 1993, the British scholar Maureen Perrie went further with her conclusion that Alexander II's 'great reforms', including the abolition of serfdom, 'may well have postponed [revolution from below] for half a century', and that they 'must be ranked among the most successful achievements of the traditional autocratic system in Russia.'[6]

It is the aim of this article to rethink the abolition of serfdom in Russia. Rather than assessing the reform in the light of events that took place two generations after the legislation was enacted, or in the context of critical assessments offered by radical opponents of the regime for political rather than academic purposes, this article proposes another context in which to assess the reform: the problems the bureaucrats who drew up the legislation of 1861 set out to address, and what it what was possible for them to do within the practical constraints in which they had to operate. It was very easy for Ogarev, Lenin and other radicals and revolutionaries to pen their condemnations of the terms of the reform. It was a much more difficult task for the officials who devised the reform to produce a settlement that would work, and that balanced the competing interests of different factions inside the government, the nobles who were about to lose their serfs and part of their land, and the 22 million enserfed peasants who were waiting with great hopes for their 'freedom'.

It is worth noting, moreover, that the men who devised the reform were a group of educated, professional and reform-minded officials who sought to address the problems faced by tsarist Russia in the mid-nineteenth century through carefully researched and planned reforms. In the late 1850s, they succeeded in gaining the confidence of a hesitant and conservative Alexander II and, over the next decade and a half, masterminded a whole series of 'great reforms'. In addition to the abolition of serfdom, their reforms included setting up elected local councils (*zemstva*) and a system of courts with trial by jury, expanding education and broadening access, relaxing censorship, creating modern banking and financial institutions, and introducing systems of taxation and military recruitment that reduced the burdens on the peasantry by sharing the load more evenly among the population as a whole. The officials managed to push these measures through in spite of the opposition of more conservative-minded men in the bureaucracy and the nobility. In persuading Alexander II of the need for reform, the reforming officials were greatly assisted by the support of three key people, all of whom were persuaded by their arguments: a senior official and confidant of the tsar, Count Jacob Rostovtsev, the tsar's brother Grand Duke Constantine Nikolaevich and aunt Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna. Nevertheless, the tsar could, and did, sack his officials at a moment's notice if he got cold feet or if it suited his political purposes. In the light of their achievements, it is not surprising that these architects of the 'great reforms' have become known as 'enlightened bureaucrats'.[7]

The enlightened bureaucrats were not 'liberals' in the Western understanding of the word. They did not seek to undermine the autocratic system of government in tsarist Russia. Their aim was to strengthen the Russian state at a time when it seemed to be being left behind economically and militarily by the rapidly developing states of Western Europe. Tsarist Russia's peasant army had been able to defeat Napoleon's French army in 1812-14, but was no match for the armies of industrializing France and Great Britain which, allied to Turkey, inflicted a humiliating defeat on Russia in the Crimean War of 1854-6. A strong case has been made by the American historian Alfred Rieber that economic and military reforms in the interests of the state were at the heart of the whole package of 'great reforms' that were prepared by the enlightened bureaucrats and implemented in the reign of Alexander II (1855-81).[8] It is these objectives, economic development and military reform, and the constraints within which the reforming bureaucrats had to operate, not the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 or the views of radical opponents of the regime, which will be used in this article as the yardsticks against which to assess the terms of the abolition of serfdom of 1861.

Thus, one of the motives of the enlightened bureaucrats was to create the conditions for economic development along the lines of Western capitalism. Economic development in the Russian Empire continued at a slow pace in the 1860s and 1870s, but took off in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when Russia experienced unprecedented rates of industrial development. In part, the pace of industrialization was the result of state policies directed at heavy industry and infrastructure. It was also a consequence, however, of growing demand for consumer goods from peasants who, on average, were experiencing a steady improvement in their living standards.[9] There was still much poverty in rural Russia, and particular regions suffered great hardship at certain times, for example the Volga region during the famine and cholera epidemic of 1891-2.[10] Contrary to the traditional picture of growing peasant poverty in the decades after 1861 as a result of the alleged defects of the terms of the reform, however; over the last generation, a number of economic historians have demonstrated fairly conclusively that, on average, for the Russian Empire as a whole, and over the medium term, rural living standards were steadily improving from the late nineteenth century. It has also been suggested, moreover, that this steady improvement in the material condition of the peasantry was a result in part of the decline in the burden of payments for the land on the former serfs, once they started to buy their land under the redemption operation.[11]

It cannot be denied that some of the terms of the reform of 1861 hindered economic development. Two terms stand out in this regard. The freed serfs had to bear the full cost of the land that was assigned to them in the redemption operation. As a result, their demand for goods which contributed to economic development was not as great as it might have been. In addition, the freed serfs were not granted the right of complete freedom of movement until 1906, and thus they could not become a fully mobile labour force to meet the demands of developing industry. Instead, they were subject to restrictions on their movement and needed the permission of their village authorities to leave their

villages to seek work. These two limitations in the reform of 1861 from the point of view of promoting economic development can, however, be explained by the constraints within which the reformers had to operate. The tsarist government was very concerned to maintain financial and social stability during the process of the abolition of serfdom. The government was virtually bankrupted by the Crimean War and faced a banking crisis in 1859. Thus, the reformers had little choice but to compel the freed serfs to pay for the land that was transferred to them from the nobility, and to restrict the amount of land the freed serfs could purchase ('redeem') under the government scheme. The redemption operation was devised within these constraints. The limitations on peasant movement were also in part a result of financial concerns. Allowing complete freedom of movement would have enabled peasants to evade their redemption payments by breaking their ties with their villages and losing contact with the authorities collecting the redemption payments. By making village authorities responsible for both the redemption payments and for controlling peasant movement, however, the reformers sought to, and seem to have succeeded, in making sure the payments were made. In spite of the arrears that had accumulated and the write-off of some outstanding payments in 1907, the freed serfs did indeed meet the full cost of the reform.[12]

A further reason for the restrictions on peasant movement was the official concern about the prospect of a massive peasant revolt in the wake of a reform that the government knew would not meet the full aspirations of the former serfs for complete freedom and land without payment. The government's concerns for social stability had been brought into sharp focus in 1858 – when the legislation abolishing serfdom throughout the Russian Empire was being prepared – by peasant unrest in the Russian Baltic province of Estonia, where the serfs had been freed without land a few decades earlier. The Estonian peasant disturbances persuaded the authors of the reform of 1861 to ensure that the freed serfs in the rest of the Empire had access to adequate quantities of land, and that they had the opportunity in the medium term to acquire land as property (i.e. the redemption operation). The disturbances in Estonia also convinced the reformers of the need to retain restrictions on peasant movement, and to replace the authority of the nobles over their serfs with that of the new village authorities over the newly free (or rather partially free) peasants. The reformers were worried that allowing the freed serfs greater freedom of movement would make them more likely to revolt.[13] Thus, taking account of the financial and social constraints within which the bureaucrats who devised the reform of 1861 had to operate, a case can be made that the terms of the abolition of serfdom of 1861 did assist the economic development that the reformers sought to foster.

The enlightened bureaucrats who devised the abolition of serfdom aimed also to promote military reform to allow the creation of more modern and effective military forces that could compete once again with those of Western Europe. One of the strongest arguments for the reform was the connection made in early 1856 by the enlightened bureaucrat Dmitrii Milyutin between the existence of serfdom and the weakness of Russia's military forces that had been exposed in the Crimean War, in which Russia was on the verge of admitting defeat. Milyutin argued that it was necessary to abolish serfdom in order to prepare the way for reform of the system of recruitment. Under the existing system, a small proportion of the peasantry were conscripted for long terms of service (up to 25 years). Serfs who were conscripted were, of necessity, freed from serfdom on joining the army. A modern army, Milyutin argued, needed a larger proportion of the male population to serve for much shorter terms, receive military training, and then be sent home in reserve. This was impossible under serfdom as it would entail either freeing a large part of the male serf population in a few years, or sending home serfs with military training who might lead revolts to win their freedom.[14] On his appointment as Minister of War in November 1861, Dmitrii Milyutin immediately drew up a comprehensive plan for reform. The culmination was the Military Service Reform of 1874, under which far larger numbers of men from all social groups served for a maximum of seven years.[15] The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 came a little too soon, however, and 'exposed the limits of the military reforms that had been enacted after the Crimean War debacle'. Nevertheless, Russia's reformed armed forces performed better in 1877-8 than the pre-reform army in 1854-6.[16] The Russian Empire emerged victorious on the battlefield in 1878, but it had not regained sufficient standing as a European power to impose the peace settlement it wanted in order to expand its influence in the Balkans. The Russian Empire was more successful in expanding its interests, through territorial conquest, in Central Asia, but could not overcome the concerns of

Great Britain, which was worried about the potential threat to its Indian empire in South Asia. Russian expansion in the Far East was also successful in the medium term, until it came up against a Japan that was modernizing its economy and military power more quickly than Russia.[17] The limitations in the foreign policy achievements of the post-reform Russian Empire cannot, of course, be attributed mainly to the reform of 1861. The reformed army that was created in the aftermath and in part in consequence of the abolition of serfdom was, however, was more successful than its predecessor, until the debacle of the First World War.

Although the consequences of the abolition of serfdom in terms of economic and military reform may seem fairly modest, it needs to be remembered that the enlightened bureaucrats who devised the reform in the late 1850s and start of the 1860s had to operate inside quite significant constraints. The financial constraints have already been mentioned: the whole reform had to be self-financing and the cost borne by the peasants. This was achieved. Moreover, it was achieved without ruining the peasantry as a whole. Indeed, on average, some steady improvement in living standards was experienced by the rural population from the late nineteenth century. A further constraint on the architects of the reform of 1861 was the need to avert a major peasant revolt in protest against terms that did not meet the aspirations of many serfs. The authorities were well aware on the eve of 1861 that many serfs were expecting total freedom and all the land at once for free, not a gradual reform process in which they had to pay for the part of the land that was assigned to them. Although there were some large scale peasant protests in the spring of 1861, and rumblings of discontent continued for years and, indeed, decades among the freed peasantry. For the most part, however, the disappointed peasants seem to have accepted their lot and made the best of what was granted in 1861.[18] Crucially, from the point of view of the argument of this article, there was no mass peasant revolt in Russia until 1905,[19] many decades after 1861, for a broader range of reasons than the terms of the reform of 1861, and in very different circumstances – including military defeat by Japan and the 'Bloody Sunday' massacre in St Petersburg – to those the reformers could have anticipated in the late 1850s and early 1860s. There were also political constraints on what the officials who drew up the reform could achieve. As has already been mentioned, with the patronage of Count Rostovtsev and the tsar's brother and aunt, the enlightened bureaucrats were able to convince a cautious and conservative tsar that change was necessary, and that the sort of reform they were proposing was the best course of action. Nevertheless, they had to fight hard against their opponents in the bureaucracy in order to see the reform through to implementation.

A further, and major, constraint on the architects of the abolition of serfdom was the need to appease the section of the population which would be the main losers: the nobility who were about to lose their serfs and part of their land, and who feared that the rest of their elite status in society was also under threat. The reformers thus had to walk a tightrope. A reform that left a large part of the land in the hands of the nobility or demanded a large amount of financial compensation in a short period from the peasantry could have ignited a peasant revolt. The memory of the last major peasant uprising, in which many nobles in the mid-Volga region had been slaughtered during the Pugachev revolt of 1773-4, still lived on three-quarters of a century later. On the other hand, a reform that transferred a large part of the land to the freed serfs with little, or no, compensation to the nobility could well have provoked a noble rebellion. This was not an abstract prospect. In December 1825 a group of progressive aristocratic army officers had staged an unsuccessful Decembrist revolt against the autocracy in the heart of the imperial capital. Rather earlier, between 1725 and 1801, moreover, factions of nobles and army officers had on occasions been able to impose their preferred candidates on the throne. Two tsars, Peter III in 1762 and Paul in 1801, had been deposed and murdered. Nevertheless, the reformers of the late 1850s and early 1860s were fairly successful in devising a reform that averted mass noble disaffection. Provincial nobles grumbled when they were invited to put forward their views on the impending reform 1859-60. In the months after the reform was implemented, some nobles agitated for a constitution to limit the powers of the tsar and his bureaucrats (in order to prevent further reforms against their interests). And, liberal nobles who served on the local councils (*zemstva)* set up after 1864 periodically demanded, but did not get, political change at the centre. The creation of the *zemstva* in 1864 was partly a deliberate act by the government to appease the nobles, who had lost their serfs, by giving them a predominant role in councils that played a significant role in local government. For

the most part, however, in the years after 1861, Russian nobles acquiesced in the abolition of serfdom, gladly received the compensation they were given for the loss of part of their land (many used it to repay their debts), and did not try to overthrow the tsar.[20]

Thus, it is possible to reach a measured assessment of the abolition of serfdom in Russia that was set in motion by the legislation approved by tsar Alexander II in 1861. In terms of what the enlightened bureaucrats set out to achieve in the late 1850s, making allowance for the financial and political constraints in which they had to operate, and disregarding the criticisms of opponents of the regime and the dramatic events two generations later, the reform of 1861 can be seen as moderately successful in the medium term. Indeed, it could be argued that it was just about the best settlement that was possible in the circumstances and at the time.

NOTES

1 For a fuller discussion of the causes, terms and process of abolishing serfdom, see D. Moon, *The Abolition of Serfdom in Russia, 1762-1907* (Harlow and London: Longman, 2001).

2 *Kolokol* ('The Bell'), no.101, 15 July 1861, p.848, translated in Moon, *The Abolition of Serfdom*, p.164.

3 See, for example, E. Acton, *Rethinking the Russian Revolution* (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), pp.50-1; T. Shanin, *Russia as a 'Developing Society'* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1986), p.92. The classic study is G.T. Robinson, *Rural Russia under the Old Regime: A History of the Landlord Peasant World and a Prologue to the Peasant Revolution of 1917* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960 [1st edition 1932]).

4 Quoted in M. Perrie, *Alexander II: Emancipation and Reform in Russia, 1855-1881*, revised edn (London: The Historical Association, 1993), p.32.

5 T. Emmons, *The Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant Emancipation of 1861* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p.414.

6 Perrie, *Alexander II*, 32-3.

7 W. B. Lincoln, *In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats, 1825-1861* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982); id. *The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1990).

8 A. J. Rieber, 'Alexander II: A Revisionist View', *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 43 (1971), pp.42-58.

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12 S. L. Hoch, 'The Banking Crisis, Peasant Reform, and Economic Development in Russia, 1857-1861', *American Historical Review*, vol.96 (1991), pp.795-820.

13 See D. Moon, 'Peasant Migration, the Abolition of Serfdom and the Internal Passport System in the Russian Empire, c.1800-1914', in D. Eltis (ed), *Free and Coerced Migration: Global Perspectives* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp.324-57.

14 A. J. Rieber (ed.), *The Politics of Autocracy: Letters of Alexander II to Prince A. I. Bariatinskii* (Paris and The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1966), pp.17-29.

15 F. A. Miller, *Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968).

16 J. Bushnell, 'Miliutin and the Balkan War: Military Reform vs. Military Performance', in B. Eklof et al (eds.), et al (eds.), *Russia's Great Reforms, 1855-1881* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press), pp.144, 156.

17 Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), pp.438-59, 579-97.

18 See D. Field, *Rebels in the Name of the Tsar*, 2nd edn (Boston, MA, and London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); S. G. Pushkarev, 'The Russian Peasants' Reaction to the Emancipation of 1861', *Russian Review*, vol.27 (1968), pp.199-214.

19 See M. Perrie, 'The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907: Its Social Composition and Revolutionary Significance' in B. Eklof and S. Frank (eds.) *The World of the Russian Peasant: Post Emancipation Culture and Society* (Boston, MA and London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp.193-218.

