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Cover: The Irish Famine (oil on canvas) by Watts, George Frederick (1817-1904) Trustees of the Watts Gallery, Compton, Surrey

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

JUDITH JESCH is Professor of Viking Studies at the University of Nottingham. She is the author of *Women in the Viking Age* (1991) and *Ships and Men in the Late Viking Age: The Vocabulary of Runic Inscriptions and Skaldic Verse* (2001), as well as of numerous articles on Norse and Viking topics. Her current research interests focus on runic inscriptions, skaldic verse and Orkneyinga saga.

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PROFESSOR CHRISTINE KINEALY is a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, where she completed a Ph.D. on the introduction of the Poor Law to Ireland. She has published extensively on the impact of the Great Famine in Ireland. In 2003, she was the Arlo Browne Visiting Professor at Drew University in the United States. While there, she undertook research on Irish-American nationalism in the 1840s. Her recent publications include, *A New History of Ireland* (Sutton Press, 2004); 'The Orange Order and representations of Britishness' in S. Caunce, E. Mazierska, S. Sydney-Smith and J. K. Walton (eds, Manchester University Press, 2004); '*Les marches orangistes en Irlande du Nord. Histoire d'un droit*', *Le Mouvement Social* (no.202, janvier-mars 2003); and *The Great Famine in Ireland, Impact, Ideology and Rebellion* (Palgrave Press, 2002). She is currently researching the history of the 1848 uprising in Ireland.

DR IRINA PAERT is a lecturer at University of Wales, Bangor. Having been educated in Russia and Hungary, she has defended her PhD at the University of Essex. She is the author of *Old Believers, Religious Dissent and Gender, 1760-1850* (Manchester 2003). She has published articles in *Slavic Review*, *The Russian Review*, *Slavonica* and *Gender and History*. She also has publications in Russian and Italian. She is the coordinator of the study-group "Religion in Russia and Eastern Europe", part of the British Association of Slavic and East European Studies.

KEN BROWN has been Professor of Economic and Social History since 1988 and Pro-Vice Chancellor since 2002 at Queen's University, Belfast. He has written extensively on aspects of modern British labour, business, religious, and social history. Twice a Visiting Professor at Japanese Universities in the 1990s, his comparative study of the modern economic and social history of Japan and Britain since 1900 was published by Manchester University Press in 1998. His ninth book, a business history of the famous Liverpool toymaking firm of Meccano Ltd., is due to appear later this year.

DR FIONA MONTGOMERY is Head of School of Historical and Cultural Studies at Bath Spa University. Her publications include *The European Women's History Reader* (Routledge, 2002, with C. Collette); *Into the Melting Pot* (Ashgate, 1997 with C. Collette); *Edge Hill University College: a history 1885-1987* (Phillimore, 1997); 'Women and Politics' (with E Chalus) in Barker and Chalus, *Women's History, Britain 1700-1850* (Routledge, 2005 forthcoming); 'Mary Wollstonecraft' in P. Dematteis and P. Fosl (eds), *British Philosophers, 1500-1799* (Bruccoli Clark Layman, 2002); 'Women who dids' in C.J. Parker, *Gender and Sexuality in Victorian England* (Scholar Press, 1995). She has also published widely on popular protest including the Unstamped Press, the Anti-Corn Law Movement and gender and suffrage, as well as on feminist pedagogy. In 2001, she gave the Tumelty Memorial Lecture at the University of Glasgow. At present she is completing a book on *Women's Rights: Feminism and Feminists in Britain c.1780s-1970s* for Manchester University Press.

DR STEVEN MOREWOOD is a lecturer in international history in the Institute of Archaeology & Antiquity, School of Historical Studies, University of Birmingham. He is the author of several articles on the Mediterranean origins of the Second World War from the British perspective. His book, *The British Defence of Egypt, 1935-1940*, was published in 2004 by Frank Cass. A second volume, covering the period June 1940 to November 1942 is now being researched.

Editorial

ANDREW HUNT

It is always a pleasure to be able to offer SATH's thanks to all the contributors of each Year Book. They are unfailingly well organised in delivering their promised articles; often better than punctual and never, in any case, unpunctual; and always personally professionally courteous, and interested in what I am asking them, on SATH's behalf, to do. I think the fact that, over the years, the Year Book has attracted such high quality writing over such a breadth of historical fields and range of universities, has had its own good effect in perpetuating that standard, as new potential contributors become intrigued enough in this fairly small Scottish publication, to want to add in their bit. Many of them comment that there seems to be nothing like it, at this level, in England. I also think that the Year Book has hit on a fortunate fact that SATH is asking its contributors to do something that they are in fact very good at doing; focusing on a key defined issue [often with several subheadings], being asked to contextualise this in about 4000 words, and then applying their literary skills at tantalising us into seeing why the whole issue is a worthwhile thing to study. I don't think we should under-estimate the 'word-smithing' skills of our academic colleagues: many of them love playing with the way it can be expressed, as they pursue the thread of their argument. I note that this skill is not absent from SATH's reviewers too; the flash of insight, the development of supported argument and the depth of cogent reasoning are all evident in the reviews in the end section of this Year Book. So, on SATH's behalf, I extend my thanks to all those who have helped turn the notion of a Year Book into the reality of one.

In terms of getting the Year Book 'on the go', so that there will be a 'reality' for members to read by the following June, I start my search for contributors very early on; in the very month following the publication of each Year Book in fact. I therefore soon have an idea of who is going to accept the invitation and what they will choose as their theme. I therefore also have the good fortune to be the first to read what the articles contain, and am even brave enough to offer the odd point of constructive criticism [normally over points of grammar and any problems I might have in trying to read longer sentences than I'm normally used to seeing!]. Another thing I look out for [ever since a real omission by me many years ago in proof-reading the last lines of an article in Vol 9] is a typing error which says the total opposite of what is actually meant. In these days of all articles coming into me straight from the contributor, as typed-up e-mail attachments or disc versions; I've got to be pretty bold and sure of my ground in challenging them over whether they actually meant that! Still, that's the editor's job I suppose.

So; this issue of the Year Book has that typical loose theme again of a fair bit built round the needs of Advanced Higher, especially, I'm glad to see, in some 'smaller' fields that often get overlooked. There are usually plenty of contributors prepared to write on aspects covered within the bigger fields [ie US Civil War, Germany and Soviet Russia], so it is welcome to see 3 articles which will be collectively appreciated by the 110 odds candidates [2004 figures] who sit Romans and North Britain, Renaissance and Japan. I'm glad also to see, in the remaining 4 articles, some interesting speculations in some other areas that don't normally get much teaching in our upper schools.

You'll have noticed the striking and evocative front cover picture of the Irish Famine, with its hint of pre-Raphaelite romanticised grief, which comes to us courtesy of the Watts Gallery in Surrey. At a time of mainly lithographs and engravings, George Watts provided one of the few fairly contemporary coloured portraits of the impact of the Irish famine. This picture was painted in 1849-50, when Watts was in his early thirties. He is now considered 'one of the greatest portrait painters of the Victorian era' although that celebrity came, for the very long-lived Watts; a while after this early picture was painted. Watts is probably more famous for the fact, firstly, for making a disastrous marriage to the actress Ellen Terry, who became far more famous than he was; and secondly for being the subject of a 1975 biography by Wilfred Blunt, a name often confused with his brother Anthony Blunt; who also became more famous than he was!

Reading the Sources for Viking and Norse Scotland

PROFESSOR JUDITH JESCH

The spectacular Viking Age boat burial at Scar, on Sanday in Orkney, epitomises the excitement generated by the archaeology of Viking and Norse Scotland. The site was first revealed to locals when the winter storms of 1985 caused extensive coastal erosion, and in 1991 it was eventually excavated in heroic fashion by archaeologists working in difficult circumstances.[1] The finds were equally dramatic, for pagan Viking boat burials are rare enough in the British Isles, and this one contained some beautiful and unusual objects. Most of all, the burial hinted at a mysterious story of family life: it contained the bodies of an elderly woman, an adult man and a child. The excavators speculated that the woman might have been a priestess of Freyja, but we will never know for sure who this ill-assorted group of people were, what had caused their deaths, or why they were buried together.

Archaeological discoveries from Scotland's Viking and Norse periods continue, both by chance and by planned excavation, particularly in the Northern and Western Isles.[2] By furnishing tangible objects from daily life, many well exhibited in museums, and by its clear links to the current landscape, archaeology has made Viking and Norse Scotland very immediate to students of all kinds. It is also well supported by recent published surveys and by various electronic resources.[3] Other types of evidence do not increase in quantity so quickly, or even at all, and have often not received the same kind of survey treatment. In this paper I will therefore present a range of non-archaeological evidence for Viking and Norse Scotland, discussing their problems and possibilities. In particular, I will consider: (a) place-names and other linguistic evidence; (b) runic inscriptions; and (c) sagas and other Scandinavian texts. Although Scotland is relatively poor in early medieval documentary sources, there are also some annals and chronicles bearing on the Viking and Norse periods, which I shall not consider in this paper.[4]

A note on terminology

While the terms 'Viking' and 'Norse' can both be ambiguous in their reference, and are often contested in their meanings, they provide a useful chronological distinction for studying what has also been called 'Scandinavian Scotland'.[5] In the following, the term 'Viking' is mostly used as equivalent to 'the Viking Age', referring to a period of time, very roughly 800-1100 A.D., during which people from the Scandinavian homelands (today's Denmark, Norway and Sweden), made a considerable mark on their immediate neighbours and further afield.[6] The Viking Age saw these Scandinavians raiding and trading throughout much of the British Isles, the European continent, and Russia and the East. This period also saw the establishment of permanent colonies in the uninhabited islands of the Faroes and Iceland, and more temporary settlements in Greenland and North America. In the British Isles, the Viking period saw raiding, trading and settlement in many regions. As our islands were not uninhabited, these activities involved some kind of accommodation by the incoming Scandinavians with the indigenous population. Much of the study of the Viking impact on Britain has involved trying to work out what such accommodations involved: politically, socially, culturally, linguistically and in religious practice. In the Northern and Western Isles, the Scandinavian impact was so strong that the island groups (and parts of the adjacent mainland) became a part of Scandinavia and its North Atlantic diaspora in all of these respects. The Scandinavian impact on southern Scotland, on the other hand, is best seen as a part of the process that also affected the north of England, involving a certain linguistic, cultural and social impact on a well-established indigenous population.

The end of the Viking Age, as defined by modern scholars, coincides with clear watersheds in the history of both England and Scandinavia. The Norman Conquest of 1066 was a conquest of Anglo-Scandinavian, as well as of Anglo-Saxon, England. In the Scandinavian homelands and the North Atlantic colonies, the century from 1000 to 1100 A.D. saw the introduction of Christianity and the strengthening of centralised monarchies in the homelands, with all the social and political changes

these brought. After 1100, such Scandinavian links as there were with England completely changed their character. However, other areas remained part of the Scandinavian polity for varying lengths of time. Iceland and the Faroes have had no major new immigration or cultural change since the Viking Age. The Norse colony in Greenland lasted until around 1500. Similarly, those parts of Northern and Western Scotland which had become Scandinavian remained so for some time. The Western Isles acknowledged the rule of Norway until the Treaty of Perth in 1266, while the Northern Isles did not become a part of Scotland until the impignorations of Orkney in 1468 and Shetland in 1469. Thus, the term 'Norse' usefully covers the period when certain parts of Scotland were still Scandinavian, both officially and in outlook, from the end of the Viking Age to the fifteenth century. It also emphasises the close links that the Northern Isles in particular had with Norway and Iceland in the High Middle Ages. 'Norse' should thus be the preferred term for any aspect of Scandinavian Scotland that postdates the Viking Age: for instance, the runic inscriptions of Maeshowe are in 'Norse', not 'Viking' runes, despite what can be read in tourist brochures.

Place-names

The study of the place-names of Scotland lags well behind those of its southern neighbour, partly because of the linguistic complexities involved and the relative paucity of early documents, but mainly because Scotland does not yet have an equivalent to the Survey of English Place-Names, in progress since 1923 under the aegis of the English Place-Name Society.[7] While a systematic and authoritative survey of the origins of Scottish place-names is thus still lacking, there have nevertheless been numerous studies which track the formation of names given in a Scandinavian language in various regions of Scotland.[8] Place-names can be enormously informative about the Viking Age in Scotland, making up for the great gaps in the documentary sources.

Scotland can be divided into 4 zones, according to the type of Scandinavian settlements, and thus the formation of Scandinavian place-names there: (1) the Northern Isles and northeast Caithness; (2) Easter Ross, Sutherland, the Hebrides, and the northern and western seaboards; (3) Dumfriesshire and Galloway; and (4) the central lowlands.[9]

In the Northern Isles, the overwhelming majority of old farm- and settlement-names, as well as the names of most islands and natural features, are Scandinavian in origin.[10] The significance of the different place-name types in the Northern Isles has been much debated, with more recent scholarship questioning older certainties of being able to reconstruct the settlement process from a hypothetical chronology of name-giving.[11] The place-names are important evidence because there are no documentary sources to give a clear account of the process by which a Christian Pictish culture was replaced by a pagan Scandinavian one, and the archaeological picture is not always clear either, and is much debated.[12] Whatever model is proposed to explain this process also needs to take into account the linguistic situation. Not only are the overwhelming majority of the names Scandinavian, but Scandinavian language continued to be spoken in the Northern Isles for many centuries after the first arrival of the Viking raiders and settlers.[13] Gradually, the inhabitants of the Northern Isles went over to speaking English, without an intervening Gaelic period as elsewhere. Yet even today the dialects of Orkney and Shetland contain many words of Scandinavian origin, although the picture is complicated by the fact that many dialects of English do too, including the Lowland Scots introduced into the Northern Isles from the late Middle Ages onwards.

The Western Isles experienced a Viking Age similar to that of the Northern Isles, but they only remained under the Norwegian crown until 1266, and the linguistic picture there is particularly complex because of the period of Gaelic speech that followed. The Scandinavian place-names, which are quite numerous in parts of the Hebrides, and the loan-words in local speech, were transformed during this Gaelic-speaking period and are now unrecognisable except to the specially-trained philologist. Nevertheless, the overall picture is similar to that of the Northern Isles, when we allow for the shorter Viking and Norse period in the Hebrides and consequently fewer names of Scandinavian origin.

Like the names in the Northern Isles, the interpretation of Scandinavian place-names on Scotland's west coast has also been subject to revision, and it has recently been argued that these names reflect short periods of settlement by Scandinavian speakers in that region.[14]

The Scandinavian place-names of Dumfries and Galloway are mostly similar, and in some way related, to those of northern England, in particular the large number of settlements ending in the typically Scandinavian generic -bý, which is very common in the English Danelaw. Gillian Fellows-Jensen has in numerous publications propounded the theory that these names represent the tail end of an expansion process by which such name-types were taken from Yorkshire to northwest England and then on to southwest Scotland, where the names were formed on the analogy of their originals in the Danelaw.[15]

The date at which such names were formed in southwest Scotland is still a matter of debate, and requires the careful interpretation of complex and fragmentary evidence. There is a similar problem in the central lowlands of Scotland, which are also home to twenty-five place-names in -bý. These have recently been analysed by Simon Taylor, who comes to the conclusion that they reflect settlement there by Anglo-Scandinavians from the north of England in the ninth or tenth centuries.[16]

Because there are very few Scottish documents from before the twelfth century, and because most Scottish settlement-names were formed before then, the study of their origins inevitably proceeds in tandem with the more general study of the history of Scotland. Thus, most scholarly interpretations of the place-names depend on the scholars' understanding of the historical development, but the opposite is also true, and sometimes the arguments become circular. There are also fashions in place-name study, for instance an increasing emphasis on place-names as used today, rather than the earlier obsession with etymology and origin.[17] There is still much basic work to be done in analysing the names of Scotland, and the last word on the place-names of Scandinavian origin has not yet been said.

Runic inscriptions

Despite extensive contacts with, first Roman, and then European Christian, civilisation, the inhabitants of Scandinavia were slow to adopt the habit of writing using the roman alphabet – this first became common with the introduction of Christianity and its attendant bureaucracy towards the end of the Viking Age. But Scandinavians had their own form of literacy in the runic alphabet, one that they shared with other speakers of Germanic languages in Anglo-Saxon England and on the European continent. The Scandinavians developed and used this alphabet to a much greater extent than elsewhere, however, and took their knowledge of runes with them to their colonies in both east and west.[18]

Scandinavian runic inscriptions in the British Isles are surprisingly few, with the exception of the Isle of Man, which boasts around 30 memorial stones carved with inscriptions in Scandinavian runes and Scandinavian language. There were no doubt various social and cultural factors behind the use or non-use of runes at different times in the Viking and Norse periods, and in different parts of the Scandinavian world. Runes were not used in the same way that the roman alphabet came to be used later, for instance they were not used for books, or to record extensive literary or documentary texts. They were used on stone memorials commemorating the dead, for ephemeral and casual messages on a variety of objects (including graffiti), and to mark the manufacture and ownership of small, often personal, objects. Runic inscriptions have been found at a number of sites in both mainland and insular Scotland and, like the place-names, they help to map various types of Viking and Norse activity.[19]

The most recent survey (in 1996) of Scandinavian runic inscriptions in Scotland counted 17 individual inscriptions in Orkney (not including the collection of 33 graffiti in Maeshowe), 7 in Shetland, and 15 in the rest of Scotland.[20] Runic inscriptions continue to be found, and are reported in the Norwegian journal Nytt om runer ('News About Runes').[21] Although the total seems impressive, some of these inscriptions make little or no sense, either because the condition of the object on which they were inscribed is poor and they are therefore fragmentary, or in some cases because they were probably never intended to make sense. There has certainly been a recent flush of 'twig'-rune finds in Orkney which Michael Barnes is inclined to believe may be more modern attempts rather than original Viking or Norse messages.[22]

Outside the two main runic areas of Orkney and Shetland, the Scottish inscriptions cover a range of types. The Hunterston brooch, found in Ayrshire, is a Celtic brooch of the seventh or eighth

century, on which someone carved 'Maelbrigde owns [this] brooch', probably in the tenth century. Maelbrigde is a Celtic name, but the runes and the language of the inscription are Scandinavian. As the brooch was a casual find, it is difficult to say anything about it with certainty. The appropriation by a Viking of a Celtic object has many archaeological parallels, but the Celtic name gives us pause in this interpretation. More obviously Norse are the graffiti found in St Molio's cave on Holy Island off Arran – these eight inscriptions have been ascribed to Norwegian visitors to the island in the thirteenth century (possibly connected with the expeditions of the Norwegian King Hákon), and do not reflect local knowledge of runes. The inscriptions that do reflect local use of runes are found on crosses and cross-slabs. The Kilbar cross from Barra, the Inchmarnock cross from Bute, the Iona cross-slab and two memorials from Thurso all show the use of Scandinavian language and runes on Christian memorials to the dead, all of them with Scandinavian names, representing the immigrant population's adoption of the Christian religion and customs, while still retaining their language and script.

Orkney, too, has Christian memorials with runic inscriptions, but it also boasts a varied corpus including graffiti on stone, and inscriptions on small objects such as a spindle whorl, a bear's tooth and bits of bone. The most spectacular runic inscriptions are the 33 graffiti cut into the inside walls of the prehistoric chambered cairn at Maeshowe. The language and rune-forms of the inscriptions indicate a date in the mid-twelfth century, and carvers of mainly Norwegian origin, with possibly some Orcadian and Icelandic involvement.[23] There is a plausible hypothesis that they were carved by the Jerusalem-bound or homecoming crusaders who went east with Earl Rögnvaldr, as described in *Orkneyinga saga*.[24]

The Shetland corpus is too small and fragmentary to draw conclusions from it, though it is clear that it too spans the Viking and Norse periods, and includes several memorial stones.[25]

Overall, the runic inscriptions of Scotland are informative about the language and culture of some of the inhabitants of Viking and Norse Scotland, and the preponderance of Christian monuments shows the settlers keeping some aspects of their culture even after abandoning their ancestral, pagan religion.

Orkneyinga and other sagas

Our main near-contemporary narrative source for Scandinavian Scotland was originally composed around 1200 in Iceland, although it only survives in a later and not entirely complete version.[26] While *Orkneyinga saga* does not fit easily into any of the various sub-categories of medieval Icelandic literature, it is still recognisably a product of that great flowering of literary culture, and is the most prominent example of a noticeable tendency of the Icelanders to take an interest in the history of their neighbours.[27] As many of the Icelandic sagas deal with the adventures of the Viking Age, so many of them contain scenes set in Scotland, or involving Scottish characters. Moreover, some Icelanders had close family ties in the Northern Isles, and took a genealogical interest in their history.[28]

The difficulty with all of the Icelandic prose narratives mentioning Scotland lies in how to read them. Are they history or literature, or an unfathomable amalgam of the two? On this fundamental question in saga-studies, the pendulum has swung back and forth throughout the twentieth century. Within the last few decades, scholars have developed more nuanced views of both 'history' and 'literature', causing some of them to reject the necessity of even attempting to categorise texts in this way. Nevertheless, it is hard to escape the fact that many Icelandic saga-narratives are based on a kernel of 'historical' fact, which is usually interpreted in what might be described as a 'literary' way.

Orkneyinga saga is a good example of the range of modes in which the sagas were written, and which caused them to oscillate between the fictional and the factual. While it is hardly a well-rounded piece of imaginative literature, in the way that many nineteenth- and even twentieth-century novels are, it is notably entertaining, at least in parts. At the same time, it is clearly historical in intent, providing an Orcadian equivalent to the sagas of the Norwegian kings, proceeding through the reigns of the earls in chronological fashion, recounting their main deeds and feuds, and describing their deaths and successors. Like the sagas of the Norwegian kings, the narrative of the deeds of the earls of Orkney is confirmed and supported by the quotation of authoritative and contemporary

skaldic verse, the saga-man's equivalent of the learned footnote.[29] Overall, Orkneyinga saga appears to have been rather unevenly constructed from a wide variety of source materials.[30] The early chapters cannot be taken as a reliable history of the beginnings of the Orkney Earldom, but the saga's account of twelfth- and thirteenth-century events seems reliable, and was clearly indebted to both the testimony of Orcadian informants and a close knowledge of the geography of northern Scotland.[31] Moreover, the sharply skeptical narrative stance of much of the latter part of the saga suggests a context of discussion and debate about recent events that can plausibly be located in this Orcadian phase.[32]

The close connections between Norway, Iceland and Orkney throughout the Viking and Norse periods mean that Orkney also played a part in their common literary culture of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Although we have no medieval literary manuscripts in Old Norse from Scotland, a number of texts that survive in Icelandic manuscripts have more or less plausibly been attributed a Scottish, usually Orcadian, origin. The Maeshowe inscriptions discussed above, and the evidence of *Orkneyinga saga* itself, particularly in the time of Earl Rögnvaldr, suggest a strong interest in poetry, runes and mythology in twelfth-century Orkney, all of which are consonant with the other cultural currents of that time.[33] Both Rögnvaldr himself, and the thirteenth-century Bishop of Orkney, Bjarni Kolbeinsson, were well known to the medieval Icelanders as poets, and it is possible to reconstruct the contours of a lost Orcadian literature.[34] The evidence from Icelandic manuscripts shows a continuous tradition of poetry and narrative in Orkney from at least the mid-eleventh through to the mid-thirteenth century. We can clearly trace the development of court and political poetry from Arnórr to Rögnvaldr to Bjarni. The prose literature is more difficult to reconstruct. Any prose narratives that might have originated in medieval Orkney have largely been subsumed into various Icelandic literary genres, including sagas and myths. But it is clear that Orcadian poetry-making in the second half of the twelfth and the first half of the thirteenth century took place in the context of a wider literary culture which cultivated both Norse traditions of myth, saga and verse forms, and the international forms of love poetry and Latin learning.

The Scottification of Orkney (and the rest of Scandinavian Scotland) was a slow but inevitable process and the vitality of Norse culture began to diminish well before the official transfer of the Northern Isles to Scotland in 1468-9. There is no evidence for high literary culture in the Norse language after about the middle of the thirteenth century. A final glimpse of Norse literature in Scotland comes in the saga of the Norwegian king Hákon Hákonarson.[35] After his setback at Largs, Hákon intended to return to Norway via Kirkwall, but died in the Bishop's Palace there in 1263. On his sickbed, he called for books to be read to him. When he found it tiring to listen to works in Latin, he called for vernacular books, and sagas of saints and Norwegian kings were read to him. Both the Latin works and the sagas might have been books he had brought with him (for Hákon was a king who cultivated literature), but it seems equally likely that the successors of Bishop Bjarni would have had both types of book available to royal guests in their palace.

Summary

Unlike England, Scotland had a Scandinavian period that extended beyond the three centuries or so of the Viking Age, with parts of the country remaining Norse for several centuries more, until the mid-fifteenth century in the case of the Northern Isles. Archaeological, architectural and art-historical evidence from both the Viking and Norse periods is complemented by sources which show the persistence of Scandinavian language and culture in Scotland. Place-names of Scandinavian origin can help us assess the extent and the nature of Scandinavian settlement, which varied enormously across the four regions affected in this way. Runic inscriptions show that some Scottish residents of Scandinavian origin were still using their ancestral language and script, even though they had adopted the local religion of Christianity. They also reveal the presence of Scandinavian visitors, which can be linked to historical events of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Finally, texts preserved in Iceland can help to reconstruct the literary and historical culture in the Norse language of medieval Orkney, as well as showing its close ties to the Norse world of the North Atlantic.

NOTES

1 The discovery and excavation, and the burial itself, are fully and engagingly described in Olwyn Owen and Magnar Dalland, *Scar: A Viking Boat Burial on Sanday, Orkney* (East Lothian: Tuckwell, 1999).

2 For two current projects in Orkney and Shetland, see: http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/arch/quoygrew/ and http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/archsci/depart/resgrp/northisles/scatness.php. The Quoygrew page also has links to recent archaeological work in the Hebrides.

3 Of the archaeological surveys, Anna Ritchie, *Viking Scotland* (London: Batsford, 1993) and Olwyn Owen, *The Sea Road: A Voyage through Viking Scotland* (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1999) are more popular, while James Graham-Campbell and Colleen E. Batey, *Vikings in Scotland: An Archaeological Survey* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998) is more academic, though still very accessible. For some electronic resources, see http://www.rcahms.gov.uk/, http://www.scran.ac.uk, http://www.sair.org.uk and http://www.govanold.org.uk/sculpture.

4 The material is usefully collected in Alan O. Anderson, *Scottish Annals from English Chroniclers: A.D. 500 to 1286* (London: David Nutt, 1908; reprinted with corrections Stamford: Paul Watkins, 1991) and Alan Orr Anderson, *Early Sources of Scottish History: A.D. 500 to 1286* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1922; reprinted with corrections Stamford: Paul Watkins, 1990). Both of these anthologies of gobbets tend to the inclusive, and the material in them should be used with extreme care and a strongly source-critical approach.

5 See, e.g. Barbara E. Crawford, *Scandinavian Scotland* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1987), a good introduction to the topic.

6 For those new to the topic, the best introduction is still Else Roesdahl, *The Vikings* (London: Penguin, 1991; 2nd ed. 1998).

7 See http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/english/research/EPNS. A Scottish Place-Name Society was established in 1996, and there is much useful material on its website: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/institutes/sassi/spns/. For a brief, general survey of all Scottish place-names, see W.F.H. Nicolaisen, *Scottish Place-Names: Their Study and Significance* (London: Batsford, 1976; most recent ed. 2001).

