HISTORY TEACHING REVIEW

YEAR BOOK

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Editorial

ANDREW HUNT

It is a real pleasure, once again, to thank all contributors for their articles. Collectively they bring fresh and some times off-beat angles of enquiry – picking up and running with a more unusual or hitherto under-developed idea and seeing where it takes them. So, on the intellectual side of things I'm always glad to get my hands on the articles and see what exactly the authors have come up with in response to my original request back in July 2006. Then on the practical side of things, it is so very gratifying to have all these articles just arrive by e-mail promptly to deadlines [or even far earlier] after a couple of friendly letters, be forwarded straight on to the printers/ graphics people for them to set up the print etc, then they send me back the almost completed thing for so little worry or effort.

As usual the bulk of the articles fit into the Higher/Advanced Higher area of study and I know the value that so many teachers of Adv. Higher fields [2], [6], [8] and [10] will get from articles which pick actual parts of their syllabus and give them the latest slant.

I am also especially pleased in this tri-centennial anniversary year of the Treaty of Union to have an article on that celebrated event. In due recognition I would have gone for a front cover illustration associated with it but I couldn't find anything colourful enough to do justice to the article. A picture of the original Union parchment or a black and white litho of the signing didn't quite match the attraction of the chosen art work which will probably provide readers with further evidence that the editor of this magazine quite likes cover illustrations in a light shade of blue!

It is also pleasing to have articles about areas from far less well researched or developed areas of world history, like Dr Beth's on the Dalit. In the present state of debate on 'Whither Higher?' there still is time and room to weigh up which 'non-Western societies' should become options. Certainly China and India have put themselves back into the picture as possibles simply because they are likely to become so prominent in global affairs this century [world's largest population and world's largest democracy etc]. There is every reason for us to ask ourselves whether we couldn't understand these nations and peoples better if we knew a bit more about their history. In the light of suggestions for possible new languages curricula, pupils picking Hindi or Mandarin are quite likely to ask themselves why Mughal or Modern India or Ming China are not on the list of optional History topics.

My thanks also go to the reviewers. There is a steady band of regular reviewers to the pages of the Year Book who take the evaluation and dissection of their books to new levels. I think Ron Grant has actually got a full article in him somewhere, still to come, so wide-ranging and profound are his 'feature length' reviews. I am glad to acknowledge yet another masterly offering from him this year; the 8th year running that Ron, and also Jim McGonigle, have made such valuable contributions to the Reviews section.

The cover illustration this year was selected to go with the article on Mussolini. The illustrator was Achille Beltrame who built up a reputation in the first 45 years of the 20th century for colourful, slightly stagey and stylised, almost comic-book layouts of famous events across world history. A glance at some websites which sell prints of his work will show how wide ranging his coverage was: he was as adept at showing suffragettes first voting or Ghandi's resistance to British rule as he was with scenes from his own land and society in the 1930s. Slightly two-dimensional then, but colourful all the same!

England and Scotland at War in the Early Fourteenth Century

PROFESSOR MICHAEL PRESTWICH

When war broke out in 1296 it would have seemed inconceivable that the English could have anything to learn from the Scots. There had been no significant fighting in Scotland since 1235. In contrast, many of the English had campaigned for Edward I in Wales, in successive expeditions, and there was a long tradition of military activity. It is hardly surprising that the Scots were rapidly routed at Dunbar by the English cavalry in 1296, and that they offered little further resistance in that year. How could a people unschooled in warfare resist the might of the English war machine? Yet it has long been argued that the Scots, with their victories at Stirling Bridge in 1297 and, above all, at Bannockburn in 1314, taught the English important lessons, which transformed the nature of English warfare. The result was that the large, incoherent armies of Edward I's day were converted into the well-honed and effective killing machines of the Hundred Years War.[1]

There are various elements to the argument. One relates to battle tactics, and specifically to the way in which the English learned to dismount their heavy cavalry, the knights and men-at-arms. Under Edward I, these men fought as cavalry, mounted; but when the English lined up to fight the Scots in 1327, they were dismounted. The Scots won their victories at Stirling Bridge in 1297 and at Bannockburn in 1314 with footsoldiers; it was logical for the English to copy them, and as logical to see this as the origins of the tactics that were to be so successful in the Hundred Years War. When the English commander Andrew Harclay drew up his men at Boroughbridge on foot in 1322, this was described by the Lanercost chronicler as being 'in the Scottish manner', with knights and pikemen arranged in schiltroms, the infantry formations used by the Scots.[2] Secondly, the Scottish invasions of the north England, with swift mounted raids characterized by the burning of crops and villages, and the driving off of cattle, were seen as models to be copied by the English with their own savage *chevauchées,* or mounted raids, in France. This was economic warfare conducted by Bruce and Douglas, reducing the capability of the English government to raise taxes in the north to a minimal level, and providing the Scots with the resources with which to fight. Again, it was the Scots who taught the English how to fight.[3] The third element is the guerrilla warfare employed by the Scots, and in particular the way in which they captured English-held castles one after another, by a series of surprise attacks, so transforming the nature of castle warfare.[4]

One of the difficulties with this argument is that surprisingly little is known about the way in which the Scots fought, or about the composition of their armies. There are no pay rolls for Scottish armies, no muster records, no contracts or indentures such as survive to enable historians to analyse English forces in considerable detail. The English sources, however, are reasonably clear as to how the Scots fought in battle. At Falkirk in 1298 William Wallace drew up his men in circular formations, with spearmen linked together, their weapons facing outwards. Archers were in the gaps between the four circles, or schiltroms, and a cavalry force was held in the rear.[5] It does not seem that these tactics were traditional; this was surely a highly intelligent soldier's solution to the problem that the well-equipped English cavalry posed. At Bannockburn, according to the Life of Edward II, the *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, all the Scots were dismounted, 'and not one of them was on horseback, but each was furnished with light armour, not easily penetrable by a sword. They had axes at their sides and carried lances in their hands. They advanced like a thick-set hedge, and such a phalanx could not easily be broken'[6] In contrast to Falkirk, however, the Scottish schiltroms were not static at Bannockburn, nor is it clear that the formations were circular.

A much fuller account of Scottish warfare than the English sources provide is of course to be found in John Barbour's life of Robert Bruce.[7] The difficulty with this is that Barbour was writing in the 1370s, long after the events he described. There has to be a suspicion that he viewed them with a distorted, romantically tinted lens. He was making use of earlier sources, but it is not possible to tell how far he elaborated them, as none survive. For many engagements, such as Loudoun Hill in

1307, there is unfortunately no other source. Barbour's depiction of the tactics employed by the Scots in warfare is complex; it was certainly not just a matter of the Scots huddled together in schiltroms, dealing with English cavalry with their pikes. At Loudoun Hill Bruce prepared the ground with great care, so as to minimize the Scots numerical disadvantage. Three ditches were cut at right angles to the road, with gaps to force the English through. The English horses were impaled upon Scottish spears, and the English commander Aymer de Valence was forced to flee with his men. The implication that the Scots were all fighting on foot is clear, but not explicit.[8] Barbour's account of Bannockburn shows the infantry playing a major role, with the Scots tight formations once again highly successful against English cavalry. It should be noted that Barbour also gives an important role to Sir Robert Keith and a cavalry force, which disrupted the English archers, preventing them from loosing their volleys. At Bannockburn, unlike Falkirk, the Scots did not simply wait for English to attack; they were prepared to take the initiative themselves.[9] At Myton in 1318 the Scots and English advanced upon each other, the Scots in two divisions one behind the other. When they were almost at close quarters, the English simply turned tail and fled.[10]

Barbour undoubtedly made mistakes: the death of Robert Neville is placed too early.[11] He had Douglas triumph over, and kill, the earl of Richmond, rather than Sir Thomas Richmond, and then found that he has to call John of Brittany, earl of Richmond, simply John of Brittany when it came to the skirmish at Byland in 1322.[12] The earl of Lancaster was, according to Barbour, first beheaded, then hanged and drawn, which is not physically possible.[13] Such factual errors are, however, understandable, and are not so serious as to discredit the whole work.

All too often there is no alternative account against which to compare Barbour. If, however, he proves reasonably reliable when the narrative can be checked from other sources, the problem is greatly lessened. The English sources for Myton provide slightly different accounts from Barbour, but the contrasts are not too worrying. According to the *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, the Scots used a smokescreen, setting fire to hay that had been gathered, making it impossible for the English to attack. The Lanercost chronicle has the Scots in one single division, not two. They drove the English off by the simple expedient of shouting at them. They then divided their forces, mounted, and killed large numbers in the rout that followed.[14]

Barbour's account of Bannockburn is the classic narrative of the battle. He is surely totally misleading on the way in which the English forces were organised, for he claimed that Edward II divided his men into ten divisions.[15] This, as the book's latest editor rightly points out, is fanciful. There is nothing to suggest that any English army of this period consisted of more than four divisions. Ten sounded impressive; the exaggeration is perhaps pardonable, and on a par with the seven divisions Barbour claimed for the English army of 1327. There is doubt too about Barbour's Scottish divisions – were there four in all, or was he muddled and there were only three, as the English sources suggest? There are differences in some of the details of the battle between Barbour's account and some English sources. Barbour placed the death of the chivalric hero Giles of Argentein at the end of the battle. Giles tacitly rebuked Edward II for fleeing, turned his horse, and charged single-handedly into the Scottish force led by Edward Bruce. The English knight Thomas Gray, recording his father's memories, provided a similar account. In contrast, the *Vita Edwardi Secundi* had Giles die at an earlier point, trying to assist the earl of Gloucester.[16] Which is correct is impossible to tell, but certainly Barbour represents one solid tradition. It is strange that Barbour nowhere describes the death of the earl of Gloucester, the most high-ranking of all the Englishmen slain in the battle, though he lists him among the English dead.