20 Emmons, *The Russian Landed Gentry*, pp.414-23.

'To the Final Destruction of All Enemies!': New Approaches to Stalinist Terror

DR KEVIN McDERMOTT

On 7 November 1937 at a private banquet marking the twentieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Josef Stalin uttered the remarkable words: 'Anyone who attacks the unity of the socialist state, either in deed or in thought, yes, even in thought, will be mercilessly crushed.' Stalin concluded with the chilling toast: 'To the final destruction of all enemies...!'[1] This quotation, together with many other pieces of evidence gleaned from the former Soviet archives, shows conclusively that the Georgian dictator must bear prime responsibility for the Great Terror that was unleashed on Soviet state and society in 1937 and 1938. But Stalin's role in the carnage is only one question that has divided historians. For many decades scholars have been preoccupied with the origins, processes and outcomes of the Terror. Not surprisingly, there is no consensus. Experts disagree on Stalin's motivations and aims, the influence of other key actors and institutions, the intended targets of state violence, the number of victims, the input 'from below' of local officials and the population as a whole, and the short- and longer-term impact of mass repression on Soviet society. This brief article cannot hope to address, let alone 'answer', all these imponderables. Instead, I focus on recent interpretations of the Terror, which demonstrate that rather than being a unitary phenomenon possessing a single overriding aim, it was a multi-faceted process composed of separate but related political, social and 'national' dimensions, the origins and goals of which were differentiated, but which coalesced in the horrific mass repressions of 1937-38.

Historiographical Context

Before examining the latest research it is necessary to review older debates and controversies. The historiography of Stalinist terror is bulky and growing.[2] Most western Sovietologists writing in the 1950s and 1960s came under the influence of the 'totalitarian model' formulated by the Harvard political scientists, Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Their famous 'six-point syndrome' emphasised *inter alia* 'physical or psychological terror' and an omnipotent secret police force (NKVD) as typical characteristics of the totalitarian state.[3] In subsequent variants of the model, state terror was regarded as the central attribute of totalitarianism. By fragmenting and atomising society, terror represented the principal means of establishing and maintaining social order and mass mobilisation. Friedrich and Brzezinski's 'syndrome' proved an attractive explanatory model to a western academic community that was not immune to the anti-communist Cold War atmosphere of the times. But this alone does not account for its endurance: it seemed highly applicable to Stalinist Russia, an authoritarian and repressive regime *par excellence* and it confirmed the testimony of post-war Soviet émigrés, who tended to assert the terroristic essence of the communist state. Robert Conquest's hugely influential *The Great Terror,* which depicted a power-hungry Stalin at the heart of the mass repression, is the classical expression of this 'totalitarian' framework.

Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, the concept of totalitarianism came under sustained challenge from a new breed of political scientists and historians, who insisted that it was an ideologically motivated construct, too static and hence incapable of recognising dynamic change and the agents of reform among the Soviet elites. The 'social historians' of the 1970s and 1980s, notably Moshe Lewin and Sheila Fitzpatrick, while not neglecting the awesome power of the Stalinist state, re-shaped our thinking about Soviet realities by concentrating on the interactions between the regime and a differentiated social base.[4] By the mid-1980s, under the influence of Lewin's and Fitzpatrick's pioneering studies, so-called 'revisionist' historians, such as J. Arch Getty and Gábor Rittersporn, were beginning to cast doubt on Stalin's dominant role in the terror, the 'intentionalist' origins of the mass arrests and executions, and the 'functional' impact of repression on the loyalty and efficiency of the Soviet

bureaucracies. The revisionists, rejecting 'anecdotal' memoir literature and relying largely on official Soviet sources, asked different questions of the evidence in front of them and arrived at different, and often contentious, conclusions, stressing 'centre-periphery' tensions, inter-elite rivalries and in-fighting, and the chaotic and dysfunctional elements of the Stalinist system.[5] In essence, the revisionists concluded that the dynamics of the terror were far more complicated than just the machinations of an evil megalomaniac despot.

The totalitarian v. revisionist debates of the 1980s and 1990s were often cantankerous and ultimately largely sterile affairs. Neither paradigm was 'right' or 'wrong'; both elucidated fundamental 'truths' of the Stalinist system. The totalitarians correctly identified the monist urge of the Bolsheviks to gain mastery over social processes and human destinies. The revisionists accurately surmised that intention 'from above' was often foiled by unforeseen reaction 'from below', which in turn demanded ever more draconian 'solutions' from the leadership. In short, the Stalinist state failed to achieve its aim of 'total' control over all aspects of public life. Recent literature specifically on the Great Terror spans both approaches. The emphasis, however, is on the dominant hand of Stalin and the 'centre'.

The Political Dimension

Even though historians have overwhelmingly concentrated their attentions on the political dimensions of the terror, there are still many unresolved issues[6]: the motivations and the relative influence of Stalin and other leading actors (Ezhov, Molotov, Kaganovich, for instance); the connections between specific events of the terror (the assault on the Red Army in May-June 1937 and the subsequent mass repressions launched in July-August 1937); and the precise role of key institutions, such as the Politburo, its special commissions, the Central Committee, the NKVD, and the regional and district party bodies. I will concentrate here on arguably the most controversial theme: the impact of Stalin.

It has been recognised for many years that Stalin's personal role in the terror was profound. He signed dozens of 'death warrants' containing thousands of names, carefully orchestrated the three Show Trials of 1936, 1937 and 1938, and even participated in some of the interrogation sessions of leading prisoners. He pulled no triggers, but metaphorically there are oceans of blood on his hands. Recently declassified documents from hitherto inaccessible Soviet archives have extended our knowledge of Stalin's activities. He despatched telegrams to local party leaders demanding that 'enemies of the people' should be peremptorily shot; oversaw the decimation of the Red Army command in May-June 1937; confirmed the composition of the local *troiki* (three-man sentencing bodies) and regional requests to extend the quotas of victims; and ratified the death penalty for numerous regional party officials.[7] These actions were often agreed by the 'quintet' of leaders (Stalin, Molotov, Ezhov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov), who managed repression strategy in 1937-38. Interestingly, by this time the Politburo itself seems to have effectively ceased functioning as a regular collective decision-making body.

As suggested in the introduction, the question of Stalin's overall guilt for the terror is now a non-issue for historians. Even the revisionist expert, J. Arch Getty, concedes that 'he played the leading role....his name is all over the horrible documents authorizing the terror.' But for Getty 'that role remains problematic and hard to specify.' Distancing himself from those scholars who perceive Stalin as adroitly planning the entire purge process, Getty maintains that the archival record shows 'too many twists and turns, too many false starts and subsequent embarrassing backtrackings to support the idea that the terror was the culmination of a well-prepared and long-standing master design....[Stalin] seems not to have decided on a wholesale massacre until early in 1937'.[8] In Getty's scenario, Stalin responds *ad hoc* to events as much as he initiates them. He is a relatively weak, sometimes panicky, leader fearful of domestic and foreign encirclement, who blindly lashes out in 1937-38 against an ill-defined array of 'enemies'.

It is true that Stalin's actions were subject to change and vacillation, and that he and other elite communists were apprehensive about the hostile environment. But Getty's interpretation tends to ignore the abundant evidence that Stalin had proven himself a committed exponent of state violence since at least the late 1920s. He had demanded the death penalty for errant officials as early as August 1930[9], had called for the 'elimination of the kulaks as a class', had supported harsh measures against a

series of party 'oppositionists' in the years 1930 and 1932 (Syrtsov-Lominadze, the Riutin Platform, and Smirnov-Tolmachev-Eismont), and had personally imposed the strictest legal sanctions after Kirov's assassination in December 1934. To be sure, this does not definitively prove the existence of a long-term 'plan' to physically remove all opponents. Getty is probably right here, but it does demonstrate that the logic and technologies of terror were in place well before 1937 and that Stalin's instinct, regardless of the occasional 'liberal' interludes in the mid-1930s, was for repression rather than concession.

What can be termed the 'primacy of Stalin' in the organisation and implementation of the terror is accepted by most contemporary scholars. The 'boss', though no doubt influenced by hawks like Ezhov, was the real power-broker, the master manipulator of situations, individuals and institutions. Only he could call an end to the mass arrests and executions, as he did do in November 1938.[10] Indeed, we can justifiably ask the question: without Stalin would the terror have taken place? Indicative of this position is the hard-hitting conclusion of a recent archival based article by Michael Ellman on rural repression: 'The *raion* [district] show trials which took place in September-December 1937 were initiated by Stalin personally and the (chief) sentences were decided by Stalin personally.'[11] David J. Nordlander argues along the same lines, referring to 'Stalin's crucial agency....[and] authoritarian impact' on the destruction of the Bolshevik party.[12] We do not need to view Stalin as some kind of omnipotent and omniscient tyrant to appreciate his signal input in the whole terror process.

The Social and 'National' Dimensions

Little was known about the social aspects of the terror until very recently. The studies of historians such as Paul Hagenloh and David Shearer have documented the inter-relationship between, on the one hand, social disorder and evolving NKVD strategies to contain it in the early-to-mid 1930s, and, on the other, the onset of mass arrests in the summer of 1937. Hagenloh perceives the Great Terror as 'the culmination of a decade-long radicalization of policing practice against "recidivist" criminals, social marginals, and all manner of lower-class individuals.'[13] Shearer maintains that the threat of social instability posed by criminals, hooligans, other 'socially harmful elements', and even armed bandit gangs, was taken extremely seriously by secret police chiefs. By 1937 the lethal triumvirate of social disorder, political opposition and national contamination had raised fears among the increasingly xenophobic party and police elites of a broadly based anti-Soviet 'fifth column', linked to foreign agents and spies. In response, Stalinist leaders launched the massive purge of Soviet society in 1937-38 in order to destroy what appeared to them to be the social base for armed overthrow of the Soviet government. To this extent, Shearer has concluded that mass repression under Stalin was not solely a means of combating the state's enemies; it became a 'constitutive part of Soviet social policy.'[14]

The now infamous NKVD Order No. 00447, ratified by the Politburo in late July 1937, launched the mass operations against 'former kulaks, criminals, and other anti-Soviet elements'.[15] It has been calculated that under the terms of this order, which remained in force until November 1938, approximately 750,000 people were convicted.[16] The order cold-bloodedly and precisely listed by region of the USSR the number of executions (category no. 1 - 72,950) and 8 to 10 year sentences in the Gulag (category no. 2 - 186,500) which were to be carried out.[17] In reality, these figures were over-fulfilled, the Politburo regularly acceding to the requests of local NKVD leaders to extend the quotas of mass arrests. Thus, one of the most interesting conclusions of the new research is that, contrary to received wisdom about the elite nature of the victims of the Great Terror, in strictly numerical terms the bulk of those repressed were 'ordinary' non-communist citizens, 'kulaks', workers, and various 'social marginals': recidivist criminals, the homeless, the unemployed, all those who appeared to deviate from the social norms of the emerging Stalinist system.

Another characteristic of Stalinist terror which has only recently been explored in detail is the 'national', or ethnic, component.[18] It is now known that beginning in the summer of 1937 the NKVD launched 'national sweeps' of specific categories of foreigners and Soviet citizens of foreign extraction. Central and East Europeans were particularly badly hit, but so were Koreans, Chinese, Afghans and many other minorities. The 'Polish Operation', based on NKVD Order No. 00485 and ratified by the Politburo on 7 August 1937, resulted in the arrest of approximately 140,000 people, a staggering

111,000 of whom were shot.[19] Similar campaigns were directed against Germans, Finns, Balts and many others who were perceived to be real or potential 'spies' and agents of foreign anti-Soviet intelligence agencies, although the percentages of those shot were generally lower than in the Polish case. A substantial proportion of victims were members of foreign communist parties affiliated to the Comintern in Moscow. That organisation was decimated by the purges, as a new documentary collection shows all too persuasively.[20] Such was the scale of the 'national operations' that from about February 1938 they became the prime function of NKVD activity, more pervasive than the campaigns associated with Order 00447. Although the number of arrests and executions decreased significantly from late 1938, it is well known that during World War II entire populations (Chechen, Ingush, Crimean Tartar etc) were deported from their homelands to Central Asia.

Inevitably, these examples of Soviet 'ethnic cleansing' have compelled some scholars to compare Stalinist and Nazi exterminatory policies. The terminology of 'Stalinist genocide' employed by one or two specialists suggests a close relationship and moral equivalence between Nazi and Soviet terror. If we view the latter in the 'intentional' v. 'functional' framework, it appears that both elements of motivation were applicable: the 'intended' victims were the 'traditional suspects' (peasants, political opponents, and supporters of the Tsarist regime) and the 'functional' ones were invented in the specific context of developments in late 1936 and 1937, consisting of replaceable elite cadres and alien nationals. However, while recognising the enormity of Stalinist repression, I tend to agree with those historians who emphasise the uniqueness of the Holocaust - 'the only example which history offers to date of a deliberate policy aimed at the total physical destruction of every member of an ethnic group. There was no equivalent of this under Stalinism.'[21]

Motivations for the Terror

The key question of motive remains. Why did Stalin launch the mass arrests of loyal party-state bureaucrats after the February-March 1937 Central Committee Plenum?; why the extension of the terror in the summer of that year to include all 'socially harmful elements'?; why the vicious assault on ethnic minorities that escalated in late 1937 and continued well into 1938? 'Traditional' explanations for the strictly political aspects of the terror emphasise Stalin's power lust, his determination to liquidate all real and perceived rivals in a paranoic drive for autocratic rule. Large numbers of 'Old Bolsheviks', former oppositionists and a host of unreliable elements - 'wreckers', 'saboteurs', 'spies' - were targetted in what became an arbitrary frenzy of blood-letting. By eliminating these undesirables and replacing them with totally devoted 'yes-men', Stalin's power base would be mightily strengthened. As we have seen, this Stalin-oriented approach was challenged by the 'revisionists', who saw a certain systemic rationale behind the seemingly irrational waves of repression.

Stalin's motives remain, and will continue to remain, obscure. What is more, he did not decide everything. Indeed, a convincing consensus is emerging which stresses the multiplicity of factors, both internal and external, and the inter-relatedness of the Stalinist 'revolution from above' of the early 1930s and the Great Terror of 1937-38. The latter, it is argued, was inextricably linked to the massive industrialisation campaigns and the forced collectivisation of Soviet agriculture from 1928-29 onwards. The intense social flux and dislocation, the rising crime levels, the peasant resistance to collectivisation, the urban tensions attendant on rapid industrialisation, the limited success of the initiatives on the 'nationality question', and the contradictory pressures on the bureaucracies and other elites, which engendered insubordination, deceit and local and regional self-defence cliques and networks, all these 'outcomes' of the Stalinist 'revolution from above' created conditions that were propitious for the hunt for 'enemies'. Add in Stalin's not inconsiderable personal power goals and paranoias and the in-built need for scapegoats to 'explain' the dire state of Soviet material consumption, and the origins of mass repression become more explicable.

The launching of the mass operations in the summer of 1937 appear to be directly related to reverses in the European and Asian arenas, in particular the lessons of the Spanish Civil War, which induced an atmosphere of panic in the Kremlin and incited the Stalinists to seek 'enemies' at home and abroad.[22] The Soviet leadership's fears of a 'fifth column' among party, state and military elites, which in the event of war could count on broadly-based support among 'socially harmful elements' and

'hostile' national minorities in the USSR, seems to explain the dramatic extension of mass arrests and executions. In his later years Molotov insisted that it was this threat of a 'fifth column' which caused, and in his opinion justified, the purges.[23] To this extent, the threat acts as the crucial link between the three dimensions of the Great Terror: political, social and 'national'. Only in the context of the Stalinists' grave fears for the security and integrity of the Soviet state can the mass repressions of 1937-38 be understood.