8 The articles in *Scandinavian Settlement in Northern Britain: Thirteen Studies of Place-Names in their Historical Context*, ed. Barbara E. Crawford (London: Leicester University Press, 1995) relate mostly to Scotland, with a few about northern England. The book also has a very full bibliography. *Nomina*, the journal of the Society for Name Studies in Britain and Ireland, and *Northern Studies*, the journal of the Scottish Society for Northern Studies, both regularly publish papers on the Scandinavian place-names of Scotland; the former also contains a useful annual bibliography which should enable readers to track down the many recent contributions which are published in scattered journals, conference proceedings and essay collections.

9 Gillian Fellows-Jensen, 'Scandinavian Settlement in the British Isles and Normandy', in *Scandinavia and Europe 800-1350: Contact, Conflict, and Coexistence*, ed. Jonathan Adams and Katherine Holman (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), pp. 137-47 (p. 138). These zones, or 'linguistic regions', were first mapped in Barbara Crawford, *Scandinavian Scotland* (as note 5), p. 93.

10 For Orkney and Shetland, we still rely on the work of two great pioneers, the Orkneyman Hugh Marwick and the Faroeman Jakob Jakobsen. Marwick's most important works on names are: *The Place-Names of Rousay* (Kirkwall: W.R. Mackintosh, 1947); *Orkney Farm-Names* (Kirkwall: W.R. Mackintosh, 1952); *The Place-Names of Birsay* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1970); and ch. 29, 'A Place-Name Miscellany', of his general book *Orkney* (London: Robert Hale, 1951). Jakob Jakobsen's *The Place-Names of Shetland*, first published in Danish in 1901, and in English in 1936, has been reprinted (Kirkwall: The Orcadian, 1993), with a critical introduction by Gillian Fellows-Jensen.

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14 Arne Kruse, 'Norse Topographical Settlement Names on the Western Littoral of Scotland' and Andrew Jennings, 'The Norse Place-Names of Kintyre', both in *Scandinavia and Europe* (as note 9), pp. 97-107, 109-19.

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21 Some parts of the journal are also available at http://ariadne.uio.no/runenews/. This website currently lists some four inscriptions from Orkney that have come to light since Holman's survey.

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24 Barnes, *Maeshowe*, p. 40.

25 For Orkney and Shetland, see further Katherine Holman, 'Reading the Runes: Epigraphy and History in the Northern Isles', in *Roman, Runes and Ogham: Medieval Inscriptions in the Insular World and on the Continent*, ed. John Higgitt, Katherine Forsyth and David N. Parsons (Donington: Shaun Tyas, 2001), pp. 112-20.

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29 Diana Whaley, 'Arnórr, Earls' Propagandist? On the Techniques and Social Functions of Skaldic Eulogy', in *The Faces of Orkney* (as note 22), pp. 18-32.

30 Judith Jesch, 'History in the "Political Sagas"', *Medium Ævum* 62 (1993), 210-20.

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33 See various articles in *St Magnus Cathedral and Orkney's Twelfth-Century Renaissance*, ed. Barbara E. Crawford (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1988).

34 See Judith Jesch, 'The Literature of Medieval Orkney', to be published in a volume edited by Anne Brundle and Olwyn Owen, and Judith Jesch, 'Norse Literature in the Orkney Earldom', to be published in the forthcoming *Edinburgh History of Scottish Literature*, ed. Ian Brown, Thomas Clancy, Susan Manning and Murray Pittock. A Hebridean origin is also possible for some Old Icelandic poetry, though the arguments are not very convincing. For some examples of Scandinavian poetry from medieval Scotland, see *The Triumph-Tree: Scotland's Earliest Poetry 550-1350*, ed. Thomas Owen Clancy (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1998), and Roberta Frank, *Sex, Lies and Málsháttakvæði: A Norse Poem from Medieval Orkney* (Nottingham: Centre for the Study of the Viking Age, 2004).

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Plato, Byzantium and the Italian Renaissance

DR JONATHAN HARRIS

The ideas of the Athenian philosopher, Plato (429-347 BC), encapsulated in the form of dialogues, have exerted such an abiding influence on western philosophy and political thought that it is easy to forget that for many centuries, between about 500 and 1400, his works were almost unknown in western Europe. This was partly because very few people in Medieval Europe knew enough Greek to read Plato and even if they had, copies of the Dialogues were almost impossible to obtain, with only the *Timaeus* available in Latin translation. Scholars were therefore largely dependent on earlier Latin authors such as Cicero and St Augustine for a second-hand knowledge of Plato's ideas.[1] It was the rediscovery of the Dialogues in the original during the Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth century that set western thought off on new paths, a rediscovery that was made possible by the preservation and transmission of Plato's work by scholars in another part of the Christian world, the Byzantine empire or Byzantium.

In Byzantium, the literary language was not Latin but Greek, and therefore classical Greek literature continued to be studied and read throughout the medieval period. In the empire's capital city of Constantinople, the works of the ancient Greek poets, historians, dramatists and philosophers were taught in a traditional course of higher education that trained laymen for the imperial civil service.[2] Plato was by no means the most popular author on the higher education curriculum, however, for there were several aspects of his thought which were extremely difficult to reconcile with Christian doctrine. In the Dialogue known in English as the Republic, for example, Plato described the transmigration of souls (*metempsychosis*), the idea that souls of the dead await a new body in which to be reborn, something completely at odds with the Christian teaching that souls await only resurrection and judgment. Plato also advocated the sharing of wives which is hardly compatible with the Christian ideal of marriage.[3] Consequently, in 529 the Emperor Justinian (527-565) had closed the Platonic Academy in Athens and thereafter showing too much enthusiasm for Plato's writings could incur the disapproval of the Church.[4]

There were, however, courageous individuals who were prepared to run the risk. One poet described Plato as the 'teacher of immortality' and the statesman Michael Psellos (c.1022-c.1080) openly expressed his admiration for Platonic thought in his memoirs. He may even have espoused aspects of Plato's political thought and applied it to the situation in his own day.[5] Another Byzantine Platonist was George Gemistos Plethon (c.1360-1452) who went so far as to incorporate elements of Plato's philosophy into letters of advice sent to members of the Byzantine royal family.[6] Both men aroused the suspicion of the ecclesiastical authorities. Psellos was on one occasion called to justify himself before the ecclesiastical synod while Plethon was exiled from Constantinople to Mistra in the Peloponnese on suspicion of holding heretical views. Yet the study of Plato did not always lead to accusations of doctrinal deviance. Even the emperor responsible for exiling Plethon, Manuel II Palaeologos (1391-1425), a man renowned for his piety, saw nothing wrong with choosing a copy of the works of Plato as a gift for an old friend.[7]

It is likely, however, that Manuel II had much weightier matters on his mind than Platonic philosophy, for by the time he became emperor in 1391, the Byzantine empire was in a state of terminal decline. Its territories had slowly been eaten away by the remorseless advance of the Ottoman Turks. By the beginning of the fifteenth century, Constantinople was surrounded and under siege, and it seemed that it would only be a matter of time before the city fell. Manuel II and his advisers fell back on the only policy that now seemed open to them: they decided to appeal for help to their co-religionists in western Europe.[8] The transmission of Plato to the West was to be a by-product of this decision.

To negotiate western aid, a number of ambassadors were despatched, including Manuel Chrysoloras (c.1350-1415), a personal friend of Manuel II and a product of the Byzantine system of higher education. Although his mission was primarily diplomatic, Chrysoloras supplemented his

income while in Venice in 1394 by giving some lessons in ancient Greek to a Florentine gentleman called Roberto Rossi. On his return to his native city, Rossi passed an enthusiastic account of his teacher to Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406), the Chancellor of Florence. So impressed was Salutati that he decided to secure Chrysoloras's services, and in 1396 invited him to teach grammar and Greek literature at the University of Florence. Chrysoloras duly came and had a tremendous impact. His lectures were thronged with eager learners and among his pupils were numbered some of the foremost Italian intellectuals of the day, such as Guarino da Verona (1374-1460) and Pallas Strozzi (1372-1462). Such was the enthusiasm with which his presence was greeted that the contemporary writer Leonardo Bruni (1370-1444) claimed that Chrysoloras had restored to the Italians a knowledge of classical Greek, which had been lost for seven hundred years.[9]

How can all this enthusiasm be accounted for? There can be no doubt that there was real hunger in Italy for a knowledge of ancient Greek. The movement that has come to be known as the Renaissance developed during the later fourteenth century, as scholars and artists rediscovered the 'humanist' values of Roman literature and classical art. Yet these early Renaissance scholars were painfully aware that they were only getting half the picture. Roman authors such as Cicero and Seneca constantly referred to Greek authors but for these writers the Italians either had no texts or if they had, they could not read them. This was the predicament faced by the Florentine poet Francesco Petrarca or Petrarch (1304-1374). Although he acquired a manuscript of the works of Homer in 1348, despite all his efforts, he was never able to learn enough Greek to be able to read it.[10] Chrysoloras created a sensation in Florence because of his teaching methods. He pioneered a way of simplifying Greek grammar in his textbook, the *Erotemata* or 'Questions' and so provided a way out of the difficulty faced by Petrarch.

Chrysoloras only occupied the post at Florence between 1397 and 1400 when he left and moved on to Pavia and Milan, before travelling extensively throughout Europe in his quest for aid for beleaguered Constantinople.[11] During this time he became involved in another activity that was to have great long-term significance. Realising that there were many who wanted to gain access to the ideas contained in ancient Greek literature who, like Petrarch, would never learn Greek, he gave his assistance to the Milanese scholar, Uberto Decembrio (d. 1427), in his efforts to produce a Latin translation of a Greek text. Translations from Greek to Latin had been made before but they had followed a word for word approach which made them turgid to read. Chrysoloras and Decembrio instead adopted a technique which conveyed the spirit of the text in a Latin of some literary merit.[12] Even more radical than Chrysoloras and Decembrio's method, however, was their choice of text. Rather than going for something purely literary, they decided to translate Plato's *Republic*.

Why they should make this choice is not entirely clear but a possible reason is found in Decembrio's introduction to the translation where it is suggested that Plato's authority could be cited against republican liberty.[13] Traditionally, the Italian city-states had embraced in theory an Aristotelian and Ciceronian ideal, that man was 'a political animal' and that it was in his nature and his duty to participate in the political life of his city.[14] While not democracies in the strict sense, these city-states usually had some mechanism whereby the citizen body could gather in the main piazza and express its approval or disapproval of decisions taken by the city government. By the later Middle Ages, however, some intellectuals were questioning whether wide participation in the political process really provided the best protection for liberty or whether it merely gave rise to factionalism detrimental to the best interests of the state. Politics, it was coming to be argued, should be left rather to those who were best qualified to pursue them, a wise and enlightened elite, who had the wealth and education to devote to matters of state. A life of contemplative withdrawal and disengagement from political life, formerly seen as reprehensible, was now coming to be regarded as praiseworthy.

All this was not merely a matter of philosophical speculation, for it mirrored changes that were taking place in the way that the Italian city states were governed and of which the result was usually to place the political process under the control of an upper class of nobles. In Venice, the aristocratic Great Council and the Council of Ten had come to dominate decision-making, leaving the General Assembly of the citizens as merely a rubber stamp. Florence, after 1382, was dominated by conservative patricians, with power concentrated in fewer hands, providing a government that was less representative but probably much more stable and efficient.[15]

In this climate, Plato's ideas, especially those outlined in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, were extremely attractive to Florentine and other Italian intellectuals, most of whom were part of the new governing elite. In the *Republic*, Plato argued that the only way to secure the stability of the state and the wealth and happiness of its citizens was to entrust government to an elite, the Guardians or philosopher kings.[16] States organised along other lines failed to secure these goals because the citizens were divided into groups which were in competition with each other. Democracy was no answer because in that type of state the rulers do not consider the common good, but tend to give the people what they want which is by no means the same thing. The Guardians of Plato's state would be specially educated from childhood for their role and would be morally incorruptible because they would have no families or private property. Above all, they would be philosophers and so able to discern how to achieve the absolute highest good of the state.[17] Thus the *Republic* and other Dialogues provided a reasoned justification for a less directly representative form of government.

Chrysoloras died in 1415 while representing the Byzantine emperor at the Council of Constance, but the process of disseminating Plato's thought which he had helped to initiate continued. The *Laws* was translated into Latin in Rome in the 1440s by George of Trebizond, a Greek scholar from Crete in papal service, and although it was heavily criticised for inaccuracy by some contemporaries, it enjoyed wide circulation.[18] Another opportunity for Italian intellectuals to improve their acquaintance with Plato came in 1439, when Constantinople was once more in danger from the Turks and once again the Byzantines hoped that help would come from the West. Unfortunately there was a stumbling block in that the Byzantine and western Churches were in schism, deeply divided by differences on the issues of papal authority and the wording of the Creed. In 1438, therefore, the Emperor John VIII Palaeologos (1425-1448) and a large delegation of clergy and laymen arrived in Italy to attend a church council to resolve these issues with the pope and the cardinals. The Council met first at Ferrara and then in January 1439 moved to Florence, the choice of the latter city being partly dictated by the generous offer of its *de facto* ruler, Cosimo de'Medici (1389-1464), to meet the cost of housing and feeding the delegations.[19]

The months went by and the interminable theological debates went on, but many of the Italian intellectuals soon discovered that there was a much more interesting side to the gathering. Many of the Byzantine delegates were highly educated men, steeped in the literature of ancient Greece about which the Italians were so curious. Ambrogio Traversari (1386-1439) was delighted to make the acquaintance of Bessarion (1402-1472), archbishop of Nicaea, as he discovered that the archbishop had in his library books that Ambrogio had only heard of but never seen.[20] The Byzantine delegate who impressed the Florentines most, however, was Bessarion's teacher, George Gemistos Plethon of Mistra. When a lively debate began on the relative merits of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, the Italians were delighted by Plethon's enthusiastic championing of the former. Plethon even wrote down his defence of Plato in the form of a treatise, *On the Differences of Plato and Aristotle*, which he circulated during the council.[21] Plethon's brief stay in Florence seems to have made a lasting impression. The philosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) was later to comment that Plethon had brought the spirit of Plato from the Byzantine empire to Italy and the host of the Council of Florence, Cosimo de'Medici, was later to found an academy for the study of Plato just outside the city at Careggi.[22]

Another event was to have the side effect of helping the growth of Platonic studies in Florence. In May 1453, Constantinople finally fell to the Ottoman Turks, the long hoped-for help from the West having failed to materialise. A stream of refugees left the city for Italy, including many scholars and intellectuals. Among them was John Argyropoulos (c.1415-1487) who had been one of the Byzantine delegates to Florence in 1439. In 1456 he was offered the chance to follow in the footsteps of Manuel Chrysoloras and teach in Florence with a generous salary of four hundred florins.[23]

Argyropoulos enjoyed the same celebrity status in Florence that Chrysoloras had. His public lectures, given in the mornings, were thronged by eager listeners from all over Europe, while in the afternoons he gave private lessons to some of the most prominent Florentines, including the son of Cosimo de'Medici, Lorenzo the Magnificent (1449-1492). He became a leading member of the Academia Fiorentina, a literary club which met in the house of another of his pupils, Alamanno Rinuccini (1426-1499), and he received Florentine citizenship in 1466.

Argyropoulos's popularity was probably due, at least in part, to two aspects of his teaching method. The first was the importance which he attached to speculative philosophy as an essential part of the curriculum, rather than adhering solely to rhetoric, the traditional mainstay of humanist education. Secondly, there was his choice of philosopher. Although personally an Aristotelian who accepted the traditional, scholastic interpretations of Aristotle's philosophy, in his private teaching Argyropoulos gave instruction in the works of Plato. His exposition proved to be so effective that many of his students, including Rinuccini, transferred their interest from rhetoric to Plato's metaphysical philosophy.[24]

Yet just when it seemed that the future of Platonic studies in Italy was secure, the old suspicion of the incompatibility of Plato's philosophy with Christianity once more made itself felt. In 1458, George of Trebizond, apparently having repented of translating the Laws, published a strongly worded denunciation of Plato, entitled *Comparisons of Aristotle and Plato*. In this book he claimed that Plato's ideas led inevitably to immorality and heresy, and denounced any attempt to reconcile Platonism with Christianity. To prove his point, he cited George Gemistos Plethon, who he claimed had been led by reading Plato to abjure Christianity and to turn to the worship of the old Olympian gods.[25]

The debate on the legitimacy of studying Plato raged on during the 1450s and 1460s, centred mainly in Rome at the house of Bessarion, who was by now a cardinal and had come a long way since his days as archbishop of Nicaea. Several émigré Byzantine scholars penned replies to George of Trebizond, but the most effective was that written by Bessarion himself, his *Against the Calumniator of Plato* which he published in 1469. In this work, Bessarion sought to defend Plato by stressing those areas of his thought which were reconcilable with Christianity. Those which were not, like Plato's ideal state, with its communal sharing of property and wives, he presented as ideals, unattainable in a fallen world. His championship of Plato proved to be extremely successful. By expounding Plato's thought clearly and in Latin, *Against the Calumniator* made it accessible to a much wider readership and, by stressing the points of agreement both with Aristotle and with Christian doctrine, it helped to make its study respectable.[26] The controversy did not die down for another ten years, with George of Trebizond being joined by his son, Andreas (d.1496) in his attack on the Platonists. Ultimately, however, it was Bessarion's view which gained ground among the Italian humanists, leaving George of Trebizond increasingly isolated.

Italian intellectuals were now free to use Plato to frame their new vision of man and the state. He was cited endlessly, and not always accurately, in support of whatever position the author was in favour of. The stability and longevity of the Venetian republic was attributed to its founding fathers having read Plato's *Laws* and put its precepts into practice in the constitution.[27] In Florence, Platonic arguments were used to justify the dominance of the Medici, with Lorenzo the Magnificent portrayed as the ideal philosopher king, and Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) framing his thoughts on the city's government in the form of dialogues.[28] It could even be argued that the influence of his ideas can be seen the works of the most famous Florentine thinker, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527). It is often pointed out that Machiavelli only mentioned Plato once in his writings and that was to say that the Greek philosopher had merely succeeded in conjuring up a vision of an ideal state which he was incapable of putting into practice.[29] Nevertheless, there are certain parallels between their ideas. Both considered that for a well-ordered state to be created or renewed, the citizens would have to subject themselves completely to one prudent, virtuous individual.[30] So important was the role of this lawgiver, statesman or prince, argued Machiavelli that though he must still appear to be good and moral in the traditional sense, in order to avoid unpopularity with his subjects, yet he could not afford to adhere to that morality in matters of state and must be prepared to abandon it to achieve the common good.[31] Plato never goes as far as that but he does assert that his Guardians should promote morality fables that they know to be untrue because these would make people more willing to serve the state, the so-called 'noble lie'.[32] Whether Machiavelli was inspired by Plato or not here, this is the type of interpretation that has sparked the continuing debate as to whether the Greek philosopher was a champion of good government, justice and individual freedom or a sinister precursor of twentieth century totalitarianism.[33]

Whatever one's views of Plato's ideas, however, one point is clear: in its dying years, Byzantium bequeathed the works of this philosopher to western Europe. Moreover, he is by no means the only

author whose preservation we owe to the Byzantines. We only have the works of Homer, Aristophanes, Thucydides, Euripides and other classical Greek authors today because the Byzantines preserved them and because manuscripts of their works were taken from Constantinople to Italy during the fifteenth century. It is a formidable legacy and one which should entitle Byzantium to wider exposure in universities and schools than it currently enjoys.

NOTES

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25 John Monfasani, *George of Trebizond* (Leiden, 1976), pp. 201-29; Hankins, *Plato*, i. 165-92.

26 Setton, 'Byzantine background', 73; Wilson, *Byzantium to Italy*, pp. 57-67; Hankins, *Plato*, i. 217-63.

27 Franco Gaeta, 'Giorgio di Trebizonda, le leggi di Platone e la costituzione di Venezia', *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano* 82 (1970), 479-501; Felix Gilbert, 'The Venetian constitution in Florentine political thought', *Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence*, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (London, 1968), pp. 463-500.

28 Francesco Guicciardini, *Dialogue on the Government of Florence*, trans. Alison Brown (Cambridge, 1994); Brown, 'Platonism', 391-8; Hankins, 'Humanism and modern political thought', pp. 128-31.

29 Leo Strauss, *Interpreting Machiavelli* (Seattle and London, 1958), p. 224; Mark Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1983), pp. 134-5, 143, 151; Maurizio Viroli, *Machiavelli* (Oxford, 1998), p. 146.

30 Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago and London, 1996), bk. I, ch. 9, p. 29; Plato, *The Statesman. Philebus*, ed. Harold N. Fowler, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1925), pp. 142-3; Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: the Doctrine of Raison d'État and its Place in Modern History*, trans. Douglas Scott (Boulder, Colorado and London, 1984), p. 58; Copenhaver and Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy*, pp. 143-95.

31 Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. George Bull (5th ed, Harmondsworth, 1999), chs. xv and xviii, pp. 50, 57.

32 Plato, *Republic*, 414b-415d; *Laws*, 663-4.

33 See Thomas L. Thorson, *Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963); Renford Bambrough, *Plato, Popper and Politics* (Cambridge and New York, 1967).

The Great Irish Famine

PROFESSOR CHRISTINE KINEALY

The Irish Famine of 1845 to 1852 is central to understanding the development of modern Ireland. The death of over one million people and the emigration of an even higher number within the space of five years made it one of the greatest catastrophes in Irish history. The tragic consequences of the crop failure were also unique within modern Europe, where famine had largely been eradicated by the mid-nineteenth century. Moreover, Ireland never recovered from its demographic shock, with the population continuing to fall until the beginning of the twentieth century, and even at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Irish population is smaller that it was in 1845. The imprint of the Famine was also visible in the development of countries where famine refugees settled, particularly the United States, the main destination of the emigrants. Within the United States, however, the Irish Famine is often referred to as The Great Hunger, or its Irish name *An Gorta Mhór,* on the grounds that as large amounts of food were continuing to leave Ireland, it was not a true famine.

Historiographical Developments

Despite the significance of the Famine, until 1995 (the sesquicentenary of the first appearance of blight in 1845) few books had been written about this event, moreover, it was rarely taught in Irish schools or universities. Furthermore, a view had emerged, generally referred to as 'revisionism', that played down the tragic impact of the event, viewing a major subsistence crisis as inevitable (due to over-population and economic under-production) and interventions of the British government as benign.[1] Some of the new research that emerged in the 1990s challenged this orthodoxy and so became referred to as post-revisionism. Its main contentions were that despite high dependence on the potato, Ireland had a diverse agricultural sector that produced a large surplus, much of which was exported to Britain (including sufficient high-quality corn to feed two million people annually). Also, the Irish people (poor and landlords alike) were viewed by the British governing classes through a colonial prism, based on a variable combination of cultural stereotyping, providentialism, principles of political economy and pragmatism, that believed that interventions by the government should be done in such a way as to bring about long looked for changes in Ireland.[2] Increasingly, therefore, saving the lives of the Irish was made secondary to the desire to change and modernise Ireland. The social and human cost of these policies was high, and they affirmed that Irish people were not regarded as equal partners with the United Kingdom. Some of the new writing in the 1990s demonstrated that the Famine was not a local subsistence crisis (ie confined to the west coast of the country) but that it affected some of the more industrialised areas in the north east of the country.[3] Local studies have shown how the impact of famine could vary, depending on the complex interplay between local landowners, merchants, religious ministers, access to external assistance, and the resources and resilience of the people.[4] Overall, a much more nuanced view of the causes and impact of the Famine has emerged. The history of the Famine continues to divide Irish historians (and Irish people), although the legacy of the last ten years has been the creation of a rich and diverse famine historiography. [5] The debate has also been influential in opening up discussion about other controversial areas of Ireland's past.

Famine Memory and Commemoration

Despite the marginalisation – the memory of the Famine was a strong part of Irish folk tradition, not only in Ireland but amongst the diaspora, kept alive by songs such as 'Revenge for Skibbereen' and 'The Fields of Athenry' (which was actually written by Pete St John in 1979). The hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of the tragedy demonstrated how widespread interest in and the memory of the Famine was, providing a further spur for research, teaching and publications on the Famine. The government

in the Irish Republic even appointed a committee to oversee and finance a number of high-profile commemorative events, including ones in Britain, North America and Australia. By becoming so closely associated with the commemorations though, was the government attempting to appropriate and shape the memory of the Famine? Relatively little was done in Northern Ireland and what took place generally was located within the Catholic community, thus reinforcing an incorrect interpretation that the Famine did not affect the north east of the country and did not affect Protestants.[6] Yet, no part of Ireland escaped from the consequences of the Famine, although there were some marked regional variations, with areas in the south and west, notably Skibbereen and Kilrush, being indelibly linked with the Famine suffering. Even Ulster, the most industrially advanced part of the country, was affected, including Belfast, the flagship of Ireland's manufacturing and commercial progress. By 1847, there were daily accounts of dead bodies on the streets of Belfast, the local workhouse and hospitals were full, and the three major cemeteries (including the Protestant Shankill graveyard) were overflowing.[7]

The Irish government's commemorations were marked by a closing event in Millstreet in County Cork. It provided an opportunity for the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to apologize retrospectively, for the actions of the Whig government in the 1840s. The then President of the USA, Bill Clinton, also sent a message of sympathy, indicating that the Irish Famine had a political relevance today, and not just in Ireland.[8] Within the United States also, in the 1990s a number of States (including New Jersey and New York) adopted a famine curriculum to be taught as part of a human rights programme to students aged 12 to 14.[9] Ironically, students in the United States were being been taught more about the Famine period than their counterparts in Ireland or Britain have had an opportunity to learn. The fact that so few British students study modern Irish history (either at school or university level) is particularly strange given that all of Ireland was part of the United Kingdom from 1800 to 1921, and Irish events have had a disproportionate impact on British political decisions.[10]

The Government's Response to the Famine

What happened during those tragic years, especially in the light of the new research?

The tragedy was triggered by a mysterious blight that appeared on potatoes in the late summer of 1845, destroying approximately one-third of the crop. Potatoes were an important subsistence crop, with over half of the population of eight-and-a-half million people depending on this vegetable for their survival.[11] The Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, responded swiftly by putting into place a series of measures that would become effective the following spring when the shortages began to be felt. They included importing Indian corn (maize) from the United States, and providing matching grants to local relief committees for the purchase of food or the establishment of public works. These measures, although short-term and limited, were successful. In the year following the first appearance of blight, despite severe suffering, there was no excess mortality in Ireland. Many localities expressed their gratitude to Peel and his government for their intervention.