Barbour's full accounts of warfare in Scotland contrast with his treatment of Edward Bruce's Irish campaign, which lasted from 1316 to 1318. There is much less detail provided about the military tactics adopted in Ireland. It is clear that in one battle in Ireland the Scots all fought on foot, while their opponents under Richard de Clare were mounted.[17] There is little detail given about the battle of Faughart, in which Edward Bruce was killed, and where the Scots appear to have been outnumbered. According to Barbour, Gib Harpour, probably a minstrel or herald, wore Edward's armour and bore his coat of arms in the fight – why is not explained. The point of the story was to show that Edward Bruce's corpse was not despoiled; it was Harpour's head that was cut from his corpse, salted, put

in a box, and sent off to England. This is not much better than an Irish account, which has Edward Bruce deceived by one of his enemies who dressed as a juggler, distracted him with his entertainment, and killed him with an iron ball swung on a chain. Barbour was surely being inventive, but not with details of the tactics adopted by the Scots. This suggests that where he does provide an account of fighting methods, he was not being purely imaginative.[18]

Barbour was keen to show something of the horrors of war; the pages of his account are liberally scattered with blood and brains. He was also anxious to display his heroes in a chivalric mould. For that, it was necessary to show them fighting in true chivalric manner, on horseback. The famous tale of Robert Bruce's encounter with Henry de Bohun at Bannockburn fitted Barbour's ideals well, for not only was Bruce mounted, but he also cleaved his opponent's head with a mighty blow.[19] In one battle in Galloway Edward Bruce rode out with fifty horse, leaving his footsoldiers in safety. There was a heavy mist; when it lifted, Bruce found himself a short distance from his enemy. The Scots charged right through the English force, turned, and charged again. As his opponents' force disintegrated, Bruce charged them a third time (344-52).[20] This was surely more skirmish than battle, but it shows the Scots fighting on horseback. In Weardale in 1327, again according to Barbour, Douglas had a large force of horse concealed, ready to charge at the right moment. William Erskine, freshly knighted, galloped forward so far that he found himself surrounded by English troops, who took him prisoner.[21]

Do these descriptions of the battle tactics used by the Scots suggest that the English learned from them? Of course experience was gained, but the extent to which the English emulated Scottish methods should not be exaggerated. There is only one reference to the English using the schiltrom, when Andrew Harclay, long schooled in the Scottish war, adopted this formation at Boroughbridge in 1322.[22] The major change to English tactics came in 1327, when a writ ordering those summoned to serve, even magnates, asked that they be ready to fight on foot, and to come with horses suitable to pursue the Scots, rather than their great warhorses.[23] This suggests that the English battle-plan, which proved so successful at Dupplin Moor in 1332, at Halidon Hill in the following year, and then in the battles of the Hundred Years War, was first instituted in 1327. The intention was to fight in a defensive position, men-at-arms dismounted, with archers on the flanks in support. The role of the archers to soften up the advancing enemy was vital; in particular, as at Crécy in 1346, the arrows had the effect of maddening the advancing horses, causing them to rear and panic. The line of dismounted men-at-arms would then fight with swords and other weapons, with successive attacks on them breaking like waves on a beach. This was far from the Scottish 'schiltrom' tactic.

There is no way of telling who was responsible for the tactical revolution of dismounting the English cavalry. It is possible that the new English tactics owed something to developments on the continent. The battle of Courtrai in 1302 provides an obvious parallel, for it saw the Flemish nobility requested to fight on foot, alongside the ordinary folk.[24] There were other battles that showed the sense of adopting such methods. At Arques in 1303 and even at Mons-en-Pévèle in 1304 infantry had the upper hand over the cavalry. Kephissos in Greece in 1311 was a victory for the dismounted Catalan company.[25] There was a pattern in the early fourteenth century of infantry successes against cavalry, and knowledge of what had taken place, particularly in Flanders, may have been influential in persuading the English that, contrary to the customs of their forefathers, as the chronicler Geoffrey le Baker put it, they should dismount to fight.[26] It is possible that the English took the advice of someone who had come to England in the company of the count of Hainault, who had provided forces for Queen Isabella's invasion in 1326, though the count himself was not present at the English court at the time that the decision was made that the cavalry should come on campaign prepared to fight on foot.

Quite as important as the fighting tactics employed by the Scots were the methods they used to avoid fighting. Battle was a huge risk; just as effective was the technique of withdrawing, and wasting the land through which the English advanced. This was done to brilliant effect in 1322, when Edward II's army was forced to retreat ignominiously without striking a blow. This was as good as a victory on the battlefield, but it was not a technique that the English were themselves able to adopt in subsequent wars.

The techniques used by the Scots to raid the north of England were devastating in their effects. For Clifford Rogers, it is clear that the English learned from this: 'Much as the swift, devastating raids of the Scots had left the north of England in smouldering ruins and compelled the young Edward III to accept the Bruce's sovereignty over Scotland, so the *chevauchées* of the English reduced much of France to smoke and cinders.'[27] Rogers has argued that the purpose of the *chevauchée* was to compel the French to give battle, and that the raid of 1346 which culminated in the triumph at Crécy marks the perfect example of this.[28] The alternative, more traditional, view was that the *chevauchée* was intended to put intense economic pressure on enemies, compelling them to come to terms without the risks involved in battle. There is little doubt that the strategy of Scottish raiding fits the latter argument; the Scots were not seeking battle, but aimed to take booty and destroy English settlements.[29] The only raid which resulted in battle was that of 1319, when the Scots defeated a motley army of clerics and others at Myton, and even here it does not seem likely that the Scots deliberately sought out the English. These raids did not interest Barbour, for as he noted of the 1314 raid, 'no proven chivalry was done there worth speaking about.'[30] There is, however, a remarkable description by the Hainaulter, Jean le Bel, of the raiding army of 1327, with the Scots mounted on little ponies, carrying the minimum of food supplies, boiling the meat from captured cattle in their own skins.[31] These were hardly the techniques of the English *chevauchées* of the Hundred Years War, led by men such as the Black Prince and Henry of Lancaster. The extent to which the Scottish raids inspired the English under Edward III should not, therefore, be exaggerated. The mounted raid was not something that the English needed to learn about. Edward I's remarkable foray from Conwy into the Lleyn peninsula in January 1295 provides one example from before the Scottish wars, while in those wars the English had employed mounted raids from an early stage. In the winter of 1303-4, for example, John Segrave, Robert Clifford and William Latimer led a mounted raid through Lothian.[32]

Much of the guerilla warfare conducted by the Scots went unrecorded. The *Vita Edwardi Secundi* told of an ambush by Bruce and his men, who had been hiding in caves in woodland, and slaughtered three hundred English and Welsh infantry, but there must have been many other such engagements.[33] It is of the capture of English-held castles that the tales were told; this was one of the most astonishing elements in Scottish success. One after another the castles fell to a series of ruses and surprise attacks. These were an immense contrast to the solemn large-scale sieges that the English had conducted, of which the siege of Stirling in 1304 was the prime example. The tale of William Bunnock and his cart, which he used to block the gate to Linlithgow while the men hidden under his load jumped out, is one example of the stories told by Barbour. Douglas and his men when attacking Roxburgh apparently disguised themselves as cattle by going on hands and feet, and in this way approached the walls close enough to raise their ingenious rope ladders. William Francis' climb up the rock to enter Edinburgh secretly is another good story; he used a route familiar from youthful escapades when he climbed out of the castle to visit his girlfriend in the town.[34] The stories are, indeed, worryingly too good to be wholly plausible. But there is no doubt that surprise attack was the order of the day, and so was the slighting of castles once captured, so that the English could not make further use of them. These were tactics borne of necessity. At Carlisle in 1315 the Scots attempted a proper siege, which totally failed as their machines, particularly a great movable wooden tower, became bogged down in the mud; it was a year of dreadful rains.[35] Despite this failure, overall the Scottish successes against English fortifications were truly remarkable, and demonstrated the futility of English attempts to hold Scotland through castle garrisons. And, of course, the castle warfare provided Barbour with good stories. His chivalric enthusiasm was roused by the sad account of the unidentified Sir John Webton at Douglas Castle, after whose death a letter was found from his lady, asking him to keep the castle for a year in return for her love.[36]

With the solitary exception of Andrew Harclay's use of the schiltrom at Boroughbridge, there is no indication that the English attempted to copy Scottish methods. One innovation came from Ireland, for a new type of soldier to appear in the English ranks was the hobelar, a lightly armed cavalrymen well suited to the task of pursuit in rough country; such men appeared first in the forces that men such as the earl of Ulster recruited under Edward I. More important, by the 1330s, was the introduction of the mounted archers. These men travelled on horseback, but fought on foot; they provided armies with much-needed mobility.[37] Less effective were experiments in the course of Edward II's reign to

recruit better armed infantry troops; the move was logical, but such men could not march at speed, and were ineffective against an elusive foe. What the English did not do was imitate the Scottish infantry, with their pikes and axes.

Plainly, the English must have gained much valuable experience from the Scottish wars, experience which men such as Sir Thomas Ughtred would put to good use in the fighting in France.[38] The lessons that were learned did not, however, persuade the English that they should simply adopt Scottish methods of fighting. The experience of Bannockburn above all persuaded the English that the old methods were inadequate, but what they developed was far from an imitation of Scottish techniques. When it came to the battles of Edward III's reign, Dupplin Moor in 1332 and Halidon Hill in 1333, it was the new English ways of drawing the knights and men-at-arms up in line, ready to fight on foot, with archers in support, that triumphed. The *chevauchées* of the Hundred Years War were different in methods and intention from the Scottish raids into northern England, while the Scottish successes in capturing the castles held by the English could hardly be copied. The Scottish achievement under Wallace and Bruce had been astonishing, but its influence on English warfare should not be exaggerated.

NOTES

1   See for one statement of this M.C. Prestwich, *The Three Edwards: War and State in England, 1272-1377* (2nd ed., London, 2003), pp. 56, 60-1. For recent discussion of the warfare of this period, see Fiona Watson, *Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland 1286-1306* (East Linton 1998), and C. McNamee, *The Wars of the Bruces; Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-1328* (East Linton, 1997).

2   *Chronicon de Lanercost*, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1839), pp. 243-4. See T.F. Tout, 'The Tactics of the Battles of Boroughbridge and Morlaix', in his *Collected Papers* (Manchester, 1934), ii. pp. 221-3.

3   Prestwich, *The Three Edwards*, p.61; C.J. Rogers, *War, Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III* (Woodbridge, 2000), p. 6.

4   M.C. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: the English Experience* (London, 1996), p. 298.

5   *The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough*, ed. H. Rothwell (Camden Series 89, 1957), p. 328.

6   *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, ed. W. Childs (Oxford, 2005), p. 91.

7   The most recent and best edition is John Barbour, *The Bruce*, ed. A.A.M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1997).

8   Ibid., pp. 296-308.

9   Ibid., pp. 408-99.

10   Ibid., pp. 644-6.

11   Ibid., p. 570.

12   Ibid., pp. 596-604, 690.

13   Ibid., p. 660.

14   *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, p. 164-7; *Chronicon de Lanercost*, p. 239.

15   John Barbour, *The Bruce*, p. 412.

16   Ibid., p. 494-6; *Scalacronica*, ed. A. King (Surtees Society, 2006), pp. 76-7; *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, pp. 90-3.

17   John Barbour, *The Bruce*, p. 534.

18   Ibid., pp. 670-4; S. Duffy (ed.), *Robert the Bruce's Irish Wars: The Invasions of Ireland 1306-1329* (Stroud, 2002), p. 117.

19   John Barbour, *The Bruce*, p. 450.

20   Ibid., pp. 348-52.

21   Ibid., pp. 716-8.

22   *Chronicon de Lanercost*, pp. 243-4.