Some Thoughts on Future Research

Scholars are only beginning to tackle the manifold complexities of Stalinist state and society and their interactions. All conclusions must therefore be necessarily provisional. As we have seen, the most recent writings to varying degrees reaffirm the 'primacy of Stalin' in the mass repressions of the late 1930s. As Robert Tucker insisted several years ago, he was the Great Terror's 'director general'.[24] But this observation does not imply that 'centre-periphery' tensions and regional variations should be overlooked. Clearly, even as 'omnipotent' a tyrant as Stalin could not inspire or control everything that occurred in his vast domain. Indeed, there has been a marked tendency to shift attention from the decision-making processes in Moscow to the implementation of those decisions in the provinces, often demonstrating unintentional, and sometimes contradictory, outcomes.[25] The same seems to be true of the repression in cultural organisations, an emerging theme among researchers.[26] Should we also take ideological concerns more seriously than hitherto? To what extent was the mass purging motivated not only by Stalin's desire to strengthen his power base, but also to 'revolutionise' and transform Soviet society by crushing once and for all counter-revolutionary 'socially harmful elements' and 'class enemies'? Likewise, was the attack on the sprawling bureaucracies an attempt to smash the 'bourgeois' and 'Menshevik' lethargy of party-state functionaries?[27]

We still need to know far more about how the terror was received by different sections of Soviet society. Did 'ordinary' citizens perceive the mass arrests of communists as an essentially positive phenomenon: the despised 'them' devouring each other? How far did the language and images of 'enemies', 'wreckers' and 'spies' reflect a society, still largely rural, in which traditional notions of evil spirits and nefarious demons were deep-rooted?[28] To what extent did the assault on 'suspicious foreigners' tap into a rich vein of popular xenophobia? From a longer term perspective, what was the psychological and demographic impact of mass repression on Soviet wartime performance and popular attitudes? One prominent 'revisionist' historian has asserted that the morale of the Red Army, and of the Soviet people in general, during the Great Patriotic War was not unduly undermined by the terror of the late thirties, though this hypothesis requires closer inspection.[29] Finally, much more clarity is needed on the winding down of the Terror in the course of 1938. Why did Stalin and Molotov decide to rein in Ezhov and the NKVD and limit mass arrests? Recent evidence suggests that by the autumn of 1938 the Stalinist leaders had become aware of the dysfunctional aspects of repression and sought to restore a modicum of 'normality' to party and economic life.[30] These are just a few of the themes and issues, I suspect, that will engage scholars in the immediate future. Two things are for sure - the 'great debate' on Stalin, Stalinism and the Terror will continue for a long time to come and we should expect no 'definitive' answers regardless of archival revelations.

NOTES

1. Cited from A. G. Latyshev, 'Riadom so Stalinym', *Sovershenno sekretno*, no. 12 (1990), p. 19.
2. Among the key texts are: R. Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purges of the Thirties* (Harmondsworth, 1971), up-dated as *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (London, 1990); R. A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism,* revised edn (Oxford, 1989); R. C. Tucker, *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941* (New York, 1990); J. A. Getty and R. T. Manning (eds), *Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives* (Cambridge, 1993); S. Davies, *Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Propaganda, Terror*

and Dissent, 1934-1941 (Cambridge, 1997). The most recent contribution is B. McLoughlin and K. McDermott (eds), *Stalin's Terror: High Politics and Mass Repression in the Soviet Union* (Basingstoke, 2003).

3. C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd edn* (Cambridge: Mass, 1965).

4. See M. Lewin, *The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia* (London, 1985); S. Fitzpatrick, *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934* (Cambridge, 1979); and S. Fitzpatrick (ed.), *The Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931* (Bloomington, 1978).

5. The 'revisionists' were never a coherent grouping, but prime examples of their work are J. A. Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938* (Cambridge, 1985); G. T. Rittersporn, *Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications: Social Tensions and Political Conflicts in the USSR, 1933-1953* (Chur, 1991); R. W. Thurston, *Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934-1941* (New Haven, 1996). See also Getty and Manning (eds), *Stalinist Terror.* For an impressive account of the debates, see C. Ward, *Stalin's Russia,* 2nd edn (London, 1999) pp. 106-47. The fierce polemics engendered by the totalitarian-revisionist controversy can be found in S. Fitzpatrick, 'New Perspectives on Stalinism', *Russian Review*, vol. 45 (1986), pp. 357-73, the discussions that followed at pp. 375-413, and in *Russian Review*, vol. 46 (1987), pp. 375-431.

6. For a useful overview of the problems, see J. A. Getty, 'The Politics of Repression Revisited', in Getty and Manning (eds), *Stalinist Terror,* pp. 40-62.

7. See the relevant documents and commentaries in J. A. Getty and O. V. Naumov, *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939* (New Haven, 1999), pp. 444-51 and 454-62; see also the telegram correspondence between A. A. Andreev, Secretary of the Central Committee, and Stalin in A. V. Kvashonkin, L. P. Kosheleva, L. A. Rogovaia and O. V. Khlevniuk (eds), *Sovetskoe rukovodstvo. Perepiska, 1928-1941* (Moscow, 1999), pp. 364-7, 371-5, 377-80, 383-9, 393-7.

8. Getty and Naumov, *The Road to Terror*, pp. xiii and 451. See also J. A. Getty, 'Afraid of Their Shadows: The Bolshevik Recourse to Terror, 1932-1938', in M. Hildermeier with E. Müller-Luckner (eds), *Stalinismus vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Neue Wege der Forschung* (Munich, 1998), pp. 169-91; and J. A. Getty, '"Excesses are not permitted": Mass Terror and Stalinist Governance in the Late 1930s', *Russian Review*, vol. 61 (2002), pp. 113-38.

9. L. T. Lih, O. V. Naumov and O. V. Khlevniuk (eds), *Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936* (New Haven, 1995), p. 200.

10. This is, basically, the interpretation of the world-renowned Russian expert, Oleg Khlevniuk, in his numerous works on the subject. See, for example, 'The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937-1938', in J. Cooper, M. Perrie and E. A. Rees (eds), *Soviet History, 1917-1953: Essays in Honour of R. W. Davies* (Basingstoke, 1995), pp. 158-76; and 'Party and NKVD. Power Relationships in the Years of the Great Terror', in McLoughlin and McDermott (eds), *Stalin's Terror,* pp. 21-33.

11. M. Ellman, 'The Soviet 1937 Provincial Show Trials: Carnival or Terror?', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 53 (2001), p. 1225.

12. D. J. Nordlander, review of Getty and Naumov, The Road to Terror in *Europe-Asia Studies,* vol. 52 (2000), pp. 769-71. See also E. A. Rees' review of the same volume 'The Great Terror: Suicide or Murder?', *Russian Review,* vol. 59 (2000), pp. 446-50.

13. P. M. Hagenloh, '"Socially Harmful Elements" and the Great Terror', in S. Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Stalinism: New Directions* (London, 2000), pp. 286-308.

14. D. Shearer, 'Social Disorder, Mass Repression and the NKVD during the 1930s', in McLoughlin and McDermott (eds), *Stalin's Terror,* pp. 85-117; see also D. R. Shearer, 'Crime and Social Disorder in Stalin's Russia: A Reassessment of the Great Retreat and the Origins of Mass Repression', *Cahiers du Monde russe,* vol. 39 (1998), pp. 119-48.

15. For the English text of Order No. 00447, see Getty and Naumov, *The Road to Terror*, pp. 473-80.

16. R. Binner and M. Junge, 'Wie der Terror "Gross" wurde. Massenmord und Lagerhaft nach Befehl 00447', *Cahiers du Monde russe*, vol. 42 (2001), pp. 557-614.

17. The total of 186,500 Gulag sentences is my own calculation and is also implied in Khlevnyuk, 'The Objectives of the Great Terror', p. 162. J. Arch Getty, however, gives the slightly higher figure of 194,000 in his '"Excesses are not permitted"', p. 117.

18. The evolution of Stalinist national policies can be found in T. Martin, 'The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing',

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19. For details, see N. Petrov and A. Roginskii, 'The "Polish Operation" of the NKVD, 1937-8', in McLoughlin and McDermott (eds), *Stalin's Terror,* pp. 153-72.

20. W. J. Chase, *Enemies within the Gates?: The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934-1939* (New Haven and London, 2001).

21. I. Kershaw and M. Lewin, 'The Regimes and Their Dictators: Perspectives of Comparison', in I. Kershaw and M. Lewin (eds), *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 8; see also C. S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge: Mass, 1988), pp. 71-84.

22. This at least is the view of O. V. Khlevniuk, 'The Reasons for the "Great Terror": The Foreign-Political Aspect', in S. Pons and A. Romano (eds), *Russia in the Age of Wars, 1914-1945* (Milan, 2000), pp. 159-69.

23. See A. Resis (ed.), *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics* (Chicago, 1993), p. 254.

24. Tucker, *Stalin in Power*, p. 444.

25. For new local and regional studies of the terror, see H. Kuromiya, 'Stalinist Terror in the Donbas: A Note', in Getty and Manning (eds), *Stalinist Terror,* pp. 215-22; R. T. Manning, 'The Great Purges in a Rural District: Belyi Raion Revisited', in Getty and Manning (eds), *Stalinist Terror,* pp. 168-97; F. Benvenuti, 'Industry and Purge in the Donbas, 1936-37', *Europe-Asia Studies,* vol. 45 (1993), pp. 57-78; S. Fitzpatrick, 'How the Mice Buried the Cat. Scenes from the Great Purges in the Russian Provinces', *Russian Review,* vol. 52 (1993), pp. 299-320; R. Weinberg, 'Purge and Politics in the Periphery: Birobidzhan in 1937', *Slavic Review,* vol. 52 (1993), pp. 13-27; S. Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley, 1995), pp. 280-354; J. R. Harris, 'The Purging of Local Cliques in the Urals Region, 1936-7', in Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Stalinism,* pp. 262-85; M. Ilic, 'The Great Terror in Leningrad: A Quantitative Analysis', *Europe-Asia Studies,* vol. 52 (2000), pp. 1515-34; L. Rimmel, 'A Microcosm of Terror, or Class Warfare in Leningrad: The March 1935 Exile of "Alien Elements"', *Jahrbucher für Geschichte Osteuropas,* Bd 48 (2000), pp. 528-51; Ellman, 'The Soviet 1937 Provincial Show Trials', pp. 1221-33.

26. See for instance, H. Hudson Jnr, *Blueprints and Blood: The Stalinization of Soviet Architecture, 1917-1937* (Princeton, 1994), pp. 147-65; S. Reid, 'Socialist Realism in the Stalinist Terror: The Industry of Socialism Art Exhibition, 1935-41', *Russian Review*, vol. 60 (2001), pp. 153-84; C. Brooke, 'Soviet Musicians and the Great Terror', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 54 (2002), pp. 397-413; and K. B. Eaton (ed.), *Enemies of the People: The Destruction of Soviet Literary, Theater, and Film Arts in the 1930s* (Evanston, 2002).

27. For a recent general text which seeks to integrate ideas and political practice in the USSR, see M. Sandle, *A Short History of Soviet Socialism* (London, 1999).

28. See G. T. Rittersporn, 'The Omnipresent Conspiracy: On Soviet Imagery of Politics and Social Relations in the 1930s', in Getty and Manning (eds), *Stalinist Terror,* pp. 99-115; and S. Davies, '"Us" against "Them": Social Identity in Soviet Russia, 1934-41', in Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Stalinism,* pp. 47-70.

29. See Thurston, *Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia,* pp. 199-226.

30. See B. McLoughlin, 'Mass Operations of the NKVD, 1937-8: A Survey', in McLoughlin and McDermott, *Stalin's Terror,* pp. 118-52.

Appeasement and the Czechoslovaks

DR MARIA DOWLING

'All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness.'

Thus Winston Churchill bade his famous if premature farewell to Czechoslovakia in the House of Commons after the Munich conference.[1] 'Munich' in fact became a synonym for the policy of appeasement which was disastrous for the Czechoslovaks on two counts. First, it destroyed the unity of the country and effectively delivered the Czech lands into the hands of Nazi Germany. Second, it delivered the reunited country into the hands of the Communists after World War II.

The story of the destruction of Czechoslovakia is soon told.[2] Agitation by the ethnic German minority (who came to call themselves 'Sudeten Germans') which was encouraged by Nazi Germany led to a series of interventions by the Western democracies, France and (more particularly) Great Britain. France was bound by treaty to support Czechoslovakia militarily in case of attack by a third party. Britain was not so bound, but as the ally of France felt obliged to consider the former power's commitments in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition the prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, felt a moral obligation to avoid war at all costs.[3] This led him to pay a number of visits to Hitler, at each of which the German Fuhrer increased the demands and exaggerated the grievances of the Germans of Czechoslovakia. The last of these meetings took the form of the Munich conference, brokered by Mussolini and attended by Hitler, the French premier and foreign minister Daladier and Bonnet, and Chamberlain and his foreign minister Lord Halifax. The Czechoslovaks sent representatives, but they were not invited to attend the conference. Instead these men languished in a hotel until summoned by a weary Chamberlain to learn that peace had been saved, but at the cost of the integrity of their country. Altogether the Czechoslovaks lost about 11,000 square miles of territory, 800,000 citizens of whom more than 700,000 were Czechs rather than ethnic Germans, and the major part of the chemical, glass and textile industries and of steel and ironworks.

Six months later, on the night of 13-14 March, the Munich agreement was broken by the Germans when they invaded the Czech lands.[4] Emil Hacha, who had succeeded Edvard Benes as president when the former was forced by Nazi pressure to resign and leave the country, was summoned to Berlin and forced to sign a document asking for German protection for the Czech lands, which duly became the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. Meanwhile the Slovak leader, Jozef Tiso, had been seen by Hitler and bluntly offered the choice between independence- again under German protection- or rule by Hungary. As the leading Slovak politicians had been agitating for independence, or at least some form of autonomy, for decades, Tiso was happy enough to accept Hitler's offer. Thus Czechoslovakia disappeared from the map of Europe.

Many Czechoslovaks, however, refused to acquiesce in the destruction of their country. In the Czech lands a resistance movement soon formed. While the bulk of the population took refuge in forms of petty harassment known as the 'policy of pinpricks' (actions such as misdirecting Germans in the street, changing the destination boards on trams and buses and pretending not to understand German), the resistance performed more daring feats of sabotage. There were huge fires at industrial concerns such as the Skoda armaments works in Plzen, while in the countryside fields full of crops unaccountably caught fire just before harvest. The Germans for their part reacted to the provocation, and in November 1939 themselves provoked a student demonstration which gave them the pretext for closing the Czech universities as well as committing numerous atrocities against Czech students.

Resistance, however, continued unabated. So concerned were the Nazi rulers of the Czech lands that the Reichsprotektor, Constantin von Neurath, was recalled on the pretence of sick leave and a deputy sent to Prague in his place. Neurath's effective successor was Reinhard Heydrich, the 'blond

beast' who was soon to be known as the 'hangman of Prague'. (He was also to be the architect of the Holocaust.) Soon after his arrival in autumn 1941, Heydrich implemented what can only be described as a reign of terror.[5] Immediately he declared a civil state of emergency and established summary courts to deal with real and suspected offenders. Between 27 September 1941 and 20 January 1942 these courts awarded 394 death sentences and sent more than 1,134 people to the Gestapo for further investigation.[6]

So much for the fate of the Czechs. The Slovaks, meanwhile, found that their coveted independence was little more than a sham. True, and unlike the Czechs, they did not have to endure direct occupation. True, too, that Nazi Germany regarded Slovakia as its 'calling card' to the rest of East-Central Europe, and so was anxious to keep up the appearance of good relations. None the less, the treaty of protection of 23 March 1939 between Nazi Germany and Slovakia allowed the Germans to station troops and build fortifications on Slovak soil; effectively, this gave them control of Slovak defence and foreign policy, and made Slovakia into a satellite of the Third Reich.