Peel used the Irish food shortages as an opportunity to repeal the Corn Laws, which was protective legislation that kept the price of imported corn artificially high. This action lost him the support of many members of his Tory (Conservative) Party and ultimately led to the end of his premiership. The Tory government was also replaced in the summer of 1846 by a Whig (Liberal) administration led by Lord John Russell. The Whigs had been traditional allies of Daniel O'Connell, the nationalist leader, and within Ireland there was optimism that they would live up to their promise of 'justice for Ireland'. Political aspirations were pushed aside, however, as within a few weeks of coming into power, Russell's government was confronted by the reappearance of potato blight, even earlier than in the previous year. By September 1846, over three-quarters of the crop had been destroyed, which meant the extent of distress would be far higher than in the previous year and the impact of food shortages would be felt immediately. Russell was anxious not to alienate his British supporters by endorsing high expenditure on Ireland. Consequently, his relief measures placed a higher financial burden on Irish taxpayers rather than on the central government. Public works, based on hard, physical labour, were made the main form of relief provision, with the cost of the works being repayable by the localities in Ireland. This philosophy was in keeping with a widely held belief that 'Irish property must support Irish poverty'. As a system of providing emergency relief, however, the public works system was flawed:

the wages were kept deliberately low despite the steep rise in food prices; the hard physical labour and long hours of employment weakened the health of a people already debilitated by hunger; the many layers of bureaucracy slowed down their effectiveness as a mechanism for relief and averted money from the poor; moreover, the work undertaken served little purpose, resulting in their popular portrayal as 'roads that led nowhere and walls that surrounded nothing'. Despite the expense of the public works – by March 1847 outlay had reached over £5,000,000, much of which was to be repaid by Irish tax-payers – they patently failed to save lives or maintain a basic level of health. [12]

The Whig Response

The new Whig government did not have a majority in parliament and, unlike the Tory Party, it derived a substantial part of its support from corn merchants and traders. One of the first things it did upon learning about the reappearance of blight was to assure the merchants that the government would keep its interventions in the Irish trade (both imports and exports) to a minimum.[13] Nonetheless, a number of local corporations and prominent individuals asked for the Irish ports to be closed as a short-term expedient to keep food within the country. Although food imports did increase, most did not arrive until the following spring, by which time many people had already died or emigrated, or their health had been seriously jeopardised. The fact that Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, which was the richest and most industrialised empire in the world, did not protect the Irish poor at a time of deprivation and starvation. Furthermore, a comparison with the response of the government to the food shortages occurring in the Highlands of Scotland at the same time reveals that Scottish distress was regarded with more sympathy by the British administrators than the suffering in Ireland.[14]

In spring 1847 the government's policies again changed, indicating that the measures introduced only six months earlier had failed. The new procedures marked the most liberal phase of famine relief. Import duties were removed from corn, the restrictive Navigation Laws were temporarily relaxed, which meant that food could be carried on ships not registered in Britain, and sugar was allowed to be used in distillation in place of grain. All of these measures meant that more food was available and this, in turn, helped to bring prices down. The most important change in policy was that – for the first and only time during the Famine – for a limited period only, poor people could receive free food in specially opened 'soup kitchens'. Although the portions given were meagre, the soup kitchens meant that the poor had direct access to free food. The scale of demand provided a measure of the extent of need in Ireland. By July 1847 over three million people were receiving free food rations daily whilst thousands of others, considered to be above destitution levels, were able to buy rations of food. Consequently, over forty per cent of the Irish population were kept alive by the soup kitchens.[15] Moreover, the soup kitchens demonstrated that the British government possessed both the administrative and logistical capability to feed the Irish poor. However, it lacked the political will or courage to do so for a prolonged period, despite unequivocal evidence of extensive need. Furthermore, the giving of gratuitous relief – especially to the Irish poor – was regarded with horror not only by orthodox supporters of political economy but also by British and Irish tax-payers who felt they were financing a flawed system of relief. Despite being cheap and effective, therefore, the soup kitchens were closed in the fall of 1847 and a more draconian phase of relief commenced.

Providentialist interpretations of the Famine were favoured by leading Protestant British statesmen and administrators such as Charles Trevelyan of the Treasury and Charles Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.[16] This interpretation was enthusiastically supported by the London Times.[17] Initially, some Catholic clergy viewed the food shortages as a judgement of God, requiring moral atonement by the population. However, this viewpoint was rejected by some Catholic clergy including Archbishop Hughes of New York. At a fund-raising lecture given at the Broadway Tabernacle in March 1847, he averred that it was 'blasphemy' to blame the tragedy on God, as the Famine was man's doing. He also pointed out that only one crop had failed in Ireland, whilst there was an abundance of other foodstuffs.[18] Hughes, at a distance of three thousand miles, was highlighting the central paradox of the Famine – how could people starve whilst vast amounts of foodstuffs were being grown and exported from Ireland?

The end of Famine?

There was little evidence of blight in the 1847 potato harvest, although the crop was very small. Nevertheless, the British government used the apparent disappearance of the blight to announce that the Famine was over and suggest that if further relief was necessary, it had to come totally from Irish sources. All relief, both permanent and emergency, was to be transferred to the Poor Law. The Poor Law had been introduced to Ireland in 1838 and was based on a system of workhouses, which were authoritarian, regimented institutions that provided a minimal amount of relief to families who were destitute. As the name implied, relief was given in return for work undertaken by the inmates, who were categorised as 'paupers'. The 130 workhouses in Ireland could only hold a total of 110,000 inmates, but since 1846 they had been allowed to rent extra accommodation. After 1847 also, to deal with the additional demands placed on it, the Poor Law was permitted to give a limited form of outdoor relief, thus allowing some paupers to remain in their own homes. For the British government, the key advantage of this form of relief was that each workhouse was supported by local taxation, which meant that the government could reduce its involvement in providing relief. The Famine, however, was far from over and, despite stringent regulations, in 1848 over one million people were dependent on the Poor Law for survival. Moreover, the increase in local taxation and the inability of tenants to pay their rents on time had resulted in a policy of mass evictions. Consequently, the Irish poor now faced homelessness.

In 1848 the blight returned just as virulently as in 1846, yet the British government refused to deviate from its policies introduced in the previous year, determined that relief should be financed from Ireland, and not by British tax-payers. The result of this minimum intervention was disastrous, and in 1849 proportionally as many people died as in 'Black '47'. Again, the British government demonstrated its determination that the Irish poor would not be a financial drain on British resources. At the beginning of 1848 the British government gave a small grant of £50,000 for Irish relief, while insisting that no more money would come from the central government. Even this small contribution angered some British taxpayers whose sympathies towards Ireland had hardened as a result of the Young Ireland uprising in July 1848. To cope with the on-going distress in Ireland a new tax was imposed on Irish rate-payers known as the 'Rate-in-Aid'. This taxation aroused the anger of some Protestant rate-payers in Ulster who argued – incorrectly – that they were being forced to subsidise the laziness and improvidence of paupers in the west of Ireland.[19]

International responses

The impact of the Famine was not confined to Ireland. Newspapers throughout the world carried reports of the suffering and by the end of 1846 an international fund-raising effort had commenced. Reports of the food shortages first reached the United States and Canada at the end of 1845 but the coverage was mixed about the seriousness of the scarcity. Within a few months, news from Ireland was dominated by the repeal movement and divisions between Young and Old Ireland, the two main sections of the nationalist movement. The second, more serious crop failure in 1846 appeared in the international press as early as October 1846. Even at this early stage it was clear that the situation was far more serious than in the previous year. It resulted in relief committees being organised in a number of cities. Their priority was to raise money to send to Ireland rather than alleviate the condition of famine refugees in America. In 1847 the usual St Patrick's Day dinners were cancelled and money sent to Ireland. Individual churches also raised money and sent it though the Society of Friends.[20] In New York three ships were commissioned to take money and supplies to Ireland, the *New Haven*, the *Duncan* and the *Boston*. The *Macedonia*, donated by the Secretary of the Navy, also included supplies for Scotland. It subsequently sailed from Boston, together with the *Jamestown*, which sailed directly to Queenstown (Cobh) in Cork. Paradoxically, as supplies left for Ireland, food was arriving in the US from Irish ports, the British government having refused to close the Irish ports and keep food in the country.[21]

In the summer of 1847 conditions improved in Ireland and mortality slowed down. This was partly due to the introduction of soup kitchens, but it was also because large donations and supplies of provisions were arriving from all over the world.

At the end of 1847, however, private donations to Ireland dried up. This was due to a combination of factors; the British government's declaration that the Famine was over; compassion fatigue, and frustration that despite large amounts of aid being sent to Ireland, paupers were emigrating and becoming an immediate burden on the taxpayers of their new country. These sentiments were evident in New York, which had raised money so generously for famine relief at the beginning of 1847. At the end of the year, the local authorities passed legislation making landing more difficult and they introduced tighter housing legislation, which included restrictions on cellar dwellings. Nonetheless, the generosity of the people following the second crop failure had been remarkable, not only in terms of the amount of aid raised, but also for the fact that donations had cut across national, religious and ethnic boundaries, money being given by individuals and groups as diverse as the President of the United States, the Choctaw Indians, policemen in London, the Sultan of Turkey, Queen Victoria, and convicts in Sing Sing prison in New York. In total, almost £2,000,000 worth of relief was raised for Ireland and its importance in saving lives was immeasurable.

Emigration

Mass emigration extended the suffering of the Irish people beyond Ireland. Since the second crop failure in 1846 thousands of people had fled Ireland, selling what few possessions they owned in order to afford the fare. Their preferred destination was North America, often via the circuitous route of Liverpool and Canada, in order to obtain the cheapest fares. The journey across the Atlantic could vary from between 17 and 90 days. Because the British-registered ships were subject to few regulations, many of the Irish immigrants arrived in a debilitated state. Ship fever had become commonplace and so the immigrants inadvertently brought fever into the city. More than any other European immigrants, Irish ones were undernourished, flea-ridden and ill, with little capital or either the skills or robust health to ensure that they could find employment quickly. As early as November 1846, immigrants were arriving who were escaping from the destitution in Ireland. Because of their poverty many became applicants for relief but the city authorities found it difficult to cope with the increased demands on their limited resources. In New York, for example, the city's Almshouse could only hold 1,671 inmates, and it quickly became over-crowded. The ill-health of many immigrants also meant that they filled up the hospitals and quarantine stations at the ports in which they landed.

Although Irish immigrants were evident in all walks of life, they predominated amongst the poorer classes. Despite being mostly from rural areas, many famine immigrants settled in cities in Britain and the United States. In New York, they congregated in the slums in Lower East Side and Upper East and West sides.[22] In Britain, many emigrants settled in the already overcrowded and unsanitary towns and cities, notably Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow and London. As far as possible, they avoided applying for poor relief in Britain because the complicated laws of settlement meant they could be deported back to Ireland if they did so.[23] Ironically, Irish emigrants escaped the poverty of Ireland to live in over-crowded, polluted, unsanitary slums, where they were exploited by greedy landlords and corrupt city officials. Mortality was high, caused by ship-fever or typhoid, with the Irish also being over-represented in mortality resulting from the 1849 cholera epidemic. The Irish poor had exchanged one form of poverty for another. In 1850, approximately one-third of Irish emigrants to Britain and the United States were living in cellar dwellings. The better-off Irish emigrants who tended to be healthier and have some capital generally escaped from the cities. The rise of anti-Irish nativism in the United States, and anti-Irish activities in Britain in the 1850s disguised the support and help given to the thousands of Irish arrivals who had fled from the Famine in the 1840s. Emigration offered a life-line for survival and without this safety-valve, an even higher number of Irish people would have died.

Good potato harvests did not return to Ireland until after 1851. By then, over one million people had died and an even higher number had emigrated. The return of good harvests, however, did not mark an end to hunger or social dislocation, and levels of disease, mortality and emigration remained higher throughout the 1850s than they had been prior to 1845. The Great Hunger had not only changed Ireland dramatically, its repercussions changed the development of other countries to which Irish people had fled.[24]

NOTES

1 An example of this approach is M. E. Daly *The Famine in Ireland* (Dundalk, 1986). For a criticism of it, see J.S Donnolly Jr 'The Great Famine and its Interpreters, old and new' in Tom Hayden (ed) *Irish Hunger. Personal Reflections on the Legacy of the Famine* (Roberts Rinehart, Colorado, 1997) pp. 117-133.

2 The way in which Ireland was viewed was complex, and responses to the food shortages did vary, reflecting shifting public opinion in Britain as well (particularly in the period leading to the General Election in August 1847). For more see Christine Kinealy, *This Great Calamity. The Irish Famine 1845-52* (Gill and Macmillan, 1994; to be re-issued in 2005).

3 Gerard MacAtasney, *The Famine in Lurgan/Portadown* (Belfast, 1997).

4 Some of the best local studies are, Ivor Hamrock, *The Famine in Mayo. A Portrait from Contemporary Sources* (Mayo, 2004); Patrick Hickey, *Famine in West Cork. The Mizen Peninsula. Land and People 1800 – 1852* (Mercier Press, 2002).

5 The fact that the Famine is still a source of controversy outside Ireland was demonstrated in 2001 when the Irish premier, Bertie Ahern, cancelled a visit to unveil a Famine monument in Carfin in Lanarkshire, due to the threat of sectarian violence following a Celtic-Rangers match; see, BBC News Scotland at https: news8.thdo.bbc.co.uk

6 This was stated in the Irish Dáil by Mr M. McDowell, *Parliamentary Debates of Dáil Eireann* (vol.456. No 5., col.1219, 5 October 1995; for comment on Protestants not being affected see Liam Kennedy, 'The rural economy' in Liam Kennedy and Philip Ollerenshaw (eds) *An Economic History of Ulster 1820-1939* Manchester University Press, 1985).

7 *Banner of Ulster,* 5 February 1847, 13 April 1847; *Belfast Protestant Journal,* 13 November 1847, 20 November 1847.

8 For more on Famine commemorations see, Christine Kinealy, *The Great Irish Famine, Impact, Ideology and Rebellion* (Palgrave, 2002).

9 Not everybody approved of the Famine curriculum, John Major's government objecting when it was introduced in New York, see Kinealy, *Great Famine,* Introduction.

10 Christine Kinealy, *A Disunited Kingdom? England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales 1800-1949* (Cambridge University Press, 1999). Welsh and Scottish history are also under-represented in the teaching of 'British' history.

11 For more on Irish economy and agriculture see, Cormac Ó Gráda, *Ireland. Before and After the Famine. Explorations in Economic History, 1800-1925* (Manchester University Press, 1993).

12 *Correspondence explanatory of the measures adopted by Her Majesty's Government for the relief of distress arising from the failure of the potato crop in Ireland* (British parliamentary Paper, 1846 [736] xxxvii; see also Kinealy, *Great Calamity,* pp.71-136.

13 Lord John Russell to the Duke of Leinster, 17 October 1846, G. P. Gooch, *The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell,* (London 1925) p.157.

14 See, T. M. Devine, *The Great Highland Famine: hunger, emigration and the Scottish Highlands in the Nineteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1988).

15 Kinealy, *Calamity,* pp.136-174.

16 D. A. Kerr, *A Nation of Beggars?: Priests, people and politics in Famine Ireland* (Oxford, 1994).

17 *Times,* 4 January 1847

18 Right Rev. John Hughes D.D., 'A Lecture on the Antecedent causes of the Irish Famine in 1847', full text printed in *New York Irish History,* (Vol. 9, 1995) pp. 13-14.

19 *Banner of Ulster,* 6 March 1849.

20 Rob Goodbody, *A Suitable Channel: Quaker Relief in the Great Famine* (Bray, 1995).

21 For more on private donations see, Kinealy, *Great Irish Famine,* chapter three.

22 The standard text on American emigration remains, K. A. Miller, *Emigrants and Exiles. Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America* (Oxford University Press, 1985); see also, Arthur Gribben (ed.) *The Great Famine and the Irish diaspora in America* (Mass. USA. 1999); Donald MacKay, *Flight from Famine: the coming of the Irish to Canada;* Frank Neil, *Black '47. Britain and the Famine Irish* (London, 1998).

23 Kinealy, *Great Calamity,* pp. 327-341.

24 Hayden, *Irish Hunger.*

Culture and religion in Russia: debates and new trends

DR IRINA PAERT

"No other national history in the world has been a subject to so many contradictory myths as the Russian" said Dimitry Likhachev, the devoted scholar of Russian culture.[1] It is not an exaggeration to state that the most persistent myths are those that are built on the dichotomy 'Russia versus Europe', the dichotomy that owes both to the Russian own myth-making, and to the Western travelogues and observations. Despite its geographical position in the realms of Europe and Asia, relative economic backwardness and outdated political institutions, Russia was part of the European Christendom guarding the purity of faith and evangelising the heathens. But as a recipient of the Eastern branch of Christianity and one of the few sovereign Orthodox nations after the fall of Constantinople in the fifteenth century, Russia had developed a strong sense of religio-national identity, projecting it forcefully to its European neighbours through the means of culture and politics. A few will dispute that from its conversion in the tenth century to Peter the Great's reforms, Russia remained relatively remote from the European cultural and religious developments. But even though it had assimilated a rich liturgical tradition, it failed to develop its own intellectual theology.[2] It produced spectacular religious art, but it did not experience Renaissance.[3] It had nourished some remarkable saintly ascetic figures, but it was slow to develop ethical teachings that would apply to laity.

From Peter the Great's reforms (1700-21), we are told, Russia entered the era of European modernity and very quickly adopted the same language and expression as her Western European neighbours. One of the outcomes of the Petrine 'cultural revolution' – traumatic for some and blissful for others – was that it had produced one of the most persistent debates in the history of Russian culture and religion on whether Russia was a legitimate member of the European cultural modernity.

The first section of the article will sketch the more or less standard interpretations of Russian religious and cultural history since Peter the Great's reforms. In the second half of the article I would like to outline revisionist trends in this field.

a) Westernisation and secularisation

The historiographical evaluations of Russian cultural modernity can be roughly divided into three large areas. The first theme, which I define here as 'Westernisation and secularisation,' runs through numerous surveys of Russian history and specialist studies. The reforms by Peter I created a novel cultural situation forging a distinct Westward-looking religious elite that operated within the same cultural framework as their European neighbours. Theology and education, Church music, architecture and icon-painting experienced a profound transformation under the influence of the Western cultural and religious forms. As Igor Tarasov have shown in his study of icons, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Russian painted icons were primarily based on foreign models, unwittingly adopting the post-Tridentine didactism of Roman Catholic Arte Sacra. The Russian church hierarchy almost universally was under the spell of scholastic theology. Latin was the universal language of theological training. The eighteenth century produced, what George Florovsky called, a theology without roots, a 'theology on piles'. [4]

But the Enlightenment did not have simply a secularising influence. It turned the Church elite into its most vociferous promoters. The Church hierarchy that had experienced its own inner conversion had now embraced its mission as re-Christianisation of the Russian folk.[5] The arrival of the Western theological models was not the only new cultural development in post-Petrine Russia. Secularisation was another biggest vice imported from the West. Prior to the eighteenth century the Russian culture – unlike Byzantine and West European – remained overwhelmingly religious.[6] But in the wake of Peter the Great's reforms, anticlericalism became fashionable, theatre and assemblies substituted for long church services of Muscovites, the art

of portrait and biography-writing now emphasised individuality to the same extent as previously icons and hagiography denied it. Literature and poetry turned to the genres and models of pre-Christian antiquity, architects found inspiration in classicism.

Secularisation had also a more pragmatic dimension. The state had asserted itself over the powerful institution of the Church, subverting the power of the ecclesiastical elite and monasteries. The eighteenth-century reforms, it was argued, have reduced the Church to a mere state department, which was governed by a lay bureaucrat and had no power and will of its own, serving purposes of the Imperial state.[7]

b) 'loci of tradition'

The Petrine revolution was not without opponents. According to James Billington, protest against Petrine reforms came from two separate religious corners, schismatics and monks.[8] The religious schism of Old Believers was believed to be the only purist form of Russian Orthodoxy uncontaminated by the Western influences. The majority of scholars generally support the Old Believers' own claim that their social organisation, worship and art belonged to 'Old' not 'New' Russia.[9]

However, it was the monastic revival of the eighteenth century that has been deemed by the author of the brilliant *The Icon and the Axe* as "perhaps the deepest of all and the one most faithful to the culture of Old Muscovy".[10] Despite the official obstruction of monasticism, the eighteenth century saw a revival of hermitic life and ascetic-mystical theology, which by the end of the century resulted in the publication of a newly translated anthology of Byzantine ascetic writings *Dobrotoliubie* (1794).[11] The importance of this revival will come in full force in the nineteenth century contributing to the self-projected image of 'Holy Russia' that was so morally superior to the decaying Western civilisation.

c) 'Popular versus elite'

And finally, the Petrine revolution was to be blamed for the growing gap between popular and elite cultures. The cultural chasm between the Muscovite and European culture: between the beardless French-speaking squires and their wives wearing décolleté, on the one hand, and their traditionalistic serfs as well as conservative merchants, on the other, could not be greater in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.

Historians tirelessly commented on the persistent misunderstanding and conflicts between two camps, the Russian official church and the religion of the folk.[12] Religious dissent, especially in its concealed form (only a small proportion of religious dissenters were registered, the majority considered to be treated as nominally Orthodox), presented a particularly suitable model for 'non-conformist' popular culture that did not share in the values and symbols of the elite.[13]

The revival of interest to religion following the breakdown of the Soviet style Marxist ideology both in the West and in Eastern Europe led to the emergence of a very heterogeneous body of works, driven by diverse (not always scholarly) agendas. Therefore, it is impossible to summarise historiographical developments of the recent years. What I would like to do is to outline some ways in which new works allow us to rethink traditional models of Russian culture and religion, particularly with regards to the impact of the 'Petrine revolution'.

As Juri Lotman argued, the tendency to evaluate the eighteenth century as a break with the national roots and popular culture, belongs to the intelligentsia of the 1830-40s who believed that it was their task to restore these broken ties between past and present, and between the intellectuals and the people.[14] The intelligentsia's search for national authentic roots had stimulated interest in the pre-Petrine history and religious tradition. Challenging the prevailing view in the Soviet historiography, Lotman argued that the perceived 'break' from the traditional culture (national, Christian, Orthodox) was a myth that disguised a number of continuities in pre- and post-Petrine culture. He discusses, for example, how the ideas of the Enlightenment

and Romanticism mixed with the traditional Christian patterns of culture, such as the prophetic and missionary role of the poet, a search of artists and literary figures for an ideal human person, and the fascination with the patriarchalism of the peasantry. He analysed a specific Russian attitude to an artist as to a spiritual authority, who had to justify his right to communicate by his exemplary life and asceticism (*podvizhnichestvo*).[15] Lotman's pioneering argument is supported by the recent works of literary scholars and historians, who have demonstrated a strong impact of religious themes and models on the work of secular writers who were immersed in Western education and life-style.[16] Coming from a different perspective, the new Russian scholars of religion argue that the Russian nobility was not as secularised as was hitherto perceived.[17]

The dichotomy 'Russia vs. West' appears more problematic today, when the myth of the Western progress to secularised modernity had been challenged by the works on religion in Modern Europe.[18] These studies put to a test the widespread view of a profound secularisation of Western societies. The processes of rechristianisation, religious revivals, Church reform and modernisation, the rise of new religious movements are all as characteristic of Western modernity as science, rationalisation of social and political institutions, atheism and anticlericalism. Thus, in the light of these works, today a historian can find even more parallels between the Russian and Western societies. Laura Engelstein in her recent article has pointed out that 'tradition – modernity', instinct-reason, religious-secular, Russia-Europe, East-West were used by scholars as mutually reinforcing pairs. She has endeavoured to demonstrate that nineteenth-century Russia and Europe were moving in parallel tracks and that in Russia as in Europe, religion 'was evolving in tandem with other cultural forms'.[19]

She shows that the Russian proponents of tradition and defenders of Orthodoxy were sophisticated thinkers, well-aware of European intellectual fashions. The parallel tracks which Russia and Europe were moving in included Enlightenment, mysticism, revivalism, Darwinism, Spiritualism and missionarism. Even the most traditionalistic beliefs of peasants could not be seen as timeless. The proliferation of mystical and rationalistic sects among the ordinary folk suggested that even the Russian village was not immune to centrifugal religious processes characteristic for Europe.

Even before the 'archival revolution' in the 1990s, the thesis on the assimilation of the church into the bureaucratic machine of the state had come under a robust criticism by Gregory Freeze who had once and for all changed the persistent orthodoxy of the Church as 'a handmaiden of the state'. He argued that the Church had continued to play an autonomous role in the politics of the Empire and – despite the administrative position – managed to pursue its interests the state notwithstanding.[20]

The argument on the progressive secularisation of society in pre-revolutionary Russia, favoured by the Soviet scholars, has been reassessed in the recent works on religion and society. The impact of modernisation and urbanisation on Church-society relations appears now less clear-cut that in the earlier studies. While the urban mission of the Church was not a great success, at least it demonstrated that the seemingly reactionary institution tried to engage with the pressing social and intellectual demands of the modernising society.[21]

While in today's Russia the view of the Old Believers and monasticism as the bastions of tradition is prevailing, there is evidence that neither of these were sealed from contemporary influences. Back in the 1980s Robert Nichols' work showed how the Western concepts of social mission affected the traditional ascetic ideals of the Russian monasticism.[22] Igor Tarasov's and Roy Robson's books demonstrated the extent to which Old Believer icons and architecture experienced the impact of the Western art forms – in the same way as the Orthodox Church did.[23]

In their thinking and social forms, the outwardly traditionalistic urban Old Believers were no exception to European cultural modernity. Even when they tried to mobilise the archaic Byzantine ideas, remarkably modern social forms were a result. The Moscow merchants, regardless of their faith, have managed to combine the traditional patriarchal and the European ideal of the family, emphasising the values of conjugal marriage and "separate spheres".[24]

The ubiquitous folk religion

And finally, the dichotomy of 'popular versus elite' culture had been significantly redefined in recent years. Following the work of historians and anthropologists of religion in the West, the students of Russian religion rejected the old-fashioned two-tiered model of religious life, in which one is represented by the institutionalised church armed with theological arguments and professional army of the clergy, the other is an ill-defined area of folk or popular religion that exists almost autonomously from the first. What is proposed instead of the old model varies. Vera Shevzov proposes a holistic, inclusive way of understanding the Church, which includes not only the ideas and practices of the elites and professional clergy but beliefs and practices of common practitioners. In her work she focuses on the exchanges between religious authorities and the communities of practitioners, showing both tension and co-existence but also a striking single-mindedness between the two tiers of the old model. In her presentation of the ecclesiological community the peasants are the active participants and makers of religious order, reinforcing their communal identity through building of chapels and temples and venerating icons.[25]

Alexander Panchenko's theoretical position is similar to that Shevzov, in what he sees as a polyvalent relationship between popular and institutionalised religion: they mutually influence and transform each other. "The peasant practices influence the emergence and the change of the institutionalised religion, while the latter have impact on popular culture as a result of diffusion of their elements or by direct social coercion."[26] In contrast to Shevzov, however, he does not idealise the religion of peasants which, according to him, was characterised by heterodox beliefs, misreading of the teaching of the church and by officially rejected practices. Analysing the Sect of Christ-Faith believers and Castrates, for example, he had shown how the cult was formed from the elements of Orthodox liturgy, theology and the Gospel's (mis)-interpretation. At the same time, he pointed to the folkloric and mythical elements in the writings about this sect by official church theologians, the myths of human sacrifice and religiously sanctioned group sex.

The work of these scholars is in a stark contrast to the romanticised view of the patriarchal peasants and their institutions by the neo-Slavophile approach of the Moscow ethnographer Marina Gromyko and her school.[27] These scholars tend to present an idealised image of the pious peasant whose innate sense of faith and doctrine seems to have an immanent character. The work of this group is marked by an evident ideological programme, heavily influenced by nationalistic trends within the contemporary Russian Orthodox Church.

In conclusion, I would like to point out the prevalent heterogeneity of the recent studies on religion and culture in Russia. While some of these studies use new historical sources to revive old models, others continue to defend their once taken positions. It is too early to speak about a profound revisionism of the traditional models and of a much deeper comparative analysis of the Russian religion and culture vis-à-vis the West.

The old schemes and myths continue to pervade the scholarship and raise a number of questions about the underlying social and political significance of religion in modern Russia.

NOTES

1   D.S. Likhachev, 'Russkaia kul'tura v sovremennom mire', *Novyi mir* 1 (1991): 1.

2   See for example works of F. J. Thomson, *The Reception of Byzantine Culture in Medieval Russia* (Ashgate-Variorum, 1999).

3   Although attempts were made to uncover a Russian Renaissance, Russia did not experience an intellectual and cultural movement characterised by the rediscovery of the culture of Classical Antiquity in the same way as Western Europe.