23 Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, p. 318.

24 Interestingly, Sir Thomas Gray in the *Scalacronica*, pp. 74-5, suggested that the Scots were copying Flemish tactics at Bannockburn.

25 For accounts of these battles, see K. DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 1996), pp. 9-48, 58-65.

26 *Chronicon Galfridi le Baker de Swynebroke*, ed. E.M. Thompson (Oxford, 1889), p.51.

27 Rogers, *War; Cruel and Sharp*, p. 6.

28 See C.J. Rogers, 'Edward III and the Dialectics of Strategy', in his *The Wars of Eward III* (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 265-83.

29 C.McNamee, *Wars of the Bruces*, pp. 72-115, provides the fullest account of the Scottish raids.

30 Barbour, *The Bruce*, p. 518.

31 Conveniently translated by Rogers, *The Wars of Edward III*, pp 7-8.

32 M.C. Prestwich, *Edward I* (London, 1988), pp. 221, 499-500.

33 *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, p. 22-5.

34 Barbour, *The Bruce*, pp. 368-72, 380, 388-90.

35 *Chronicon de Lanercost*, pp. 213-5.

36 John Barbour, *The Bruce*, p. 316.

37 Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, pp. 52, 134-5.

38 For Ughtred's career, see A. Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution', in J.S. Bothwell (ed.), *The Age of Edward III* (Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 107-32.

The Union of 1707 after 300 Years: the debate goes on

PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER A WHATLEY

The Scots were unusually popular in London in 1707; England's default position as regards her northern neighbour was to sneer, denigrate and bully. Before a packed audience in St Paul's cathedral on 1 May 1707, however, William Talbot, bishop of Oxford preached a weighty sermon on the advantages of unity between peoples. The occasion was the inauguration of the Act of Union that now bound together the nations of England and Scotland in the United Kingdom of Great Britain. For most of those there, not least Queen Anne, to whom Talbot's remarks were principally addressed, the Act had come as a blessed relief. The same was true of the pressing crowd outside.

Despite being bound together by the Union of the Crowns, during the years preceding 1707, relations between the two nations had deteriorated to the extent that armed conflict looked likely. Scottish merchant ships were being taken by English naval vessels – even in the Firth of Forth. Especially outraged were the directors of the Company of Scotland (sponsor of the failed Darien venture), whose merchantman the *Annandale*, heading from London to the Clyde, had been boarded by English customs officers, and seized. The Scots, rightly resentful at being hindered in their attempts to open up direct trade links in the Far East (the *Annandale*'s intended destination), had retaliated by capturing the small, leak-prone English East India Company-licensed *Worcester*, which was lying at anchor off the Fife port of Burntisland. While satisfying the vengeful Edinburgh crowd's Anglophobic bloodlust, the hanging on Leith sands of her captain and a couple of crewmen in April 1705 had brought responsible politicians on both sides back from the brink. Soon afterwards, Queen Anne set in motion the process that would lead to union – the best means she believed, of healing the breach between the two nations, provided that the Scots were granted admission to what would become the British empire.[1]

The Union also settled (or was intended to settle) the underlying cause of Anglo-Scottish tensions: the unwillingness of the Scots to go along with the English Act of Settlement of 1701, which had decreed that Anne's successor should be the Protestant Electress of Hanover, Princess Sophia. It was English exasperation over the Scottish Parliament's failure to resolve this issue that lay behind the so-called 'Aliens Act', which, if implemented, would have crippled Scotland's already weak economy. The Scottish Parliament since the general election of 1703 had been digging its heels in over the succession however and, unwilling to bend in the face of the overbearing English, MP's demanded concessions and insisted on 'limitations' on the monarch's powers.

There were Scots in 1707 however, who shared in England's joy. A few – led by the duke of Queensberry, the Queen's commissioner in Scotland - were in London at the beginning of May, basking in the public's adulation. Queensberry would have been one of the Scots bishop Talbot had in mind when he eulogised Scotland's 'ancient' nobility, which had 'generously Sacrificed some Private Advantages [seats in Parliament], to do so great a Public Good'.

But amongst Scots, those in London in the spring of 1707 were very much in a minority. In Edinburgh the mood was sombre. During the debates in the Scottish Parliament about the terms of union, angry crowds had rioted. These included Episcopalians – who were usually Jacobites, the supporters of James Francis ('James VIII'), known later as the Old Pretender, who wanted no truck with a union that dented their hopes that he would be restored as his father James VII's rightful successor. (Much more prominent in Parliament from 1703 than beforehand, the Jacobites were bitterly opposed to the Hanoverian succession. Indeed it was their role in blocking the succession, according to the well-informed contemporary Sir John Clerk, that forced England's hand: 'if the succession had been settled', he wrote later, 'there had never been a word of the union'.[2]) Presbyterian theocrats and their fundamentalist flocks were against too, as were nationalists, protesting passionately against the loss of Scotland's ancient sovereignty.

Inside Parliament the best speakers on the opposition side drew succour from Scottish history, and legendary heroes such as William Wallace and the 'valiant' Robert the Bruce. The duke of Atholl found inspiration in the Declaration of Arbroath, proclaiming on 4 November 1706 that so long as there were 100 of us alive, 'we will not enter into a treaty so dishonourable and entirely subversive of us as this is'. To counter a rumour that the Scottish crown, along with the sword and sceptre of state, were to be taken to England in the winter of 1706-7, government ministers hastily amended the twenty-fourth Article of Union to exclude the possibility of this happening – ever. The regalia of Scotland were potent and highly visible symbols of Scotland's nationhood which, when Cromwell's invasion force had marched northwards in the 1650s, had been jealously guarded and hidden away in the forbidding castle of Dunnottar, and afterwards under the flagstones inside the nearby parish church of Kinneff.[3]

Evidence of this sort has led Scottish historians in recent decades not only to argue that the Union was pressed on the unwilling Scots by England, but also approved by unprincipled Scottish MP's who betrayed their countrymen and women in return for pensions, government posts and promises of honours.[4] In support of their case some have drawn from the revelations of George Lockhart of Carnwath, MP, whose *Memoirs* were published in 1714, complete with an appendix that alleged that £20,000 had been sent to Scotland in 1706, and also listed the names of the recipients.[5] It was a startling allegation, tantamount to libel, and even seditious. Some of those accused were outraged, others – to whom at least some of the mud thrown by Lockhart rightly stuck – felt embarrassed. Earlier in the same volume Lockhart had claimed that the nation as a whole had been bribed by the Equivalent, the sum of almost £400,000 that was to compensate Scottish investors in the Company of Scotland, as well as for other equally dishonourable purposes. Had inducements of this sort not done the trick, it has been suggested more recently, England would have sent troops into Scotland and forced the Edinburgh Parliament's hand. Extreme exponents of these explanations for the Union even deny that the Scots acceded to incorporation in return for free trade and access to England's colonies – denouncing this argument as a Victorian 'invention'.[6] Such concessions, it is asserted, were unnecessary, the evidence that Scots sought such ends being thin on the ground.

There are varying degrees of truth in much of this. There is no doubt whatsoever that it was from England that the initiative for incorporating union at this point in time came. Monies were remitted northwards, and paid out. Those court party adherents and members of the new party (or *Squadrone Volante*) who had posts or were in receipt of government pensions voted fairly consistently in favour of the articles of union. Explanations for the successful passage of the Union through the Scottish Parliament along the lines outlined above are now commonly accepted. The furore in 2006 over the chancellor of the exchequer's decision to authorise the minting of a £2 coin to mark the 300th anniversary of the Union has seen even usually measured political commentators repeat uncritically Robert Burns's cry that Scottish politicians in 1706-7 were 'bought and sold for English gold'. This was a far cry from 1907, two centuries on from 1707. Then the received wisdom was that 'the Union was both necessary and desirable if Scotland was to win her due share of the world's prosperity and to keep pace with the development of other nations'.[7] We will return to the question of the relationship between economic considerations and union later.

Subject to scrutiny, however, other parts of the argument too are less convincing than they may appear at first sight. It is some years now since Professor Allan Macinnes demonstrated the importance of party allegiance in determining how MP's voted in the union parliament, and that only a handful of the men on Lockhart's list were actually bribed.[8] Two weren't even MP's; one, who was paid £60, was the un-named 'Messenger that brought down the Treaty of Union'. Searching investigations into the circumstances of other MP's who are alleged to have switched from the opposition side and supported the Union in return for pensions or posts, suggest that the case against them is far from conclusive. Thus William Seton of Pitmedden is accused of selling his services for a £100 pension in 1704, and acting afterwards as a proselytiser in the union cause, as it happens a particularly effective one.[9] Yet Pitmedden had published a pamphlet advocating a union of the Parliaments several years earlier, on grounds that included the proposition that such a move would be advantageous for the Scottish economy and provide a means of reducing the numbers of the poor. Like the aforementioned

John Clerk, Pitmedden also hoped that the House of Commons could act as a check on the powerful Scottish nobility, who dominated the Scottish Parliament.[10]

But there are serious omissions in the case presented by historians who have been critical of the Scottish parliamentarians who voted to carry the measure in the winter of 1706-7. Not only did very few of them change their mind at the last minute. What has also become clear from an examination of the careers of most of the MP's who supported the Union, is that there were politicians in Scotland who were unionists in principle. Several of them had been in favour since the time of the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9, when the estates of Scotland had written to William in support of a union which would create 'one body politic, one nation to be represented in one parliament'.[11] Thus early others had accepted nominations as commissioners to treat for the hoped-for union. Some of the same men were remarkably persistent over the next two decades in promoting union, an arrangement they believed was in the country's best interests. In this sense, they were also patriotic, as much so as the opposition Jacobites who played with great skill the nationalist card.