The heady patriotic euphoria with which Slovak 'independence' was initially greeted was soon replaced with disillusion, and then outright resistance to the clerico-fascist Slovak state and its German protectors. Slovaks imitated their Czech brothers and sisters in the 'policy of pinpricks' and in more dramatic acts of sabotage.[7]

There were also groups of partisans who conducted an organised resistance from the mountains. Many, though certainly not all, of the partisans were Communists.[8] In August 1944 resistance would culminate in the Slovak National Uprising, a heroic venture which met with some initial success but ultimately failed due to lack of military assistance from abroad. While logistically the Soviet Union was the foreign power from whom such aid might be expected, Stalin both failed to supply the insurgents himself and effectively prevented the western allies from doing so either, by letting it be known that he considered Czechoslovakia to lie in the Soviet sphere of operations.[9]

Meanwhile the former president Benes had worked hard to set in motion a Czechoslovak 'Action Abroad'. In July 1939 he had travelled to London, where he began the slow process of obtaining official recognition by the British authorities of himself as president of Czechoslovakia and also of a government in exile.[10] In July 1941 he gained provisional recognition for his government; a year later full recognition was granted. This came in the wake of the assassination of Heydrich by British-trained Czechoslovak partisans. The killing of Heydrich led to a horrific programme of reprisals against the Czech population, including the wholesale destruction of the villages of Lidice and Lezaky. This did little to endear Benes and the exiled democrats to the home population.

The alternative to democracy was, of course, Communism, and it is appropriate here to discuss the Czechoslovak party. This had been allowed to function legally in democratic Czechoslovakia between the wars, when the party leadership blindly followed the Comintern in refusing to co-operate with non-Communist parties against the threat of Nazism. This was all the more extraordinary, since, as foreign minister from 1923 to 1935, Benes had consistently followed a policy friendly to the Soviet Union. In his view, there could be no true international security unless Soviet Russia were readmitted to the comity of nations, and to that end a Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty was signed in May 1935. This promised Soviet military aid if Czechoslovakia were attacked by a third party, though this aid would only be given if France first assisted Czechoslovakia as she was bound by treaty to do. [11]

In 1938 Klement Gottwald and other leading Communists fled to Moscow. Following the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact in August 1939 and the outbreak of war in September they denounced the war as an imperialist struggle from which the mighty Soviet Union, as guardian of the interests of the international proletariat, rightly stood aloof. With an eye to the post war future of Czechoslovakia they worked by means of propaganda to discredit the work of Benes and the 'Action Abroad' as well as to harp on the failings of the western democracies.

One pamphlet produced by the Czechoslovak Communists is particularly interesting. Published in London in English as *Czechoslovakia's Guilty Men*, its title echoed the classic denunciation of appeasement by 'Cato', first published in July 1940. 'Cato's' work categorically blamed the policy of appeasement for the Second World War and all the military disasters of that conflict to date. The Czechoslovak pamphlet lacked the graceful irony of the original *Guilty Men*. Instead, in the hectoring

tones typical of Communist literature of the time, it blamed Benes and the western Allies for fighting an imperialist war at the expense of the Czech and Slovak peoples. While the author or authors were not averse to stirring things in London for the government in exile, it seems likely that the purpose of the pamphlet was also to undermine Benes in particular and democracy in general with the home population. It seems probable that versions of the document were probably also published in the Czech and Slovak languages and smuggled into the Protectorate and Slovakia for the edification of the home population. Internal evidence shows the pamphlet to have been published between the fall of France and the German invasion of the Soviet Union- when, of course, the complexion of the war changed for Communists.[12]

The Soviet Union was, naturally enough, more concerned with the struggle against the Nazi invader than with quarrels between Czechoslovaks. None the less, as the war progressed Stalin turned his thoughts to the post war complexion of Europe. The security of the Soviet Union was his priority, and so 'friendly' governments in Central and Eastern Europe were a necessity. Stalin seems to have suffered from two slightly contradictory fears: that after victory the Western Allies would turn on the Soviet Union; and that after defeat a resurgent and revengeful Germany would once more invade the USSR.[13]

This was why the affairs of Czechoslovakia became of interest to Stalin. His attitude to the Czechoslovak politicians was much more complex than that to the neighbouring Poles. For Poland, nothing less would do than a Communist government composed of Stalin's own puppets who had spent the war years in Poland; thus he rejected the London-based Polish government in exile. He recognised Benes, however, as the only man of any stature to represent Czechoslovak interests, and during the war was quite prepared to negotiate with him. This was not unconnected to his contempt for foreign Communists. He often spoke of them as 'peasant politicians', and on one occasion told Benes that the Czechoslovak Communists were 'simple people without erudition'.[14] Indeed, his cynical attitude to his followers in the Comintern is shown by the fact that he purged the foreign parties as thoroughly as he did the Soviet one. Moreover, during the period of the non-aggression pact with Hitler he sent many German Communists and Social Democrats back to the Third Reich to face the tender mercies of the Nazi regime.[15]

Stalin had one moral weapon he could use in any negotiations with Benes, and this was the fact that he had not been a signatory of the Munich pact. Indeed, on two occasions in December 1943 Stalin took pains to maintain the fiction that he had been prepared to help Czechoslovakia in the hour of crisis. At an official banquet in the Kremlin he asked Benes why he had not fought in 1938; and later that evening, at a showing of a newsreel of Soviet troops, he reproached Benes, saying that the red army had been at Czechoslovakia's disposal at the time of Munich. [16] Indeed, as Igor Lukes remarks, Stalin was 'The Man Who Won at Munich'. Much later, Gottwald claimed that Stalin had assured him of unconditional military help in 1938, regardless of whether or not the French fulfilled their treaty obligations. With Stalin's permission he had relayed this information to President Benes, who had failed to act on it. That this was a blatant and opportunistic lie, made after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and after the death of Benes, is quite evident. [17]

In December 1943, and much to the displeasure of the British and Americans, the Czechoslovaks signed a treaty with the Soviet Union.[18] This promised that the Soviets would not intervene in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. None the less, in subsequent negotiations with the Czechoslovak Communist leadership in Moscow, Benes had to make a large number of concessions. The Communists were to have all the government ministries except that of justice, while the new prime minister was to be Zdenek Fierlinger, a Social Democrat so subservient to the Communists that he was later nicknamed 'Quislinger'.

Benes did return to Czechoslovakia via Moscow, and he was concerned on the long journey from Kosice in Eastern Slovakia to Prague to stop in as many towns as possible to reassure the population that democracy had returned.[19] Though his journey to Prague became something of a triumphal progress, the Communist propaganda machine was already busy reminding people that democracy had been responsible for the policy of appeasement that culminated in the debacle of Munich. In the elections of May 1946 the Communists polled almost 38 per cent of the vote. Within just over two

years, in February 1948, the Communist politicians felt strong enough to launch a coup and seize control of both government and state.[20]

It would be facile to suggest that the pre war policy of appeasement was alone sufficient to bring the Communists to power. Czechoslovakia after the war was faced with a number of complex problems, among them the expulsion of the ethnic German minority and the question of land reform. In addition the Communists were both nervous that they would lose votes in the coming elections and encouraged by the first Cominform meeting in September 1947, which they took as a sign of encouragement from Moscow. Yet when Sheila Grant Duff visited Czechoslovakia as part of a Fabian Society delegation the word she heard most often was 'Munich'. This experience informed both Czechoslovak foreign policy and the attitude of the man in the street. [21] Appeasement in general and the Munich conference in particular continued to feature as reasons for the Communist triumph in Czechoslovak historiography, dissident as well as official.[22] For dissident historiography, cf. Eagle Glasheim, 'The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia, 1945 – 47', in Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, eds, *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948* (Lanham, 2001), p. 211. For official, Communist-controlled historiography see, for example, Miloslav Novak, *Munich Pact 1938, Betrayal of Collective Security* (International Association of Journalists, Prague. 1988). A British Communist variant is Tony Gilbert, *Treachery at Munich* (Liberation Books, London, 1988).

However well meaning its proponents might have been, certain it is that appeasement was fatal to a renewal of democracy in Czechoslovakia after World War II.

NOTES

1 Quoted in Robert Rhodes James, *Churchill: A Study in Failure 1900-1939* (Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 432.

2 For a more detailed account, Maria Dowling, *Czechoslovakia* (London, 2002), Chapters 3 and 4. It is unfortunate that President Benes' own account of the Munich crisis, Mnichovske dny ('Days of Munich') has not been translated into English. In fact, it was only published in Czech during the short-lived Prague Spring of 1968.

3 For a sympathetic view of Chamberlain, John Charmley, *Chamberlain and the Lost Peace* (London, 1989).

4 Czechoslovakia was comprised of Bohemia and Moravia (the Czech lands), Slovakia, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. This last province was acquired by Hungary by the first Vienna award of December 1938. The award was made by Hitler and Mussolini without reference to the democratic signatories of Munich.

5 Cf.. Czechoslovak Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [ie, the Czechoslovak government in exile], On the Reign of Terror in Bohemia and Moravia under Reinhard Heydrich (London, 1942).

6 Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Four Fighting Years* (London, 1943), pp. 117-21.

7 For Slovakia during World War II, Peter A. Toma and Dusan Kovac, *Slovakia from Samo to Durinda* (Stanford, 2001), Chapter 6; and Matej K. Schwitzer, *Slovakia, The Path to Nationhood* (London, 2002), Chapters 14 and 15.

8 For an autobiographical, Communist account of wartime Slovakia and the partisans, Alexander Dubcek, *Hope Dies Last* (London, 1993), Chapters 5 - 7.

9 Dowling, *Czechoslovakia,* pp. 74-76

10 For detailed discussion of Anglo-Czechoslovak relations and of the recognition process, Martin D. Brown, *'Dealing with Democrats. Decision Making and Foreign Policy Formation within the British Foreign Office's Central Department with regard to the Czechoslovak political exiles in Britain and the Czechoslovak Question, 1939 – 1945'*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Surrey, 2003.

11 Igor Lukes, *Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler, The Diplomacy of Edvard Benes in the 1930s* (Oxford, 1996).

12 *Czechoslovakia's Guilty Men: The Inside Story of the Czechoslovakian "Provisional Government"*, published by Modern Books Ltd, London. There is no author or date, but that this was 1940 can be deduced from a reference to the granting of provisional recognition to the government in exile in July.

13 For views of Stalin's fears and foreign policy, cf. Lloyd C. Gardner, *Spheres of Influence; The Partition of Europe, from Munich to Malta* (London, 1993); and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, *Stalin's Cold War, Soviet Strategies in Eastern Europe, 1943 to 1956* (Manchester, 1995).

14 Edward Taborsky, *President Edvard Benes Between East and West 1938 – 1948* (Stanford, 1981), p. 207.

15 Margarete Buber-Neumann, *Milena, the Story of a Remarkable Friendship* (New York, 1988). The author and her husband were two such victims of Stalin's cynicism.

16 Taborsky, *President Benes Between East and West,* p. 67. Taborsky served Benes as his personal aide and legal adviser and was an eyewitness of both these incidents.

17 Lukes, *Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler*, pp. 256-60.

18 For the treaty and Benes' policy towards the Soviet Union, Hubert Ripka, *East and West* (London, 1944). Ripka was deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in the government in exile.

19 Taborsky, *President Benes Between East and West,* pp. 211 ff.

20 For the Communist coup, Karel Kaplan, *The Short March, The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia, 1945 – 1948* (London, 1987).

21 Sheila Grant Duff et al, *Czechoslovakia: 6 Studies in Reconstruction* (Fabian Society, London, 1946), pp. 13. The other members of the delegation were the MPs John Parker, H.D. Hughes and James Callaghan; and Michael Young and Carol Johnson.

Historians and the Holocaust since 1945

DR NEIL GREGOR

Over the past ten years the Holocaust has come to occupy a central place in the historical consciousness of the western world. Academic studies and popular histories alike have proliferated in ways which would have seemed unthinkable to pioneering scholars in this area in the decade or two immediately after the war. Beyond this, however, its presence is manifest in almost every field of our political, civic and popular culture. It is regularly treated in films - from Hollywood blockbusters such as 'Schindler's List' to art house movies such as 'Aimee und Jaguar'. It has become a central feature of the museal topography of the western world, as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, exhibitions at the Imperial War Museum, London and a host of dedicated sites in Germany and the rest of former occupied Europe show.[1] It has moved centre-stage in a series of controversies in the sphere of contemporary politics and international relations, causing, for example, protracted disputes over compensation for those who suffered as forced workers at the hands of German business and the Nazi regime, or over the return of dormant or looted assets held by Swiss (and other European) banks but rightfully belonging to other governments or to the descendants of murdered Jews.[2] And as both the institution of Britain's Holocaust Memorial Day and the constant references to the Jewish catastrophe made during the Rwandan genocide of 1994 or the successive waves of ethnic violence in former Yugoslavia show, the Holocaust has become the yardstick by which other crimes against humanity are judged.[3]

From the perspective of the present, one could be forgiven for assuming that it was ever thus. However, for many years after the war, the Holocaust occupied a very marginal position in most people's understanding of Nazism and the Second World War. In West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, the pioneering serious scholarly work on Nazism - such as that by Karl Dietrich Bracher - tended to focus on the failure of the Weimar Republic and on the Nazi seizure of power rather than on Nazi racial policy.[4] Given the experience of the 1920s and the status of West Germany as a fledgling new democracy whose success was far from guaranteed, it was perhaps understandable that historians should want to explore the circumstances under which democratic systems succeed or fail. For reasons which were similarly rooted in the immediate present of the 1950s, many historians also focussed their attention on resistance to Hitler, wanting to demonstrate that not all Germans had been Nazis and that there had been non-fascist political traditions in Germany which had survived under and through Nazism. In Britain, meanwhile, the early focus was on the origins of the Second World War rather than on the Holocaust. Alan Bullock's otherwise magisterial biography of Hitler devoted only 15 or so pages out of 800 to the genocide;[5] likewise, the famous controversy between A.J.P. Taylor and Hugh Trevor-Roper of the 1960s focussed on the diplomatic history of the 1930s. This was also no doubt understandable in its way, since the dimension of Nazi rule which impacted most obviously upon Great Britain was of course the war, but it did have the unfortunate unintended effect of consigning the Holocaust to the margins of most historians' concerns.[6]

From the late 1950s onwards, however, a series of events and pressures combined to encourage a greater focus on the events of the Holocaust. In 1958 the trial in Ulm of some former members of one of the Einsatzgruppen- the notorious SS killing squads which entered the Soviet Union behind the regular German army in 1941 and undertook mass shootings of Jewish civilians - brought to a close the period of judicial silence which characterised the 1950s and fostered a growing sense within West German society that a problematic past had not been adequately confronted. This was confirmed by the capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann, which caused a media sensation across the western world, and by the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial of 1963 to 1965, at which several guards from the former concentration and extermination camp were indicted. Meanwhile, in 1966 the neo-fascist NPD made a series of striking gains in West German regional elections, giving the problem of fascism a renewed topicality such as it had not enjoyed for some years.[7] In Israel, the 1967 war was also instrumental in fostering a revival of Jewish consciousness which drew upon images of the Holocaust to mobilise

support for Jewish defence against a hostile outside world, stimulating a wider interest in the experience of the genocide which was hitherto lacking in large parts of Israeli society.

The more critical intellectual and political climate of the 1960s also started to feed into the ways in which a new generation of historians thought about the nature of the 'Third Reich'.[8] Previously, most historians had contented themselves with a simple image of Nazism as a 'totalitarian' state, in the sense of it having been a monolithic regime, driven by ideological intentions and maintaining itself in power purely by means of a massive terror apparatus against which a defenceless population had been powerless to act. According to this model, responsibility began and ended with Hitler, the Gestapo and the SS; the institutions of civil society (army, bureaucracy, industry, judiciary) did not figure in this interpretation, and the complicity of ordinary Germans was similarly not discussed. But in the 1960s, a more critical attitude towards capitalism, the bureaucracy and the state more generally, coupled with the student movement's critique of the failings of the older generation, encouraged historians to think about the nature of the Nazi regime more broadly than before. This set the scene for what has come to be known as the 'intentionalist' versus ' structuralist' debate, the debate which gave the decisive impulse towards a proper historical understanding of the Holocaust, which dominated historical discussion throughout the 1970s and 1980s and which continues, in many ways, to shape the agenda of historical research today.