4   George Florovsky, *The Ways of Russian Theology*, 2 vols (Belmont, 1979-87).

5   G. Freeze, 'The rechristianisation of Russia: the Church and popular religion, 1750-1850', *Studia Slavica Finlandesia*, 7 (1990), pp. 101-35.

6　Paul Bushkovitch, *Religion and society in Russia. The sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries* (Oxford, 1992), p. 10.

7　The bibliography on this subject, see in Freeze's article "Handmaiden of the state? The Church in Imperial Russia Reconsidered", *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 36 (1985), 82-102.

8　James H. Billington, *The Icon and the Axe, An Interpretative History of Russian Culture* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 19..), p. 200.

9　Old Believer claims to the legacy of Byzantium were overwhelmingly rejected by the official Church. It was only after the publication of the book by Professor Kapterev that some of the Old Believer arguments were sustained. Today the works of Elena Jukhimenko, Nikolai Pokrovskii and Roy Robson reveal the richness and traditional orientation of the Old Believer culture. In the similar vein my book *Old Believers, Gender and Religious Dissent in Russia* (Manchester 2003), reconstructs the patristic legacy in Old Believer theological arguments. N. Kapterev, *Patriarkh Nikon i Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich* (Mosocw, 1909-12), vols. 1-2, E. Jukhimenko, *Vygovskaia saroobriadcheskaia pustyn': dukhovnaia zhizn' i literatura* (Moscow, 2002), vols 1-2, N. Pokrovskii and N. Zol'nikova, *Starovery-chasovennye na vostoke Rossii v XVIII-XX vv.: problemy obshchestvennogo soznaniia* (Moscow, 2002), Roy Robson, *Old Believers in the Modern World* (DeKalb, 1996).

10　Billington, *The Icon and the Axe*, p. 2001.

11　The works that interpret ascetic mystical revival as 'going back to the roots' are A. E. Tachiaos, *Ho Paisios Velichkovski kai hi askitikophilologhiki schooli tou* (Thessaloniki, 1964); S. Chetverikov, *Starets Paisii Velichkovskii* (YMCA-Press, Paris 1988).

12　G. Freeze, 'The rechristianisation of Russia: the Church and popular religion'.

13　The works that interpret Old Belief in terms of 'popular culture' are numerous, for the summary see Robert Crummey, 'Old Belief as Popular religion: new approaches', *Slavic Review*, 52 (1993), 700-12.

14　Ju. M. Lotman, 'Russkaia literatura poslepetrovskoi epokhi i khristianskaia traditsiia', *Kul'tura. Tekst. Narrative. Trudy po znakovym sistemam XXIV* (Tartu, 1992), p. 58.

15　Ibid., 63.

16　P. Davidson, 'The moral dimension of the Prophetic ideal: Pushkin and his readers', *Slavic Review* 61:3 (2002), 490-518, Idem, 'The Validation of the Writer's Prophetic Status in the Russian Literary Tradition: From Pushkin and Iazykov thtough Gogol and Dostoevsky', *The Russian Review* (October 2003), 508-36, David Bethea, *The Shape of Apocalypse in the Russian Fiction* (Princeton, 1988), Gary Marker, 'The Enlightenment of Anna Labzina: Gender, Faith and Public Life in Catherinian and Alexandrine Russia', *Slavic Review* 59:2 (2000): 369-90.

17　O. Kirichenko, *Dvorianskoe blagochestie* (Moscow, 2002).

18　Ruth Harris, Lourdes, D. Blackbourn, 'The Catholic Church in Europe since the French Revolution', *Comparative studies in Society and History*, 33:4 (1991)

19　L. Engelstein, 'Holy Russia in Modern Times: an Essay on Orthodoxy and Cultural Change', *Past & Present* 173 (2001): 129-156.

20　Freeze, "Handmaiden of the state? The Church in Imperial Russia Reconsidered".

21　On urban mission, see Freeze, 'Going to the Intelligentsia: the Church and its Urban mission in Post-Reform Russia, in E. Clowes, Samuel Kassow and James West (eds), *Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia* (Princeton, 1991), 215-32. Simon Dixon, 'The Orthodox Church and the Workers of St Petersburg, 1880-1914', in Hugh McLeod (ed), *European Religion in the Age of Great Cities, 1830-1930* (New York, Routledge, 1995), 119-45;

22　R. Nichols, 'The Orthodox Elders of Imperial Russia', *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook*, i, (1985): 1-30.

23　Oleg Tarasov, *Icon and devotion: Sacred Spaces in Imperial Russia*, translated and edited by Robin Milner Gulland, (Reaction Books, 2002). Robson, *Old Believers in the modern world*.

24　Paert, *Old Believers*.

25　V. Shevzov, Orthodoxy

26　Alexander Panchenko, *Khristovshchina i skopchestvo: folklor i traditsionnaia kul'tura russkikh mistischeskikh sekt* (Moscow: OGI, 2002), 73.

27　M. Gromyko, A. Buganov, *O vossreniiakh russkogo naroda* (Moscow: Palomnik, 2000), O. Kirichenko, Kh. Poplavskaia, *Pravoslavnaia vera i traditsii blagochestiia u russkikh v XVIII –XX vv.* (Moscow, 2002).

The role of the state in Japan's industrial modernization, 1868-1914

PROFESSOR KENNETH D BROWN

By the 1870s Great Britain was the world's most industrialized nation, having become, in J. D. Chamber's memorable phrase, the workshop of the world.[1]   On the other side of the world, Japan was on the verge of industrialization. Following the collapse of the established Tokugawa Shogunate and the restoration of imperial power under the youthful Emperor Meiji in 1868, the rulers of the new state consciously embarked upon a policy of modernization designed to place Japan on a footing comparable with that of the great western powers. By the turn of the century, the government, the armed forces and the economy had all been transformed to the extent that successful wars were fought against China (1894-5) and Russia (1904-5). Logistical difficulties in this latter conflict, however, highlighted how far Japan's economy still had to go in order to support the nation's great power aspirations and prompted the further development of modern heavy industry. Overall, manufacturing output more than doubled between 1879-82 and 1908-12, with factory production accounting for more than 10 per cent of national income by 1912. Trade expanded at 7.5 per cent a year between 1880 and 1913 and as early as 1876 the balance of Japan's exports had swung in favour of manufactures for the first time. By 1900, when the total value of commodity exports was eleven times higher than in 1874, the ratio was almost four to one. Thirteen years later manufactures accounted for nearly 90 per cent of total exports by then worth over 700 million yen a year. Apart from a tiny blip around the turn of the century, the Gross National Product also rose fairly steadily from the 1880s, one estimate suggesting an annual growth rate of 3.6 percent between 1870 and 1913, although others have calculated a lower rate of 2.4 percent.[2]   As an ally of the Entente powers but with relatively little direct military involvement in the First World War, Japan benefited from the diversion of other economies to the war effort, and by 1918 had emerged as a major power in her own right.[3]

It is important to keep the country's economic transformation in perspective, however. For one thing, in terms of inland and coastal transport, urbanization, the commercialization of agriculture, skill levels, and educational provision, the late Tokugawa economy was considerably more advanced than older writers sometimes allow. Thus while Tokugawa policy had actively discouraged contact with foreigners, some limited trade links with Europeans and mainland Asia had still developed before the Meiji Restoration. Similarly, although certainly a predominantly rural society, Japan's urban communities were well developed even by the eighteenth century. On the eve of the Restoration, Tokyo had over a million inhabitants, Osaka and Kyoto respectively three hundred and two hundred thousand, while substantial towns existed also at Hiroshima, Sendai, Wakayama, Kagoshima, Sakai and Nagasaki. Furthermore, these centres were connected by a good system of roads, in part at least the legacy of the practice of sankin kotai.[4]   Thus the contribution of the later Tokugawa regime in facilitating the emergence of modern Meiji Japan should not be under-estimated.[5]

Second, the extent of economic modernization achieved by 1914 should not be exaggerated. Despite the rapid development of industry, Japan still retained its predominantly rural traits. By that date industry employed some 3.5 million people, less than a seventh of the total labour force and probably a third of these were small employers or independents using no hired or family labour at all. Furthermore, as these figures suggest, manufacturing remained predominantly small scale. Osaka Prefecture, for example, may have boasted ten enterprises with more than 1200 workers in 1902, but nationally only about a fifth of factory workers (defined as those working in plants with more than 5 employees) were employed in plants with more than 500 employees. A third were in workforces of 50-499 and almost half worked with fewer than 49 colleagues.[6]   In addition, heavy industry lagged well behind light manufacturing, even at the very end of the century when machinery accounted for only 2.8 percent and iron and steel for 0.54 percent of total manufacturing output. Although the balance certainly began to shift after the war with Russia as the government stepped up its encouragement of

heavy industry, it was 1914 before factories made a more significant contribution than cottage industry to Japan's manufacturing output (table 1). Finally, it is worth noting that while growth undoubtedly brought with it improved living standards for some people, the aggregate income level remained well below that of the most advanced industrial nations. In 1913, for instance, average annual per capita consumption in Japan was about Y75, almost seven times lower than the comparable figure for

Table 1. Sources of Japanese Manufacturing Output

(Ymn)

Year	Factory Output	Cottage Output
1884	6.5	212.4
1892	16.7	426.9
1909	881	919
1914	1518	1090

Source: T. Nakamura, Economic growth in prewar Japan (New Haven, 1983), p 80.

England. Small wonder, then, that one contemporary British visitor to Japan was moved to wonder how a Japanese could live comfortably on his equivalent of three or four pence a day.[7]

All that said, however, Japan's economic progress within what was a remarkably short space of time compared with the experiences of the western nations was still astonishing, the more so since the country lacked a significant raw material base (save for some copper and coal), while her ability to protect nascent domestic manufactures by tariffs was severely restricted under the terms of the Unequal Treaties.[8] Although revisions allowed effective protective tariffs to be imposed from 1899, it was some years before complete tariff autonomy was regained. Not surprisingly, therefore, the magnitude of Japan's achievement attracted a good deal of attention, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century when the ideological climate was shaped by the Cold War and the competing claims of capitalism and communism. Against this background, the question of how and why economies in the past had modernized or undergone industrial revolutions assumed a powerful contemporary relevance. At a time when both the Soviet bloc and China were seeking modernization through centrally planned economies, the historical role of the state in the process of industrialization attracted particular interest. With respect to Japan, there developed a strong school of thought attributing the rapidity of the country's progress in the years after the Restoration to the directive role of the government.[9] Not everyone was convinced, however, and the rest of this essay surveys the main themes of the debate about the state's contribution to Japan's economic modernization in the key period between 1868 and 1914.

The classic model of the industrialization process, derived from western experience, predicates an initial increase in agricultural productivity and output, thereby releasing labour and capital to support the subsequent growth of urban industry. There has been much disagreement as to whether Japanese agriculture in the Meiji period conformed to this pattern or whether agricultural and industrial expansion occurred more or less simultaneously in a relationship more mutually interdependent than the orthodox model suggests.[10] What is indisputable, however, is that while the figures may not be exact, in the years prior to the First World War the amount of land under cultivation in Japan increased while real output per worker remained higher in agriculture than in industry until 1905. Both agricultural output and productivity rose to such a degree that indigenous farmers were able to provide an improved diet to a population which increased by about a quarter between 1894 and 1914. Rice productivity was higher than in many Asian countries in the 1960s.[11]

There is no doubt that the structural change which facilitated increased agricultural productivity was as much the outcome of conscious government action as of market forces. Following the Meiji

Restoration, the feudal domains ruled by the territorial magnates (daimyo) were abolished. Although some land then passed into the hands of landlords, most of it went to the peasants who generally farmed it in discreet family units. Both local and central administration, however, drew most of their income from a new land tax, which provided about 70 per cent of national government revenue. According to one source, the land tax absorbed about 17 per cent of agriculture's net income in the period 1878-82.[12] Although the real burden of this taxation was gradually reduced by rising agricultural productivity, it was still sufficient to cause numbers of peasants to sell out and become agricultural labourers or tenant farmers. By 1908, when the first reliable figures were collected, about a third of farm householders owned their land, while just over a quarter were tenants, the latter responsible for cultivating almost a half of Japan's total farm land by 1914. Although the majority of farms were small – by 1908 about 70 per cent were one hectare or less – tenant and family farmers alike had a strong incentive to raise productivity and total output because the new tax was imposed upon land values rather than crop yields.[13]   Thus it was the farmers rather than government who were the main beneficiaries of increased production, achieved in the main through the gradual extension of practices already familiar in Tokugawa times, for example, planting more productive varieties of rice; using commercial fertilizers in the form of waste fish or bean products more extensively; and improving irrigation techniques to allow second crops such as wheat to be grown. Such developments were usually initiated on the larger farms but spread relatively quickly even among small scale cultivators because they were quite cheap, while the establishment of the irrigation systems essential to rice cultivation had long since fostered a cooperative and communal approach to agricultural activity.

It has sometimes been suggested that the dissemination of these improvements also owed something to the enhanced credit facilities available as a result of the new regime's banking reforms. In fact, however, these farming innovations required little capital and the impact of the state's intervention in finance and banking was arguably far more significant for industry and trade. The demise of traditional financial mechanisms, the need to match revenue with expenditure, and the centralization of policy all combined to make banking reform a necessity for Meiji administrations. Thus a modern banking system was promoted from the 1870s, familiarizing the Japanese with western business methods and acting as a repository for savings, thereby providing funds for investment. Financial stability was not effectively secured, however, until the deflationary reforms instituted by Finance Minister Matsukata in the 1880s, one consequence of which was an increase in the number of branch banks to more than two thousand. His measures also included the establishment of the Bank of Japan (1882) to function like the Bank of England as an internal regulator and lender of last resort. From 1899 it was the only bank authorized to issue paper money. Specialist banks were also established, the most important being the Yokohama Specie Bank, set up to provide a more efficient market for foreign exchange transactions and to end the foreign domination of such activities. Assisted by 46 agricultural and industrial banks (one for each prefecture) the Hypothec Bank (1896) was established to provide commercial loans. The Industrial Bank of Japan (1900) was tasked with channeling long term investment into modern industry, the relatively tardy development of which reflected Japan's long history of international isolation, her lack of basic natural resources, and relatively limited consumer demand.

Driven largely by the Kobusho (variously translated as the Ministry of Industry, Engineering, or Construction), which was functional between 1870 and 1885, such investments gave Japan a modern telecommunications system by the 1880s and seven thousand miles of railway track by 1914. The main beneficiaries, however, were shipping and shipbuilding Altogether, about three quarters of all direct government subsidies went to these sectors in the form of postal contracts and navigation bounties to help the country secure control of its own shipping, largely through the creation of a major company, Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK). Foreigners were ousted from the inter-port trade by 1894 and from the coastal trade by 1911. By the time the First World War began two-thirds of Japan's carrying trade was in her own hands as against the ten per cent which was all she had controlled in the 1890s.

In addition to channeling revenue into industry, the Meiji state also established industrial activities in its own right. As Tokugawa control weakened during the early nineteenth century, a few of the daimyo tried to prop up their ailing finances by encouraging manufacturing activities within their domains and some farmers certainly derived significant income from such sources. These activities

were generally small scale, local in focus and catered for basic needs, rarely extending beyond brewing, some salt production, and domestic textiles such as cotton and silk. Following the Restoration, however, the state took over some of these industrial enterprises and encouraged modernization on western lines, providing subsidies, management, and often paying for western technical experts and machinery. One contemporary account suggests that in 1880 the government owned 3 shipyards, 5 munitions factories, 52 other factories, and 10 mines, as well as ships, railways and the telegraph system.[14] Well over 500 western technical experts were assisting these activities in the 1870s.[15]

As in Europe, textiles were at the forefront of Japan's industrialization process, mainly because the household production of both silk and cotton was already well established. More open contact with the West exposed indigenous cotton producers to ruinous factory competition but the government tried to show the way by importing and operating two spinning mills on western lines. The first was established at Kagoshima and was in production from 1867. Similar initiatives were taken with respect to modernizing the silk industry but none of these ventures succeeded and they were eventually sold off. More useful, perhaps, was the programme of selling imported spinning equipment on easy terms to private entrepreneurs, part of a wider programme, sponsored by the Kobusho, of importing western technology. As a result, cotton spinning became more of a factory-based activity and the typical mill grew in size. Such government assistance, combined with technical innovation and plentiful supplies of female labour, helped to boost the output of cotton yarn, which rose more than seven-fold between 1903 and 1913. Half of the total output of almost 2500 million lbs weight was exported by 1914, with Japan already challenging for some establish British markets.

Meiji governments also sought to foster the development of modern heavy industry. Strategic considerations governed state assistance to private dockyards and the merchant marine, while government arsenals sold machinery to private individuals. With respect to the most important strategic materials, iron and steel, there had been some small scale production in the Tokugawa period. Yet lacking the technical know-how and the raw materials for large scale production, Meiji Japan was heavily reliant upon imports. Once again, early attempts by the government itself to create a modern iron and steel industry based on imported blast furnaces failed. The state's Kamaishi ironworks were closed in 1883 after three years of production, during which time it had run up losses of more than Y2 million. Experience in the war against China, however, underlined the strategic need for a heavy industrial capacity and in 1901 the furnaces at the state-sponsored Yawata works, built by Germans using European technology, were fired for the first time. It was the only major state-run enterprise opened after 1880, when government began to sell off its own industrial assets to private entrepreneurs with whom, however, it continued to work closely. It was this type of collaboration that lay behind the increased tempo of heavy industrial development after the war with Russia in 1904-5. Within ten years of the war's end, Japan was producing for itself one half of its pig iron requirements and one third of its steel needs. Among other heavy industrial initiatives which received significant state encouragement were a number of joint ventures with appropriate foreign entrepreneurs. Dunlop Rubber opened a plant at Kobe in 1909, for example, while a consortium including the British giant, Armstrong Whitworth, established a cordite factory in 1905, and the same firm joined with Vickers and the Japanese themselves to operate a local steel and armaments factory from 1907.

Overall, therefore, while Meiji governments' aspirations to turn Japan into a modern nation comparable with the great powers prompted a number of direct interventions in the economy, these measures were by largely unsuccessful in commercial terms. As a consequence, most factories, mines, and shipyards were sold off after 1882. Financial intervention in the form of subsidies was equally uneven in its effects. In shipping, for instance, NYK, which got most of the subsidies, did not noticeably outperform its less favoured competitors. Similarly, the new banks were by no means an unqualified success in achieving their industrial objectives. British banks remained vital until 1914 as suppliers of foreign capital, and while the Industrial Bank did succeed in attracting foreign portfolio capital, multiplying it more than ten times between 1903 and 1913, its industrial initiatives incurred heavy losses. As a result, by 1913 the bank had to be propped up by loans from the government and the Yokohama Bank. Responsibility for Japan's industrial progress in these years rested far more with the zaibatsu, private conglomerates built up by individuals who acquired, often at very low prices, the state's industrial assets when they were sold off in the early 1880s. Thus important gold and silver

mines, as well as the Nagasaki shipyards, were sold off to what became the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. Together with Mitsui, Sumitomo and Yasuda, Mitsubishi eventually came to dominate mining, shipping and shipbuilding, steel, machine and chemical production, as well as the main financial and commercial institutions. Composed of independent companies, the zaibatu's economic and financial links were strengthened by personal or historical ties and their collaborative approach to business represented a highly rational response to an undeveloped economy in which heavy industry especially was reliant on imported technology and expertise, in which skilled labour was relatively scarce, and the market mechanisms for supply and distribution rudimentary.

A stronger case for the significance of the state in Japan's economic development can perhaps be made in terms of its measures to modernize the country's social infrastructure, although here again the case is by no means unambiguous. Four aspects may be singled out – education, political structure, social organization, and law and order. Although expenditure on education remained very low in absolute terms, the Meiji Educational Ordinance established universal education in the early 1870s and a few years later elementary education became compulsory. Consequently, the figures show that 98 per cent of the appropriate age group was receiving primary level education by 1904. The number of secondary level institutions rose from 110 in 1890 to 990 by 1910. A literate labour force was generally helpful in assisting economic modernization while the curriculum's emphasis on science and technology ultimately contributed an indigenous supply of individuals capable of moving Japan's industry forward. So, too, did the establishment of institutions such as the College for Advanced Technical Education and the Imperial College of Engineering, which helped to offset Japan's chronic shortage of individuals with knowledge of modern, western technology, although for much of the period that expertise still had to be imported, being particularly important in the first twenty years or so after the Restoration. Nevertheless, it is significant that the graduates of the new technical training institutions were rapidly absorbed by Japan's new industries.[16] This seems to confirm that whatever the plans of government and however well conceived they may have been, economic success depended in the last analysis on the response of private firms who proved receptive to modernization and organized themselves appropriately.

Second, the new controllers of power and authority in Meiji Japan set out to undermine parochialism in the interests of creating a highly centralized modern state. The tone was set when the leaders of the Restoration; members of the Satsuma, Choshu, Toza, and Hizen clans, persuaded their respective daimyo to restore their lands to the emperor and recognize his sovereignty. About three hundred feudal domains were then consolidated into a structure of counties and prefectures under the control of former daimyo in the new guise of provincial governors. As such, they became the effective political agents of central government, which consistently sought to harness local energies to the broader national purpose. Local farming societies, for example, were co-opted into the Imperial Agricultural Association from the 1880s, while in 1910 local groups of veterans were drawn together in an Imperial Military Reservists Association. The state also laid down general policy objectives in the expectation that considerations of regional honour and compliance with the wishes of the hierarchy would ensure their implementation by local authorities. Thus Osaka achieved city status in 1888 after successfully meeting the national target for slum clearance. Kobe was incorporated as a city in the same year.

Third, the Meiji state dismantled the old social structure. Under the Tokugawa, Japanese society was organized into a hierarchy according to status. Immediately below the imperial family, which was effectively isolated from the rest of society, were the samurai or warrior class. Next in precedence was the peasantry, so placed because of agriculture's importance in sustaining life. The third group was made up of artisans, merchants and traders, while at the bottom were the untouchables (hinin) who effectively acted as the system's scavengers. The lifestyles expected of, the customs observed by, and the privileges accorded to each group were all clearly defined and social or economic mobility was thus pretty well precluded. This system of formally ascribed status with its strict control over behaviour and occupation was abandoned soon after the Meiji Restoration. It is sometimes argued that this allowed the new regime to westernize norms and practices while the equalization of all people, save the royal family and a small nobility, certainly appeared to offer enhanced possibilities of social mobility by removing legal restrictions on economic behaviour. Certainly in the Meiji period

economic activity became possible for a wider range of individuals than had previously been possible. Thus Zenjiro Yasuda, founder of the Yasuda zaibatsu, came essentially from a peasant background, while the founders of the smaller Okura, Asano, and Fujita zaibatsus were respectively a grocer, a street vendor of sugar water, and the son of a sake and soya sauce brewer. Similarly, commoners were twice as important as samurai in providing share capital for the banks which developed after the passage of the 1876 Banking Act.[17] The change was well summed up by Ukitu Kazutami in 1910 when he observed that "never since the dawn of world history has the growth of the individual been so respected and material happiness so sought after as in present day Japan."[18]

Nevertheless, for the vast majority of Japanese, language and perceptions were much harder to change. As Lafcadio Hearn noted in 1904, "the ancient conditions really persist to an extent that no observation could reveal." Structures had dissolved and re-formed outwardly dissimilar, he added, but "inwardly built upon the same plan."[19] Indeed, change was to some extent prohibited by the state's own actions. In Japan there is no doubt that the Meiji state set out quite deliberately to influence the habits and attitudes of the general population in what was defined by the ruling clique as the national interest. This was clear from a white paper issued in 1874 by the Ministry of the Interior. It pointed out that while national prosperity rested on the industriousness of the people, "the source of this is none other than the degree to which they are led and encouraged by government officials."[20] Determination to harness western technical ability but at the same time to maintain a sense of continuity and stability as a hedge against the sort of social disturbances that so often had accompanied industrialization in the west, led to frequent official reiterations of old values and concepts. The 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education, for instance, enjoined citizens to be loyal, harmonious, and to "pursue learning and cultivate arts. . . perfect your moral powers. . . advance the public good and promote common interests. . . respect the constitution and observe the laws . . ."[21]

The national culture then was shaped, quite deliberately, by religious and imperialist or patriotic influences to sustain society with traditional values and rituals – harnessing western ability to the Japanese spirit.[22] Hand in hand with the ideology of modernization inculcated through education, industrial exhibitions, and the import of western expertise, went the cult of the emperor, fostered so successfully through publicity, education, and religion that the physically unimpressive and unknown youth who ascended the throne in 1868 appears to have been genuinely mourned by the mass of ordinary people when he died in 1912. This represented something of a triumph for the Meiji oligarchs who turned for a state religion to Shinto, which espoused the divinity of the emperor. Combined with the Japanese version of Confucianism, which provided guidance on social ethics and moral issues, in the interests of the national polity or kokutai, the result, in the words of one contemporary, was that religion became "transmuted into an hereditary moral impulse actuating the whole nation."[23]

A leading British scholar of Japan, G. C. Allen, remarked in the 1950s that "if it is true . . . that the most vital problems are not problems of economy but of maintaining social unity in the face of economic interests, then it may be claimed that Japan largely succeeded in solving these problems."[24] Certainly, the Meiji state was strong enough to preserve itself through the civil disturbances which followed the Restoration when it still lacked either an effective national government or military organization. After the dissident clans were brought to heel after the defeat of the Satsuma rebellion in 1877, discontent of a different sort continued to manifest itself for there was much popular indifference and resentment against some the new regime's actions and philosophies. Among the malcontents were those rural inhabitants whose tax burdens increased as a result of the redrawing of administrative boundaries, or who lost valuable labour when military conscription was instituted in 1873.[25] Similarly, local loyalties remained very strong in the face of centralizing tendencies of the Meiji state and some thirty years after the Restoration, Hearn could still observe that "even now the only safe rule of conduct . . . is to act in all things according to local custom."[26] It was also inevitable that a central government so concerned to maintain social consensus should be alarmed at the apparent breakdown of the earlier cohesion between the bureaucracy and the intellectual elite in the universities, by the rising tide of interest among intellectuals in notions of free love, socialism, and women's rights, and by outbreaks of popular disorder as in the Hibiya riot (1905). The promulgation at the turn of the century of the so-called dangerous thoughts legislation, giving wide powers over what were deemed subversive movements, was further evidence of this government concern to limit the disruptive

potential of modernization. So, too, were the Peace Police Law, which sought to confine political activity, the suppression of socialist parties, and an attempt to censor newspapers in 1909. The previous year the government issued another edict re-asserting the old traditional values, seeking then to organise the three main religions for the same purpose. None of these was sufficient to deter anarchists from plotting against the emperor, albeit unsuccessfully. The Meiji Emperor died of natural causes in 1912 but the early months of the succeeding Taisho era of Emperor Yoshihito were marked by further indications of political instability, a series of short-lived cabinets falling victim to a potent mixture of military intriguing, street violence, and corruption.