What is striking is how many of the 227 MP's or their descendents who sat in the Scottish Parliament in 1706-7 had been exiled in the Low Countries under the later Stuarts. Several had either returned with William of Orange when he landed at Torbay in 1688, met him in London or served him in the Scottish Convention of Estates in 1689 and its successor Parliament. It was from this smaller cohort of around 107 MP's that some of the staunchest supporters of the Union were drawn. These included John Dalrymple, first earl of Stair, the principal government speaker in the union cause; Patrick Hume, first earl of Marchmont, influential member of the *Squadrone Volante* whose twenty-five votes were crucial in carrying the measure;[12] and David Leslie, third earl of Leven, a prominent economic moderniser who was governor of the Bank of Scotland from 1697, and by 1707 commander-in-chief of the army in Scotland. Evidence suggests too that the court party's much-maligned leaders, the duke of Queensberry and John, second duke of Argyll, were on a 'Revolution foot'. What such individuals had in common was their Presbyterianism, in which cause some of those concerned had endured exile and sometimes worse under the Stuarts during the 1670s and 1680s, and a determination to secure the Revolution settlement in Scotland. It was an 'entire' or incorporating union, they believed (as early as 1689 when, as we have seen, it was first mooted *from Scotland*) that would best serve their purpose. Three of them, Stair, Adam Cockburn of Ormiston, and the first earl of Seafield were appointed as commissioners to negotiate union in 1689, 1702 and 1706. Another eight were commissioners in 1702 and 1706, again underlining the degree of consistency there was in the pro-union camp.[13]

Thus, in order to secure the support of men like this for incorporation, bribes or other mercenary tools of political management were helpful but probably not essential. After Queensberry, it was Marchmont who was the main beneficiary of the Queen's £20,000, receiving over £1,100, but like many others his payment represented salary arrears. Marchmont had been imprisoned in 1679 and fled from Scotland in 1684 for his alleged involvement in the Ryehouse Plot against King Charles II and his brother the duke of York, whose regime he and many of his allies considered to be arbitrary and absolute. For Marchmont therefore, union was 'the surest way for securing the Protestant religion' – in Scotland as well as England, and 'the peace and prosperity of these nations'.

For confirmation of this interpretation of the motives of many of those who supported the Union, it is necessary to go no further than Lockhart's *Memoirs*. The appendix to this volume – only fifteen pages long – has for too long been the focus for those historians intent on showing that the Union was brought about by corruption and English bullying. The kernel of Lockhart's text is to be found in the main body of what is a 403-page book (excluding the appendix). It is here that we read the Episcopalian and Jacobite Lockhart's venomous attacks on men whose political and religious positions he could barely stomach, although he was also prepared to recognise the favourable qualities of those with whom he disagreed.[14] For some though, Lockhart had little time. George Ballie of Jerviswood, an influential figure within the *Squadrone*, he described as 'Morose, Proud, and Severe', and someone who had always favoured the Hanoverian succession. He was therefore more likely to be a unionist. Yet it was Stair towards whom Lockhart directed most of his ire. It was Stair, according to Lockhart, who was the 'Origine and Principal Instrument of all the Misfortunes, that befell either the King or

Kingdom of *Scotland*'. Stair it was, he went on, who 'carried on the *Revolution* in *Scotland* , and 'Twas he that was at the Bottom of the Union' and so 'may be Stiled the *Judas* of his Country'. Yet the 'King' to whom Lockhart refers was the Stuart James VII. His hatred of Stair was in large part due to Stair's involvement in the Revolution that had replaced James with William of Orange and his wife Mary, and for the part he had played in leading Scotland into the Union, thereby – in theory at least – making it less likely that a Stuart would ever sit again on the throne in Britain, particularly if like the Old Pretender, James's son, such a candidate refused to abjure Roman Catholicism. Lockhart detested Stair, but he liked even less his political principles, which, he acknowledged, drove him.[15]

The international context in which the Union was forged in 1707 was one in which British forces and those of her allies were locked into a lengthy war with Catholic France, a formidable enemy under Louis XIV, whose vision was of French universal monarchy. Moderate presbyterians feared that a divided mainland Britain would make Scotland vulnerable to French aggrandisement, and militant Jacobitism. Indeed late in 1704, when fears of armed conflict between England and Scotland were intensifying, it was the Jacobites rather than the Scots as a whole who were preparing for battle, aided if possible by the French. Scotland at the time of the Union was divided, over dynasty, religion and what the nature of the nation's relationship should be with England. That a united kingdom would be better able to 'oppose it self' to their 'formidable' neighbour France was another reason why Seton of Pitmedden was advocating union just after the turn of the eighteenth century.

There was a British dimension to union which is often overlooked. This sentiment was expressed by William Aikman, the Scots-born portrait painter who was in London during May 1707 and informed his uncle, with only the faintest touch of irony, that, 'we are no more Scots and English but all bold Brittains'.[16] Even lord Belhaven had shared this vision in December 1704, declaring that 'they ar not good Brittains who would make a treatty [with England] difficult'. Hurt by the loss of his government post under Queen Anne, however, he would later join the opposition ranks and make one of the best-known speeches against incorporation.

As the arguments over union raged in Scotland during the summer and autumn of 1706, allied military and naval successes were celebrated, with particular pleasure being felt when Scots were involved. One instance was late in May, when reports reached Edinburgh of the duke of Marlborough's victory at Ramilles, but in which the Royal Regiment of Scots Dragoons under lord John Hay had also played a part. Most of Scotland's MP's who were or had been army officers under William and Mary, or their successor Queen Anne, supported the Union.[17]

The rejection of economic considerations in the making of the Union seems perverse. At issue in this regard is not the role of economic considerations *per se*, but *how much* importance should be attached to the Scots' interest in free trade and other economic concessions in 1706, as the terms of the Union were settled. Far from being an invention of Victorian historians, a union of trade was something the Scots had sought for a very long time, and had been in the minds of Scotland's union commissioners most recently in 1702, when negotiations had collapsed over England's intransigence over commercial matters, and in 1689, when they had not even begun.[18]

Most Scottish MP's – whatever their party - recognised how parlous Scotland's pre-1707 financial condition was, and how far removed the country was from those with material conditions to which many Scots aspired. The Low Countries were seen as something of a model, although London too was much-admired – and visited, along with smaller towns like increasingly fashionable Bath, with its 'waters'. Contemporaneous accounts of conditions in the royal burghs make for dismal reading, and despite spirited attempts on the part of the post-Revolution state to support and extend Scottish manufacturing and increase exports, little real progress was made. Increasingly, the Scots were dependent on the English market for their cattle, linen and coal. There was a growing balance of trade deficit and the inefficient and corrupt customs and excise system was unable to collect sufficient taxes to satisfy the relatively meagre demands of the Scottish state. In this respect an independent Scotland was not financially viable. Many were convinced that union with England offered the best remedy – provided that the Scots could negotiate access to England's colonies, a long-held ambition in Scotland.

Significantly, a majority of the MP's who were elected to the Council of Trade in 1705, which was charged with the task of examining the nation's trade and recommending measures for its improvement, voted in favour of union. The compensation won for the investors in the part patriotically-driven Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies - who had lost fortunes after the collapse in 1699 of the Company's attempt to establish a Scottish trading colony at Darien near Panama, was another powerful inducement.

The sum of nearly £400,000 sterling – called the Equivalent and designed also to repay outstanding government debts to individuals – has been condemned as a national bribe. But this and some of the other economic elements of the Union were concessions, prised from England whose union commissioners during the failed negotiations in 1702-3 had been unwilling to accede to Scottish demands. Whatever the reasons for the Scots' retreat from Darien – and there were many of these, apart from the difficulties William and England created, not the least being Spanish might – the fact is that by no other means were the Company's investors going to get their money back, with interest.

This was certainly how some new party (or *Squadrone*) members of the patriotic opposition in Scotland, who had attacked government ministers from the time of the flight from Darien, saw things. Typical was the MP William Bennet of Grubbet, who had sided with the opposition for several years, and in 1702 penned a passionate poem directed against court party ministers of state and others, 'under pension, promise or bribe, to betray ther country, and its libertys'. But Bennet had a Revolution pedigree, having seen military service under William of Orange. Early in 1706, as rumours of what England's negotiating position in regard to the proposed union might be, Bennet reflected that union looked to be a 'fair bargain'; with peace, security of religion and compensation for Darien and free trade, he saw 'the end of our journey'. Few Scots were entirely happy with an arrangement which sacrificed their nation's parliamentary independence, but pragmatic patriots like John Clerk of Penicuik recognised that in an age of muscular mercantilism, Scottish parliamentary sovereignty was more apparent than real. If Scotland was to flourish, union with England looked to him and many other MP's as the best way forward in the circumstances of the time. It was true that fewer of the Scots' nobility would sit at Westminster than in Edinburgh, and the number of MPs from Scotland was less than had been demanded, but, argued the marquess of Montrose, we 'wou'd…have a hand in ye management of ye affairs of a Kingdom which made a very considerable figure in the world: & by this means would become great & considerable themselves'.

With the 300th anniversary of the Act of Union upon us, perhaps it is time to take a more mature – and balanced - view of its causes. The shrill voices of nationalist historians, allied to the more cynical treatment of politicians past and present which has been in evidence from the 1950s and 1960s, have dominated the debate now for some four decades. But alongside the rhetoric, some very fine and compelling history has been produced, by William Ferguson, the late Patrick Riley and more recently Allan Macinnes, to name but three of the more important contributors.[19]

However, the fresh approach reported in this article makes clear that at the time of the Union of 1707, there were thoughtful, English-speaking Scottish protestants who were concerned for their divided nation, and one too that across the political spectrum was frequently described as 'sinking'. Scotland was locked into a relationship with England through the regal union, but this was no longer working in the Scots' interests. Admittedly against the will of the majority of people, men of this persuasion judged that parliamentary union under a single monarch with their wealthier, militarily stronger neighbour with whom they shared the same island, offered security and a context within which the Scots could achieve the material conditions they sought if they were to take their place alongside the other European nations they held in highest regard.

Although the economic benefits were slower in arriving than had been anticipated, for almost two centuries the Union worked to Scotland's advantage, as indeed it did for most of the rest of the United Kingdom.[20] Scots played a substantial role in this success. Union however has never been an entirely comfortable arrangement.[21] Whether or not it is fit for purpose now is open to question, and whether or not it will survive for another hundred years a matter of speculation.

NOTES

1 E. J. Graham, *Seawolves: Pirates & the Scots* (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2005), pp.153-90.

2 This remark was made by Clerk on his annotated copy of Lockhart's *Memoirs*, held in the National Archives of Scotland, Clerk of Penicuik MSS, GD 18/6080, p.120.

3 C. A. Whatley, *The Scots and the Union* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), pp.10-11.

4 Examples include, P. H. Scott, *Andrew Fletcher and the Treaty of Union* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992), as well as the same author's more recent pamphlet, *The Union of 1707: Why and How* (Edinburgh: Saltire Society, 2006); see too J. R. Young, 'The parliamentary incorporating union of 1707 political management, anti-unionism and foreign policy', in T. M. Devine and J. R. Young (eds), *Eighteenth Century Scotland: New Perspectives* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999), pp.24-52.

5 G. Lockhart, *Memoirs Concerning the Affairs of Scotland From Queen Anne's Accession to the Throne, to the Commencement of the Union of the Two Kingdoms of Scotland and England, in May, 1707* (1714).

6 P. H. Scott, 'Why Did the Scots Accept the Union?' in *Scottish Affairs*, I (Autumn, 1992), p.25.

7 P. Hume Brown (ed), *The Union of 1707: A Survey of Events* (Glasgow, 1907), p.9.

8 A. I. Macinnes, 'Studying the Scottish Estates and the Treaty of Union', *History Microcomputer Review*, 9 (Fall, 1990), pp.11-25.