On the one side of this debate stood the so-called 'intentionalists', who, as the label implies, continued to foreground the role of Hitler's ideological ambitions in driving both Nazi foreign policy and racial policy down its path of destruction. Focussing on evidence such as MeinKampf- Hitler's infamous political tract of 1925 - historians such as Gerald Fleming, Karl Hildebrand or Lucy Dawiedowicz emphasised that Hitler had been the key decision-maker and driving force behind a process whose broad outlines had been implicit, if not explicit, in Nazi ideology more or less from the outset.[9] Against this emerged the school of thinking which has come to be known as the 'structuralists', or 'functionalists', so-called because they stressed the need to think about the evolution of the Holocaust in terms of the evolving internal structures of the Nazi regime, or as a product of the ways in which it functioned politically. Historians such as Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat began to argue that far from operating with long term programmes based on clear goals, Nazi policies emerged on an *ad hoc* basis in response to a series of ongoing 'problems' which the inherently chaotic government system was unable to 'solve'; far from seeing a co-ordinated state machinery implementing clear goals they saw conflicting pressures and rivalries which generated a self perpetuating radicalisation of policy towards the achievement of goals which were themselves only loosely defined.[10] Hans Mommsen saw this permanent internal conflict as generating an ongoing 'cumulative radicalisation' down the path to destruction; and as Karl Schleunes emphasised in the title of a key work, the route to genocide was very much a 'twisted road' rather than a 'straight path'.[11]

The impulses created by the 'structuralist' challenge to existing orthodoxies had many important advantages. Firstly, they encouraged historians to recognise that there had been a much broader range of perpetrators and collaborators in the genocide of the Jews than the old 'totalitarianism' model, with its excessive emphasis on the SS, had allowed. Historians now began to focus their attention more closely on the role of the bureaucracy in framing anti-semitic legislation, on the role of the judiciary in implementing terroristic 'justice', or on the role of local government in administering the racism of everyday life. For example, in 1978 Christian Streit published the pioneering study *Keine Kameraden* ('Not comrades'), which demonstrated conclusively that the regular *Wehrmacht* had been directly responsible for the mass murder of 3.3 million Soviet prisoners of war between 1941 and 1945, on the basis of orders which the Army High Command had themselves helped to devise.[12] Slightly later, Ulrich Herbert published his seminal study of forced labour in the Third Reich, demonstrating the active role played by German big business in the barbaric exploitation and - often - mass murder of millions of foreign prisoners of war and civilian deportees as forced labour in Germany's wartime factories.[13] The cumulative effect of such writings was to underline that a very wide range of institutions and organisations from all areas of state and society had become actively involved in the implementation of some of the most murderous aspects of Nazi racial policy.

Secondly, and closely linked to this, the 'structuralist' school of historiography encouraged a much broader focus on the range of victims of Nazi racial and social policy. As well as stimulating

much further study on the mass murder of the Jews, it fostered - eventually - study of the murder of the Sinti and Roma people, up to half a million of whom were killed by the Nazis during the war; for the first time, serious work was also produced on the euthanasia programme, which killed many tens of thousands of innocent handicapped, ill or socially marginal people in Germany and the occupied territories, and on the related programme of forced sterilisation, which saw brutal physical intervention in the reproductive rights and abilities of at least 350,000 German women and men.[14] The cumulative impact of such work was to ensure that the category of 'race' was moved towards historians' understanding of every field of Nazi policy, so much so that by 1991 Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann could entitle their general survey of the history of the Third Reich 'The Racial State'.[15]

On the negative side, one unfortunate consequence of such debates about the nature of the Nazi regime was that the Holocaust was often discussed in terms of very abstract or theoretical models of the Nazi state and its evolution. In considering the Nazi polity and how it functioned, in arguing over whether Nazi Germany should be considered 'fascist' or 'totalitarian', in debating whether the Holocaust should be seen as a logical product of the pathologies of modernity, historians appeared to be in increasing danger of losing sight of the very human dimensions of the problem they were supposed to be discussing. The Holocaust, after all, should not be seen solely in terms of abstract systems of rule, killing vast numbers of anonymous victims: crucial dimensions of the Holocaust can only be understood, and their moral meanings adequately reflected upon, if we remember that the genocide was implemented by many, many ordinary people being willing to kill - face to face - many other ordinary people.

The key historiographical trends of the 1990s and the present may be seen in large part as a reaction to these depersonalising debates over the nature of the regime, with their occasional tendency towards excessive theoretical abstraction. In the first place, recent years have witnessed a welcome emphasis on returning individual humanity to the victims. This may be seen in the flood of survivor memoirs collected and published - often with the help of historians - with the intention of giving a voice to those whose suffering should be placed centre-stage of the story but whose personal histories were often neglected as historians grappled with understanding the politics of the Nazi regime itself.[16] Similarly, recent years have seen the creation of number of projects and foundations charged with recording the testimonies of survivors of the Holocaust before this increasingly elderly generation has died out - this is now, of course, a matter of some urgency. Indeed, recently historians have begun to move beyond the conventional format of the oral history interview to engage in subtle and complex reconstructions of the life histories and memories of individual survivors -Mark Roseman's groundbreaking study *The Past in Hiding,* which is both deeply moving and academically rigorous, is perhaps the best recent example of this.[17] That such moves in academic writing have found their parallels in the field of popular culture is shown by the 1998 film *Life is Beautiful,* which, although in many ways a deeply problematic and troubling film, had the merit of seeking to portray the victims of Nazi concentration camps as individuals with families, careers and communities from which they were wrenched, and not just as anonymous members of a homogeneous mass.[18]

Connected to this, recent scholarship has attempted to return human attributes and character to the mass of mid- and low-level functionaries in all sorts of spheres of life who were responsible for implementing the Holocaust 'on the ground'. Christopher Browning's essential study *Ordinary Men: Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* is perhaps the best example of a new wave of writing which has sought to answer the question 'How did the Nazis get ordinary people to kill?' Focussing on one police unit stationed in Poland during the war, Browning examined how unremarkable middle-aged men were co-opted into the machinery of genocide, and how most showed themselves to be compliant, if sometimes reluctant, face-to-face killers of innocent Jews.[19] In sensitive and careful fashion Browning analysed how a complex, evolving mixture of several factors - situation, routine, pressure, belief - facilitated policemen's willingness to participate in such appalling crimes. A quite different view, of course, was taken a little later by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen in his international best seller *Hitler's Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust,* in which he argued that the Holocaust, and ordinary Germans' willingness to participate in it, could be explained simply in terms of an alleged eliminationist anti-semitism which spread through German society in the 19th century to the extent that the Holocaust could be seen as the implementation of a German national project.[20] Conceptually weak and lacking in anything approaching convincing evidence, Goldhagen

proved only that the worse a book is, the more it sometimes sells, but it did have the merit of focussing a broader reading public on the question of what it is that motivates ordinary people to participate in such barbaric acts.

It is not only those engaged in the immediate business of killing who have been the focus of recent historical attention, however. Over the last five or so years, an increasing amount of work has been published which seeks to understand the role played by the mid-level 'managers' of genocide who inhabited the agencies described in largely faceless, impersonal terms by an earlier generation of 'structuralist' historians.[21] Individual and group biographies of SS planners and organisers occupying the layer of authority just below Himmler and Heydrich have shown how agencies such as the RHSA (Reich Security Main Office) were staffed by highly educated, intelligent, rational men whose ideological vision of a racially restructured Europe was matched by the organisational skill and detached ruthlessness to implement it.[22] Even Adolf Eichmann, once held up as a symbol of a putatively German disposition towards the kind of blind bureaucratic obedience upon which Hitler and Himmler supposedly depended, has recently come in for a long overdue critical re-evaluation. As David Cesarani's important forthcoming study shows, Eichmann was an ideologically committed functionary whose right wing beliefs had been formed long before the Holocaust in the environment of Austrian paramilitary politics in the 1920s and 1930s.[23]

The key effect of this work has been to collapse what is now recognised as the false distinction between ideological and bureaucratic impulses towards the Holocaust which characterised the older debates between 'intentionalists' and 'functionalists'. As a result, historians have come to recognise that for all the extent to which competition and chaos were key characteristics of the regime, it was still a regime which operated on the basis of what the doyen of Holocaust history, Raul Hilberg, long ago characterised as a 'shared understanding': a 'shared understanding' that, one way or another, the Jews were to be eradicated.[24] In other words, a renewed focus on the cooperative dimensions of mass murder has been reinserted into our understanding of the implementation of genocide. Historians have, indeed, been analysing the evolution of the Holocaust recently less in terms of an ongoing process of struggle between various agencies at the centre of government in Berlin, and more as a set of ongoing, mutually enforcing interactions between the Nazi leadership in Germany and a range of executive organs operating in the occupied territories of Europe between 1939 and 1945. A crucial aspect of recent research has been the wave of local and regional studies of the implementation of the genocide 'on the ground' - in Lithuania or Galicia, for example - which have shown that the Holocaust emerged as a series of haphazard, loosely linked actions which were only co-ordinated from above in the most general way, and which relied upon active local initiatives in the field enacted by dynamic, committed figures who correctly sensed what it was that Hitler and Himmler wanted.[25] The key finding of such local studies is that they show how diverse the implementation of genocide was from locality to locality and from region to region: the scope that such diversity left for individual initiative could only, of course, result in genocide if those charged with implementing Hitler's wishes in any given region were fully committed to the cause.[26] The uncomfortable conclusion towards which historical scholarship has thus been edging unmistakeably is that the implementation of the Holocaust rested upon the willingness of a large number of people to participate in it, although there is much ongoing debate about people's motivation to do so.

In moving towards such conclusions, historians of the Holocaust have, of course, been both reflecting and shaping our changing understanding of the nature of the Nazi regime more generally. Few historians would now use the terminology of 'totalitarianism' to describe the Third Reich (although Michael Burleigh has argued forcefully for its continued use), and the language of 'intentionalism' and 'structuralism' has similarly come to have a very tired and outdated feel about it. Perhaps the best recent interpretative model, which both captures the significance of the newest work on the Holocaust and gives us a broader framework within which to understand it, is that provided by Ian Kershaw, who, over the past ten years or so, has forcefully advocated a model based on the notion of 'charismatic authority'. Kershaw's characterisation of the regime as one in which, at all levels, committed individuals 'work towards the Fuhrer' has the advantage of allowing us to recognise that the Holocaust depended upon the active initiative of thousands of individuals in all branches of the party and the state, but occurred within a context shaped by ideological visions and ambitions defined by and embodied in

Hitler himself.[27] As consideration of Kershaw's model shows, we have come a long way from the image of a 'totalitarian' regime whose ideological crimes were implemented solely by the SS, while the population stood passively by in either fear or ignorance, and now see the Third Reich essentially as a voluntarist regime, in which the regime's ideological drives were underpinned by a broad consensus within both the political apparatus and the population at large - it was this degree of consensus and active participation which led to the successive erosion of moral values and norms and which, over 10 years, created a climate in which the unthinkable became realisable.

NOTES

1. For good discussions of the problem of representing the Holocaust in museums in Britain see the themed issue on 'Museums and the Holocaust' of the *Journal of Holocaust Education* (Volume 7, No 3, 1998). The *Journal of Holocaust Education* is essential reading for educators in this field and an excellent way of keeping abreast of latest developments in both research and teaching on the subject. For a discussion of such issues in America see Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston, 1999). On Germany and former occupied Europe see, for example, William F.S.Miles, 'Post-Communist Holocaust Commemoration in Poland and Germany' in: *Journal of Holocaust Education* 9 No.1 (2000), pp.33-50.
2. A good introduction to these debates can be found in the Holocaust Education journal *Dimensions* 13,2 (1999) special issue devoted to 'Race, Profit and Plunder: German Big Business and the Third Reich', which has articles on Deutsche Bank, Ford, Flick, and Daimler-Benz.
3. For discussions of the merits and problems inherent in the institution of Holocaust memorial Day see David Cesarani, 'Seizing the Day: Why Britain will Benefit from Holocaust Memorial Day' in: *Patterns of Prejudice* 34 No.4 (2000), pp.61-6; and the series of debate contributions in *Ethnicities* 2 No.1 (2002) pp.107-133: Nira Yuval-Davis and Max Silverman, 'Memorialising the Holocaust in Britain', David Cesarani, 'Memorialising the Holocaust in Britain: A Critical Response to Nira Yuval-Davis and Max Silverman', and Nira Yuval-Davis and Max Silverman, 'Memorialising the Holocaust in Britain: A response to David Cesarani'.
4. Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Auflosung der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie* (3rd Edn., Stuttgart, 1960); see also Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, Gerhard Schulz, *Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (2nd* Edn., Cologne, 1962).
5. Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (London, 1952).
6. For a thoughtful and subtle study of the changing place of the Holocaust in post-war British (and American) culture see Tony Kushner, *The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination. A Social and Cultural History* (Oxford, 1994).
7. A good introduction to the changing ways in which post-war West Germany 'confronted the past' is offered by Mary Fulbrook, *German National Identity after the Holocaust* (London, 1999)
8. For introductions to the historiography of the Third Reich more generally see Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (4th Edn., London, 2000); Neil Gregor (ed.), *Nazism. A Reader* (Oxford, 2000).
9. Lucy Dawidowicz, *The War against the Jews. 1933-1945* (Harmondsworth, 1977); Gerald Fleming, *Hitler and the Final Solution* (London, 1985); Klaus Hildebrand, *The Third Reich* (1984).
10. The classic statement in English of the 'structuralist' position remains Martin Broszat, *The Hitler State* (London, 1981); for one of Mommsen's statements of his views from this era see his 'National Socialism: Continuity and Change' in: Walter Laqueur (ed.), *Fascism: A Reader's Guide* (Harmondsworth, 1979), pp.151-192.
11. Karl Schleunes, *The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy towards German Jews, 1933-1939* (Urbana, 111., 1970).
12. Christian Streit, *Keine Kameraden: die.Wehrmacht und die, sowietische. Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945* (Stuttgart, 1978). A flavour of Streit's arguments may be gained from the following English summaries: Christian Streit, 'The German Army and the Policies of Genocide', in: Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed.), *The Policies of Genocide. Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany* (Hemel Hempstead, 1986), pp. 1-14; ibid., 'Wehrmacht, Einsatzgruppen, Soviet POWs and anti-Bolshevism in the emergence of the Final Solution' in: David Cesarani (ed.), *The Final Solution. Origins and Implementation* (London, 1994), pp.103-118.
13. Ulrich Herbert. *Hitler's Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich* (Cambridge. 1997).

14. On the murder of the gypsies see Benno Muller-Hill, *Murderous Science: Elimination by Scientific Selection of Jews. Gypsies and Others. Germany 1933-1945* (Oxford, 1988), and now Giinther Levy, *The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies* (Oxford, 2001); on eugenics and euthanasia see Michael Burleigh, *Death and Deliverance. 'Euthanasia' in Germany 1900-1945* (Cambridge, 1994); on sterilisation policy the key text is Gisela Bock, Zwangssterilisation im Nationalsozialismus. Studien zur Rassenpolitik und Frauenpolitik (Opladen, 1986). A flavour of her arguments may be gained from Gisela Bock, ' Antinatalism, maternity and paternity in National Socialist Racism' in: David Crew (ed.), *Nazism and German Society 1933-1945* (1994), pp.110-140.

15. Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, *The Racial State. Germany 1922-1945* (Cambridge, 1991).

16. For an early discussion of the uses of survivor testimony see Lawrence L. Langer, *Holocaust Testimonies. The Ruins of Memory* (New Haven, 1991); for an analysis of survivor memoirs see Andrea Reiter, *Narrating the Holocaust* (London, 2000).

17. Mark Roseman, *The Past in Hiding* (London, 2000).

18. For a critical evaluation of this film see Melanie J. Wright, '"Don't touch my Holocaust": Responding to *Life is Beautiful'* in: *Journal of Holocaust Education* 9 no.l (2000), pp. 19-32.