What, then, can be said in conclusion about the role of the state in Japan's rapid industrial modernization between 1868 and 1914? First, while Meiji governments certainly set out to modernize the country it is important to stress that this cannot be taken to imply conscious economic planning. Even had they wished to follow such a path, the rulers of Meiji Japan lacked the necessary expertise, resources, and knowledge, deficits well illustrated in the failure of most of the state-owned industrial enterprises set up in the first years of the Restoration. Indeed, some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that Japan's modern economic growth might more appropriately be dated from the 1880s after the government disposed of its own industrial assets.[27] Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that those responsible for formulating Japan's economic policy in the Restoration period had a clearly thought out, consistent economic programme, or that the state's economic measures were necessarily successful. As one commentator later observed, Meiji rulers did not "rise in unison and unerringly fly to the one possible goal."[28] Government motives were often mixed, occasionally mutually contradictory, and sometimes swayed by circumstances such as war, the need to employ the samurai, or the lack of essential raw materials. Thus the state-sponsored Yawata ironworks, for example, was expected to be commercially viable and reduce import dependency, although the economies of scale necessary to achieve these ends were frustrated by the simultaneous requirement to produce specialist military steel and non-standard products which could not be imported.[29]

Against all this, however, it can be suggested that the actions of the state certainly helped to promulgate the idea of industrialization and technology. Furthermore, it can be argued that without these initiatives the pace of subsequent industrial development led by private entrepreneurs would have been much slower. For example, the demonstration effect can not be overlooked, for even failed government experiments served a purpose, familiarizing entrepreneurs and workers alike with new technology and helping to overcome the sense of risk which is always a barrier to innovation. That much industrial development took the form of incremental change in existing practice initiated not by state owned operations but by private individuals and local trade associations certainly owed something to this demonstration effect. Significantly, the most important developments occurred in traditional industries like cotton and silk rather than the heavy modern sector on which the government placed particular emphasis. Finally, by selling off the enterprises so cheaply to private entrepreneurs, it could be argued that the state had borne many of the development costs that private individuals might not have been willing to risk.

More important still in the opinion of some commentators was the state's role in creating a modern infrastructure supportive of industrialization – an educated workforce, a stable banking system, and a social order which did not stifle economic enterprise. However, this argument, too, needs its caveats. For one thing, the task was not as difficult as it might have been, given that Tokugawa Japan was more advanced than has sometimes been suggested, and that Japan's traditional value systems, could be turned relatively easily to the purposes of modernization. For another – as with economic policy – policy tended to be ad hoc, rather than consistent and comprehensively thought–out, reflecting the fundamental tension between trying to modernize thought patterns whilst at the same time reiterating traditional values in the hope of minimizing social upheaval. Nevertheless, if the Meiji rulers failed to eliminate dissent and disorder they did succeed in containing social disruption to the extent that industrialization and modernization were not seriously hampered.

In conclusion it is important to remember that this essay has considered only one of the elements shaping Japan's economic modernization and that the process was highly complex, defying mono-causal explanation. The discussion has not investigated, for example, the role of Confucianism or of the samurai, the significance of a strong sense of national self identity, or the importance of a

sophisticated and comparatively honest bureaucracy, all of which had some part to play. As the discussion has tried to show, even within the narrow focus of a single element the arguments are neither straight-forward nor clear cut. Thus while the arguments might appear to point to the conclusion that the role of the state in the Meiji period was essentially that of an active facilitator of modernization rather than that of a prime mover, the debate itself is by no means concluded.

NOTES

1   J. D. Chambers, *The workshop of the world . British economic history from 1820 to 1880* (Oxford, 1961).

2   K. Ohkawa and M. Shinohara, *Patterns of Japanese economic development: a quantitative appraisal* (1979), pp 315-6.

3   See K. D. Brown, "Japan" in C. J. Wrigley (ed.), *The First World War and the international economy* (2000), pp 99-118.

4   This was one means by which the Shoguns kept control of the daimyo or territorial lords. All were compelled to spend a part of each year in Edo. When they returned to their own domains, their immediate families remained in the capital as a guarantee of their own good conduct. The constant transition of lords and their retainers between Edo and the provincial centres encouraged the development and maintenance of good main roads.

5   See T. Morris-Suzuki, *The technological transformation of Japan* (Cambridge, 1994), pp 13-54.

6   R. Minami, *The economic development of Japan: a quantitative study* (1986), p 318.

7   C. Holland, *Things seen in Japan* (1910), p 147.

8   These were treaties more or less forced upon a militarily weak Japan by the stronger western powers in the years around the Restoration. They included clauses governing the level of tariffs and the granting of most favoured nation status. In time the Japanese came to regard them as inequitable, hence the nomenclature.

9   See for example, H. Patrick and H. Rosovsky (eds.), *Asia's new giant. How the Japanese economy works* (Washington, 1976). The central role of the state also became a prominent part of explanations of Japan's spectacular economic recovery after 1945. See particularly C. Johnson, *M.I.T.I. and the Japanese miracle. The growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975* (Stanford, 1982).

10 This debate is well reviewed in P. Francks, *Japanese economic development. Theory and practice* (1992), pp 101-10.

11 T. Nakamura, *Economic growth in prewar Japan* (New Haven, 1971), p 49.

12 G Ranis, "The financing of Japanese economic development", *Economic History Review, XI* (1959), p 448.

13 Francks, *Japanese economic development,* p 133.

14 The figures were calculated by Count Okuma. Cited in G. C. Allen, *A short economic history of modern Japan* (1981), p 36.

15 J. T. Macpherson, *The economic development of Japan, c1868-1941* (1987), p 36.

16 H. Uchida, "Japanese technical manpower in industry, 1880-1930: a quantitative survey", in H. Gospel (ed.), *Industrial training and technological innovation* (1991), pp 112-35.

17 K. Yamamura, "The role of the Samurai in the development of modern banking in Japan", *Journal of Economic History, XXVII* (1967), pp 198-220.

18 Cited in O. Yashitake, "Generational conflict after the Russo-Japanese War", in T. Najita and J. Koschmann (eds.), *Conflict in modern Japanese history* (Princeton, 1982), p 197.

19 L. Hearn, Japan: an attempt at interpretation (1904). In F. King (ed.), *L. Hearn: writings from Japan* (1984), pp 220, 224.

20 R. Tachi, *The contemporary Japanese economy* (Tokyo, 1991), p 25.

21 Quoted in J. Livingston, J. Moore and F. Oldfather (eds.), *The Japan reader. I: Imperial Japan, 1800-1945* (1976), pp 153-4.

22 This is discussed at some length in M. Morishima, *Why has Japan "Succeeded"? Western technology and the Japanese ethos* (Cambridge, 1982), pp 52-87.

23 Holland, *Things seen,* p 193.

24 G. C. Allen and A. G. Donnithorne, *Western enterprise in Far Eastern economic development. China and Japan* (1954), p. 188.

25 A. Waswo, *Modern Japanese society, 1868-1994* (Oxford, 1996), p 22 ff.

26 Quoted in T. Matsuo, "Lafcadio Hearn (1850-1904). His Irish background and appreciation of Japanese culture", *Hosei University Economic Review, LI* (1983), p 55.

27 K. Ohkawa and H. Rosovsky, "A century of economic growth", in T. Megarry (ed.), *The making of modern Japan. A reader* (Greenwich, 1995), pp 191-204.

28 T. C. Smith, *Political change and industrial development in Japan, 1868-1880* (Stanford, 1965), p v.

29 S. Yonekura, *The Japanese iron and steel industry, 1850-1990* (New York, 1994).

Women's Teacher Training Colleges in the later 19th early 20th century: an instrument of social control?

DR FIONA MONTGOMERY

When Emily Davies set up Hitchin College, the precursor of Girton College, Cambridge, she enlisted the support of medical men to disprove contemporary ideas that higher education would turn women into desexed man-hating viragos at best or cause their smaller brains to explode.[1] The struggle for women's university education has been well documented and there is no doubt that many despaired at its introduction.[2] It was feared that education would threaten the sanctity not only of marriage and the family but also the entire future of the human race. As Henry Mawdsley in 'Sex in Mind and Education', *Fortnightly Review,* 21 April 1874 put it:

> It will have to be considered whether women can scorn delights, and live laborious days of intellectual exercise and production without injury to their functions as the conceivers, mothers and nurses of children. For it would be an ill thing, if it should so happen, that we got the advantages of a quantity of female intellectual work at the price of a puny, enfeebled, and sickly race.

Marriage as an institution had to be defended otherwise the belief was that society would crumble: as Walter Besant wrote in 1890, 'the preservation of the family is at the very foundation of our social system.' In line with this came the fear that an educated woman would not want to marry and thus population would fall. The crisis in the quality of motherhood became a key issue throughout Europe. Both reformers and legislators were concerned about depopulation. The annual number of births in France for example, dropped from 834,173 in 1896 to 806,847 in 1906.[3] The family therefore, was seen as a microcosm of society with women as central to its wellbeing.

This was a concern also in America where Millicent Washburn Shinn, analysed the situation:

> Now that the question of the effect of college life on the health of women seems finally and statistically settled, we are met by a new one, concerning its effect on their chances of marriage. It appears that but a small proportion of college women have married. The higher education may not be undermining our health as a nation, after all; but what if it proves to be undermining our domestic life?[4]

She concluded that, a large proportion of young women in the professional classes (probably more than half) did not marry; and that going to college tended to postpone marriage till aged over 21 but made no difference in percentage to those who ultimately marry.

In Britain, B. L. Hutchins in *Higher Education and Marriage* (1912) also drew attention to this:

> Higher education and the opportunity for a professional career have been demanded and obtained by a number of women in England in the last half-century. These innovations, as they are regarded, are welcomed by many as affording a much-needed improvement in the economic position and social status of women, but there are others ... who tell us that biological deterioration is the certain result of such a course. Education and the prospect of professional advancement, in the opinion of some observers, will draw women away from matrimony and motherhood, and lower the average fitness of the mothers of the race. If the economic advantage of the individual be put before the biological good of species, the result can only be disaster.

Hutchins pointed out that while low marriage rates were a 'serious matter', higher education was not the cause. Rather the demand for higher education might be a consequence of a lack of marriage prospects in the upper class. However, as far as Hutchins was concerned, it was due to 'a real spiritual awakening, by no means confined to single women, and to a righteous discontent with the ignoble futility of many women's lives, and the parasitism of their economic position'. She urged the heads of women's colleges to amass statistics on the subsequent careers of college women.

Universities however, were not the only form of higher education available to women, teacher training colleges also provided a type of tertiary education. Copelman writes, 'Victorian training colleges did not have a high reputation. Austere and uncomfortable, they were judged intellectually deficient by educators, socially unacceptable by middle-class parents and stifling by many of their residents'[5], but also acknowledges that, 'for many students, the two years spent at college could be a blessing'.[6] And certainly by the late nineteenth century standards had improved. Furthermore, their role was considered to be that of agents of social control and stability. In France they were viewed as institutions with the power to 'produce a new orderly Republican culture' by educating those who were to become the future educators.[7] This was taken to ludicrous extremes: J. Payot, *Avant d'entrer dans la vie: aux instituteurs et institutrices* (1900), considered that the schoolmistress could 'transform ugly and untidy women into attractive housewives: she can reveal to the peasants the delights of a clean, healthy and varied diet: she can lead a secret yet powerful war against the *cabarets*, and so she will be loved by all the villagers'[8]. Similar attitudes prevailed in Britain. At Edge Hill's (a non denominational college founded in 1885,) twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations, the Bishop of the Diocese maintained:

> After 27 years of absence he came back to Lancashire, and he saw in more ways than one the effect of the teaching of the elementary schools in the refinement and the increased civility of the people of Lancashire (Applause). In these earlier days one never heard the word "sir", and never received anything more than a nod at the most and sometimes not that. But when ten years ago he came to Liverpool he was immensely struck by the courtesy of the great masses of people, and he felt sure that that increase of courtesy and good manners was due very largely to the work of the teachers in the elementary schools (Applause).[9]

Training colleges then, were perceived as cogs within a wider machine, which through their production of teachers, generated improvement, morality and reform.

Examination of Edge Hill provides a lens through which to discern both the type of ideology and how it was presented to students, as well as whether there was any sign of students promoting a counter culture. Utilising oral evidence and personal reminiscences it is possible to hear the voices of the students themselves. At the same time quantitative material such as HMI Reports, annual reports, accounts and registers of students give the official view.

Unlike Bishop Otter (originally a male training college founded in 1839, closed in 1867 and reopened in 1873 as a women's college)[10], and Avery Hill (dating from 1906), Edge Hill was a completely new foundation and as such it differs in many ways: its principals and staff were highly qualified women with university degrees. Its students regularly out-performed male students at University College Cardiff on the Scholarship List [11]; from 1894, its brightest students received an education which gave the possibility of a university degree, as the Board of Education report for 1912-13 stated 'of all the women's colleges, [it] has hitherto prepared the largest proportion of its students for degree courses'[12]. Indeed by 1920, 14% of its graduates held BAs, MAs, BScs, MScs and MRCS as well as a number of other higher level qualifications. Its graduates included Ethel Annakin, a noted socialist, suffragist, peace campaigner and wife of Philip Snowden the first Labour Chancellor, and Helena Normanton one of the first women barristers to practise in England. Furthermore its lecturers were recognized as teachers of Liverpool University and its principals received a salary well in advance not only of those of other training college principals but also of the professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth. In 1922, Miss Smith received £800 per annum[13]. It was therefore more in the situation of a college of higher education today.

There is no doubt that training colleges did promote a culture of femininity and control.[14] Compared to today, they were small institutions with a large number of staff in relation to the number of students. Edge Hill for example initially in 1885 had five full-time staff plus VLs for drawing, music and a student population of 41 making an enviable Staff Student Ratio of 8:1, and by 1910 this had been further reduced to 6:1 which in theory should make it very easy to create a dominant ideology.

Femininity was well in evidence. Edge Hill had a clear image of the type of girl they wished to attract. Its intention was,' to produce a superior class of Elementary School Mistresses' signalling its desire to draw middle-class applicants into the profession and reassure parents that their daughters

would not lose their position in society. Refinement was a goal to be successfully imparted to students as the HMI Report of 1895 stated: 'the surroundings of the students are calculated to refine their mind and manners'.[15] Students had to be dressed demurely at all times. Even at P.E in the 1890s they wore, 'thick blue serge tunics buttoned up to the neck and with long sleeves, and "bloomers"... to match. Over the outfit, even in the summer, we had to put on our dress skirts, for it was considered indecent to show even our ankles. What shapeless bundles of humanity we must have looked, and how hot we were in summer'.[16] And even from 1904 when Edge Hill was the first to adopt the new Swedish system of gymnastics, and gym kit now consisted of a navy blue dress with a red sailor collar in which, 'the whole body was free to move as Nature intended, and the hems were a whole eleven inches from the ground!!!', once the PT lesson was over, however, normal dress (voluminous skirts with tightly boned corsets) was resumed[17].

It was always made quite plain that intellectual ability was not the only, or even main, quality required in a prospective teacher. 'Students had to come from 'a suitable home environment'[18] and have the characteristics of, 'alertness, pleasantness of manner, responsiveness, some amount of individuality, a real desire for the work'[19]. These mattered more than actual cleverness: 'No lethargic, stolid, unobservant, unattractive – whether in speech or manner – or unsympathetic person, however physically strong, mentally well-equipped, and even morally sound should be accepted for the teaching profession ...'[20]

Replicating the middle-class home and family was central to notions of femininity. The period from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century was to see much debate on the question of a woman's role, marriage and the family. It is interesting to note that Emily Davies referred to Hitchin as a 'home': 'It was first proposed to begin by building, not inviting students till there should be a permanent home ready to receive them'.[21] Edge Hill followed in many ways the ideology of the middle-class Victorian family. A system of 'mothers and daughters' prevailed whereby second year student 'mothers' supervised their 'daughters' first year's socialisation into College life. This was a general system at the time: 'Each new student thus becomes a member of a 'family' when she enters the college, as she is the daughter of her mother, who in turn is the daughter of her mother...'[22] Unlike at Bishop Otter[23] however, this did not die out at Edge Hill with the advent of male students in the 1960s, but simply encompassed 'fathers and sons' and continued till the 1980s. Meal times were also an instance of the way in which the dominant norms of middle-class society were transmitted. The midday meal, though called 'dinner' was the formal one with staff in attendance and the Principal's personal maid waiting behind her chair, unlike Universities where the formal meal was in the evening. Saturday nights were modelled on family entertainment with the students sewing at the feet of the Principal. Student societies (apart from the games clubs) were designed to be of a highly improving nature. During meetings, students made clothes for poor Liverpool children to have at Christmas reflecting traditional ideas of service to the less fortunate. Passive participation was not allowed.

Domestic duties, considered light by the standards of the time – the HMI Fitch commented in 1888 and 1889 that he was glad that Edge Hill students had not so much household and laundry work as those in other colleges – consisted of fetching and carrying their own washing water, tidying their own rooms and certain meal duties. In many training colleges there was a significant emphasis on domestic duties. At Southlands College, 'Each student is responsible for the cleanliness and neatness of her dormitory, and all in turn take charge as monitors of class-rooms and lecture hall, but no scrubbing or laundry work is done by them, nor any cooking'.[24] At Lincoln College duties included sweeping and dusting classrooms, ironing, mangling as well as the preparation of food and washing up[25].

Students at Edge Hill were split into two groups; each in turn received instruction morning and afternoon in class or did schoolwork, cookery, industrial work and private study. Four to six students were 'morning servers'; between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. they cleared tables, washed cups, saucers and plates. They then studied till noon when they set the tables for dinner and waited. This was a particularly nerve-wracking experience for the new student: 'The unfortunate victims had to rush to the dining room, fight for a dozen knives, forks, spoons with which to set the table (always somebody was without the required number and appeals to the kitchen were ignored!). Others helped prepare the meal, while a third set checked that the bathrooms were in order. Afternoon servers had to see that the tables were cleared and set for tea while afternoon cooks had 'easy duties' which lasted only till

3 p.m. and consisted 'mainly of the concocting of dainty dishes'.[26] All of which ensured that students were well versed in the workings of a middle-class family.

Also as part of the ideology went a concern with marriage and the question of a woman's role. Marriage was an issue in which Edge Hill took a great interest. Despite the many deficiencies of the *Registers* as a source of evidence, there is one piece of information which is always recorded in great detail: the date of a former student's marriage and the number of children she produced. Each *Directory* also makes great play of the numbers who got married. Matrimony therefore would still seem to be *the* career as far as the staff was concerned; teaching was second best. Edge Hill thus reinforced contemporary mores; a women's *real* place was in the home. This message was also strengthened by glowing reports of gatherings of mothers and children. 'There could not be a brighter, happier, healthier looking set of youngsters anywhere and they bear testimony to the fact that Edge Hill has trained good mothers, no less than good teachers.'[27] Teaching, therefore, was a convenient profession for tiding a woman over till she married and by 1920, 34% of its students had married.

Furthermore, Edge Hill had a clear idea of what a woman's role was, as Dr. Watson advised graduating students in 1903, 'To men, ... make the children keen and quick witted; to women, raise up women to create homes for the men ...'[28] and was concerned to propagate this image. To imbue this ideology, a system of control maintained by strict supervision was used.

To create teachers with the correct sense of duty who would become agents of social control, students were subjected to a spartan regime designed to keep them busy all day: 'The routine was inflexible – we slept, ate, worked and took walks, attended lectures and church and fulfilled extraneous duties from which no excuse could be contemplated'.[29] This contrasted with the experience of university students who did not have to account for every minute of the day. [30]

The weekday was unusually long beginning at 6.15 when the rising bell was sounded and finishing at 10pm with lights out:

6.15	Rising bell
7 am	Prayers
7-8 am	Classwork (seniors)
	school, study, cookery, (juniors)
8-9 am	Breakfast and tidying of rooms
9-12	Classwork
12-12.30	Recreation
12.30	Dinner
2.30-4.30	Classwork (juniors)
	School or study (seniors)
4.30	Plain tea
5-6.0	Walk
6-8.0	Private study
8.30	Supper
9.0	Prayers
9.45-10.0	Silence (designed for private prayer)
10.0	Lights out

Out of the 15 ¾ hour day, only 2 ¼ hours were designated for recreation. Eleven and a quarter hours were spent on classwork, practice in school, household work or private study.

Students were supervised by head teachers and had to prepare lesson notes each week. Senior students were responsible (as far as practical) for some of the classes' subjects. Friday afternoons

were devoted to 'criticism' sessions where a student gave a lesson criticised by the Principal, the head teacher, staff and fellow students. There was however a certain disquiet about the heavy workload: in 1894 the HMI commented, 'The time-table shows a heavy amount of mental work, and a comparatively slight amount of time for private study and recreation'. And two years later (1896) it was still causing concern: 'Efforts will no doubt continue to be made to secure a substantial respite from study for every student in the course of the day, which is all the more important because the College does not possess very extensive grounds for the Physical exercise of so many young persons'.[31]

Nevertheless, the emphasis throughout was on order and control, on creating a shared culture with carefully prescribed roles, norms and values. The staff constantly supervised the girls during the working day; while it was the senior students' responsibility to enforce discipline during recreation times and special monitors were in charge of the dormitories. Students were accountable for seeing that all windows were shut before bedtime. If one was found open, a governess would wake up the person on window duty to make sure it was closed. Again demonstrating that they were in control.

Students were not allowed to leave the premises after 5 p.m. on weekdays. Saturday afternoons were free but permission was required to go off site and they had to return by 7 p.m. (except in special circumstances). The rest of Saturday evening was spent doing the typical female pursuits of needlework or drawing while the Principal read aloud from an 'interesting or instructive book'. Saturday evening lectures were introduced in the autumn of 1891. These were open to former students and friends and were of an improving nature.

Sundays were relatively free. After breakfast, Miss Hale gave a talk known as 'meditation'. This was not popular as Norah Howie (1907-9) recalled, 'Most of it was above my head and to judge by faces around me, to many others too'. Each student was then supposed to attend the church of her denomination (though the College was nondenominational students were required to attend daily, morning and evening prayers). At the 8 p.m. roll call students had to answer 'once' or 'twice' signifying the number of times they had been at church. Those replying 'once' had to explain why to Miss Hale. Every minute of the day therefore was strictly accounted for.

Restrictions also extended to accommodation which was very basic. All students were entitled to a cubicle (known as a 'cube') partitioned by wooden panels which ended about four to five feet from the ceiling. This gave very little privacy 'for every sound could be heard throughout the dormitory', though whether this was fundamentally different from conditions in an upper-class boarding school is difficult to determine. Each cubicle contained a small chest of drawers, a little wash stand, a single bed, a desk and one or two shelves for books. The only light came from a large one in the corridor which was turned off at 'lights out'; candles were not allowed in the rooms. There was no hot water: the wash stands boasting only a basin and a jug of cold water which had to be brought each morning from down the corridor. Here again strict restrictions were in force: students were not allowed to wash in their cubicles between 9 a.m. and 9 p.m. but had to use the general lavatory. Baths were taken according to a timetable; each student was allotted 15 minutes and to reach the bathroom had to walk down two corridors and a flight of stairs. Even this however was a marked improvement to the situation in France, where at Sèvre (the establishment for educating teachers for the new lycées and colleges), baths were allowed only once every three weeks. Furthermore there was a Government enquiry to ensure there was no unnecessary use of heating and lighting when the students were not in their rooms.[32]

There is no doubt that there was a general awareness that students were living in a very restricted environment. As The *Board of Education Report* for 1912-13 commented, of training colleges in general; 'The complaint of an old student that they were "sometimes treated like children, sometimes as nuns, sometimes as servant girls", might have been made with equal justice of most boarding schools for young ladies of the day'. [33] Most of Edge Hill's recruits though would have had no first hand knowledge of boarding schools and for many, College must have come as a traumatic experience. It must be remembered nevertheless that male undergraduates had to be in college by 9 p.m.[34] Edna Walker (1915-17) writing in 1964, however, could not remember 'feeling rebellious at the restrictions'. Others nevertheless, felt that 'the worst of the old system was that in 1904 we were treated as

irresponsible beings, and subjected to excessive rules and restrictions'.[35]

This certainly seems to have been the case; any attempts at real private study appear to have been actively discouraged. 'The most absurd rule I [K W Wild] can remember was that, though we each had a tiny private cubicle, we weren't allowed to use it for study. One of the jobs of the staff on duty was to go poking round and hustle off any ardent but erring reader. I was too frequently turned out of the very pleasant library.'[36] Miss Wild took first class honours in Philosophy from London. This contrasted markedly with conditions for a university student of the same era who could enjoy her own study bedroom and the freedom to work whenever she wished. Restrictions did not end when the student left College. Headmistresses had almost despotic powers: one banned the reading of *Jane Eyre* by teachers unless they were aged at least 25! Their authority extended even to the teacher's private life; one assistant in 1917 was reprimanded for smoking in her lodgings following a complaint by her landlady.[37]

On the one hand then, the system was designed to produce young women who were self-sacrificing, aware of their duty to others, women who had an important but distinctive role to play. On the other, training colleges were laying the foundation of a system which enabled students to utilise their education to greater purpose as witnessed by the fact that by 1920, Edge Hill had trained 2071 of whom 288 were graduates and some went on to study Law and Medicine.

There is evidence that the students created their own counter-culture. Thus the restrictions of the day were overcome: attendance at Church on a Sunday was used as an excuse for a day out into the country. They travelled by tram and after 'a few minutes kneeling in the porch of a Roman Catholic Chapel, and possibly being sprinkled with Holy Water' went for a 'semi-rural' walk then back to Edge Hill in time for dinner. Indeed as late as 1913-15 a governess was horrified to find that 'when she gave "extension" on Saturday night for students to go the "Pictures" they had meant the Cinema and not the Art Gallery'.

Ethel Annakin, used to slip out at night and address meetings of dock labourers. Attempts were also made to circumvent the information vacuum in which students lived. Newspapers for example, did not seem to have been easily available. Mary Sheppard (1909-11) recalled 'The most daring deed ever done in our year was the opening of a window one Election Night and dropping a halfpenny on a string to a paper boy who tied the "Special Edition" at midnight on to the same string. When we had shut the window we could not read the results – nobody dared to put on the light![38]

'Open rebellion' occurred at Edge Hill over the food. This was a common reaction: at Newnham in the 1890s, eighteen students complained formally to the Principal about the meals.[39] Sample menus at Edge Hill suggest that meals were reasonable it was the cooking that was bad rather than the food itself.

The menu for meals was quite good though not exciting. The cooking at one time was shocking ... Wednesdays and Fridays were known as "Psalm, Fish and Mystery" days because we sang psalms instead of hymns at Morning Prayer and at dinner we had what we called "Mersey Whale" (a whole fish sent to table swimming in a sea of greasy water), and Mystery, a revolting sloppy mixture of flour, bread crumbs, dried fruit and huge lumps of suet. On Wednesdays also, one girl at each table of eleven girls would spend a shilling on cake or some seasonable dainty to add to the plain bread and butter provided for tea. Helena Normanton, later famous as one of the first women Barristers, was head girl when she was instructed by the Principal to ask us to forego our cake one Wednesday and give its cost to the Benevolent Fund ... I was deputed to suggest that Helena should tell Miss Hale that we would rather give up our Wednesday dinner and have the cost of that given to the fund and retain our cake at tea time. Helena did so and Miss Hale was most annoyed that the complaint had not been made before. Henceforth the fish was cooked in an appetising way and very good fruit pudding was served.[40]

Such improvement however seemed temporary, for only a year later K W Wild records 'naked fish ... in a sea of lukewarm water'. She points out that the College was only allowed 5p per head per day and relates that they had real butter and 'quite enough to eat'. 'What was galling was that years later we were asked to subscribe for a present to the indifferent cooks. I didn't.'

The students in their own activities (admittedly held under Edge Hill's aegis) also showed a healthy interest in feminism, the suffrage question and other debates of interest to the period. As early as 1894 the College Debating Society decided by 64 to 15 votes 'that the franchise should be extended to women' and against the motion 'that the influence of fashion is demoralising' by a smaller margin of 50 to 43 votes. However, in 1904 the motion that 'Man's intelligence is superior to Woman's' was surprisingly carried by 41 to 36 votes.