9 Scott, *Andrew Fletcher*, p.119.

10 *The Interest of Scotland, in Three Essays* (2nd ed., London, 1702), pp.57-8.

11 Quoted in D. Duncan (ed.), *History of the Union of Scotland and England by Sir John Clerk of Penicuik* (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1993), p.131.

12 See D. J. Patrick and C. A. Whatley, 'Persistence, Principle and Patriotism in the Making of the Union of 1707: the Revolution, Scottish Parliament and the *Squadrone Volante*', *History* (forthcoming, April 2007).

13 Whatley, *Scots and the Union*, pp.383-7.

14 See C. A. Whatley and D. J. Patrick, 'Contesting Interpretations of the Union of 1707: The Abuse and Use of George Lockhart of Carnwath's *Memoirs*', *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies* (forthcoming, Spring 2007).

15 For Lockhart's personal and political beliefs see D. Szechi, *George Lockhart of Carnwath, 1689-1727: A Study in Jacobitism* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2002)

16 J. Holloway, *William Aikman, 1682-1731* (Edinburgh: National Galleries of Scotland, 1988), p.6.

17 *Edinburgh Courant*, 29 May 1706; K. M. Brown, 'From Scottish lords to British officers: state building, elite integration and the army in the seventeenth century', in N. Macdougall (ed.), *Scotland and War, AD 79-1918* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1991), pp.133-69.

18 For further details on this debate see C. A. Whatley, *Bought and Sold for English Gold? Explaining the Union of 1707* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2001), pp.56-84.

19 W. Ferguson, *Scotland's Relations with England: A Survey to 1707* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1977); P. W. J. Riley, *The Union of England and Scotland: A study in Anglo-Scottish politics of the eighteenth century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978).

20 For the economic effects of the Union in the eighteenth century, see C. A. Whatley, *Scottish Society, 1707-1830: Beyond Jacobitism, towards industrialisation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

21 For a fascinating study of how the Scots perceived, and accommodated themselves to, the Union in the Victorian era, see G. Morton, *Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830-1860* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999).

'The First Grand War of Contemporaneous History': The American Civil War in Global Context

DR SUSAN-MARY GRANT

'We must consider that we shall be as a City on a Hill,' the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, John Winthrop famously exhorted his congregation in 1630, 'the eyes of all people are upon us.'[1] From its inception as a nation, the eyes of the world certainly were on America, and at no time was their gaze trained so keenly as during the American Civil War. Whether they fully understood what they were seeing, however, is doubtful. Some, like eminent British novelist Mrs Elizabeth Gaskell, could well enough grasp the North-South divide in England, yet its American variant bemused her. Writing to one of America's foremost literary figures, Charles Eliot Norton, she confessed herself at a loss as regarding American politics. The Union's expansion, she believed, had carried with it the seeds of its dissolution. The 'time was sure to come,' she advised Norton, 'when you could not act together as a nation; the only wonder to me is that you cohered so long.'[2]

Mrs Gaskell had the benefit of American friends to enlighten her as to the situation in their country, but the bulk of the British population relied on frequently biased newspaper accounts which often did little more than warm over anti-American prejudices. As the Confederacy looked in increasing desperation at the world beyond America's shores, seeking both recognition and more tangible support for its cause, Britain and the other 'Great Powers' of the mid-nineteenth century remained firmly on the fence, uncertain of how, if at all, the war's outcome would affect them and consequently equally uncertain as to whether they should, or could, influence that outcome in any way. The conflict that Marx and Engels described as 'the first grand war of contemporaneous history' was America's alone, in the end. It was, as Peter Parish argued, 'an exception to the rule that major civil wars tend to become international wars.'[3]

The 'Why Not' Question:

The historiography on international relations during the war has traditionally been, and remains, relatively self-contained. It largely focuses on the relationship between Great Britain and America, not just because of the historic links between the two countries but because, as the mid-nineteenth century's foremost naval power, Britain's official support could not only have helped break the Union blockade on its own but without it no other European nation would venture into the fray. In addition, as Richard Blackett has stressed, no 'other agitation in the period, not the movements in support of Polish or Hungarian independence or Italian unification, engaged [British] public interest so extensively as did the debate over the war in America.'[4] Yet this interest did not evolve into intervention, the support the Confederacy sought never came, so much of the historiography is devoted, directly or indirectly, to the 'why not?' question: why did Britain not intervene on the South's behalf; was she ever likely to do so and, if so, why did it not happen? This is, by its very nature, rather a frustrating historiography: grounded more in the social and political histories of Britain under the Palmerston government than in the historiography of the Civil War and concerned mainly with an event that failed to take place, it reveals more about mid-nineteenth-century Britain and about Anglo-American relations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries than about the war between 1861 and 1865.

One of the first, and certainly the most influential, academic theses was Ephraim D. Adams's two-volume assessment of Great Britain and the Civil War (1925), which really set the agenda for this aspect of the subject for almost half a century. Its division of the British into either the pro-Union or pro-Confederate camp, depending on political ideology and, importantly, class affiliation offered a simple, bifurcated view not only of Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth century but of the issues at stake in the Civil War. The working classes and liberal politicians, Adams argued, tended toward Union sympathies, whereas the ruling elites—political and economic—were appalled at the spectre

of democratic, mob rule in Great Britain itself, and more inclined toward the Confederate side and all it was believed to stand for in the way of aristocratic, stable 'Victorian values.' More recent studies have stressed that this frequently had little to do with any perceived affinity with slaveholders as such, but was more an expression of general horror at the prospect of democracy writ large. Such attitudes were best summed up by aristocratic author and politician, Edward Bulwer-Lytton, who at the war's outset described the United States as hanging 'over Europe like a gathering and destructive thundercloud,' and at its end expressed dismay at the Union's victory. He was, he advised an American acquaintance, 'sorry for it. I had indulged the hope that your country might break up into two or more fragments. I regard the United States as a menace to the whole civilized world if you are allowed to go on developing as you have been, undisturbed.'[5]

Donald Bellows' study of British conservative reaction to the Civil War, for example, highlighted 'British conceptions of the nature of American society and government' as influential in Britain's response to the conflict. Bellows presented the British aristocracy as pretty much united, not so much in any particular admiration for the South but in its suspicion, indeed overt hostility, of democracy in a period (1815-1867) when the question of British constitutional reform was rarely out of the headlines for long. The Civil War, Bellows stressed, 'raised for the British questions whether the Union, a rival power, and whether democracy, a threatening ideology, would survive. For the British the two questions were linked.'[6]

The increasing emphasis on the ideological context of British reactions to the conflict meant that few works in this period dealt directly with what the British actually did, rather than what they thought. One notable exception was Kenneth Bourne's article, 'British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862.' This revealed by its title alone the significance of the Civil War for Britain. That the *English Historical Review* of 1961 felt no need to make it clear to its readers that the 'North' in question referred to America indicated either a supreme confidence in its readership's knowledge of the dates of this 'foreign' Civil War, or a recognition that only American affairs carried enough weight in Britain—in 1961 as much as in 1861—to instigate anything approaching military deployment. A detailed examination of the extent to which the defence of Canada was the prime factor in 'British so-called appeasement of the United States,' Bourne's article explored the degree to which Britain's political leaders took seriously the threat of a Union invasion of Canada.[7] The inadequate reinforcements sent out to British Columbia in the spring and summer of 1861 were more for show than for action; they were in any case deemed unnecessary by those such as Sir George Cornewall Lewis, the Secretary of State for War and a leading opponent of British intervention, who thought—correctly as it turned out—that the Lincoln administration would not likely 'gratuitously increase the number of its enemies, and, moreover, incur the hostility of so formidable a power as England.'[8]

Bourne's close analysis of the political debates over the issue emphasised the vacillation within the British Cabinet, even after the *Trent* affair of November, 1861, and highlighted the fact that more than either ideological or political considerations informed the British response to the war: Britain, as much as America, could not afford to increase the number of its enemies, nor commit its military forces at such a distance, in the mid-nineteenth century.[9] Intervention, either political or military, simply did not make sense for Britain. Although British politicians and the public alike were fascinated by events across the Atlantic—and a degree of *schadenfreude* may well have been a factor—diplomatic realities precluded any closer involvement. In a global context, Britain was more immediately concerned with her relationship with the more proximate European powers and, as Brian Holden Reid has recently stressed, had far more to gain from the Union's success than from its dissolution, despite the opinions of the more extreme conservatives.[10]

King Cotton Diplomacy

In light of the practical, political, diplomatic and military constraints on Britain as far as North America was concerned, Frank Owsley's influential 1931 thesis on *King Cotton Diplomacy* seemed increasingly less plausible. Henry Blumenthal did a fairly comprehensive job of dismantling it in

the 1960s, when he argued that Confederates not only 'misjudged their own needs as well as the realities of European power politics,' but never fully appreciated 'the importance of foreign aid and recognition for the survival of their nation.' King Cotton diplomacy was too tenuous a thread on which to hang Southern hopes, and inevitably it snapped.[11]

Blumenthal's argument has been reinforced by more recent studies by David Crook, Lorraine Peters, and Charles Hubbard. They argue that 'the foreign policy of the Confederacy was narrowly self-centred and paid little attention to the Europeans' analysis of the American problem.' With the British and the French watching each other, and both having very good reasons not to intervene— Napoleon III believed he was in no position to propose that France interfere 'in the affairs of the model republic,' and the British were unlikely to do anything to change his mind—the outcome was stalemate as far as Confederate diplomatic efforts were concerned. In the end, despite the undoubted impact of the 'cotton famine' on cotton operatives in both countries—some four million in Britain and one million in France—British investment in other areas of the US economy, including the railroads, banks, and mining, far exceeded the investment in cotton.[12] The London *Times*, at the start of the war, had grounds for its assertion that the 'destiny of the world hangs on a thread,' and its grim prediction that 'civil war in the United States means destitution in Lancashire.' Cotton exports fell dramatically: 3.8 million bales had been exported in 1860; two years later only a very small amount was reaching Europe via the blockade runners. Yet as Sven Beckert's important article on the subject highlights, in fact the rest of the world recovered—and in some cases benefited—fairly quickly from the abrupt removal of American cotton from British and French industries, despite the very real economic hardships endured by mill workers in both countries.[13]