19. Christopher Browning. *Ordinary Men. Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York, 1992).

20. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York, 1996).

21. A good example of this shift is Gotz Aly, *Final Solution. Nazi Population Policy and the* Murder of the European Jews (London. 1999).

22. An English summary of this much of this work and its significance is offered by Ulrich Herbert, 'Ideological Legitimisation and Political Practice of the Leadership of the National Socialist Secret Police' in: Hans Mommsen (ed.), *The Third Reich between Vision and Reality. New Perspectives on German History between 1918 and 1945* (Oxford, 2001), pp.95-108.

23. David Cesarani, *Eichmann - his life, crimes and legacy.* (London, forthcoming, 2003)

24. Raul Hilberg's study *The Destruction of the European Jews* (revised edn., New York, 1985) remains a classic account.

25. An excellent English language introduction to the findings of such recent research is represented by Ulrich Herbert (ed.), *National Socialist Extermination Policy* (1999).

26. This is not to say that the 'centre' no longer figures in current research: for a superb synthesis of the latest discussions of the nature of the decision-making process in the 'Final Solution' see Mark Roseman, *The Villa. The Lake. The Meeting. Wannsee and the Final Solution* (London, 2002).

27. Ian Kershaw, *Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris* (London, 1998); ibid., *Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis* (London 2000). For an earlier summary of some of the arguments expounded in these volumes see also Ian Kershaw, *Hitler* (London, 1991).

The Defence Production Committee and South-East Asia, 1950-60

DR JOHN WESTE

The United States occupied Japan in September 1945 committed to the task of demilitarising and democratising its former enemy. The Imperial Army and Navy were abolished, armaments production was banned, production facilities were earmarked for reparations and the Purge removed military men from positions of responsibility and power. The Occupation, however, did not occur in a vacuum and by 1947 Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union provided an impetus for America to re-orientate its policies towards Japan. Washington aimed to re-arm a capitalist Japan as its ally in the struggle against Communism. The dismantling of Japanese industrial might through the reparations programme was wound down. Likewise, 1950 saw the formation of the National Police Reserve and the expansion of the Maritime Safety Force as forerunners to land and naval rearmament. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 enabled the United States to combine its twin strategies of encouraging the development of both Japanese capitalism and rearmament. Special procurement orders, placed on behalf of UN troops fighting in Korea, directed desperately needed dollars, technology and demand towards Japan and thus played a significant role in modernising the industrial base; by 1955 military expenditure in Japan totalled $4 thousand million.

The Korean War marked the re-emergence of a Japanese military industry, a process which Japan's heavy and chemical industrial sector was keen to encourage. In this capacity the role of Keidanren's [Japan Federation of Economic organisations] Defence Production Committee was indispensable. Since its inception in August 1952 the DPC operated as a semi-autonomous body under the umbrella of Keidanren; its posts were staffed with representatives from the elite circles of Japanese business, bureaucracy and former officers of the defunct Imperial Army and Navy. The DPC moved rapidly to develop and strengthen links within Japan's post-war bureaucracy, military establishment and the ruling party. Likewise, the DPC independently formed extensive and intimate connections with the American armed forces, both in Japan and the United States.

Special procurement orders, while outliving the Occupation, could not provide the base for long-term economic stability and economic co-operation between Japan and the US. The DPC, in common with its American connexions, saw the development of a South-East Asian export market for armaments and military technology as one potential solution. Success in this area would represent a step toward linking the economy of a post-war capitalist Japan with the resource-rich South-East Asian region. Moreover, Japan would then be able to economically and militarily co-operate with US goals of resisting communism in South-East Asia, in addition to supporting defence industry aims of developing as an earner of valuable export dollars.

The DPC's interest in the gains from an expanded South-East Asian market was not new. In 1953, DPC's President Gôko Kiyoshi anticipated that South-East Asian nations spending their US financial assistance in Japan would be worth $600 million, $10 million of which would consist of military sales to Indo-China.[1] In June 1953, the government established a South-East Asia Council which was presided over by Hara Yasusaburô, president of Nihon Kayaku and the DPC's Gunpowder Committee. In late 1953, Hara and Ishizaka Taizô, president of Tôshiba and the DPC's Electrical Committee, joined the newly formed Asian Industrial Association.

The swiftness with which the DPC identified the South-East Asian region as a potential market is striking, however, debate was not limited to the military industrial sector alone. Fukushima Masao, a member of the Keidanren Secretariat, readily supported increased economic involvement in South-East Asia. Even so, Fukushima was also cognizant of the problems the area posed, specifically the huge regional political and economic diversity which made overseas investment difficult. Nonetheless, Fukushima hoped that by aiding light industrial development in South-East Asia, the resultant improved economic performance would stimulate the region's purchasing power and thus increase its capacity

to import foreign goods. Moreover, he added that if Japan declined to assist in this process, West Germany, Belgium or other Western nations would.[2]

Fukushima emphasised the importance of approaching economic co-operation with South-East Asia with sensitivity. Probably foremost in Fukushima's mind was the disastrous occupation of much of Southern Asia during the Second World War and the ensuing legacy of anti-Japanese sentiment. In any case, 'the Japanese have a fault of judging solely from their own side and immediately announcing plans and policies'; consequently 'I think we will want to be more humble and prudent'.[3] Ishizaka Taizô was more blunt in calling for Japan to 'reject egoism: we must not fail twice'.[4]

Purged of egoism or otherwise, by the mid-1950s Japanese failure in South-East Asia was appearing most unlikely. From the late-1940s onwards, Japan had entered into trade agreements with Burma and began exchanging manufactured goods, such as rolling stock, for rice with Thailand.[5] Within British territories, too, Japan's presence was soon felt. In 1948, Japanese imports from Malaya and Singapore amounted to approximately £2.5 million, and exports to the same territories were around £1.65 million. By 1951 the growth fuelled by the Korean War had been phenomenal, and the equivalent figures were roughly £19.6 million and £30.46 million respectively.[6] Over January to May 1954, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development surveyed Malaya, with an eye to advising on economic development, and concluded that, given Malayan iron-ore mining's dependency upon exports for survival, Japan constituted the logical market. In 1954 Malayan iron-ore production totalled 1,212,780 tons, of which 1,039,430 was exported to Japan. Bauxite mining at Telok Ramunia, Johore, provided a similar example, where again the bulk of the monthly production of 20,000 tons was shipped to Japan.[7]

By 1952, Japan's trade with the whole of South-East Asia accounted for fifteen percent of exports as compared to twelve percent in 1937. The same year imports from South-East Asia accounted for eleven percent of Japan's total imports by value, which represented a slight increase over the 1937 figure of ten percent. Demonstrative of such trends, Japan participated in international bodies such as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the International Rice Commission and the Food and Agriculture Organisation with a view to further promoting regional economic influence. In October 1954, Japan was granted membership in the Colombo Plan sponsoring South and South-East Asian economic development.[8]

Japan's rapid economic return to South-East Asia emjoyed powerful American support. However, it is also worth remembering that over the late 1940s and early 1950s great portions of the region were still colonies of the European empires and their responses to a Japanese return to the region are also important. Given that Great Britain still remained the greatest of the colonial powers, the Japanese presence provoked mixed reactions on the part of the British government, bureaucracy and commercial interests. A gallimaufry of responses was employed from cautious encouragement, suspicion, and resignation, to the September 1952 anti-Japanese campaign of the *Daily Express*.[9] While an absolute distinction is impossible, in general British manufacturing concerns and some local colonial administrators identified Japan as a rival and dangerous economic competitor to be compelled and repelled with high tariffs, strict controls and quotas. Despite such fears, Westminster and Whitehall tended to support Japanese economic recovery and the economic push into South-East Asia, albeit with care and often distaste.

This response is not necessarily a puzzling one. Certainly, Japan's almost casual military humiliation of Britain in South-East Asia, coupled with the brutal treatment of POWs, created a bitter legacy that, as Japanese imperial visits show, remains to this day. Further, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Britain's South-East Asian territories and dependencies were viewed as crucial to United Kingdom economic recovery, and to the UK's global strategic interests. Nonetheless, British officials were not necessarily intent upon selling-out British interests to the Japanese, or, for that matter, to the United States. Instead, they felt that, if properly harnessed, Japanese economic strength could contribute to an improvement in regional living conditions, and hence help fulfil British plans for regional security and the defeat of communism. In addition, Tokyo's economic contribution, whether wanted or otherwise, soon proved essential given the difficulties London faced in persuading UK financial and business concerns to provide for South-East Asian development.[10] In this context, Japanese return to South-East Asia reflects the process of British de-colonisation and the growth of more attractive non-

imperial markets for UK enterprises, as much as any desire to co-operate with the United States in the Cold War.

Regardless of imperial concerns, the question of Japan's reparation payments to the victims of its war-time aggression was seen by Japanese industrialists and merchants as both a block and a potential vehicle for economic penetration into South-East Asia. Keidanren vice-president and DPC Deliberative Room president, Uemura Kôgorô, saw in resource-rich South-East Asia a plentiful and cheap supply of natural resources. He regretted the government's inability to normalise relations with the region and failure to conclude Treaties of Navigation and Commerce and reparation negotiations.[11] Other DPC members such as Ishizaka Taizô and Hara Yasusaburô also spoke of the need to resolve the outstanding matter of reparations. Hara underscored the benefits a successful conclusion to reparation negotiations could bring. Payments of reparations with goods and services would 'let South-East Asian nations know the state of Japanese industry and would, from the point of view of the economy, create a favourable relationship of inseparability [thus] opening a permanent market for Japanese goods'. Quite simply, 'reparations, through the method of payment will not simply end with payment alone. We will be able to turn misfortune into fortune'.[12]

Although reparation negotiations remained stalled, organised business maintained an interest in expanded trade with South-East Asia. In March 1956 Keidanren dispatched an Economic Goodwill Inspection Team to the region. The Team, initially under the leadership of Uemura Kôgorô, visited Indo-China; later, control was passed to Japan Foreign Trade Association President, Inagaki Heitarô, who guided the Mission through Thailand, Burma and Pakistan. Keidanren claimed that the mission's objectives were twofold. Firstly, to counteract the economic advance into South-East Asia by both Western nations and the Eastern bloc; and secondly, to enable Japan to recover lost ground and lay a foundation for co-operation in the economic development of the region.[13] There was, however, a third goal, one that DPC Secretary Senga Tetsuya referred to as 'the hidden objective of the Keidanren mission', which was a direct result of seven months' planning and discussions between the DPC and United States Commander-in-Chief Far East (CINCFE).[14] This goal was to investigate the possibilities of a market in South-East Asia for surplus Japanese munitions.

Pursuing its private aim of developing 'an individual mobilization base in Japan', in August 1955 CINCFE recommended a plan to the Defense Department to aid the Japanese by 'establishing initial goals, furnishing technical assistance, and helping to obtain adequate markets'.[15] Capitalising on this offer of co-operation, the DPC requested information so that it could co-ordinate industrial production with South-East Asian armament needs. The key queries posed centred on the nature of US aid to the region, what type of weapons were being given as aid, the state of military equipping in South-East Asia and so forth.[16] In turn, CINCFE informed the State Department of Japanese plans to send a mission to Asian nations to sell the products of munitions plants through commercial trade, barter or reparation negotiations. CINCFE briefed the State Department on the assistance the mission would require in the nations it visited and requested guidance as to what reactions the Japanese could expect and whom they should call upon.[17]

The Department of State responded to CINCFE in December 1955. Although supportive, the State Department argued that sales missions would be more effective as independent Japanese initiatives undertaken on a commercial basis. Consequently, US missions were instructed not to intercede with host governments but only to assist the Japanese regarding government officials and other similar matters. In addition, the State Department provided information on the possibilities of arms sales to the various South-East Asian nations.[18] Headquarters Far Eastern Command (FEC) passed this information to Keidanren which then departed on 21 March 1956.

While the mission was ostensibly under Keidanren control, DPC and military industrial influence was strong, particularly under the Uemura-led mission to Indo-China. Apart from DPC Deliberative Room President Uemura, members included the Komatsu Seisakujo President and DPC Standing Committee member, Kawai Yoshinari; DPC Secretary and Keidanren Economic Co-operation Section Chief Senga Tetsuya; the Ishikawajima Heavy Industries President Dokô Toshio, and Atarashiya Tetsuji, the managing director of Nihon Steel Works, a manufacturer of gun emplacements and recoilless shells.[19]

After returning to Japan the Keidanren mission conferred with Headquarters FEC and reported that it had been well received. Although unable to confirm markets for surplus munitions stocks, the mission met with success of a different nature in South Vietnam where the retreating French were turning over their military arsenals and supply bases to the South Vietnamese government. Although the South Vietnamese relied on the US Military Assistance Advisory Group - Vietnam (MAAG-V) for aid in fulfilling many of its defence requirements, MAAG-V was unable to supply technicians to repair and maintain arsenals. Consequently, the South Vietnamese urgently requested Japan to dispatch one thousand technicians. Lacking in appropriate technical skills, the Keidanren Mission promised to dispatch a survey group to examine the possibilities for Japanese technical assistance.[20] Again, while this survey group was broadly under Keidanren control, DPC interests were well represented.

The seven-member survey group, led by Senga Tetsuya, left Japan on 28 April for a two-week mission to South Vietnam. Other members included Natta Kiyoshi and former Lieutenant-General Mabuchi Toshio, both of the DPC, and former Rear-Admiral Shimizu Fumio, a founding director of Japan Technical Production Association (an early military industrial pressure group) and at that time acting as adviser to Nihon Steel Works. The goals of the survey group were to briefly assess the possibilities of re-equipping arsenals and supply bases with plant and materials and then report to the Vietnamese government and MAAG-V. In mid-May Senga decided that with the appropriate organisation and technical groups, reviving the French arsenals and repair workshops would be a feasible project.[21]

One of the key points noted by the survey group was South Vietnamese industrial backwardness. The group concluded that to develop the skills necessary for industrial repair and maintenance, whether it be for military or civilian demand, there was no other option than to improve the capabilities of military facilities as the then sole centres of modern heavy industry.[22] The Japanese were particularly drawn to the Saigon Naval Arsenal which was established by the French in the 1880s. Despite its age, the arsenal was rated highly by both the Japanese and MAAG-V: it employed approximately 1,000 personnel and had three dockyards.[23] Although limited in plant, Senga's group was impressed and saw in the Saigon Naval Arsenal the only comprehensive heavy industrial plant in South Vietnam.

Once the survey was completed Senga reported to the South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem who reaffirmed his request for technical aid. There remained, however, the problems of how to best revive the French arsenals and define the future purpose behind their operations. Inevitably, debate centred on the Saigon Naval Arsenal and exposed major differences of opinion between Saigon, MAAG-V, the DPC and FEC as to the degree which military concerns should dominate Japanese technical guidance.

Senga Tetsuya was doubtful of the purposes behind any re-animation of the Naval Arsenal, fearing that if re-opened and invigorated with modern technology it would soon equal any other major arsenal in the Asian region. In particular, Senga was thinking of strategic ramifications vis-à-vis Britain's base in Singapore and so was 'unable to consider converting the Saigon Naval Arsenal into a major naval arsenal'.[24] President Diem agreed and was well-aware that the South Vietnamese navy was too small to justify retaining the naval arsenal solely for military purposes. His government suggested that the arsenal could be re-developed under civilian control as the nucleus for industrial development in South Vietnam. Diem also aired the possibility of obtaining equipment through reparation funds from Japan.[25]

Unfortunately, Senga departed Vietnam without convincing MAAG-V of the benefits of a general industrial centre as opposed to a purely military armoury. MAAG-V hoped that the Saigon Arsenal could be developed as a major Far Eastern shipyard, second to Japan's Yokosuka, and so requested large-scale technical assistance from Japan to support the 3,000 employees at the Arsenal.[26] Unwilling to be caught in the middle, the DPC met with Headquarters FEC which backed plans laid down by Senga and Diem and recommended that Japan dispatch small numbers of key technicians who could train and supervise Vietnamese technicians on site. MAAG-V resisted but eventually Japan's *Jimmu* economic boom (mid-1955 to mid-1957) absorbed vast numbers of technicians into the domestic Japanese economy and thwarted MAAG-V's grandiose plans as much as DPC, FEC and Saigon's opposition.[27]

Upon returning to Japan, Senga's survey group met with the five DPC sub-committees most relevant

to the proposed operations in Vietnam. Meanwhile, an industry-wide Preparatory Committee had been formed to discuss the fundamental problems of technical co-operation and met on 31 May and again on 25 June 1956.