Furthermore, despite Miss Hale's disapproval of feminism in general and the suffragettes in particular, students and former students were interested in getting the vote. As well as debating the proposition on a number of occasions, from 1907 there was a steady reference to suffragette activities in the *Edge Hill College Magazine*. In 1907, Ethel Snowden (nee Annakin), contributed an article on 'Education and the Woman Question'. She herself made reference to the fact that the *Magazine* was actually publishing it:

> the fact that this subject has been selected as entirely proper for such a journal gives the lie once more to those people who are continually taunting us with the charge that the teaching profession is too absorbed in its professional work to take an intelligent interest in anything outside that work.

She pointed out that 'politics generally and the woman question in particular' was vitally connected to teaching. But even here, there was the wider reference to motherhood. It was important to improve mothers' education and home conditions:

> By means of politics better land laws can be made, better housing, better sanitation, better wages, work for all under decent and honourable conditions, more leisure for self improvement, temperance legislation and help for the aged – all these can be secured … the voices of the nation's women should be heard; but they are silent. Women have to share in this work, simply because they are women. Never a question comes before Parliament but it has some bearing on the sphere which is to be the woman's, the home; or it affects in some way, the woman herself. Yet she has no say in the ordering of her life and that of her children.

On 25 January 1908 the prospective Liverpool City Councillor, Ellen Robinson, addressed the Guild on 'The Present Political and Social Status of Women' and advocated the suffrage for women. In March it was reported that 'College was represented in the audience' at the Picton Lecture Hall to hear Mrs. Fawcett and the former Edge Hillian, Mrs. Philip Snowden (Ethel Annakin, 1900-2) on 'Women Suffrage'. These speeches 'were listened to with attention by a crowded meeting'.[41]

Great coverage was given to developments in June 1908. Two articles were devoted to them: one by Kathleen Ratcliffe on the Hyde Park Demonstration of 21 June and one by Helena Normanton, who had been one of Edge Hill's most successful university students, having graduated from the University of London with a first-class B.A. Honours degree in History, on the March to Albert Hall on 13 June. She pointed out that 'Edge Hill women must be proud that a distinguished old student, Ethel Snowden (née Annakin), was in the front rank', along with Lady Frances Balfour, Mrs. Fawcett, Miss Emily Davies (who had founded Girton College Cambridge and was now 70 but had presented the first petition to John Stuart Mill in 1865) 'which means to say that for fifty years women have been asking in a nice polite way for this great reform before it dawned on them that they were being made the victims of their own sweet reasonableness! … To all Edge Hill suffragists I give the advice – it takes no moral courage whatever to walk in a procession!'. This was an outright call to militancy and contrasted very much with the views of Miss Hale. Despite Miss Hale's reservations, interest continued. On 23 March 1912 Ethel Snowden gave a 'forcible address on Woman Suffrage' to the Guild and the Home Reading Association meeting 'to an enthusiastic gathering and the discussion which followed proved that keen interest is taken in this subject'.[42]

The position of the Principal, as regards contemporary issues, was interesting. As a woman she had few role models and had to present a public masculine authority figure role in what was a patriarchal society. Interestingly, there is no record of Miss Hale ever using a feminine discourse to describe the College community even though it mirrored the Victorian family. Rather the whole tenor of her writings is in the vein of the masculine discourse of the patriarchal authority figure. Her stand on equality changed with time. As early as 1895 however Miss Hale made an impassioned plea for

equal pay for women teachers:

> It is terrible heresy, no doubt, and would lead to a great upheaval in the present order of things, but why also should not a *woman* teacher be paid at the same rate as a *man*? She does the same kind of work, puts in more rather than less, hours per day, and may be as highly certificated. Even when she is working under precisely the same conditions, say as Assistant in a boys' department, her salary falls very much below that of her fellow-assistant, just because he is a man, and for no other reason.[43]

This was dynamite especially coming from one who had been a leading light in the Conservative Club while a student at Newnham College, Cambridge. As she grew older, she reverted to her conservatism. Thus she did not approve of women teaching boys and doing teaching practice in boys schools during World War One, and was not convinced of the equality of women '... one does not contemplate with satisfaction the dearth of men teachers. However well the women teachers succeed in the management of boys, they need more of virile quality to make them really efficient, especially for the older scholars'.[44]

Her arguments on women's suffrage reiterated those of opponents and even invoked the Marian myth:

> Women will come into their rights, nay, they may now enjoy even political rights in effect if not in law, by exercising a wisely quiet and tenderly wise influence over those with whom they are in communication – not by wildly shrieking forth their woes, real or fancied. I am very grateful to Dr Watson who, in his charge to the students who left this year, urged them to bear in mind that they as women teachers, and teachers of those who would presently be the women of England had it greatly in their power to mould the character of its people and therefore to influence the country for good or evil. In this way all women can, in the words of Mazzini, "Hasten the redemption of woman, by restoring her to her mission of Inspiration, Prayer and Piety, so divinely symbolised by Christianity in Mary."

Her attitude when women did get the vote was no different:

> It is the duty of every voter to consider carefully what this new privilege means – for there is no privilege without accompanying responsibility. That the influence of women however felt hitherto, is now to be recognised as factor in the state, is of the utmost importance, but it must be exercised for the good of the community as a whole, not in the interest of any one party or sex ...[45]

It says much for the students that they were able to formulate their own opinions.

Training colleges, then, did not promote feminist consciousness; neither did they produce students skilled in docile femininity. While there is little evidence of widespread resentment (most students even those chaffing at restrictions appreciated their student days), there is much to suggest that they turned out competent professionals, who while aware of their duties to a wider society, were well able to think independently and doubtless did aid social control.

NOTES

1   *Times* 10 October 1871.

2   See D. Bennett *Emily Davies and the Liberation of Women* (Andre Deutsch, 1990. R. McWilliams Tullburg, *Women at Cambridge* (CUP, 1998 ed). L. Moore *Bajanellas and Semilinas. Aberdeen University and the Education of Women* (Aberdeen, 1991). C. Dyhouse, *No distinction of Sex? Women in British Universities 1870-1939* (UCL Press ,1995).

3   L.Coons, '"Neglected Sisters" of the Women's Movement: The Perception and experience of working mothers in the Parisian garment industry 1860-1915', *Journal of Women's History*, 5 (2), Fall 1993, p. 51.

4   'The Marriage Rate of College Women' Century 1, 1895, p .946.

5   D. M. Copelman, *London's Women Teachers Gender, class and feminism 1870-1930* (Routledge, 1996), p. 136.

6   Copelman, p. 140.

7   S. Gemie, 'Docility, Zeal and Rebellion: Culture and Sub-cultures in French Women's Teacher Training Colleges, c.1860-c.1910' *European History Quarterly,* 1994, (2), p. 216.

8   Quoted in Gemie, p. 225.

9   *Liverpool Courier,* 4 July 1910.

10   G. P. McGregor, *Bishop Otter College and policy for teacher education 1839-1980* (London, Pembridge, 1981).

11   Fiona A. Montgomery, *Edge Hill University College. A History 1885-1997* (Phillimore, 1997), p.18.

12   *Board of Education Report* 1912-13, Cd. 7341 (1914), p. 5, para. 5.

13   Montgomery, p, 26; Elizabeth Edwards, *Women in Teacher Training Colleges, 1900-1960 A Culture of Femininity* (Routledge, 2001), p. 58 states that Dorothy Meades, principal of Bishop Otter was offered in 1936, 'an attractive salary of £600 rising to £750 per annum'.

14   See Montgomery, *Edge Hill,* and Edwards, *Women in Teacher Training Colleges.*

15   HMI Report, 1895.

16   Agnes Sutton, Written Reminiscences, 1893-4, Edge Hill Library.

17   D Waid, 'Random Recollections of Edge Hill College Sixty Years Ago', *Newsletter,*73 (1964), p.8.

18   *Edge Hill College Magazine,* 17, 1908, p. 15.

19   Ibid.

20   Ibid.

21   *Times* 10 Oct. 1871.

22   *Schoolmistress,* 27 Feb 1890, p. 356 quoted in Copelman, p. 139.

23   Edwards, p. 26.

24   *Schoolmistress*, 23 Jan. 1890, p. 176 quoted in Copelman, p. 137.

25   *Schoolmistress,* 12 June 1890, p. 176 quoted in Copelman, p. 137.

26   Mary Sheppard, student 1909-11. Written reminiscences, Edge Hill Library.

27   *Edge Hill College Magazine*, 21,1912, p.7.

28   *Edge Hill College Magazine*, 12, 1903,pp 42-3.

29   Mary Sheppard, student 1909-11. Written reminiscences, Edge Hill Library.

30   M. Vicinus, 'Women's Colleges: An Independent Intellectual Life' in Vicinus *Independent Women. Work and Community for Single Women 1850-1920* (Virago, 1985), p. 140.

31   HMI Report, 1896.

32   James F McMillan, *Housewife or Harlot. The Place of Women in French Society 1870-1940* (Brighton, 1984), p.52. This section follows my *Edge Hill*, p. 29.

33   The *Board of Education Report* for 1912-13, p.24, para 37.

34   Vicinus, p146.

35   D Waid, 'Random Recollections of Edge Hill College Sixty Years Ago', *Newsletter,73 (1964), p.8.*

36   K. W. Wild, student1907-10, Written Reminiscences.

37   Mary Price and Nonita Glenday, *Reluctant Revolutionaries, A Century of Headmistresses 1874-1974* (Pitman, 1975), p.41.

38   Written reminiscences.

39   Vicinus, p.130.

40   Montgomery, pp.31-2.

41   *Edge Hill College Magazine*,7, 1908, p.48.

42   *Edge Hill College Magazine*, 21,1912,p.40.

43   *Edge Hill College Magazine*,4, 1895, p.6.

44   *Edge Hill College Magazine*,26,1917, p.7.

45   *Edge Hill College Magazine*, 28, 1919, p.17.

The Italo-Abyssinian Crisis as a Tilting Point Towards World War Two

DR STEVEN MOREWOOD

During the heated debate in the countdown to the 2003 Gulf War pro-conflict American commentators derided the prospect of leaving an unhinged dictator in power by referring to the precedent set in 1935-36 – 'the Abyssinian moment'. Then the international community, in the form of the United Nations' predecessor, the League of Nations, acted feebly and ineffectually against fascist Italy, following its invasion of fellow member Abyssinia, despite declaring it an aggressor in breach of the League Covenant. The outcome, at the very least, accelerated the drift towards another world war. The failure of the League to enforce its will left it discredited and irrelevant. Benito Mussolini remained firmly at the helm in Rome, deluded that his grand vision of recreating the Roman Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean at the expense of Britain and France was realisable. Adolph Hitler, having originally considered his fellow dictator's gambit an act of madness, began lauding *Il Duce* as a 'genius' and warmed to a closer Italo-German relationship that led on to joint intervention in Spain, the Axis, *Anschluss* and beyond. Anglo-French cowering in the face of Mussolini's threats to unleash his weapons of mass destruction (bomber aircraft and submarines) against their Mediterranean interests unless they backed down on the imposition of a crippling oil sanction, convinced Hitler that he could safely bring forward by a year his intention to remilitarise the Rhineland. In the aftermath the image of the timid and faltering western powers stuck in the minds of the dictators, leading onto Munich, Prague, Albania and Poland.

It is intended here to consider some seminal aspects of the 1935-36 crisis. In particular to summarise the debate as it stands; to analyse why the British and French response to Italian aggression fell way short of bringing Mussolini to heel; and to suggest that an alternative robust option existed, creating a possible alternative scenario.

The debate

Not long after Italy absorbed Abyssinia in May 1936, the House of Commons convened for a post mortem. Anthony Eden, who had succeeded the disgraced Sam Hoare as Foreign Secretary, faced a hostile reception from the Opposition as he announced his government's intention to discontinue sanctions. This followed the pronouncement of Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor and heir-in-waiting to Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, that maintaining sanctions when Abyssinia was lost represented 'the midsummer of madness'. An embarrassed Eden once seen by League supporters as their best hope to thwart Mussolini, faced constant heckling and cries of 'resign', 'shame' and 'sabotage'. Only military action could restore the situation, a prospect which he claimed no League member supported, whose burden would fall primarily on Britain as the most proximate military power, and for which there was no support in the country. Arthur Greenwood, for Labour, responded that 'no more deplorable speech has ever fallen from the lips of a British Minister'.[1]

This set the tone for the debate that followed. There were soon doubts over the wisdom of letting Mussolini off the hook. Leo Amery, a leading Conservative backbencher and staunch opponent of war in 1935-36 had changed his tune by the close of 1937. 'Everyone knows now that our Abyssinian policy was crazy...we might have done better to have shut the Suez Canal on Mussolini in the summer of 1935 and run the risk, or more than the risk of war.' Instead Britain was now faced with the triple threat posed by Berlin, Rome and Tokyo to its metropolis and far flung empire.[2] Eden came round to this view and, where before he blushed at condescending to Mussolini, by February 1938 considered resignation preferable to the further appeasement of Rome for no tangible benefits.

In the immediate decades after the Second World War advocates of a stronger line assailed apologists for inaction. A.J.P.Taylor pointed to the Nyon Conference of September 1937, which ended

Italian submarine piracy over Spain, as a unique example in the 1930s of Britain and France successfully standing up to Mussolini. 'Here was a demonstration', he pronounced, 'never repeated, that Mussolini would respect a show of strength.' On the British Admiralty's pusillanimity over Abyssinia Taylor, renowned for not mincing his words, considered that 'the successors of Nelson put their name to a craven opinion which would have earned them instant dismissal from an earlier Board of Admiralty'.[3]

Memoirs veered between justification for inaction in 1935-36 from those in government and scathing criticism from opponents of appeasement. In the latter camp Winston Churchill proclaimed in 1948: 'If ever there was an opportunity of striking a decisive blow in a generous cause with the minimum of risk, it was here and now.'[4] Eden considered the Chiefs of Staff were at fault for exaggerating the Italian threat. 'The military appraisal given us of the world's fighting forces in these years', he bemoaned, 'was almost universally at fault.'[5] The Times' military correspondent, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, echoed this sentiment. 'While French reluctance could be pleaded as an excuse for Britain's failure to fulfil her pledges, it was Britain who controlled the approach to the Suez Canal, the route by which Italy was sending fuel supplies and reinforcements to her forces invading Abyssinia. That route could have been closed without serious risk.'[6] Andrew Cunningham, then a rear admiral, recorded the sense of frustration felt on the spot. 'To us in the Mediterranean Fleet it seemed a very simple task to stop him [Mussolini]. The mere closing of the Suez Canal to his transports which were then steaming through with troops and stores would effectually have cut off his armies concentrating in Eritrea and elsewhere.'[7]

The opening of the official British records after the introduction of the Thirty Year Rule in 1967 produced more sympathetic assessments of the Baldwin government's predicament. Captain Stephen Roskill's official history of the Royal Navy between the world wars set the tone when he emphasised that the Chiefs of Staff felt that war with Italy was not worthwhile. It would seriously disrupt barely begun rearmament against Nazi Germany and Japan, whom they considered much the greater threats. The Admiralty was concerned lest decisive action to thwart Mussolini led to capital ships being lost to air power (there were just fifteen by this time), thereby encouraging Japan to move against British interests in the Far East. The aftermath would likely be a permanently hostile Italy posing a constant threat to imperial communications through the Mediterranean and Red Sea, bringing into doubt long conceived contingency plans to send a fleet to Singapore by the fastest route to deter or confront Japan should the need arise.[8]

The debate took a new twist in 1977 when an Italian historian, Rosarario Quartataro, examined the British Chiefs of Staff records. She concluded that 'imperial defence remained chaotic and confused throughout 1935-1936. The Chiefs of Staff must, in retrospect, have been profoundly relieved that Mussolini never dared to put their dispositions to the test…They appeared to be unable to devise any effective means of defence…in 1935-1936 Britain could not defend Egypt or the Suez Canal, let alone fight in defence of the Covenant.'[9] The imputation was that had it come to war in 1935-36 then the result of 1940-41, when the Italian invasion of Egypt was decisively defeated, would have been reversed with Mussolini triumphing in the earlier 'dress rehearsal'. This view failed to recognise that the Chiefs of Staff were self-evidently seeking excuses not to fight. They schemed to deprive politicians of a military option. Hoare bemoaned their attitude, castigating them as 'the worst pacifists and defeatists in the country'. Moreover, it was the 'men on the spot', the commanders in the eastern Mediterranean who would have done the fighting. An examination of their strategy by the present author provided striking parallels with the later military successes of 1940-41, such as an early version of the plan to attack the Italian fleet at Taranto naval base.[10] Moreover, there was an ebullient mood of confidence in the theatre, which contrasted sharply with the foreboding felt at home.[11] Cunningham records the anger and frustration of his commander-in-chief, Admiral W.W.Fisher, at receiving a defeatist Chiefs of Staff appreciation. 'Cunningham', Fisher remonstrated, 'I have sent a signal to Their Lordships telling them I disagree with every word of this pusillanimous document. The Mediterranean Fleet is by no means so powerless as is here set out.'[12]

Numerous historians have explored the Italian dimension. With more records becoming available the old view of Mussolini as an opportunistic bluffer posturing and gesticulating like a demented cockerel has given way to a recognition that he cherished a longstanding vision to wage a 'war of expansion' in the Mediterranean with Germany guarding Italy's European flank. Abyssinia was but a

stepping stone towards an eventual wider conflict with Britain and France for control of the 'middle sea'.[13] MacGregor Knox and Brian Sullivan first linked fascist Italy's foreign policy and its military planning, a critical connection. Subsequently Robert Mallett's pioneering research in the Rome archives confirmed the validity of this approach and took it much further, adding immensely to knowledge of the inner mood of Mussolini's regime.[14]

Anglo-French Pusillanimity Dissected

Abyssinia had appealed to the League following the Wal-Wal incident of December 1934 but its two leading lights, Britain and France, did not welcome the prospect of confrontation with Italy. A raft of competing factors influenced the British position. First, following Nazi Germany's overturning of the rearmament restrictions of Versailles in March 1935, Mussolini was instrumental in forging a containment front with Britain and France at Stresa the following month. His duplicity is now apparent – he was already shifting towards a pro-German stance and siding with Britain and France was mere pretence. At the time it served to deceive the latter. Both London and Paris believed that it was best to dissuade Mussolini not to invade Abyssinia but if diplomacy failed then a compromise outcome should be sought. This halfway house appeared to them the best way of maintaining Stresa and led on to the infamous Hoare-Laval Pact. Second, British public opinion, as expressed through the Peace Ballot in June 1935, indicated overwhelming support for the League and the imposition of sanctions against an aggressor. With an election due in November the Baldwin government dare not risk alienating the electorate and cannily stood on a ticket of 'All sanctions short of war.' Third, when it became clear that Britain would not stand aside, Italy threatened its interests in the Mediterranean region with deadly air attacks, especially against the Malta naval base, which lay just half an hour's flying time from Sicily. The spectre of 'mad dog' attacks by Italy in response to sanctions led the Baldwin government to remove the Mediterranean Fleet to Alexandria, to reinforce it from far and wide, and to strengthen the garrisons in Egypt and Aden with all arms. Fourth, rearmament, aimed at deterring Nazi Germany and Japan, had only just begun. In November 1935 the Defence Requirements Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence decreed that British resources were inadequate to face a 'triple threat' including Italy (not even mentioned by name in the report). It was imperative, therefore, not to jeopardise the traditional friendship with Italy that had hitherto prevented an Anglo-Italian conflict. Fifth, there were concerns that Abyssinia, as at Adowa in 1896, might inflict an embarrassing defeat on Italy, which could spark a general uprising against Britain and France across the Middle East. This was a key consideration in not lifting the arms embargo against Abyssinia.[15] Last, minority voices within the Colonial Office and the Egyptian Department of the Foreign Office warned prophetically that Mussolini's ultimate ambition was to supplant British dominance in Egypt and the Sudan to link up his imperial territories in north and east Africa. They, however, were deafened by the crescendo of voices calling for caution.[16]

The French shared some of these concerns but also had several of their own. It remains controversial whether or not the French Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister, Pierre Laval, gave Mussolini carte blanche over Abyssinia during their infamous talks in Rome of 4-8 January 1935. But, as Robert Mallett persuasively argues, Laval's overwhelming desire to secure Italian military support against German revisionism led to a deal that France would not stand in the way. Italian documents leave no doubt about it. On 5 January, after Mussolini pronounced that 'the principal question was a free hand in Ethiopia', his guest responded appropriately. 'Laval', the record of the meeting records, 'is perfectly in agreement with this principle.' His only concern 'was to find a formula that will present the French attitude as correct even in the event of publication'.[17] A subsequent Italo-French military accord allowed France to withdraw troops facing the Italian frontier to concentrate against Nazi Germany. Indeed, only British threats to disown Locarno and the League come September persuaded the French to fall into line and support mild sanctions.[18]

Beyond protecting its vital imperial interests, the Baldwin government wished to avert a military confrontation and was intent on going no further down the sanctions road than fellow League members, which effectively meant France. In the summer Joseph Avenol, the League's Secretary-General, predicted that 'if at the Council table Great Britain gave the lead for action "all would follow"'.[19]

A.L.Kennedy, *The Times* correspondent, was not so certain. 'Yes, no doubt they'd follow at Geneva', he recorded, 'but they certainly would not in the Mediterranean!'[20] French public opinion regarded the sudden apparent 'conversion' of the British to staunch backers of the League with cynicism and incredulity after years of Britain turning a deaf ear to France's notion of Geneva as a world (and especially German) policeman. What is now known is that from spring 1935 the French General Staff anticipated German re-militarisation of the Rhineland in the near future and its thoughts were concentrated on meeting this challenge. Reports from the French Military Attaché in Berlin warning that the Nazis were waiting for a favourable opportunity to march into the Rhineland reinforced this tendency. As a consequence of the Abyssinian crisis, the French were unable to withdraw any military units from North Africa for concentration against Germany. By the start of 1936 the Italians were tying down one fifth of the French Army – precisely the situation which the secret Franco-Italian military accord of June 1935 sought to avoid. 'Are we', asked Admiral Jean Decoux, of the French naval staff,

> through respect for League of Nations principles of mutual assistance and sanctions, principles that have never been put into practice before because of England, and for a purely colonial question in which only the interests of the British Empire are directly threatened, going to accompany London down a path that takes us straight into war with Italy?[21]

In September 1935 French army and naval intelligence warned that the major gainer from an Italo-Abyssinian conflict would be Nazi Germany. The collapse of the Stresa Front, closer Italo-German relations and Nazi threats to Austria and Czechoslovakia were all expected to flow from the situation.[22]

Paris was only prepared to participate in a tough sanctions front if London overturned its traditional reluctance to publicly guarantee threatened European small powers and pledge itself to the continued independence of Austria, a seismic policy shift unacceptable to Whitehall. French 'treachery' (Baldwin even suspected Laval was on Mussolini's pay roll) underpinned the British government's excuse for inaction that it could not be expected to uphold the Covenant single-handed. 'Military sanctions', the Cabinet decreed on 2 October, 'were out of the question in view of the attitude of the French.' Neville Chamberlain felt that the League had to be tried to appease domestic public opinion but 'If things become too serious the French will run out first, and we could show that we had done our best'. Hoare shared this cynical approach: 'we have got to see through the attempt to make the Covenant work, [but] that we might get out by the failure of others to support us'.[23] As Richard Davis remarks, going no farther than the French 'made valour safe'.[24]

Letting Mussolini off the Hook

Churchill warned that Mussolini risked committing himself to 'what might be a deadly trap'.[25] Neville Chamberlain observed privately that, in sending Italian military forces to the other side of Suez, Mussolini gambled that the noose left dangling would not be pulled.[26] Britain was in the best position to play hangman but was reluctant to take the role. On the eve of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia the Italophile British Ambassador in Rome counselled that Mussolini 'had worked up his party and the general population to such a fever pitch of expectation that he *cannot* climb down now'.[27] To a large degree, in fact, Anglo-French diplomacy was invested with sympathy for Rome's predicament. From the outset it was implicitly recognised that a compromise settlement represented the preferred solution, from which Mussolini might gain sufficient prestige to prevent his regime from collapsing.

This set the tone for what would follow. Neither Britain nor France severed diplomatic relations with Rome and were careful to make reassuring noises behind the scenes that they wanted to avert anything drastic. Crippling sanctions were avoided. As Churchill reflected: 'the measures pressed with so great a parade were not real sanctions to paralyse the aggressor, but merely such half-hearted sanctions as the aggressor would tolerate, because in fact, though onerous, they stimulated Italian war spirit'.[28] Fascist propaganda manipulated the situation to advantage: it was 'fifty nations against one', the League members who backed sanctions against Italy, rather than an advanced nation against a backward one. A naval blockade of Italy was never even considered. The western powers trumpeted the 1888 Suez Canal Convention, which deemed that the famous waterway must remain open to *all* vessels in peace and war, as a convenient excuse not to deny Italian forces in East Africa

continual sustenance. This legal smokescreen conveniently forgot their concerted denial of access to Suez to vessels of the Central Powers during the Great War. Moreover, the confidential advice of the Foreign Office's Legal Adviser was that Italy could be denied access to the canal on the basis that an invasion of Abyssinia placed it outside international law.[29]

The prospect of an oil sanction would also have remained off the table had not Canada broken ranks and tabled its consideration at Geneva. Laval made it clear France would not play ball, refusing to offer the British any concrete guarantees of French military support if its application provoked a wider war as Mussolini threatened. The Baldwin government refused to take the lead and instead sent Hoare to Paris where he concluded the infamous pact with Laval. The resulting public furore over rewarding the aggressor brought both their resignations at a time when Italian forces were encountering severe difficulties in overcoming the resilient Abyssinian resistance. In any event, Mussolini would have been unlikely to accept the terms of the pact, generous though they were. For his personal prestige Italian forces needed to be seen to have decisively defeated the Abyssinian 'savages' in battle. To ensure that the odds were stacked in his favour, Mussolini now authorised the widespread use of poison gas. The new tactic succeeded all too well and, together with the unfortunate bombing of Red Cross units in Abyssinia by the *Regia Aeronautica*, brought fascist Italy's reputation to a new low in world opinion.

Yet, despite the continued backing of the electorate for decisive action against the aggressor, Baldwin's government, notwithstanding the crafty addition of Eden as Hoare's successor, continued to dither. While there was no question of any repeat of Hoare-Laval, neither was there any enthusiasm for an oil sanction and such support as was now given at Geneva rested on the knowledge that France remained adamantly opposed. In any event, the eruption of the Rhineland Crisis refocused attention on the German threat. On this occasion, the French caretaker government under the hapless Albert Sarraut looked to British indifference to provide an excuse for inaction and was duly rewarded. With most of Britain's finite armed forces concentrated in the Mediterranean, as the Chiefs of Staff were at pains to point out, there was no possibility of backing a French military riposte to reverse the remilitarisation. Soon Italian forces were marching in triumph through Addis Ababa, the Abyssinian capital, providing an opportune moment for Mussolini to declare victory. He promised publicly that he harboured no designs against British or French interests in the Eastern Mediterranean but directives to his military planners to prepare for a wider conflict in the future tell otherwise. Indeed, just three days after Addis Ababa fell Mussolini, buoyed up by his success, spoke to Baron Aloisi, *chef de cabinet* at the Foreign Ministry. He disclosed his desire to develop the new Italian colony into a military springboard for his ultimate ambition: uniting Libya with what now became Italian East Africa (Abyssinia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland) through driving the British from Egypt and the Sudan.[30]

Far from Mussolini being eternally grateful for Britain and France's lack of resolve over Abyssinia, he used their token opposition to make the case, behind the scenes, for an eventual showdown with them. Never again, he decreed, must Italy be faced with the prospect of being denied the use of Suez. He chose to treat Chamberlain's overtures, as British prime minister, for a renewal of the traditional friendship with contempt (as the diaries of Count Ciano, Mussolini's foreign minister and son-in-law amply testify).[31] The failures of the Anglo-Italian Gentleman's Agreement (January 1937) and the Easter Pacts (April 1938) to restore the old position and Mussolini's ever closer alignment with Nazi Germany were symptomatic of his burning ambition to one day realise his grand vision. The latter could offer what neither Britain or France was willing to give – a free hand in the Mediterranean – and if the price was *Anschluss* with Austria then Mussolini was happy to oblige.[32] Throughout the later 1930s Mussolini taunted the British with constant reinforcements of Libya, creating a threat to Egypt and bringing into doubt Britain's capacity to defend the Land of the Pharaohs. Mussolini singled out France, in turn, for malice. After Italian claims were lodged in November 1938 for Tunisia, Corsica, Nice and Savoy the two sides' respective partners, Britain and Nazi Germany, declared their willingness to go to the aid of the other if attacked.[33]

By this time (early 1939) the League had long become an irrelevance. In taking unilateral military action against Saddamist Iraq, George W.Bush lost patience with the United Nations, which he perceived to have become another 'talkshop' like its predecessor. Whether American intervention to topple Saddam will be vindicated is too early to say. What can be said is that the failure of Britain, in

particular, to stop Mussolini in his empire-building tracks in 1935-36 had profound consequences. The scale of future crises was to rise as the fascist dictators' propensity to gamble increased incrementally as they sensed the lack of resistance from the feeble western democracies.