In its diplomatic efforts, the South neglected the adage about winners and losers. As cotton operatives were laid off in Lancashire, those in the Nile Valley, and India, along with jute workers in Dundee and tweed manufacturers in the Scottish borders benefited from an increased demand for their products. Economic interests, as Peters recently argued, even in a country as small as Scotland were sufficiently varied and the impact of America's conflict too diverse to drive Britain's economic efforts as a whole in a Confederate direction, let alone permit any overarching thesis to encompass every aspect of the response to what were essentially local crises.[14] No more can theories developed in the context of one particular part of England readily apply to other parts of Britain, let alone to peoples and economies far beyond the British Isles, areas in which Civil War historians, at least, have to date shown less interest. Beckert, in particular, draws attention to this historiographical lacuna by reminding us that one 'of the most important chapters in the history of global capitalism and labor, in effect, was written on the battlefields of provincial America,' a fact that, he argues, was more obvious at the time that it has been since. Contemporary 'statesmen, merchants, manufacturers, and intellectuals, especially those residing outside the United States,' he points out, 'perceived the war to be as much about cotton's political economy, that is, the particular interaction between states and markets, as about the unity of the American republic.' In an article that, by its author's admission, established 'perhaps unexpected links between Antietam and Ashton-under-Lyne, Bull Run and Berar, Tupelo and Togo,' Beckert shows how the South's loss was the world's gain: from India to Egypt and Brazil, cotton cultivators, manufacturers and statesmen were swift to seize the opportunities offered by the removal of southern cotton from the market. In the process, they 'had sown the seeds for a recasting of the empire of cotton.'[15]

Emancipation

This fundamental reshaping of the global cotton network, of course, had serious consequences for the Confederacy, and helped reshape foreign opinion on the war as a whole. Any initial pro-Southern tendencies produced by the desire to access its main export crop soon diminished in the face of alternative sources of supply and, most crucially, convinced many that 'emancipation and cotton production might not be mutually exclusive.' This argument finds support not just in Holden Reid's work on diplomatic relations but in Jay Sexton's recent exploration of the views of the Anglo-American banks, who 'found it in their best interests to remain neutral, if not support the North.'[16]

Economic ties were, as Southern leaders realised, crucial ones; it was simply that these ties were not, as they had anticipated, made of cotton.

There was, of course, no simple shift toward a more pro-Union position, and the modern scholarship gives equal weight to political predilection as to economic involvement. From both perspectives, there was no doubt at the time that slavery confused the matter, and both economic and moral imperatives came into play. Those whose economic stability had for so long rested on the products of slave labour were understandably wary of change; others, taking a more principled stand, were unconvinced that change was on the cards. Unable to grasp the political and constitutional complexities of the federal system in America as these informed Lincoln's approach to the Civil War, many contemporary foreign observers were, frankly, bemused by the Union's apparent hesitation over emancipation, and had been since John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry in 1859. From France, Victor Hugo mused on the implications of Brown's execution: 'there is something more terrible than Cain slaying Abel,' Hugo observed; 'It is Washington slaying Spartacus.'[17] Writing at the war's mid-point, English journalist Edward Dicey suggested that if 'the North had but dared to take for its battle cry the grand preamble of the Declaration of Independence...then it might have appealed to the world for sympathy in a manner it cannot now... If the war continues,' he argued, 'it must continue as a war for emancipation. This is a fact it is useless ignoring.'[18]

Lincoln's announced intention to issue the Emancipation Proclamation was for a long time assumed to have clarified the matter for foreign onlookers. The workers of Manchester, England, famously sent a message of support to Lincoln at the end of 1862, expressing their 'high admiration' for his 'firmness in upholding the proclamation of freedom.'[19] The question of how typical this response to the Emancipation Proclamation was opened a fresh seam in the scholarship. Again, the question derived from Owsley's thesis, in particular the emphasis he had put on Antietam (or Sharpsburg), the tenuous Union victory of 1862 that presented Lincoln with the opportunity to announce his intention to free the slaves in the seceded states.

Some historians argued that Antietam had simply 'reinforced the conviction that neither side would win the war on the field,' while others described the notion that the Emancipation Proclamation was in some ways instrumental in swaying British opinion toward the Union as 'totally fallacious.'[20] Historians also uncovered pro-Confederate attitudes in the most unexpected places. Mary Ellison, for example, examined the extent of support for secession in Lancashire, and suggested that pro-Union sympathy was actually lukewarm at best in those areas hardest hit by the cotton embargo, whilst Howard Jones has, most recently, proposed that the 'Union's move against slavery so repelled the British that it encouraged the very intervention that the Lincoln administration sought to prevent.'[21]

Unusually, perhaps, some of the conclusions offered by the many detailed analyses either of the global cotton economy or of the debate over British intervention have not yet found their way into the mainstream scholarship on the Civil War, in which Antietam is still frequently accorded a decisive role in keeping foreign interference at bay. James McPherson's study of that particular battle, for example, provided a nuanced interpretation of its impact, but still conveyed the impression that it settled foreign indecision by quoting English radical Richard Cobden's assertion that Lincoln's proclamation had 'closed the mouths of those who have been advocating the side of the South.'[22] In these, as in other aspects of the Civil War's global impact, different parts of the scholarship run along parallel tracks that, to date, have shown little sign of merging.

Towards Total War

The historiography on the military impact of the Civil War, as with that on foreign opinion, has long been influenced by the dominance of one work. Jay Luvaas's 1959 study, *The Military Legacy of the Civil War*, has, with good reason, been described as 'the unassailable authority' on the war's European legacy.[23] There are signs, however, that it may be in line for some modification. It has, as Hugh Dubrulle recently charged, 'commanded widespread assent among historians, leading them to downplay the impact of the conflict on European military thought.'[24] Dubrulle is not alone in calling for a reassessment of some of Luvaas's conclusions, but his article is primarily significant not just for

offering a fresh angle on a traditional argument but for establishing an important and long overdue bridgehead between the social, political and military historiographies of the Civil War. The convoluted and frequently contradictory debate in Britain over the Civil War was instrumental, Dubrulle argues, in 'shaping the military lessons that observers drew from the conflict.' What Dubrelle has termed the 'semiofficial' view of the conflict arose out of the interaction of ideas—many preconceived—beliefs and prejudices that the British elites—comprising 'statesmen, journalists, foreign service personnel, and soldiers'—held about America in general and the Civil War in particular. Their claim that the Union was waging 'a new type of war unprecedented in its destructiveness and scope' fed their fears that such a war might represent the future of warfare in general, something the British sought to avoid. Their horror of this 'revolutionary war of nations,' Dubrulle shows, originated in and was sustained by a broader fear of democracy in general.[25]

In effect, Dubrulle suggested, the British elites 'created a Confederacy in their own image, transforming it into a society with a mixed constitution whose achievements conveniently highlighted the democratic North's shortcomings.' There were other factors at play here, as Holden Reid has astutely pointed out, and one of the most significant was what period of the Civil War British observers actually observed. Most were present at the creation of armies 'composed of naïve and enthusiastic volunteers,' and were therefore 'not present to witness vital improvements and the emergence in 1864 of lean, better-regulated, veteran troops.' In the decades immediately following the Civil War, therefore, the American experience may well, as Dubrulle concluded, have 'justified choices British soldiers had already made,' but Holden Reid stresses that the war's legacy was no simple, single lesson to be learned and applied—or not—but constituted 'a *strategic background* to the position of countries like Great Britain and provided an anvil on which to hammer out thinking in and exploration of important military questions, such as the importance of command of the sea, the reinforcement of armies in place, and the challenges posed by the recruitment of volunteers in a democracy.'[26]

Although frequently treated as though in a vacuum, the American Civil War was not the sole war of the nineteenth century, let alone of the 1860s, a period that Eric Hobsbawm summed up as a 'decade of blood.'[27] The years between 1840 and 1880 witnessed no fewer than 177 conflicts; of these, the deadliest occurred in the 1850s and 1860s.[28] Consequently military thinkers were not alone in pondering the Civil War's implications for the future not just of warfare between nations but the lineaments of these nations themselves as they were defined and forged through violence.

It is in military history, indeed, that the Civil War is now most constructively placed in its global context, in essay collections such as that offered by Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler exploring the points of convergence between the Civil War and the later wars of German unification, or Michael Geyer and Charles Bright's analysis of 'nationalizing wars' in Eurasia and America. The emphasis of the Förster and Nagler volume was evident from its title, *On the Road to Total War*, but Geyer and Bright argued that, if the Civil War and the German wars of unification were heading down the same road, at the end of which lay this contentious concept of 'total war,' they nevertheless approached it from different directions. Both conflicts 'taught lessons, through the practice of war itself, about how to mobilize whole nations, national identities, and industrial capabilities for war.' Yet there were crucial differences. The German wars of unification were 'short, duel-like events' whereas the Civil War, 'the clash between alternative and uncompromising visions of the nation's future turned into a drawn-out war of destruction that had no ready political solution.' In essence, these wars, Geyer and Bright suggested, arose 'from two distinct axes of conflict—one along the Eurasian seam, the other on the Atlantic rim—both of which were formed by the on-going crises and transformation of eighteenth-century empires.'[29]

A War between Nations

The most recent research challenges the notion that the Civil War was a conflict over a single nation's future, and instead presents it as a clash between nations, albeit one of them only putative and, in the end, stillborn. In an echo of Marx and Engels' description—although not, perhaps, their rationale for it—Nicholas and Peter Onuf assert that the Civil War was 'the first great conflict in the nineteenth century between modern nations that commanded the loyalties and lives of their

peoples.' In that sense, as in others, both the war's contemporary implications and its long-term legacy involved the reconfiguring, not just of the American nation, but of the concept of nationhood more broadly. America was hardly alone in facing the challenge of nation-making in this period, and the interest of foreign observers was piqued, in large part, by the question of what the American experience of warfare in the nation's name might produce.[30]

In the broader context of the nationalist struggles of the nineteenth century, two conjoined issues have evolved in the modern scholarship on the Civil War's global implications: the first is the fairly narrow question of whether, or to what extent, the Confederacy was indeed a modern nation; the second is the larger question of the national significance, and the significance for nationalism globally, of the war's actual outcome. The lineaments of Confederate nationalism have been addressed primarily by Civil War historians such as John McCardell, Drew Gilpin Faust and Gary Gallagher, although what we might term the 'the nation status' of the South is implicit in much mainstream Civil War historiography.[31] Together, they argue that insofar as many white Southerners believed in the possibility of a separate nation, and constructed—before or as a result of the war itself—an identity distinct from that of the rest of America, but specifically from the North, Confederate, or Southern nationalism did exist. Few historians have so far ventured any comparisons between the South and other nationalist endeavours, and work in this direction is very much in its preliminary stage. James McPherson brought the Civil War into the orbit of modern Quebec's nationalist impulses as well as those of the states of the former Soviet Union in a short study of ethnic and civic nationalisms that juxtaposed Confederate/ethnic and Union/civic nationalisms. Adopting a bolder and more analytical approach, Don Doyle contrasted the American and Italian Souths in the nineteenth century. Doyle concluded not only that the Civil War 'furnished a horrifying illustration of the price nations pay when they do not learn to live together,' but that 'America's past would become the future for many nations.' At the time of the Civil War, of course, this was precisely the fear, or the hope, of many foreign observers of America's conflict.[32]