The main concern facing the Preparatory Committee was procuring the necessary number of technicians. In addition to the demands of the Japanese economy, there were fears that after a few years in Vietnam, technicians would have difficulties in obtaining employment upon their return. Related problems such as contractual conditions, personnel administration and payment of technicians while in Vietnam were also of concern. Nonetheless, the Preparatory Committee believed that 'the success or failure of this case of technical co-operation will have a major influence on future economic co-operation with the [South-East Asian] region'.[28] Finally, the Committee called for the formation of a strong parent body encharged with the overall guidance of technical co-operation.

While discussions regarding the administrative form of technical co-operation were underway, several teams of technicians had already been dispatched to Vietnam. The US Far Eastern Command maintained its interest in these missions and received reports upon their return to Japan. Taking advantage of its Asia-wide links, CINCFE also maintained contact with US missions and furnished MAAG-V with copies of Japanese reports and offered to assist MAAG-V in any way possible.[29]

The first Japanese technical mission was a twenty-six-strong group and focused on armaments, naval, aircraft, communications and vehicle needs. This group was to develop a plan for the replenishment of personnel, plant and operational management for relevant sections and the advise the Vietnamese government of its conclusions.[30] Simultaneously, an emergency repair squad was dispatched directly to deal with urgent repairs. This squad was divided into two groups: one of thirty-three technicians dealt with vehicles and the other of twenty-seven technicians concentrated on signals units. A short time later, a second team of thirty-eight technicians was dispatched to improve ordnance and vehicle repair facilities in the Saigon area. This second team returned to Japan with the plans of the first technical group which it presented to the Preparatory Committee. It was decided that the dispatch of a third team would take place gradually in accordance with the progress of the plans of the first team.[31]

The complexities of organising the numerous technical and survey groups further promoted the formation of a parent body. To this end, on 27 June 1956, six company sponsors, led by Nihon Steel Works and the DPC Weapons Sub-committee President Ishizuka Kumezô, met to discuss the formation of a company to oversee technical co-operation. The sponsors continued their discussions over July and August and finally on 19 September 1956 completed registration of the Japan Technical Co-operation Pty. Ltd. (JTC).[32]

The JTC was comprised of thirty-seven member companies. Its objectives were to survey industrial technical development in foreign nations relating to iron and steel manufacturing machinery, electrical and signalling machinery, vessels, vehicles, aircraft and chemical products. However, the company's main role was that of mediator. Firstly, it was to co-ordinate the domestic instruction and on-site training of overseas technicians in Japan; secondly, to intercede in the overseas dispatch of technicians and to co-operate in effecting technical development in industrial sectors of overseas nations; and thirdly to mediate in the provision of the necessary machines, materials and resources to realise the above.[33]

Again, although the JTC membership represented a broad range of Japanese industrial interests, the number of member companies or personnel with strong interests in defence production is striking. Of the eight company directors, three (Senga Tetsuya, Kawai Yoshinari and Ishizuka Kumezô) held prominent positions in the DPC. Moreover, by 1959 of the remaining five directors, four (presidents: Ishikawajima Heavy Industry's Dokô Toshio, Mitsubishi Electric's Takasugi Shin'ichi, Mitsubishi Japan Heavy Industry's Sakurai Shunki and Japan Electric's Watanabe Toshihide) would be appointed to the DPC Standing Committee. DPC members were also well represented in other levels of JTC management. Hitachi and DPC Machine Committee President Kurata Chikara was appointed as a JTC auditor; all three Company Consultants (Ishizaka Taizô, Hara Yasusaburô and Uemura Kôgorô) held respectively two leading positions in the DPC; and JTC advisers included former Lieutenant-General Kan Seiji, the vice-president of the Japan Ordnance Industrial Association.[34] While not indicating

that the JTC was overwhelmingly weighted toward military concerns, the company membership (and, indeed, its operations in South Vietnam) suggests that defence-related exports and technical co-operation were both well within its abilities and the minds of its executives.

As the dispatch of technicians to South Vietnam gained momentum, on 23 June 1956 the Preparatory Committee, prior to the formal establishment of the JTC, sent Senga Tetsuya and Atarashiya Tetsuji to South Vietnam to negotiate the fine contractual details of technical co-operation. These negotiations took over a year, demonstrating the many difficulties Japanese companies faced when participating in overseas economic development.

The key problem was that the technical co-operation agreement was reliant on the US, through the International Co-operation Administration (ICA: July 1955 successor to the Foreign Operations Administration and responsible for funnelling economic, military and technical assistance abroad), for funding. ICA financial aid to South-East Asia paid for much of the region's orders in Japan. In 1955 these orders totalled $67 million which was a five-fold increase on the previous year.[35] By late 1957 ICA-funded South Vietnamese orders placed in Japan were worth approximately $50 million per year.[36] Despite past experiences, Japanese negotiators in Vietnam were confronted with a new situation in that the aim was a long-term project of organised technical guidance. Moreover, as negotiators had to deal with Saigon as the contractual partner and with Washington as the financial source the resultant three-way negotiations became laborious and complicated .

As Saigon was politically independent and the direct contractual partner in technical co-operation, Senga was required to deal with a South Vietnamese government which, he lamented, was administratively inefficient and in any case, 'no more than an office window where discussions took place'. In reality, every contract clause had to be re-negotiated and confirmed with US agencies in South Vietnam which then required Washington's approval. Senga found this process a 'totally unexpected and trying experience'. Nonetheless, Senga acknowledges that without ICA aid, technical co-operation between Japan and Vietnam was 'unfortunately, near to impossible'.[37] Although progress was slow, a contract was eventually signed on 25 November 1957, approximately seventeen months after Senga Tetsuya and Atarashiya Tetsuji first undertook negotiations. By the terms of the agreement, nineteen technicians specialising in ship building were dispatched to South Vietnam. The group left Japan on 28 April 1958 and again suggestive of a connection with military industrial concerns, overall command was given to former Rear-Admiral Shimizu Fumio.[38]

The formation and activities of the Japan Technical Co-operation Pty Ltd demonstrated the ability of the DPC to function within the broader parameters of Japanese economic activities, namely the attempt to strengthen economic ties with South-East Asian nations. Indeed, aiding the dispatch of technicians to refurbish former French arsenals emphasised the DPC's ability to perceive a wider application of its military industrial skills beyond that of formal armaments manufacture. Beyond being a reflection of the sophistication of the DPC, this attempt at establishing a weapons export market in South-East Asia highlights an early Japanese interest in utilising technical and economic co-operation schemes in the region as a means to promote limited South-East Asian development and with it the rise of an independent Japanese economy. The expression 'independent', however, needs to be tempered by a more telling comment on the early post-war Japanese economic involvement in South-East Asia, and that is the almost total reliance on Washington for economic, political and military support.

NOTES

1 Keidanren, *Bôei seisan iinkai (hereafter, Bôkai) sokuhô*, No. 9, 10-7-53, 'MSA enjo no ukeire', p. 4

2 Fukushima Masao, "'Tônan Ajia kaihatsu" to iu koto no knagaekata', Keidanren Geppô, No. 3, 1953, pp. 2-3.

3 Ibid., p. 5

4 Masada Ken'ichirô (ed.), *Kindai Nihon no Tônan Ajia-kan.* Ajia Keizai Kenkyûjo, 1973, p. 135.

5 Andrew Rotter, *The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to South-East Asia,* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 130-1.

6 Malcolm MacDonald Papers, University of Durham (hereafter, MMC), 19/7/13, 'Press Release on Third Visit to Tokyo', 8 July 1952. The actual figures are given in Malay dollars (Malay $19,700,000; $13,200,000; $157,000,000; $243,700,000 respectively). As of 1906, the pound sterling-Malay/Straits dollar exchange rate was set at the constant level of 2s. 4d. to the dollar, that is nearly 12p., or one- eighth of a pound.

7 *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Malaya* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 352-3.

8 White, *'Britain'*, p. 283. On the Colombo Plan, see: Porter, 'Colombo Plan', Note by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and other Ministers, 20 December 1951, CAB 129/48 in A.N.Porter & A. Stockwell (eds), *British Imperial Policy and Decolonisation 1938-64*, Vol. 2, 1951-64 (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 115-26; Remme, *Britain and Regional Cooperation*, pp. 200-16.

9 Marguerite Dupree, (ed.), *Lancashire and Whitehall: The Diary of Sir Raymond Streat*, Vol. 2, 1939-57 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), pp. 646-50.

10 Remme, *Britain and Regional Cooperation;* Nicholas Tarling, *The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia* (Kuala Lumpur and London: Oxford University Press, 1993); White, *'Britain'*, p. 286.

11 Uemura Kôgorô, 'Nankan Nihon kiezai no dakaisaku', *Jitsugyô no Sekai* Vol. 50, No. 8, 1953, pp. 24-5.

12 Hara Yasusaburô, 'Baishô ondai to Tônan Ajia shokoku no dôkô', *Keidanren Geppô*, No. 3. 1953, p. 7.

13 Bôei seisan iinkai, *Jûnenshi,* Keidanren, 1964, p. 183.

14 Kondô, Kani'ichi and Osanai, Hiroshi (eds), *Sengo sangyôshi e no shôgen,* Vol. III, Mainichi shinbunsha, 1973, p. 253.

15 Head quarters Far East Command and United Nations Command, *Command Report July-September 1956*, p. 67.

16 Kondô and Osani, Sangyôshi, p. 251.

17 Head quarters Far East Command and United Nations Command, *Command Report July-September 1956*, p. 67.

18 Ibid. pp. 67-7.

19 Keidanren, *Bôkai Tokuhô*, No. 42, 31-3-56, 'Keizai kyôryoku shinzen shisetsudan no khaken ni tsuite', p. 17.

20 Keidanren Jimukyoku, 'Nihon Gijutsu Kyôryoku Kabushikikaisha no setusritsu keika ni tsuite', *Keidanren Geppô,* No. 9, 1956, p. 45.

21 Keidanren, *Bôkai Tokuhô,* No. 44, 20-4-56, 'Betonamu Kyôwakoku ni taisuru gijutsu kyôryoku mondai n keii', pp. 1-2.

22 Keidanren, *Bôkai Tokuhô,* No. 44, 20-4-56, 'Minami Betonamu gijutsu kyôryoku chôsa hôkoku', p. 7.

23 Atarashiya Tetsuji, 'Bietonamu e no tabi', *Keidanren Geppô,* No. 12, 1958, p. 44.

24 Kondô and Osani, *Sangyôshi,* p. 253.

25 Ibid. pp. 253-4; Atarashiya Tetsuji, 'Bietonamu e no tabi', *Keidanren Geppô*, No. 12, 1958, p. 46.

26 Ibid. p. 46.

27 Kondô and Osani, *Sangyôshi,* pp. 253-4.

28 Keidanren, *Bôkai Tokuhô,* No. 44, 20-9-56, 'Betonamu Kyôwakoku ni taisuru gijutsu kyôryoku mondai no keii', p. 2.

29 Head quarters Far East Command and United Nations *Command, Command Report July-September 1956*, p. 69.

30 Keidanren, *Bôkai Tokuhô*, No. 44, 20-9-56, 'Betonamu Kyôwakoku ni taisuru gijutsu kyôryoku chôsa hôkokuI, pp. 16-7; Keidanren Jimukyoku, 'Nihon Gijutsu Kyôryoku Kabushiikaisha', Keidanren Geppô, No. 9, 1956, pp. 45-6.

31 Keidanren, *Bôkai Tokuhô*, No. 44, 20-9-56, 'Betonamu Kyôwakoku ni taisuru gijutsu kyôryoku chôsa hôkokuI, pp. 17-8; Keidanren Jimukyoku, 'Nihon Gijutsu Kyôryoku Kabushikikaisha', *Keidanren Geppô,* No. 9, 1956, pp. 46-7.

32 Keidanren, *Bôkai Tokuhô,* No. 44, 20-9-56, 'Betonamu Kyôwakoku ni taisuru gijutsu kyôryoku mondai no keii', p. 3.

33 Keidanren, *Bôkai Tokuhô,* No. 44, 20-9-56, ''Nihon Gijutsu Kyôryoku Kabushikikaisha no teikan', pp. 19-20; Keidanren Jimukyoku, 'Nihon Gijutsu Kyôryoku Kabushikikaisha no setsuritsu keika ni tsuite', pp. 19-20.

34 Keidanren, *Bôkai Tokuhô*, No. 67, 13-7-59, 'Shijôtaisaku iinkai shinsetsu o kettei', pp, 4-6; Bôkai, *Jûnenshi*, pp. 314-9; Keidanren, *Bôkai Tokuhô*, No. 44, 20-9-56, 'Betonamu Kyôwakoku ni taisuru gijutsu kyôryoku mondai no keii', pp. 4-5.

35 Keidanren, *Bôkai Yokuhô,* No. 42, 31-3-56, 'Jôhô issoku: keizai kyôryoku shinzen shisetsudan no haken ni tsuite', p. 17.

36 Senga Tetsuya, 'Betonamukoku to no gijutsu kyôryoku keiyaku teiketsu no keii', *Keidanren Geppô,* No. 1, 1958, p. 57.

37 Ibid. p. 58.

38 Keidanren, *Bôkai Tokuhô*, No. 58, 25-5-58, 'Bôei sangyô no seibi ni kansuru kenkyû hôshin o kettei', p. 4.

Czechoslovakia **Maria Dowling**

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"Multiperspectivity" is very much in focus at the moment in the teaching of history in Europe, and indeed in European history teaching,(though the two terms are not synonymous). This concept can be illustrated by reference to the article by Bodo von Borries [1] concerning the teaching of the Crusades. If a true picture is to emerge, he argues that there has to be analysis from 'the Christian West', the 'Muslim East' and the 'Jews' - my attributions from his article. Maria Dowling is trying to develop a similar approach in her 'brief history' of Czechoslovakia - a country whose treatment by British historians has been too much influenced by, paraphrasing Neville Chamberlain, 'a country far away; about whose people we know little'. The author, drawing on new material published in English tries to correct this imbalance. This is no easy task, as in 184 pages, she tries to cover over one thousand years of the history of this area. Thus, the book presents the reader with a broad sweep of history, rather than an in-depth study.

As claimed in the preface, *"the history of Czechoslovakia, characterised as it is by the themes of nationalism, democracy and authoritarian rule, offers insights into the nature of government, power and culture in Europe"*.

In her introduction, the author attempts to set the scene by providing the reader with a brief overview of the history of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia, highlighting grievances the latter had towards the former, prior to 1918. Much is made of the role of the Liberator President, Tomas G. Masaryk, Edvard Benes and Milan R. Stefanik [the latter two as political and military aids respectively to Masaryk], as architects of the state which emerged from the ruins of the Hapsburg Empire in 1918.

The birth of the nation was not easy. The allied powers needed convincing of the case for the creation of a separate nation and there was deep suspicion of the motives of the founding triumvirate. Nonetheless, with the skilful use of resistance to the Hapsburgs at home during the war, and diplomatic efforts to persuade the Entente Powers of the justice of their cause, an agreement in principle was reached to consider the case for an independent Czechoslovakia. However, events, as often happens, outran the diplomats. The Czechs announced the independence of the republic on 28th October 1918, a move ratified by the Slovaks eight days later.