An Alternative Scenario

Could events have turned out differently? In 1991 American forces were prevented from moving on Baghdad, their limited mission of liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation having been accomplished. Thereafter, until the second Gulf War, the debate raged over whether this was a wise move and the extent to which Saddam remained a threat to world peace. 'Should we not have shown more determination in pressing through with sanctions in 1935 and if we had could we not have called Musso's bluff and at least postponed this war', Eden asked his diary after fascist Italy surrendered. 'The answer, I am sure, is yes. We built Musso into a Great Power, the Greeks first debunked him.' Eden's private secretary, Oliver Harvey, reached the same conclusion a year before global war spread to the Mediterranean. 'We missed our first and great chance: not facing up to Mussolini over Abyssinia and forcing him to his knees by immediate drastic military sanctions.'[34]

'In retrospect', a distinguished historian concluded, 'it appears that a resolute closure of the Suez Canal rather than the at-the-time greatly overestimated oil sanction would have been the most effective way of stopping Mussolini...'[35] Like Saddam, Mussolini may well have taken his country to war with the hegemon, in this case Britain, had it instigated the closure of Suez through the League. Mussolini's high command, we now know, was profoundly uneasy at the prospect. Robert Mallett discovered a revelatory document detailing a meeting of the fascist service chiefs at the behest of Mussolini when, in August 1935, it appeared momentarily that Britain might go to war to enforce the League Covenant. The tone of the meeting was decidedly pessimistic with no one present relishing the prospect of conflict with the British Empire. Both the air and naval chiefs predicted certain defeat with only General Federico Baistrocchi, for the army, presenting any reason for optimism. 'In the Mediterranean', concluded Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio, chief of the supreme general staff, 'any initial advantages we might enjoy will subsequently evaporate as the British reinforce the theatre with additional air and naval forces, and neither will it be possible for us to counter this on land.'[36]

Admiral Cavagnari did not consider that the *Regia Marina* could stop the Royal Navy from denying Suez to Italian supply ships. The much-vaunted might of the *Regia Aeronautica* was unproven and benefited from the doom-laden prophecies of the air proponents in the aircraft versus battleship controversy. They portrayed the narrow confines of the Mediterranean and Red Sea as prospective bombing alleys. But Italy lacked torpedo bombers (later used by Japan to devastating effect) or an armour-piercing bomb. Nor was the *Savoia Marchetti 81* bomber the wonder plane the British feared, soon demonstrating its deficiencies in the Spanish Civil War following which it was demoted to a transport role. Again, Italian submarines were slow to dive and easily detected in the clear waters of the Mediterranean and Red Sea. Indeed, several were forced to the surface by dummy depth charges when they lurked too closely to the British Mediterranean Fleet. On land the Italians lacked a genuine tank and with all their military efforts directed against Abyssinia, were in no position to mount a serious invasion of Egypt. All this and other factors suggest that it was the Italians rather than the British who were the risk takers in 1935-36. Moreover, unlike over the Rhineland, there was substantial public support for decisive action against the aggressor. And, despite some shortcomings (there is rarely a perfect time for war) Britain clearly possessed the military capacity to prevail against Italy and enforce the will of the League of Nations.[37]

Conclusion

'The Abyssinian war', judges David Omissi, 'completely altered the strategic picture in the Mediterranean...[and] struck a blow at the delicate equilibrium of British global strategy from which it never fully recovered'.[38] Britain might have faced down Mussolini in 1935-36 to its strategic advantage. Instead the prospect of sending a main fleet to Singapore receded as an emboldened Mussolini continued to dream of expanding his Mediterranean empire. The emergent 'triple threat'

(Germany, Italy and Japan) produced inertia and underpinned appeasement as the Chiefs of Staff's constant refrain was that the number of Britain's potential enemies must be reduced through diplomacy. By 1939 most of the Nazi leadership was convinced that Britain would not fight for Poland, that its guarantees policy was mere propaganda and expected, at worst, token sanctions and diplomatic protest as in 1935.

Over Abyssinia, the Führer's admiration for the Duce's defiance of the British grew from afar, drawing them into a close political relationship. As Geoffrey Waddington remarks:

Hitler's view of the value of British friendship was profoundly influenced by the latter's policy during the Abyssinian crisis. Far from witnessing a display of the formidable power which he associated with the British Empire and which he wished to share, the Führer looked on in amazement as Britain tried desperately to avert an Anglo-Italian breach with offers of compensation and compromise solutions. Such was the impression which Italy's military achievements appear to have made upon the Chancellor that Sir Eric Phipps [British Ambassador in Berlin] found him in May 1936 expatiating on the 'greatness and genius of Signor Mussolini'.[39]

By August 1939 Hitler, egged on by his Anglophobe foreign minister, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, had convinced himself that he need only threaten the vulnerable points of the British Empire through his Italian and Japanese allies to ensure that an invasion of Poland remained a localised conflict. 'Mussolini', he told his generals, 'has demonstrated his strength in [the] Abyssinian conflict'.[40] Up to a point Mussolini played ball by threatening Egypt through extraordinary reinforcements to Libya. But Britain and France's unusually stern reaction, combined with Italy's lack of preparedness for major conflict, soon persuaded him to cry foul with the famous list of requirements remitted to Berlin if Italy was to honour the terms of the Italo-German Pact of Steel (May 1939). Japan's pro-Axis government fell in the aftershock of the Nazi-Soviet Non Aggression Pact. Nonetheless Hitler persisted in his conviction that the western powers were weak willed and fight shy, a perception which dated from Abyssinia and received further confirmation at Munich ('My opponents are little worms'). When the British ultimatum arrived unexpectedly at the Chancellory an angry Hitler read it then famously glared at Ribbentrop whom he asked in an incredulous tone: 'What now?'[41]

NOTES

1 *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, Vol.313, 18 June 1936, cc.1197-1211. Just over three years later Greenwood again led the attack on the government when, amid cries of 'Speak for England', he castigated Chamberlain's statement for failing to honour immediately the guarantee to Poland by declaring war on Germany.

2 Amery diary, 31 December 1937, in J.Barnes and D.Nicholson eds. *The Empire at Bay. The Leo Amery Diaries 1929-1945* (London: Hutchinson, 1988).

3 Alan Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Penguin, 1961), pp.163, 125.

4 Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (London: Cassell, 1948), p.154.

5 Lord Avon, *Facing the Dictators* (London: Collins, 1962), p.99.

6 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, *The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart*, Volume 1 (London: Cassell, 1965), p.289.

7 Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, *A Sailor's Odyssey* (London: Hutchinson, 1951), p.173.

8 See Steven Morewood, 'Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal in British Defence Strategy, 1919-1941', *War & Society*, 10, 1992.

9 Rosarario Quartataro, 'Imperial Defence in the Mediterranean on the Eve of the Ethiopian Crisis (July-October 1935)', *Historical Journal*, 20/1, 1977, pp.219-20.

10 The successful attack by the Fleet Air Arm in November 1940 provided the inspiration for the Japanese attack on the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

11 See Steven Morewood, 'The Chiefs of Staff, the "Men on the Spot", and the Italo-Abyssinian Emergency, 1935-36', in Dick Richardson and Glyn Stone eds. *Decisions and Diplomacy – Essays in Twentieth Century International History* (London: Routledge, 1995), *idem.*, *The British Defence of Egypt 1935-June 1940* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), chapters III-IV.

12 Cunningham, *A Sailor's Odyssey*, p.174.

13 Robert Mallett, *Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933-1940* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp.8-9. Nevertheless there continues to be an outpouring of poorly researched Mussolini biographies which restate the old view. See, for example, Nicholas Farrell, *Mussolini. A New Life* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003).

14 MacGregor Knox, *Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), Brian Sullivan, 'A Thirst for Glory: Mussolini, the Italian Military and the Fascist Regime, 1922-1936 (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984), Robert Mallett, *The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansion, 1935-1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

15 The arms embargo also applied to Italy but since it had a defence industry the effect was minimal.

16 For further details see Morewood, *Defence of Egypt*, chapter II.

17 Mussolini Laval meeting, 5 January 1935, *I documenti diplomatici Italiani* (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, Libreria dello Stato, 1997), Series 7, Volume 16, document 391.

18 See Mallett, *Mussolini and the Origins*, pp.25-7, R.Davis, '*Mesentente Cordiale*: The Failure of the Anglo-French Alliance. Anglo-French Relations During the Ethiopian and Rhineland Crises, 1934-6', *European History Quarterly*, 23 (1993).

19 Fortunato Minniti, *Quaderni di Clio. Fino alla guerra. Strategi e conflitto nella politica di potenza di Mussolini 1923-1940* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2000), p.112, Anthony Mockler, *Haile Selassie's War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).p.112.

20 Kennedy Journal, 14 July 1935, Churchill Archives Centre LKEN 1/18.

21 Haut Comité Militaire note 125 EMGEAN, 30 September 1935, quoted in R.M.Salerno, 'The Mediterranean Triangle: Britain, France, Italy and the Origins of the Second World War, 1935-40', (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1998), p.80.

22 Peter Jackson, *France and the Nazi Menace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.114-15.

23 Cabinet, 2 October 1935, The National Archives CAB 23/82; Chamberlain comment in Leo Amery, *My Political Life Volume 3: The Unforgiving Years* (London: Hutchinson, 1955), pp.174 and 174.

24 Richard Davis, *Anglo-French Relations before World War II. Appeasement and Crisis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.75.

25 City Carlton Club luncheon speech, 26 September 1935, in Robert Rhodes James ed. *Winston S.Churchill. His Complete Speeches 1897-1963 Volume IV: 1935-1942* (London: Chelsea House, 1974).

26 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 8 December 1935, Birmingham University Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1941.

27 Drummond to Hoare, 27 August 1935, Cambridge University Library Templewood Papers, VIII: 3.

28 Churchill, *Gathering Storm*, p.153.

29 Committee of Imperial Defence Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War. Sub Committee on Economic Pressure, 'Economic Pressure on Italy' July 1935, Appendix VI, Manchester University Ramsay MacDonald Papers, RDM/3/3.

30 Mallett, *Mussolini and the Origins*, pp.79-80.

31 See Anthony Mayor ed. *Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938* (London: Methuen, 1952), and Malcolm Muggeridge ed. *Ciano's Diary, 1939-1943* (London: Heinemann, 1947).

32 Germany conceded the free hand in September 1937 and *Anschluss* followed in March 1938.

33 See Esmonde Robertson, 'Hitler's Planning for War and the Response of the Great Powers (1938-Early 1939)', in Hans Koch ed. *Aspects of the Third Reich* (London Macmillan, 1985), pp.196-234.

34 Avon, *Facing the Dictators*, p.311, British Library, Harvey diary, 24 June 1939.

35 Donald Cameron Watt, 'The Breakdown of the European Security System 1930-1939', in *Papers Presented to the XIVth International Congress of Historical Sciences, San Fransciso*, 22-29 April 1975 (San Fransciso: Comitæ Internationale des Sciences Historiques/American Historical Association, 1975) pp.1713-14.

36 Mallett, *Italian Navy*, appendix 2.

37 See Morewood, *Defence of Egypt* conclusion and Robert Mallett, 'The Italian Naval High Command and the Mediterranean Crisis, January – October 1935', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 22, 4 (1999).

38 David Omissi, 'The Mediterranean and the Middle East in British Global Strategy, 1935-39', in Michael Cohen and Martin Kolinsky eds. *Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s. Security Problems, 1935-39* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), p.6.

39 Geoffrey Waddington, '*Hassgegner*: German Views of Great Britain in the Later 1930s', *History*, 81, 261 (1996), pp.27-8.

40 Conference held by Führer (Obersalzberg), 22 August 1939, in C.Burdick and H-A. Jacobsen eds. *The Halder War Diary 1939-1942* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1989).

41 Ribbentrop responded – correctly – that a French ultimatum would follow.

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Reviews and Perspectives

"Attila and Tamerlaine"

The Dictators: Hitler's Germany Stalin's Russia   Richard Overy

In our supermarket society bargains beguile us. Books are commodities no different than detergents or canned soups. Check out the "3 for the price of 2" offers at Waterstone's. Buy Schama and get Starkey half price at W.H. Smith's.

With Richard Overy we are given a welcome variation. For £25 purchase a study in depth of not one but two regimes and their overlords, a remarkable attempt to get under the skin of the 20th century's most notorious dictators, to make evil acts comprehensible in historical terms, to measure the relative weights of control and consent.

Read the next two sentences, then close your eyes. *How do you visualise Hitler and Stalin? Give yourself thirty seconds before you recommence this review......* So how did you get on? Did you picture Stalin, chewing on his pipe, dressed in simple tunic and breeches tucked into knee-length boots? Was Hitler similarly modest in his attire of brown jacket, swastika armband and black trousers? Did both men wear only one adornment – Stalin his Hero of Soviet Labour badge and Hitler his Iron Cross? Power dressers they were not. Construction of their image was much more subtle: "The image of unsophisticated men-of-the-people was deliberate, almost certainly sincere, and entirely different from the pomp and ceremony of the pre-war emperors. This pose allowed both men to appear to be simultaneously accessible and distant to their public. On the one hand, people could identify with the leader-figure., on the other, both dictators cultivated the idea that they were, despite their political humility, forced to separate themselves from everyday life while they ran the nation's affairs." (p112).

Overy tells us that he had two aims in writing *The Dictators* – "to supply an empirical foundation on which to construct any discussion of what made the two systems either similar or different.... (and) to write a comparative 'operational' history of the two systems in order to answer the large historical question about how personal dictatorship actually worked." (pp xxxiii/xxxiv)

In a sense Overy's route was prepared for him over a decade earlier by the late Alan Bullock's *Parallel Lives..* But while Bullock's scholarship was rooted in the tradition of classical historical biography, Professor Overy deploys the historical methods and mines the archival resources that have developed and emerged in the last three decades. His work is thus a rejection of the "totalitarian" school and a celebration of the contextual approach.

Yet as readers we are never far away from the two monsters. It is part of Overy's triumph that through his comparative approach he provokes his reader to re-think, re-assess and re-evaluate. It is thus rewarding to compare Hitler and Stalin as thinkers and writers. There is a strong case for arguing that Hitler's mind was hermetically sealed as early as 1924, the year of *Mein Kampf*, to become in Hugh Trevor Roper's stunning encapsulation: "the expression of giant strength and savage genius, surrounded by a festering heap of refuse – old tins and dead vermin, ashes and eggshells and ordure – the intellectual detritus of centuries." Older than Hitler by a decade, Stalin proved much more intellectually nimble.

Sneered at by Trotsky as a philistine, Stalin in fact wrote with clarity, power and – on occasion – remarkable intellectual audacity. His *Problems of Leninism* (1926), succinctly illustrates this. On one level he succeeded in depicting himself as Lenin's natural heir, as the keeper of the flame. On another he quite simply stood Marxism on its head and created the intellectual rationale for what was to be his "revolution from above", commanding the economy, dictating cultural revolutions and with himself as the embodiment of the will of the people.

Witness this key passage: "The bourgeois revolution usually begins when there already exist more or less ready-made forms belonging to the capitalist order, forms which have grown and matured within the womb of feudal society prior to the open revolution, whereas the proletarian revolution begins when ready-made forms belonging to the socialist order are either absent, or almost absent. The bourgeois revolution is usually consummated with the seizure of power, whereas in the proletarian revolution the seizure of power is only the beginning, and power is used as a lever for transforming the old economy and organising the new one." (JV Stalin *Works*, Volume 9, p 22, Moscow n/d).

Stalin thus generalised the Soviet experience of having to "create" new social relations after the seizure of power into a law of development for all socialist revolutions. While both the Fuhrer and the General Secretary had utopian visions, Hitler's promised land was clearly marked "For Aryans only." By contrast Stalin preached the classical Marxist message of progress towards the liberating socialist revolution. Across the globe millions – workers, peasants and intellectuals – became either card-carrying Communists or fellow travellers of the Soviet system.

The ideologies underpinning the two dictatorships were as distinct as the militant Protestant evangelicals and the reinvigorated Church of the Counter-Reformation four centuries before. Thus Spain became a battleground for the rival creeds. Yet only a few months after Franco's victory, "The Scum of the Earth" and "The Bloody Assassin of the Workers" greeted each other with exaggerated deference over Poland's corpse. For fellow-travellers of Stalinism such as David Low, the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact was a lacerating wound. It was to be proof of the gradualness of inevitability, both dictators were prepared to bide their time. Armageddon was off..., but for how long? It was, too, a reminder of the amorality of the two dictatorships and their contemptuous rejection of what they saw as superannuated bourgeois values, moral and legal.

Overy leaves readers in no doubt that both Hitler and Stalin saw total war between the two states as historically unavoidable: "The language and metaphors of violence and belligerency were eventually mobilized for a conflict of exceptional scale and savagery between the two states... Rearmament and the militarization of politics underscored the fact that violence was central to both systems." (p482).

The Dictators is Overy's Everest but it has been an ascent many years in the making. It is as an economic historian of the Third Reich that Overy secured his reputation. Thus the chapter "Commanding the Economy" is masterly. An earlier reviewer has written: "The difference between Nazism and Soviet Communism is usually thought to be that the latter was hostile to capitalism while the former was parasitic on it. But Overy insists the two economic systems converged, largely because of political imperatives... the powerful driving engine was not the market but the target policies of the regimes" (Frank McLynn, *The Herald* 3 July 2004).

From peculiar, discrete features both dictatorships created command economies: "In the 1930s the two dictatorships chose guns *before* butter." (p426) Why did the Soviet Union embark on "The War in the Countryside" and the conjoined campaign of rapid industrialization? Why, in 1936, at a time when full employment had practically been achieved did the Nazis accelerate armaments production at the expense of consumer goods? Overy is unequivocal in his analysis and interpretation: Both regimes were driven by stark political necessity.

Once again Stalin displayed nimble fingering on the keyboard of Marxist dialectics. In 1927 the Soviet Union remained isolated in a capitalist world, The Communist Party, the revolutionary party of the proletariat, had seized power across the vast, backward and predominantly agricultural country where the industrial working class was in the minority. Whither the 1917 Revolution? Did it require to travel down Trotsky's road of "Permanent Revolution" or would Russia ride into socialism on the back of Bukharin's peasant nag? In fact Stalin, by now the Party's key figure, charted a different route, "Socialism in One Country."

Stalin projected a process of primitive accumulation, levying tribute on the kulak class. He would be a 20th Century Tamerlaine: "The construction of an industrial economy from above through the agency of a socialist planning apparatus replaced the missing bourgeois stage of a Russian economic revolution altogether: under Stalin, socialists rather than capitalists would build the modern economy." (p400)

In 1936 rather than join in with peaceful world trade (as appeasers such as Chamberlain hoped might happen) and develop economic policies to raise the standard of living, Hitler and the Nazi elite embarked on armament and war preparations policy. It is not in the nature of a "totalitarian" dictatorship to announce "Mission completed" and voluntarily retire. As the Hungarian Marxist Mihaly Vajda has argued: "It was in the Nazis' vital interests to keep the tension up artificially, and create a situation of no return. For them the loss of political power would have meant their complete disappearance." (Mihaly Vajda *Fascism as a Mass Movement*, UK edn, 1976, p117). As in Stalin's Russia so it was in Nazi Germany. What Overy's old adversary, the late Tim Mason, labelled "the primacy of politics" was clearly present in both dictatorships.

Yet perhaps the most compelling of Overy's chapters is "The Empire of the Camps". Here the homologies between Stalinism and Nazism are most apparent: "The camps, despite their isolation and restrictions, their secrecy and exclusiveness, reflected wider processes at work in state and society. They were never simply a by-product of crass authoritarianism, but cruel mirrors in which dictatorship confronted its own hideously magnified and distorted image." (p595).

The same debasing reception routines operated in the camps of the Gulag and the SS. The prisoners followed similar Sisyphean schedules of labour. "Camps in both systems operated a 'double terror' on prisoners already victimized by the system. The German camp political department was linked to the Gestapo; its job was to monitor the camp population for any signs of political resistance, (while) the Gulag special departments, run by an NKVD plenipotentiary... employed prisoners as spies or "stuchki".. In 1940 there were 10 "stuchki" for every 1000 prisoners." (pp621/622).

In both systems the prisoners were made to govern themselves. The "predarki" and "prominenten" kept close watch on work rate, prisoner discipline and fitness for work. In both prison empires a special language appeared. Those wretches unfit for further work were in the Nazi camps the "Muselmänner", in the Gulag the "dokhodyaga" ("the concluded ones"). These were the damned no longer able to be economically exploited by their masters.

Overy emphasises the centrality of the camps to both dictatorships. They were neither accidental in their origin nor incidental in their development. Given the success of the operation to round up their political enemies the Nazis, he argues, could have housed their "hardcore" opponents in prisons from mid 1935. But the increasingly significant role of Himmler in the Nazi ruling elite ensured the continuance and growth of the camps. As for the Soviet system from 1936 onwards, there were always in excess of one million prisoners. From 1948 that figure topped two millions... at the time of the achievement of socialism.

So why? "The camps functioned as the logical outcome of ideologies rooted in the dichotomy between belonging and exclusion.. (they) were not just a product of circumstance and utility, nor simply an expression of pure terror. They were the direct consequence of the ideological driving-force of the two dictatorships, which rested, like most modern authoritarianism, on the allocation of blame and the redemptive destruction of the enemy." (p634)

And further, Overy reminds us that what he describes as "the calculus of risk" (p341) kept most German and Soviet citizens politically inert: in both societies political opponents were pulverised and atomized, especially in the Third Reich. Only a naïf would deny the significance of terror in sustaining the dictators. But just as significant as physical repression was the active complicity of so many Soviet and German citizens: "The dictatorships reduced allegiance to very simple formulae of belief in a better future, a more secure identity and the transformative effect of the new politics." (p649)

In both systems there was a deep-seated impulse to denounce one's neighbours. Witness the remarkable pioneering research of Merle Fainsod and W S Alien, historians of a generation before Overy. In the 1935 Purge in Smolensk, 4100 Party members were investigated and 455 were expelled for a staggering total of sixteen forms of activity. "In achieving this grand total the report noted that the Smolensk Party authorities had enjoyed the benefit of no less than 712 oral denunciations and 200 written declarations." (Merle Fainsod *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*, Vintage Books, USA, 1958 edn., p230). Meanwhile in the much smaller town and neighbourhood of Northeim, "The general feeling was that the Gestapo was everywhere.. though in point of fact there was probably only one for the

whole town.. and that was considerably later (than 1933)" (W S Allen *The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-1945*, first edn 1965; 1989 ed., p189). Allen shows how Northeimers were inundated by amateur "Gestapo" operatives.

Once again, why? For Fainsod force, terror and organization cannot by themselves explain Stalinism's triumph. "In a fundamental sense a Revolution only begins to consolidate itself when it calls forth new energy from below to defend its conquests... It (the Revolution of 1917) dethroned an established ruling class and set a profound social revolution in motion. It tapped fresh talent from the lower depths of society and harnessed it to the revolutionary chariot... It built its own network of revolutionary beneficiaries with vested interests in the perpetuation of the new order" (Fainsod, *op cit*, pp 451/452). Allen is more prosaic in his evaluation, in itself an indication of the comparative shallowness of any Nazi social revolution: "In return for outward conformity Northeim's Nazi leaders did not inflict much violence upon the townspeople in the mature Third Reich, but it is manifest that the Nazi leaders also knew that conformity depended on the unspoken threat of violence and was outward only. Acceptance of these rules made life temporarily tolerable in many aspects of daily experience" (Allen, *op cit*, pp 301/2)

For tens of millions Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia brought death, horror and deprivation. Human dignity was imperilled in both these relentlessly secular regimes. Theirs were cultures embedded in hostility to the development of the human personality. Overy recognises this and in this epic work his moral fervour never falters, his condemnation is absolute: "The bleak downward spiral from social exclusion, through hatred, to perpetual violence is difficult to reconcile with the Utopian aspirations of the two systems". (p645) It is too easy for us at the sometimes literally sharp end of education to be cynical about our politicians and "social inclusion" and "citizenship."

The Dictators is thus a remarkable achievement elevating Richard Overy into the very top rank of historians. Indeed with Overy joining Richard J Evans and Ian Kershaw we have a troika of scholars of the highest stature, nationally and internationally. It is Penguin's good fortune to be each man's publisher.

RON GRANT

The Iron Age in Northern Britain: Celts and Romans, Natives and Invaders
D W Harding

Routledge	£27.50	300pp	Pbk	2004	ISBN 0 415 30150 5

Advanced Higher Northern Britain: a study of Celtic society, the influences upon it and the eventual creation of the first 'unified' Scottish kingdom is a subject that arouses passion among its supporters, and, if the last Advanced Higher markers meeting was anything to go by, a certain degree of scepticism among other teachers. Yet, it is a subject of great importance and one that has seen a flowering of work in recent years. The interest in early Scottish history has seen considerable interest and the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh are to be congratulated for their work in this area. Nevertheless an accessible, general reader for this topic has been lacking. Most recent work has been divided into topics, such as 'Roman' Scotland or 'Viking' Scotland, or are parts of bigger works, such as Barbara Crawford and Owen Clancy's work in the *Penguin History of Scotland*. Indeed, most of us rely upon the still challenging work of Alfred Smyth in *Warlords and Holy Men* to give us one text to study this topic.

This is why I was particularly pleased to be given the above text to review. Professor Dennis Harding is Abercromby Professor of Archaeology at the University of Edinburgh. His archaeological knowledge of Northern Britain is based upon extensive fieldwork, from excavation to air photography, for over thirty years. In the preamble to the book it offers, 'a story of continuity through change over nearly two millennia. It examines the impact of the Roman expansion northwards and the native response to the Roman occupation on both sides of the frontiers. It traces the emergence of historically recorded communities in the post-Roman period and looks at the clash of cultures between Celts and

Romans, Britons, Angles, Picts and Scots.' I hoped to see the emergence and growth of Christianity within this. The only thing missing was the impact of the Vikings and the creation of the Scottish Kingdom. I was extremely encouraged by the preamble.

What I read was work that was clearly the work of a man at the peak of his profession. It was steeped in a deep knowledge of the Iron Age, and provided valuable insights into the changing interpretations of the physical past by archaeologists. What it does not do is provide a comprehensive synthesis of archaeology with history, place name evidence and numisology. Other disciplines are mentioned, even discussed, but the book clearly never intended to do this. It is the work of an archaeologist and should be commended as such.