Doyle's study has pointed the way toward a fresh approach to the issue not just of Southern nationalism, but of nationalism as a whole in this period. Nicholas and Peter Onuf have taken the debate a stage further in their proposition that the Civil War was the first modern war of a modern age: 'the wars arising from the French Revolution represent a transition,' they argue, 'since the wars so significantly contributed to making the belligerents into modern nations. Arguably, the first fully modern war was the Civil War fought within the boundaries of the United States. Its belligerents were already modern nations, and there would have been no war had they not been modern nations.' Of course, there are difficulties with this interpretation, not least the question of how modern, or stable the Confederate nation could ever have hoped to be. Given that slavery 'was the foundational institution and animating principle of Southern nationalism,' with half the population never likely to be on message, the Confederacy would have been a precarious prospect at best, an anachronism at least.[33]

In a real sense, the nineteenth-century South was already an anachronism in global terms. Although much of the modern historiography on foreign reactions to the conflict proposes that British leaders such as Gladstone came round to the Union and to the idea that the Civil War was fundamentally about freedom only once that Union was secured, in fact emancipation, in the context of the times, was hardly a radical step given that most of the rest of the world had already taken it. In this sense it remains the case, as David Potter pointed out many years ago, that the Civil War 'has been interpreted in terms which disguised its broader meaning.' In seeking to assess the war's global significance, Potter suggested, 'it may be useful to begin by asking ourselves simply, what were the prevalent tendencies of the nineteenth century, and what did the Civil War contribute in causing these tendencies to prevail?' The answer that Potter arrived at was that the Civil War had 'turned the tide which had been running against nationalism for forty years, or ever since Waterloo; and second, it forged a bond between nationalism and liberalism at a time when it appeared that the two might draw apart and move in opposite directions.'[34]

To date, however, only really one side of Potter's argument has been pursued in the scholarship, that of the triumph of liberalism against conservative forces as an international paradigmatic shift of which the Civil War was but one aspect. This has certainly been explored through the historiography

on the war's global impact, most fruitfully in Robert May's collection *The Union, the Confederacy and the Atlantic Rim*, which comprised essays by Blackett, Jones, McPherson and Thomas Schoonover. Schoonover, in particular, stressed the international context within which the ideological battle between the Union and the Confederacy was played out, a theme he developed in his work on Mexican-American relations during the war, and in his study of Mexican minister Matías Romero's perspective on the Civil War. Both the Civil War in America and *la reforma* in Mexico were, he argued, conflicts 'between liberalism, industrial capitalism's ideological and world view, and conservatism, the remnants of mercantilistic, paternalistic, and agrarian institutions supporting monarchical and aristocratic management of society.' Many of the most conservative contemporary British onlookers would have concurred, and viewed the Union triumph with dismay, as Lord Acton advised Robert E. Lee: 'I saw in State Rights the only availing check upon the absolutism of the sovereign will, and secession filled me with hope, not as the destruction but as the redemption of Democracy...I deemed that you were fighting the battles of our liberty, our progress, and our civilization; and I mourn for the stake which was lost at Richmond more deeply than I rejoice over that which was saved at Waterloo.'[35]

The modern historiography dismisses Lord Acton's perspective, and puts a more positive spin on the war's outcome. Yet, in our own age, one in which both the claims and the costs of nationalism have come to exert an increased power, the second part of Potter's argument may come to be probed more closely. Perhaps the true significance of the Civil War lay, as he argued, in the fusion of liberalism and nationalism. Or perhaps the war was, as Geyer and Bright argued, only one small part of 'a universe of endemic, world-wide, violence played out within global patterns of conflict in which warfare was dispersed, decentered, and mostly of low-intensity yet capable of threatening the survival of whole ethnes.' An 'integral part of the nationalizing outcome of the American Civil War,' they point out, were the Indian Wars of the 1870s, 'the truly "destructive wars" of the North American continent' in this era.[36] Or even, perhaps, as Nicholas and Peter Onuf suggest, the Civil War was no civil war at all, but the first of many national confrontations in which nationalism itself was the issue at stake. When Europeans contemplated this 'first grand war of contemporaneous history,' whether they understood it or not, they were undoubtedly witnessing the terrible power that could—and in the future would again—be unleashed in the nation's name.

NOTES

1   John Winthrop's full sermon of 1630 can be found online at the University of Virginia: http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/charity.html.

2   Mrs Gaskell was, of course, the celebrated author of *North and South* (1854). Her letter to Charles Eliot Norton can be found in Charles E. Shain, 'The English Novelists and the American Civil War,' *American Quarterly*, 14:3 (Autumn, 1962): 399-421, quotation on p. 399.

3   Peter J. Parish, *The American Civil War* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975), 381.

4   R.J.M. Blackett, *Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War* (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 2001) 168.

5   Bulwer-Lytton quoted in Shain, 'The English Novelists,' p. 403.

6   Donald Bellows, 'A Study of British Conservative Reaction to the American Civil War,' *The Journal of Southern History*, 51:4 (November, 1985), 505-526, quotations on p. 505-506.

7   Kenneth Bourne, 'British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862,' *The English Historical Review*, 76:301 (October, 1961) 600-632; quotation on p. 600.

8   Cornewall Lewis quoted in Bourne, 'British Preparations,' p. 602.

9   Bourne, 'British Preparations,' 620, 628.

10 Brian Holden Reid, 'Power, Sovereignty and the Great Republic: Anglo-American Diplomatic Relations in the Era of the Civil War,' *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 14:2 (June 2003): 45-76.

11 Frank Lawrence Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate*

States of America (1931. Revised Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); Henry Blumenthal, 'Confederate Diplomacy: Popular Notions and International Realities,' *The Journal of Southern History*, 32:2 (May, 1966) 151-171, quotations on pp. 151, 154.

12 David Paul Crook, *The North, the South, and the Powers, 1861-1865* (New York: Wiley, 1974); Crook, 'Portents of War: English Opinion on Secession,' *Journal of American Studies*, 4 (February 1971): 163-179; Charles Hubbard, *The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1998); Peters, Lorraine Peters, 'The Impact of the American Civil War on the Local Communities of Southern Scotland,' *Civil War History*, 49: 2 (2003), 133-152; Blumenthal, 'Confederate Diplomacy,' 154-6, 166-7.

13 The (London) *Times*, 1 June and 29 April, 1861; Sven Beckert, 'Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War,' *American Historical Review*, 109:5 (December 2004): 1405-1438.

14 Lorraine Peters, 'The Impact of the American Civil War on the Local Communities of Southern Scotland,' *Civil War History* 49: 2 (2003), 133-52.

15 Beckert, 'Emancipation and Empire,' 1405, 1408-9, 1422.

16 Beckert, 'Emancipation and Empire,' 1423; Jay Sexton, 'Transatlantic Financiers and the Civil War,' *American Nineteenth Century History* 2:3 (Autumn 2001) 29-46, quotation on p. 43.

17 Victor Hugo, *Letters on American Slavery*, in Belle Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (eds.), *Europe Looks at the Civil War* (New York: Collier Books, 1962) 23.

18 Edward Dicey, *Spectator of America* (first published 1863 as *Six Months in the Federal States*. Reprint. Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1989) 294.

19 Letter from the Workingmen of Manchester to President Lincoln,' 31 December, 1862, in Sideman and Friedman, *Europe Looks at the Civil War*, 166-8, quotation on p.168.

20 Brauer, 'British Mediation,' 50; Hernon, 'British Sympathies,' 359.

21 Howard Jones, "History and Mythology: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War", in Robert E. May (ed.), *The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1995), 34. Jones developed the thesis at length in his monograph *Union in Peril: The Crisis Over British Intervention in the Civil War* (Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

22 James McPherson, *Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam: The Battle That Changed the Course of the American Civil War* (2002. Paperback Reprint. London: Penguin Books, 2003), quotation on p.146.

23 Brian Holden Reid, '"A Signpost That Was Missed"? Reconsidering British Lessons from the American Civil War,' *The Journal of Military History*, 70 (April 2006): 385-414, quotation on p. 386

24 Jay Luvaas, 'G.F.R. Henderson and the American Civil War,' *Military Affairs*, 20:3 (Autumn, 1956): 139-153; *The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance* (1959. Reprint. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988); Hugh Dubrulle, 'A Military Legacy of the Civil War: The British Inheritance,' *Civil War History*, 49:2 (2003), 153-180, quotation on p. 153.

25 Dubrulle, 'Military Legacy,' 156, 153-4

26 Dubrulle, 'Military Legacy,' 158-9; Holden Reid, 'A Signpost That Was Missed,' 394.

27 E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875* (1975. Reprint. London: Abacus Books, 1993) quotation on p. 98

28 Figures from the Correlates of War Project as given in Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, 'Global Violence and Nationalizing Wars in Eurasia and America: The Geopolitics of War in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 38:4 (October, 1996): 619-657, figures on p. 621-2.

29 Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler (eds), *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Geyer and Bright, 'Global Violence,' 622, quotations on p.620.

30 Nicholas Onuf and Peter Onuf, *Nations, Markets and War: Modern History and the American Civil War* (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2006) 4, 5-6.

31 John McCardell, *The Idea of a Southern Nation: Southern Nationalists and Southern Nationalism, 1830-1860* (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979); Drew Gilpin Faust, *Confederate*

Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton Rouge, La. and London, 1988); Gary Gallagher, *The Confederate War* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1997).

32 James M., McPherson, *Is Blood Thicker than Water?: Crises of Nationalism in the Modern World* (1998. Paperback Reprint. New York: Vintage Books, 1999); Don H. Doyle, *Nations Divided: America, Italy, and the Southern Question* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 2002) 95.

33 Onuf and Onuf, *Nations, Markets and War*, 345, 339, 333.

34 David M. Potter, 'Civil War,' in C. Vann Woodward (ed.), *The Comparative Approach to American History* (New York & London: Basic Books, 1968) 135-45, quotations on pp. 136, 137-8.

35 See Thomas D., Schoonover, *Dollars over Dominion: The Triumph of Liberalism in Mexican-United States Relations, 1861-1867* (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); and Schoonover, translated and edited, with Ebba Wesener Schoonover, *A Mexican View of America in the 1860s: A Foreign Diplomat Describes the Civil War and Reconstruction* (London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1991), quotation on p. 228; Lord Acton quoted in Douglas Southall Freeman, *R.E. Lee: A Biography*, 4 Vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934-5) IV, 517.