The author tries to give an insight into the difficulties facing the new government. Firstly, there was the external threat to her territorial integrity with the Hungarians and the Poles, in particular, having designs on some of the new lands of the republic. Internally, there were tensions between Czechs and Slovaks, as well as tension created by the considerable numbers of ethnic minorities living within her borders - treaty guarantees to minorities notwithstanding. Then there was resentment amongst the minority Germans and Hungarians over land reform in the early 1920s. In addition, the new government had to establish its international credentials. In this respect, Benes, as foreign secretary, was to follow the same path for almost 30 years, viewing the new republic as a "bridge between east and west", taking cognizance of "its geographical position; the ambitions and attitudes of its neighbours; and great power relations". Thus, Benes was eager to seek alliances in the West as well as in the East to guarantee Czechoslovak security.

Despite these problems, the history of the First republic is quite impressive, with radical improvements in the position of women in society and much social and industrial legislation, coupled with land reform. Indeed, Ms Dowling asserts that *"social welfare provision was looked on as one of the great achievements of the First Czechoslovak Republic"*.

In international relations, Benes was a firm supporter of the League of Nations, acting as a guarantor of peace in Europe, and indirectly therefore, as a guarantor of Czechoslovak security, through collective security. Sadly, this faith was to be betrayed at the Munich conference.

With the coming to power of Hitler, the position of Czechoslovakia was to become much more tenuous. *"Hitler had a personal hatred of Czechoslovakia as an artificial state born out of the detested Paris peace settlement; as a barrier to his pan-Germanic ambitions of uniting all Germans in one Reich; and as an uncomfortable example of a parliamentary democracy which worked"*. Following the Anschluss with Austria in 1938, the *"absorption of the so-called 'Sudetenland' became more feasible and desirable"*.

In her dealings with the Munich settlement, Ms Dowling states most clearly, the Czechoslovak point of view. Benes felt betrayed by his ally France, and confounded at the machinations of Britain, operating outside the framework of the League in which the state had placed so much faith. Indeed, the only power to emerge with honour from this time was the Soviet Union which refused to approve of the Munich settlement - a fact of which the Communists would later make much play as the only ones to defend the Czechoslovak point of view in 1938. The actions of the Western Powers were also to influence the policies of Benes in the period culminating in the Communist coup in 1948.

With its virtual dismemberment by March 1939, the task facing the government in exile, as before in 1918, was to convince the powers of the need to re-establish the republic at the end of the war. Thus, Benes had to court both the Western Powers and the Soviets, to whom Eisenhower assigned the task of liberating the lands from the Nazis. This influenced the nature of the post-war government which was dominated by the Communist factions and their allies. Ms Dowling argues that the Communists always aimed for a coup, claiming that they exploited every source of tension in the republic at every level. The final spur to action was the belief that in the 1948 elections, the Communists would lose seats. Thus, the coup, was seen as vital by Stalin and in this context had the added tradition of defenestration.

The author accuses the Communist government of playing off Czechs and Slovaks as a means of maintaining a Communist monopoly on power - *'divide at impera'!* This exacerbated tensions between the two groups, which, ironically, paved the way for the 'Prague Spring'. This period was one of stultification of every aspect of life in the Second Republic. The events of the 'Prague Spring' are well known, but what Ms Dowling highlights is the willingness of the Communist leadership to consider reform - after the removal of Novotny following an inner-party power struggle. Sadly, the inability of Dubcek to keep control of events brought about the clash with the USSR in August 1968. The policy of passive resistance was announced to prevent unnecessary bloodshed, but has led to the belief amongst the people that on three occasions, 1938, 1948 and 1968, the army of the Republic was in good shape but was not allowed to defend the country.

Sadly, the rest of the book is less detailed. The chapter dealing with the period 1968-1988 is limited by the references to individual acts of opposition to the 'normalisation' process and acts of government repression in response. However, it does convey the all pervasive nature of the dead-hand of the Communist regime in all aspects of life, particularly so in relation to the re-establishment of the command economy. Again ironically, it was this lack of economic progress which led to demands for reform in 1988. The 'Velvet Revolution' is given some close attention, again focusing on the main individuals associated with the period - Havel, Cardinal Tomasek and the leaders of Civic Forum. The book concludes with a brief look at the reasons for the 'Velvet Divorce' - caused by ethnic, economic and political tensions.

In a short space, the author has covered a great deal of territory. The chapters till 1968 are more detailed than the later ones - perhaps inevitably due to the lack of available materials. The text is easy to read and there are some useful maps and an excellent bibliography. As an introduction to the history of Czechoslovakia, the book provides a good starting- point for further reading.

JIM McGONIGLE

"For Freedom Alone" – The Declaration of Arbroath, 1320 **Edward J. Cowan**

Tuckwell Press £9.99 162pp Pbk 2003 ISBN 1 86232 150 7

In the words of Professor Cowan, though not perhaps as he intended them, this book is a *"tale of two declarations"*. On the one hand we have an explanation and analysis of the Declaration of Arbroath in its own historical context. On the other we have the after-life of the Declaration and how it has influenced and informed later generations and given rise to modern notions of freedom.

Few would doubt the author when he says that the Declaration is *"one of the most remarkable documents to have been produced in late medieval Scotland"*. It has been quoted by many but understood by few so that its historical significance has almost been overtaken by its mythic status. Professor Cowan seems ambivalent when early in the book he laments that the Declaration is a victim of *"heritage creationism"* whilst by the end he is poetically portraying the bond of liberty which links the two peoples of Scotland and America. *"As America is of us, so are we of America,"* he writes. Tartan Day, the US celebration of its Scottish heritage, held annually on 6th April, the date which appears on the barons' letter to Pope John XXII in 1320, is a *"shining moment"* which links together the two peoples with a shared heritage.

Professor Cowan is at pains to stress that the document which was dispatched from Arbroath in 1320 was not a declaration. To call it thus, as we all do, is *"politically motivated anachronism"*, an attempt to confer upon the document a status and a prestige which historically it was never intended to enjoy. The name is apparently of recent origin, dating from the mid-20th century, and was employed by those who had comparisons with the American example of a Declaration in mind. It was a letter written with very specific and immediate aims in mind, though it gave voice to *"universal values of freedom, constitutionalism and human dignity"*.

Those who attended the Arbroath conference on the Declaration a year or so ago and heard Professor Cowan explain the origin of many of the ideas and words of the Declaration can only be delighted that his splendid lecture has been set down in print. The influence of Sallust's *"Bellum Catilinae"*, the Vulgate and of the Irish Remonstrance of 1317 on the author or authors of the letter is carefully presented. No doubt Pope John was impressed by the scholarship behind the letter and so should we be. It should take none of the inspiration out of the Declaration that its most famous phrases were borrowed, or adapted from, earlier sources. Rather it shows that Scotland was at the cutting edge of political thinking in the early fourteenth century, because, says Professor Cowan, of the peculiar hand that history dealt her and because in Abbot Bernard she had a scholar who recognised the words and images which would best sway his audience.

Chapter Two of ***For Freedom Alone*** is an interesting, if largely familiar, account of the events in Scotland from 1286 until 1320. It is highly entertaining and witty, drawing on the works of Professors Barrow and Duncan. It describes, as, it seems, do all accounts, both medieval and modern, Alexander III hastening home on a night of wild weather to his new young bride in Kinghorn. One can almost hear Private Fraser of "Dad's Army" sighing as he retells his tragic, mournful tale. Where the author differs from Professor Barrow is on the issue of the community of the realm. Many, he says, have *"searched the historical annals for a ...nationalist phantom which, in the late 1290s, simply did not exist"*. It is a search for a *"fictive historical political community"*.

"Freedom is a noble thing," wrote John Barbour. Professor Cowan presents us with a very detailed and useful analysis of the various meanings of freedom in a medieval context. He finds little to support the notion of individual freedom but of state freedom he finds a continuum which can be traced through the Declaration of the Clergy in 1309 and the Irish Remonstrance, or letter, of 1317, to that *"supreme articulation of Scottish nationhood and constitutionalism now known as the Declaration of Arbroath"*. For all that, one senses that Professor Cowan is at his most passionate in his chapter on "Contract, Kingship and Prophecy". He examines the famous clause in the Declaration which warned of what would happen if King Robert were to submit to the English and betray his people and their freedom. The threat to remove the king, we are told, is far more than mere expedient rhetoric. It is the first national or governmental expression, in all of Europe, of the principle of the contractual theory of

monarchy. It may in part hark back to the events of 1295 and the stripping of John Balliol of his royal dignity. In canon law terms, the *"dignitas"* was parted from the *"administratio"*, leaving John the king *"incapax"*, or incapacitated, *"rex inutilis"* or "useless king". Professor Cowan explores the origins of the justification for the removal of a tyrant through the works of Aquinas and John of Padua.

The second half of this book turns its attention to the legacy of the Declaration and the impact of its ideas at key moments in Scottish and British history. The Declaration was reborn and rediscovered in the constitutional revolution of 1688-9 which drove the last Stewart king into *"the desert of Jacobite exile"*. It became a source of patriotic quotation in the debates concerning Darien and the Union. It was even there during the Enlightenment. The big question is how important the Declaration was in 1776 in the drafting of that other declaration, that of the American people. Professor Cowan lends credence to the case that the Scottish declaration was a significant influence. The Declaration and its ideas of freedom survived in a *"distinguishable, and distinguished Scottish political tradition"*. Two of those who drafted and debated the wording of the American declaration were aware of *"freedom's echo"* from Arbroath so long before. The concept of the sovereignty of the people is one which unites the two documents, though in the final analysis, whether they are connected, is, for now, not proven.

For Freedom Alone is a welcome addition to the study of Scotland in the Wars of Independence. Its scholarship will inform the debate for decades to come. Tuckwell Press is fast emerging as the publishing house to watch for those who believe, in the title of this excellent series, that Scottish History Matters.

PETER LOVEGROVE

Nazism **Neil Gregor [Ed]**

Oxford University Press £16.99 462pp Pbk 2000 ISBN 0 19 289281 9

'May I be allowed a reminiscence?' EH Carr once asked of his audience. In this tradition, can this reviewer be allowed one such indulgence? Studying First Year History at Aberdeen, my *vade mecuma* were David Thomson's *Europe Since Napoleon*, EJ Hobsbawm's *Age of Revolution* and AJP Taylor's *The Course of German History*.

Today such texts are doubtless consigned to the gloomy stack-rooms of university libraries, joining the terra cotta warriors of an earlier century, Macaulay, Fronde, Ranke... Taylor, with his ironies and his iconoclastic approach possessed enormous appeal for the undergraduate. Today, merely to glance at the index of *The Course in German History* shows how passé it has become. For Taylor, History's course was charted by chaps. Rosa Luxemburg makes a token appearance and that's about it.

In the last generation, German history has taken exciting new directions. New areas of enquiry have opened up, the lives of 'Ordinary Men"... and women have been subjected to historical scrutiny. Heavyweight historians have slugged it out in epic confrontations. Students have been able to fuel essays from the rich seams of sources uncovered by academic diggers and miners.

Among the researchers were the British scholars Noakes and Pridham. The latter's survey of the Nazi movement in Bavaria was published in 1973, while Noakes' *The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony 1921-1933* had appeared two years earlier. The two men joined forces in the 1980s to prepare three volumes of primary sources on *Nazism: 1919-1945* published by Exeter University Press. A fourth volume on the Home Front in World War Two appeared in 1998. These 1980s readers are indispensable to any History Department offering the Germany field in the Advanced Higher History syllabus.

Now, Neil Gregor – whose doctoral research was supervised by Jeremy Noakes – has produced a new reader in Nazism. The volume consists of 107 extracts ranging from primary sources to slices of the most recent historical scholarship. Dr Gregor provides context and critical commentary throughout.

The section on 'Contemporary Characterizations of National Socialism' is absorbing. Academics,

politicians, journalists all have their say. 'What is this thing, Nazism?' asked luminaries as various as Thomas Mann, the Catholic activist, Fritz Gerlich, the 'Pope of the Second International', Karl Kautsky, and the dramatist Ernst Toller. As Gregor comments, 'The questions they ask are often similar to those that subsequent scholars have posed: was National Socialism unique, or was it to be understood as a manifestation of a more general European phenomenon? Was it primarily a reactionary force... or was it a new revolutionary force, with a genuine transformative agenda... was it an ideological force, or a blind, impulsive movement with no concrete programme or goals?'

In answer to the question, 'How do you see the text fitting into a syllabus for students – in the sense of what existing volumes/texts would it complement?', Dr Gregor has replied: 'I think of it as suiting First/Second Year undergraduates and good Upper Sixth formers. Perhaps it might also be useful for teachers less familiar with the field to orientate themselves to the main debates. My intention was to give students a way of following through some of the key evolutionary moments in the historiography – from 'totalitarianism' through 'structuralism' versus 'intentionalism' through to more recent notions of charismatic politics and the Third Reich as a voluntaristic racial community. I also wanted to give students a chance to taste a lot of key German language material which hasn't been translated. I also hoped that the extracts would offer brighter students a 'taster' which would encourage them to seek out the full original book. It might be used to complement Noakes and Pridham in the sense that it provides contrasting interpretative frameworks for the primary sources they offer. Obviously it is most suited to courses which focus on historiographical approaches.'

In Advanced Higher History, historiography is king. Gregor's anthology is thus in the 'must have' category for departments offering the Germany field of study. Dr Gregor's introductory essays and comments are central to his strategy. He has written a General Introduction of around 10000 words, while each of the six sections of sources is prefaced by a short introduction.

Inevitably in a platter of 107 sources there are those seductive to the eye and easy on the palate, and those as glutinous as canteen custard. Look beyond the familiar names – Bessel, Bracher, Broszat, Kershaw, Mason and so on – and some gems appear. One such is an excerpt 'The Abandoned Regulars' Table' by Oded Heilbronner. Published in 1993, Heilbronner's study of the relationship of 'bourgeois associational life' to the rise of Nazism in the Catholic Black Forest area argues that Nazism filled the vacuum created by the collapse of bourgeois cultural associations. Heilbronner argues that *'the political ideology and language of (the) Nazi party was similar to the language of the association and of bourgeois society; anti-clerical traits, resistance to political Catholicism, political populism, and primarily the struggle against socialism and Bolshevism.'*

Some of the extracts will appear daunting to an Advanced Higher History student and will require preparation and reduction by the teacher. An illustration of this is the passage from Jens Alber on 'National Socialism and Modernization' which will be able to be used with good effect in any classroom tutorial on the theme of 'Was there a Social Revolution in Nazi Germany?'

As Dr Gregor admits in conversation, some German academic prose is famously dense. Look no further than the passage from Gisela Bock's 'Racial Policy and Women's Policy'. Here is Ms Bock in full flight: *'The specific character, the historical novelty, and international singularity of National Socialist birth policy lay in its antinatalism. Pronatalism was at best propaganda; antinatalism was propaganda and politics. Antinatalism attained a temporal and fundamental priority...'* Perhaps Bock's work suffers in the translation. This brings back to mind AJP Taylor. At times feared, but always respected as a razor-sharp reviewer, Taylor prided himself on his clarity. We can only imagine how he would have skewered the hapless Bock.

Ending this review, two texts lie on the table. One is Neil Gregor's; the other – battered and dog-eared - is Taylor's *The Course of German History.* The cover illustration of the latter shows a pickelhaube, a bayonetted rifle, drum and Iron Cross resting on a bed of oak leaves and acorns. Clearly such symbolic shorthand as an explanation for Germany's historic path will no longer do. It is scholars such as the energetic Dr Gregor, employing sophisticated research methods and explanatory frameworks, who have cleared the way for German historiography in the 21st century.

Yet it would be foolhardy to entirely reject texts such as Taylor's. Though its central premises are now

regarded as redundant, *The Course of German History* remains an exemplary model of writing for History. One important factor explaining History's mass popularity lies in its accessibility; witness the popularity of the 'Tellydons' of whom Taylor was the first. Researching the lives of 'Ordinary Men', the new generation of historians such as Neil Gregor and his peers must present their research outcomes in language able to be freely understood... by ordinary men.

RON GRANT