Professor Harding sets out his work logically. The introduction provides the archaeological framework for the topic. He defines his chronological framework in very broad terms, quite correctly pointing out that the Roman invasion of Britain in AD 43 and its subsequent occupation of much of southern England should not cloud our views of the north. As he says, 'for much of the Atlantic north and west there is no historically defined break in the sequence of Iron Age settlement from the second half of the first millennium BC until the Norse settlements of the later first millennium AD.' However, he does recognise the need for dating between early and later Iron ages, in particular in southern Scotland where the Roman period stands as an interface between the two periods. The rest of the book is divided in such a way, between the early Iron Age, with a look at the Roman Iron Age and its Impact, followed by the later Iron Age, before the drawing of conclusions. The time scale is therefore flexible. The geographical context of Northern Britain inevitably brings in areas of modern Northern England. If there is a border it is somewhere along the line of the Trent, where coin using societies split from those that did not. However, the geographical differences within 'Scotland' give it regional variations mean that there were differing settlement patterns based upon physical environment and climate. Inevitably what is looked at in the book is archaeology in the form of artefacts, environmental evidence of human occupation and, importantly, sites of occupation. Only what survives can be interpreted, and Harding quite correctly points out that survival of artefacts, sites, etc need not necessarily tell us the whole story.

Much has not survived, so we are seeing a partial picture of what was. This is explored in the section on Taphonomy and retrieval. Taphonomy is the study of the nature of archaeological deposition and its interpretation. It is crucial to any meaningful interpretation of past societies. Harding points out that this is rarely the case. Each generation of archaeologists bring their own cultural norms and questions to the past. They read what they want into the evidence. What we find archeologically is not the sum of what those people had, or even left behind. We are constantly searching. We can identify sequences within sites of occupation. Changing structures give testament to change, though caution should be given as we must recognise that there may be period of no occupation between times of occupation. In other words, we are dealing with a complex period with partial sources of information, complicated further by questions of interpretation. Harding attacks the use of archaeology to support a historical agenda. He asks, why are symbol-stones known as Pictish symbol stones? Is there any contemporary document, which says that the Picts carved stones?

Harding's book therefore raises many questions and asks us to challenge many of the conventions, which underpin this subject. Inevitably, he emphasises the importance of archaeology. The Iron Age is divided into geographical areas. Brigantia and northern England, the Borders and southern Scotland, Central and Eastern Scotland, and the beloved Argyll and Atlantic Scotland. Each area is given similar treatment: A study of the structures within each area, from the large hill fort to the homestead, then a study of material culture. Where possible, a broad outline of archaeological thinking is given and a summation of current thought. For example, when looking at The Borders and southern Scotland he looks at the Hownam sequence of settlement, where Hownam saw a sequence of structural progression from palisaded enclosure to multiple defences, and recent interpretations from Ian Armit. There is not room to go into detail here, but deep understanding of the physical evidence, its limitations and what it can tell us pervades the book. Harding's mastery of the earlier Iron Age period is exceptional.

Then, in Part 3 of the book the Romans enter. A large degree of pre-knowledge is required here. If you do not know about Agricola, Hadrian, Antoninus Puis and Septimus Severus then you will be at

a disadvantage. This is why this book should not be used by pupils, without a good basis of knowledge in the subject. What is here is of considerable interest. There is an excellent section on the nature of Romanisation and a good historiographical survey. Harding takes his impact of Romanisation from the physical 'fact' that discovered villa and urban settlements are rare in the north, and are non-existent in the forward frontier zone. The notion that northern Britain did not have the social structures of society to sustain Romanisation is mentioned, though there is an interesting section, which points out that what may have been seen as a Roman villa in the Mediterranean may have a very different interpretation in provincial Britain. What is meant by Romanisation is assessed and the extent to which peoples in northern England and southern Scotland were Romanised is looked at. I was particularly interested in the text and map showing the distribution of Roman forts, towns and villas in northern England. I was always aware of the military presence but the distribution of towns and villas was illuminating. Where the 'Romans' were willing to put down roots and what was seen as the 'military' zone is fascinating.

The negative impact of Romanisation in the frontier areas is discussed with the very valid point of its inherent insecurity as seen through the construction of a Vallum along the northern frontier. This was unique among the frontiers of the Roman Empire, providing protection from threat to the south of the frontier as well as the more obvious wall to the north. Previous work, which presumes that souterrains were constructed as a result of the Roman presence to store grain, is challenged and Harding says that there is little evidence that the opening of new markets boosted the economy. Indeed much of this section really dwells on what can be termed as the Roman, 'interlude' as Lloyd and Jenny Laing have called it. The expansion of agricultural production can be seen before the Roman period. Souterrain construction may have been encouraged by the Roman presence, as Armit has argued, but Harding points out to their use in the later Iron Age, when the Romans had left. There were exceptions with regard to the Roman impact, such as the special status of Traprain Law and the possible 'client' status of the Votadini, but Roman goods were not uniformly available to the north of the Roman frontiers, even if finds are quite extensive. The ways in which Roman goods found their way into the hands of the northern tribes were no doubt variable and it is difficult to draw broad conclusions.

Section 4 looks at the later Iron Age, and again, takes a geographical perspective. To take one example: his first section on the Borders and southern Scotland really says it all when it points out the, 'whatever impact the relatively brief Roman occupation made upon native communities, it is unlikely to have changed radically the distribution of settlement.' Harding emphasises continuity, but does introduce change as well. When looking at the Borders and southern Scotland, he introduces a study of the kingdom of Rheged, citing the literary sources and relating it to the limited archaeological evidence. He explores the concept of the nuclear fort and citadels, such as Dunadd in Argyll, though recognises that they may have had their origins in earlier times. Likewise Crannogs are looked at, as is the development of long-distance trade and the evidence of post-Roman pottery and glass, showing that trade with the continent was intact and probably dominated by the local elites. He also introduces a section on early Christianity, albeit briefly, citing the evidence at Whithorn and long-cist cemeteries. The development of rectangular style buildings is studied, starting with the site of Yeavering in Northumberland. A high status Anglian site, though there is evidence of earlier British occupation. The role of archaeology in attesting to the Anglian expansion into southern Scotland is then looked at, based upon this appearance of large timber halls and Grubenhauser [sunken buildings], along with Christianity. Harding does recognise the evidence of the documentary sources, as well as place name evidence here. This section shows a command of other disciplines, apart from the archaeology and it is a shame it is not developed further, as this fusing of evidence gives a compelling overview of the Anglian influence in southern Scotland.

Similar treatment is given to the other geographical areas of Scotland. Central and eastern Scotland dwells on cemetery evidence, hill forts, nuclear forts and promontory forts, such as those in Moray, Banff and Buchan. This leads to a brief look at the famous bull carvings at Burghhead and the assumption it was a Pictish Royal centre. Then homesteads, and general settlement is studied. Again, there are areas of great interest, in particular a nice study of symbol-stones and symbol-ornamented artefacts, where Harding launches a blistering attack on those who make, 'simplistic and probably

false equations between archaeological evidence and historical tradition', citing the example of the Aberlemno cross-slab and its supposed depiction of the battle of Nechtansmere. Likewise a look at the term Picts and what it means is given a tantalising two pages of discussion, along with a through survey of interpretation.

Where Harding appears most comfortable is with Argyll and Atlantic Scotland. Harding points out that the transition from early to later Iron Age can be seen here with the decline of the monumental buildings, such as broch towers, their dismantling and the building or lesser proportioned buildings within, or around these. There is a huge discussion of the role of wheelhouses within this. Your knowledge of archaeology here needs to be very good. The language is very technical at points, when looking at individual sites and discussing their variety in terms of size, layout and geographical distribution. Post-broch settlement in the Western Isles in the creation of roundhouses is looked at in detail as is Argyll and the Inner Hebrides. A study of Dunadd is followed by a snap look at Iona and Celtic Christianity before a more detailed look at the building of roundhouses in Caithness. Sutherland and the Northern Isles.

Harding draws well-substantiated conclusions based upon: Settlement and enclosure, Houses and households, Domestic structures, Social structure, Death, Cultural change and Romanisation. Northern Britain was a complex place in this period. Influences ebbed and flowed, as did their impact in the short and long term. Harding's conclusion that, 'Even if there is no single Atlantic Iron Age, Northern Britain cannot be dismissed as peripheral to the mainstream of Central and Western Europe. Northern Britain and Atlantic Europe were in another mainstream altogether' is challenging and well made.

As you would expect the book has an impressive bibliography. It is lavishly illustrated with photographs and drawings. Professor Harding's proficiency as a pilot gives some stunning aerial shots of archaeological sites. This is a very important book that adds considerable intellectual weight to the study of the Iron Age in Northern Britain. However, is the book what I wanted as a teacher of the Northern British Advanced Higher? The answer is a cautious yes. There is enough here that adds to the debates of the Northern British topic. However, the book is difficult to read at times. The level of technical knowledge required with regard to archaeology would make this difficult, even for an able sixth year pupil. As I previously said, this is an incredibly important book, and I would urge those that teach this subject to buy it, but I would also say that you will have to direct pupils to those parts that reach into the course.

SIMON WOOD

Old Believers, Religious Dissent and Gender in Russia, 1760-1850   Irina Paert

Manchester University Press   256 pp.   £47.50   2003   ISBN 0 7190 6322 1

Old Believers, of whom there were many in 18th and 19th century Russia, were those followers of the Russian Orthodox faith who refused to accept the official Church reforms instituted in the 17th century. It is tempting to see this as a sort of Reformation in reverse with the 'Protestants' remaining true to the old beliefs, but it was not so much the core beliefs which were at issue as matters of religious ritual, Church administration and state authority, although there are other parallels such as the apparent appeal of religious dissent to merchants and entrepreneurs as well as to freed or escaped serfs. As the official Church became more and more closely identified with the Tsarist state, the Old Believers tended to reject the authority of the state as well as that of the official Church in much the same way as Jehovah's Witnesses more recently, and consequently, found themselves persecuted and discriminated against to varying degrees depending largely on the personal proclivities of the reigning Tsar. Their resistance to this treatment could sometimes take extreme forms such as mass suicide.

As is often the case with dissenting religious and political groups, they tended to be uncompromising in their determination to maintain what they saw as the true faith not only in relation

to the ruling authorities but also in relation to each other. Thus the Old Believers split into a number of communities which can be broadly categorised as either priestly or the more radical priestless. Again it is tempting to see parallels between the priestless Old Believers with their rejection of the priestly function as well as the religious authority of the state and other radical religious groups such as the Covenanters. But, while such comparisons can be helpful when one is trying to make sense of unfamiliar and quite complex developments in terms of one's existing knowledge, they can also be misleading.

As the title of the book clearly indicates. Irina Paert's main concern is to examine the relationship between Old Belief and gender issues in late 18th and early 19th century Russia. As well as being religious and political dissenters, Old Believer communities also tended to challenge or reject a number of contemporary social norms. This is especially true in the area of marriage and gender roles but, although less wedded to strict gender roles and allowing women more social and political freedom than the official church (hence their appeal to independently minded women) and including some all-female communities, Old Believer society still tended to be patriarchal.

In addition, the beliefs of the more radical priestless communities were dualist, seeing the spiritual world as the creation of god and the material world as the creation of the devil. Like the Cathars, therefore, they saw sex and childbirth as perpetuating the devil's realm and therefore undesirable. This meant that women tended to be treated on more equal terms, while still often being seen as the occasion of temptation and sin. As elsewhere, these unconventional views on sex and marriage led to the authorities accusing such communities of all sorts of sexual transgressions, partly as propaganda against them and partly because they were concerned about the possible effects on population growth and recruitment. Other Old Believer communities had a more positive, even idealised/romantic/modern view of marriage and so, in that respect at least, tended to incur less attention from the political authorities.

This is a very specialist area – "There is no other book like it in English" (dust cover) – so there is no way that the reviewer, with no prior knowledge of the subject and no comparators, can make a critical assessment of its historiographical value. In addition, since it only goes up to 1850, it is of no great value in terms of the Russian topics taught in Scottish schools from Standard Grade, through Intermediate and Higher to Advanced Higher which focus on the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Old Belief, like other religious phenomena, has undergone something of a revival since the collapse of Soviet communism, and it would be interesting to know what role it played and how it fared in the revolutionary period which many of us teach.

<div style="text-align: right">DUNCAN TOMS</div>

The United States, 1763-2001			J. Spiller, T. Clancey, S. Young and S. Mosley		
Routledge	£19.99	Pbk	330pp	2004	ISBN 0 415 29029 5

Designed to meet the needs of the AS and A2 examinations for the various English examination boards, this resource nonetheless offers something to teachers working furth of that land. It is important to note that this is not a history of the United States between 1763-2001. No book of only 330 pages could possibly do such a topic justice. But this is not the aim of this resource. It is designed for students to help prepare them for the rigours of examination.

The book covers several major themes, such as the struggle for the Constitution from 1763 till the redemption of the South in 1877, with the effective ending of the era of reconstruction. Inevitably, the Civil War and its aftermath feature large in the text. America in the 1920s, the years of Depression and the New Deal are also included. In these areas, the text is of interest to teachers offering the Large Scale state at Higher. The issue of civil rights is also dissected offering insight to teachers who offer Race Relations at Intermediate 2. The foreign policy of the USA is assessed in the period 1890-2001

although given that only about 17 pages of text are provided, the treatment is superficial. But this is to miss the point of the design of this book. The text is provided merely to give the context to allow candidates to see how such knowledge fits into the model answers to the essay questions provided. Despite its brevity, the text does cover all of the key themes within each chapter. This is enhanced by a timeline of events pertinent to the chapter which allows the candidate to take a long term perspective.

Exemplar essay titles and worked examples are provided showing how factual knowledge can be used in analysis and interpretation. Again these are less useful as they do not fit the type of questions set in the SQA exams.

Source analysis is developed by the inclusion of primary and secondary gobbets accompanied by worked examples. Again, the questions set do not reflect the demands of the SQA examinations, but the sources themselves may be new to teachers and therefore offering a variety in class exercises.

The final section of each chapter deals with the development of historical skills like discussion and presentation. Once again, this is of little relevance to the Scottish context.

However, one section to be commended is that dealing with essay writing skills. Often a topic of angst in Higher history classes, this section shows clearly the different types of question likely to be asked and, equally importantly, how to answer these different types of question. This ranges from the simple 'describe' to 'examine' and 'assess', 'to what extent' and 'how important'? These should ring bells with any candidate being prepared for History NQ courses this session. My own class this year have found this invaluable, particularly liking the idea of weighing the evidence on an imaginary scale before coming to a conclusion. The quality of their essays has improved and for this reason alone, the book is worth the investment!

The chapters are complemented by useful potted biographies and a glossary of key terms. There is little doubt that it is written for the upper end of the academic market. Only the most able could use it without any staff direction but the departmental library would benefit from its purchase. It would provide useful detail for extended essay research.

If your courses post-16 include any of the issues listed above, this text would prove to be an invaluable resource. Yes its thin detail could be criticised, but seen in the context of the other three aims of each chapter then this is acceptable. That sort of detail can be readily sourced elsewhere. Its strength lies with the structured approach to essay writing and with a little editing, the sources, too, would prove most valuable. In our efforts to 'drive up attainment' this is one string to fit that particular bow.

JIM McGONIGLE

A History of Ireland from earliest times to 1922   Edmund Curtis

Routledge   £12.99   Pbk   380pp   pub 1936 [2002 Edition]   ISBN 0 415 27949 6

Why Ireland in Scotland? The Histories of Ireland and Scotland are entwined like the Celtic patterns you might see on your auntie's best linen table cloth, on the crosses on Iona, and in the elastic syllables of those slightly lame 'yoof' presenters on BBC 2's token Gaelic programming. As a teacher of History in Scotland (which I'm betting includes the vast majority of readers of the SATH Review) you will be sweating over how you are going to fit an enticing Scottish and British option into your all new singing and dancing Twentieth Century Intermediate 2 course until the powers that be come to their senses and introduce Britain in the First World War as a self-standing unit. As an alternative to shoe-horning the Scottish Wars of Independence into your course on the dubious basis that Mel Gibson was a real twentieth century person, you should consider 'Time of Troubles: Ireland 1900-23'. Immediately you know that there's juicy controversy here. What on earth is a unit on Ireland doing in the British and Scottish section of a History syllabus? Insulting to Irish nationalists and a slap in the

face to the ever-growing numbers of professional letter page fillers puking with horror at the dearth of Scottish History factoids known by the young of Scotland? To both of these it is worth pointing out that Ireland in 1900-23 *was* a part of Britain (this being a rather important point of dispute at the time) and therefore *is* a part of any serious and notionally national history of the twentieth century. Nor is this any mere technicality. Since Fergus Mac Erc, Prince of Dalriada crossed the Irish Sea with his three brothers in 470 to found the Kingdom of Argyle, the Scots (Irish) and the Scots (Scots) have been criss-crossing the briny, criss-cross-pollinating our two cultures. Monks, clergy, Bruces, Stewarts, planters, economic migrants, do gooders, ne'erdowells, stirrers, writers, poets, musicians, teachers even: sharing ideas, politics, religion, grudges, language and culture for better or (as too often) for worse. The influence of the Irish in Scotland can be seen in the Fergus's, Maeve's, Rory's, Niall's and Siobhan's in many a Scottish classroom. This is their history and, potentially, a light on their future. Having shared the same bed with the same English elephant for centuries there may be much positively and negatively that 21st Century Scots can learn from the Irish experience of separation.

Having persuaded myself, colleagues and several score other junior fans of controversy, conflict and dispute of this case, I cheerfully threw a copy of Curtis's classic *History of Ireland* on top of a *Rough Guide to Dublin* and set off on our first school trip to the Emerald Isle (aka Erin aka Eire aka Hibernia aka the Republic aka the Free State etc etc – it's almost like the place is avoiding police detection) this half term. What you will want to know, having been enthused by what I've said to you already, is can I use Curtis when I come to teach the unmatched time of troubles unit? I was rather curious myself. This is hardly cutting edge stuff. Curtis, an English academic of Irish parentage, but employed by Trinity College Dublin as a medievalist from 1914, after a prolonged period as an academic in Ireland, first published his History in 1936. You might argue that this matters little if what you are after is a broad overview of Irish History to fill in the gaps that the puce letter writers of Limerick keep pointing out to us. Unfortunately, you would be wrong to argue this. A considerable amount of (oh goody!) controversial historiography has hit the fan in Ireland in the past thirty years and, to come straight to the point, if you really want to know about Ireland in the past half millennium, don't consider anything other than R.F Foster's magnificent *Modern Ireland*, or at a pinch, if you must have your history soft-soaped and popular, the creaky but very readable *Green Flag* series by Robert Kee.

Fortunately, this new printing of Curtis's book by Routledge is accompanied by a short, but enlightening introduction by Curtis's descendant as Head of Medieval History at Trinity College, Sean Duffy. Here, the key sentence is the last, *"Just as Edmund Curtis the historian has become an historical figure in his own right, so his History of Ireland is now both a study of History and an historical document"*. This was a historian who lived through the era of the Time of Troubles unit. The style and scholarship that permeates the book are very much of their time both in terms of the academic approach and assumptions of the time and, interestingly, in terms of the drama of the period of Irish History through which Curtis lived. It is not surprising that the chapters that appear to stand up best to the ravages of time are those that cover the high middle ages. However, it is in the areas where the scholarship appears more dated, the early and later sections, that the assumptions of the time come to the fore most clearly. Ireland was certainly not alone in the twentieth century in having many advocates of a near mystical sense of national destiny. What could sound more quaintly Whiggish than this: *"The Treaty of 1922 and the attainment of true self-government, with the willing assent of Great Britain, gives meaning and justification to the long-continued struggle which fills many of these pages"*

Of course this is also very elegantly expressed and the quality of writing throughout is certainly a great strength of this volume. Nevertheless, several clues to the assumptions and preconceptions underpinning Curtis's narrative make one question the very idea that national history *should* be the main item on the historian's agenda. How many national histories must begin with such over blown claims to global significance as this: *"The traditions of the Irish people are the oldest of any race in Europe north and west of the Alps and they themselves are the longest settled on their own soil"*. The mysticism in the early passages of the book call to mind nothing so much as mid-period Van Morrison (bliss for music fans, cringe-making for historians), while I could not banish images of the Olympic Games of the year of this History's publication while I read this uncritical description of Niall

of the Nine Hostages (4th Century King of Tara)– *"Niall was a splendid hero of the Gaelic blood, tall, fair-haired and blue-eyed, a great and noble-minded warrior, 'kind in hall and fierce in fray'"*

Even as the exposition becomes less gauche and acquires a depth of evidence and confidence, the story of national struggle and rediscovery that was the meat and drink of the Celtic Revival distorts the claim to be a true history of Ireland. The Black Death, which had an impact on the Irish hardly less than the seismic effects it had in England, wins only one brief mention, which itself cannot help referring to foreign incursions, as the pestilence was "a scourge to the colony not less than Bruce's invasion". The latter chapters of the book, perhaps understandably, become more neutral and blandly factual – no establishment scholar, belonging to a university that was still regarded as a suspected part of the recently overthrown Protestant Ascendancy, could afford to upset living heroes and patriots. The Bloody Civil War that killed many more than did the War of Independence (aka the Anglo-Irish War) is not even referred to. This is a pity, since these years are among the most gripping and vital in the whole of Ireland's History.

For all this, I couldn't help once again being drawn into the tragedy and missed opportunities that form the tempest of Irish History. At the same time the breezy nationalism of Curtis's scholarship managed to give me a flavour of the outlook and world view that helped to feed the fountains of rancour, anger and dispute in Ireland then and now. After all, as our entertaining guides to the allegedly rebellious streets of Dublin reminded us on our recent trip, you can't beat a really partial history to get you interested.

COLIN BAGNALL

Making History: An Introduction to the Practices of a Discipline   **Peter Lambert and Philip Schofield [Eds]**
(In association with the Open University)

Routledge   £16.99   310pp   Pbk   2004   ISBN 0 415 24255 X

Many of today's history teachers were brought up on E.H. Carr's, *What Is History?*. This slim but seminal book has shaped the perceptions of history as a discipline since it was published in 1961. Four reprints between 1965 and 1970 testify to its influence on our views of underlying principles such as objectivity, causation and the extent to which history can be classed as a science.

Lambert and Schofield's volume illustrates the considerable evolution in thinking about historical theory since the 1970s. It also says much about the pressures, some old others new, on academics in Higher Education. Devise a course, in this case historiography taught at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and then write the textbook. Better still if the book contains chapters by eleven members of staff since this will gain maximum benefit in the Research Assessment Exercise. Present policies towards Higher Education breed cynicism.

The central chapter in *What is History?* discussed how far historical methodology mirrored the scientific method, and a version of this debate runs through *Making History* since the authors take as their starting point Thomas Kuhn's explanation for changes in science. Kuhn argued that science is the creation of a "community of scholars" whose cohesive approach only breaks up when research produces unpredictable results to shatter the previous consensus. Rival theories subsequently compete to produce a new order of knowledge.

The contributors to *Making History* discuss the extent to which Kuhn's theory applies to historical methodology beginning with the professionalisation of history in nineteenth century Germany, the dominance of political history and the scientific method. Subsequent chapters trace the increasingly diverse nature of the subject as it branched out into new fields of enquiry such as economic history, which surfaced as a sub-discipline in the late nineteenth century. During the twentieth century other specialisms, notably gender and social history, developed alongside the influence of disciplines such

as anthropology, Marxism and sociology. The book concludes with a discussion of recent developments in film and heritage studies with Gareth Williams providing a thought provoking account of the relationship between popular culture and the historian to provide an interesting context for related units at Intermediate 2 and Higher.

This book is well written with helpful notes throughout. However, it produces a Calvinist feeling in the reader. On the one hand the book should be read as it is important to understand the evolution of historiography yet it is not as satisfactory a read as 'the real thing', history itself.

<div align="right">PETER HILLIS</div>

Religion In History: Conflict, Conversion and Coexistence   John Wolffe (Ed)

Manchester University Press   £9.99   Pbk   320pp   2004   ISBN 0 7190 7107 0

We live in times where understanding; acceptance, tolerance, and indeed, 'toleration' of different cultures and beliefs are increasingly needed. The book is a collection of essays, which look at the historic interaction of different religions, and also takes into account the socio-political influences which the relationships between various religions and sub-groupings have had on society throughout history. Specific attention is given to the areas of Conflict, Conversion and Coexistence.

We can often be mistaken in thinking that being 'multi-faith' and 'multi-cultural' are relatively modern concepts. However, this book clearly points out that there have been tensions within societies concerning those same concepts from earliest times, from the worship of Roman/Greek Gods through to the rise and development of the major world religions of Hinduism, Judaism Christianity and Islam, to the religious, political and cultural tensions of the present day. Not only are the major world religions looked at; Paganism, Secularism and Secularity are also included as forces and influences on society.

Conflict looks at the tensions between differing (and sometimes seemingly incompatible) religious beliefs and convictions, whether they take the form of religious persecution by Roman emperors, or deeply seated convictions concerning maters of faith, doctrine and morals, or the way in which worship is conducted (as is seen in the Reformation and Post Reformation periods). There is also the matter of one particular religion asserting the righteousness of its own faith over another, the crusades for example, and just how far are these attitudes found in the World today?

George Bush likened the war on terrorism to the crusades. The subsequent suicide bombings by Muslim extremists, and the whole notion of Jihad or holy war, are said have echoes of the 'crusade mentality'. John Wolffe highlights the contentious issue of Catholic/Protestant sectarianism in our own society.

Conversion can take many forms. Sometimes this has come about by the coercive imposition of religious beliefs through the conversion of emperors as happened in Rome or Constantinople, which have obvious implications for that particular society as a whole. Sometimes it can mean the change from one denomination to another within Christianity, or from Christianity to another religion. At others it can be a life changing response to a profound personal religious experience.

Coexistence. In dealing with 'Coexistence', Wolffe makes the important distinction between *tolerance* and *toleration.* Toler*ance* can be an internal disposition where one decides to live in peace and harmony with others of a different religion and culture, 'live and let live' or ambivalently 'Turn a blind eye'. Toler*ation*, concerns state policy, where the government admits the existence of different beliefs, of faith communities living in the country they govern. While one religion or denomination may have dominance or enjoy rights privileges over others, they grant other faith communities freedom of worship, if not full civil rights. As can be seen in the history of our own country, ie. The Catholic Emancipation Act, (1829) and the current contentious Act of Settlement (1701)

It has to be said that, toler*ance* can exist in communities without necessarily having official toler*ation*, and vice versa. However, problems can arise when other religious groups are seen to be given more encouragement or preference at the expense or suppression of another. For example, the removal or suppression of 'Christian' symbols from buildings (or Hot Cross Buns) in the name of 'Political correctness', lest they 'cause offence to minority groups' (which often the said 'minority groups' can find quite patronising), I suppose it is all a question of finding a healthy creative tension and balance.

The book is very readable. The essays are well written and give balanced and unbiased views, which seek to explain the 'Why' behind the 'What' of the situations covered. Each chapter looks at its own topic and then applies it to the areas of ***Conflict, Conversion and Coexistence.***

Ostensibly, this publication forms part of the Open University course: *AA307 Religion in History: Conflict, Convergence and Coexistence.* However, I should think that it would be a useful resource for most university: Divinity/ Religious Studies and perhaps, Sociology degree courses. I would recommend it to anyone who is interested in the history of religion, and is seeking to understand the contemporary problems concerning the role of religion in today's society.

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