36 Geyer and Bright, 'Global Violence,' 629-30, 628.

Lloyd George and the Liberal party

DR DAVID POWELL

Since at least the 1960s, what Trevor Wilson dubbed 'the downfall of the Liberal party' has been a staple topic of debate among political historians.[1] Contributors have emphasised long-term or short-term causes, 'systematic' or 'accidental' factors. Among the latter, the Asquith-Lloyd George split of 1916 has loomed large, with Lloyd George (especially in the accounts of the Asquithians and their historians) frequently being cast as the catalyst of the party's disintegration and subsequent decline.[2] In Lloyd George's own career his relationship with the Liberal party has been seen as similarly problematic. The extent of his commitment to the ideas of Liberalism and to the Liberal party as a political organisation has been questioned, and he has been portrayed variously as an unscrupulous opportunist, using the party for personal ends, and as the more principled proponent of a form of 'national' government which sought to set aside the partisan sterilities of conventional politics in favour of consensual centrist rule.[3] Yet while each of these versions may contain some truth, the fact remains that for most of his career Lloyd George operated within the formal framework of Liberal politics, and that whatever his part in the Liberal collapse he also made significant contributions to the development of the party and its policies, from the 'New Liberalism' of the 1900s to the attempts to engineer Liberal revival in the 1920s. A review of Lloyd George's evolving relationship with the Liberal party before, during and after the First World War is thus important not just for a proper biographical understanding of one of the major political figures of the twentieth century but also for explaining the experience of the Liberal party in its Edwardian heyday and in the prolonged period of crisis that followed.

Pre-1914

From the 1880s to the early 1900s, Lloyd George's career was rooted firmly in the overlapping worlds of Welsh and British Liberalism. As a Liberal Welshman brought up in North Wales, and after his by-election victory in 1890 the elected MP for Caernarfon Boroughs, it was natural that much of Lloyd George's early focus should have been on issues related to the Welsh Nonconformist struggle with the landed, Anglican establishment. In the1890s his support for education and land reform, and the disestablishment of the Welsh Church, broadened, under the auspices of the *Cymru Fydd* organisation which he led, into a full-blown campaign for Welsh Home Rule.[4] Both Kenneth Morgan and, more recently, Emyr Price, have emphasised the importance of Welsh nationalism in Lloyd George's political rise, with Price in particular seeing it as a major strand in Lloyd George's career as a whole.[5] Yet the key point here, as John Grigg realised, was that there was no inconsistency between the 'nationalist' Lloyd George and the broader aims of the Liberal movement of the period. Lloyd George in the 1890s was for a time in conflict with official Liberal organisations (especially the South Wales Liberal Federation which resented the attempts by *Cymru Fydd* to take over the Welsh Liberal party), but Liberals throughout Britain generally supported the Liberal agenda in Wales.[6] Disagreements were over tactics and timing, rather than the fundamentals of policy. Lloyd George, moreover, from the earliest days of his career, was a Liberal in the British as well as the Welsh context. His first published political writing was a letter to the *North Wales Express* (written under the pen-name of 'Brutus') in November 1880 commenting on Lord Salisbury's foreign policy. As a young MP he spoke frequently on Liberal platforms in all parts of Britain, and in 1899-1902 played a prominent part in rallying Liberal opposition to the South African War. His speeches, too, showed a growing interest in the problems of urban poverty which blighted large parts of industrial Britain, as for example at Newcastle in April 1903 when he spoke of the 'condition of the people' as 'the problem which Liberalism has to grapple with if it is true to itself'.[7]

When Lloyd George was appointed to Campbell-Bannerman's cabinet in December 1905 as President of the Board of Trade he was thus not simply a 'token Welshman' but a representative leader

of radical Liberal opinion. The period from 1905 until 1914 was arguably the most creative phase of his Liberal career. As Chancellor of the Exchequer during Asquith's premiership after 1908 he held a pivotal position in the government and was influential in formulating Liberal policy and presenting the Liberal case to parliament, the press and public opinion. His span of interests also reflected the important transition that was taking place in Liberal politics following the landslide victory in the 1906 election, from the 'old Liberalism' of Free Trade, Nonconformity and attacks on 'feudalism' to the 'New Liberalism' of social reform and state-sponsored social welfare.[8] As Kenneth Morgan noted, Lloyd George's personal blend of the old Liberalism and the New was crucial in shaping the course of the pre-war Liberal administrations and adapting the Liberal party to meet the concerns of an increasingly working class electorate.[9] The aims of traditional radicalism were addressed in the battle for Welsh Disestablishment and the prolonged struggle to reduce the powers of the House of Lords. But New Liberal thinking was apparent in the introduction of old age pensions, Lloyd George's 1909 'People's Budget' and the schemes of health and unemployment insurance embodied in the 1911 National Insurance Act.[10] In promoting these measures Lloyd George worked closely with other ministers (Asquith and Churchill in particular), and drew heavily on the work of civil servants, junior ministers and extra-parliamentary advisers. However, he seemed to understand more clearly than most of his cabinet colleagues the political imperatives of what J.A.Hobson termed the 'crisis of Liberalism' and the electoral necessity of marrying historic Liberal objectives with a new programme of social and economic reform.[11] The extent to which Lloyd George was able to put his personal imprint on Liberal policy was demonstrated most clearly by the fusion of old and New Liberal elements in the 'Land Campaign' which he launched almost single- handedly after 1912, designed to extend the work of social reform to rural areas as well as tackling problems of slum housing and urban deprivation.[12] The identification of the landlord as 'enemy' combined with progressive policies such as a rural minimum wage was typical of the balance between traditional radicalism and more social democratic ideas which characterised Lloyd George's thinking while keeping him in the forefront of the debate about Liberalism's political future.

Lloyd George was central to the fortunes of the Liberal government and the Liberal party in other ways too. His actions were not always to the party's credit, most notably in the 'Marconi scandal' where he and some of his colleagues were accused of improperly using confidential information for private gain.[13] Marconi apart, however, Lloyd George contributed hugely to keeping the Asquith government in power after it had lost its independent Commons majority in the elections of 1910. He maintained the party's hold on Wales through his personal authority and support for the Nonconformist and national cause. He was also often the middleman in dealing with the party's other allies and client groups. For example, he established close relations with the Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald which did much to preserve the 'progressive alliance' between the Liberals and the nascent Labour party. Lloyd George also played the 'friend of Labour' in his trouble-shooting efforts to resolve industrial disputes such as those in the railway and coal industries. He was less successful in conciliating the women's suffrage movement, especially its militant 'suffragette' wing which singled him out as one of its principal targets, but he nonetheless did his best to ensure that the Liberals did not entirely lose the support of those who sympathised with franchise reform. He similarly acted as a contact between the government and the Irish Nationalists at the time over the controversy over the Liberals' Irish Home Rule Bill in 1912-14. Finally, his decision to support Asquith and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, in declaring war on Germany in August 1914 was vital in maintaining the unity of the Liberal party at a critical moment and probably saved the Liberal government from collapse. If George Dangerfield's classic view that the Liberal party was facing a 'strange death' in the Edwardian period has any credibility, it could therefore well be argued that Lloyd George did more than any other leader to avert its demise and breath fresh life into Liberalism and the Liberal movement.[14]

War and Coalition

The First World War had a dramatic impact on the fortunes of Lloyd George and the Liberal party, and the relationship between them. A crude oversimplification might be to suggest that Lloyd George rose to the challenge of war whereas his party did not. The major political landmarks of the war appear in retrospect to be staging posts in the Liberal decline: the end of the 'last Liberal

government' in 1915; the parliamentary split of December 1916; the Asquithians' catastrophic failure in the 'coupon' election of 1918.[15] Lloyd George's personal prestige, by contrast, rose as he became less identified with the Liberal party and more with the nation's struggle for survival, reaching its apotheosis in 1918 when he was returned to power at the head of a Conservative-dominated coalition as 'The Man Who Won the War'. From this scenario two questions emerge. One is to what extent Lloyd George could be held personally responsible for the circumstances that led to the Liberal collapse. The other is how far his increasing detachment from the party was the result simply of the exigencies of wartime politics, or whether it was the product of a longer-term suspicion of the party system and a preference for coalition or 'national' politics.

In this last respect, much has been made of Lloyd George's pre-war proposal for the formation of a coalition government in 1910 at the height of the constitutional crisis following the Lords' rejection of the 'People's Budget' in 1909. In a private memorandum written at the time of the 'constitutional conference' of party leaders which met during the summer he suggested the creation of a Liberal-Conservative coalition which would be able to address controversial issues like social reform, imperial defence and Irish Home Rule on an agreed basis, free from the heat of party conflict.[16] There were strong similarities between Lloyd George's ideas and those of the 'National Efficiency' movement which since the turn of the century had worked to mobilise support from across the political spectrum for the setting up of a non-party government to deal with pressing national problems.[17] Yet it is still not clear that Lloyd George's initiative was any more than a temporary expedient to break the deadlock of the constitutional conference rather than a deeper laid plan to overturn the structure of the party system. He favoured cooperation between parties where possible, but the reality of party still underpinned his political outlook. When, despite the backing of figures such as Churchill and F.E. Smith, Lloyd George's plan was rejected as impractical by the Conservative and Liberal leaders, he threw himself with vigour back into the party fray and for the next four years his political activities continued to take place within the Liberal fold.

The outbreak of war altered the context of politics but did not entirely end their party-political character. It was not until May 1915 that Asquith invited the Conservatives to join a coalition government, and then only because rising criticism from the Conservative backbenches threatened to undermine the 'patriotic opposition' practised by the leader Bonar Law since August 1914 and to precipitate a wartime general election which Asquith was anxious to avoid.[18] Even then Asquith was sufficient of a party leader to ensure that the Liberals kept most of the senior posts and had a majority of seats in the new cabinet. Lloyd George was a participant in these events, but the final decision to form a coalition was Asquith's alone. It was a decision, though, that in the longer run proved fatal to the survival of the Liberal party as a political force. The longer the war went on, the more the coalition was subjected to strains which it was ultimately unable to withstand, and in the eventual resolution of these tensions Lloyd George became a key figure. From May 1915 as Minister of Munitions, and then as Secretary of State for War after Kitchener's death in 1916, Lloyd George was one of the ministers principally responsible for the war effort. He became increasingly frustrated by the way in which war was being conducted, particularly the lack of effective central direction and what he described in a speech in December 1915 as 'the mocking spectre of "too late"' which dogged official policy.[19] His constant criticisms provoked some hostility from his Liberal colleagues in the government and led to him becoming more and more isolated from the rest of the cabinet's Liberal contingent, especially after Churchill's resignation towards the end of 1915. Some of the personality clashes had their roots in jealousy and suspicion of Lloyd George which dated from before the war, but they were related to a wider argument among Liberals about how the war should be fought. The most obvious example of this was the prolonged debate which preceded the introduction of full military conscription in 1916. Asquith delayed the decision until the last possible moment, to enable him gradually to win over Liberal opponents of the measure and maintain the unity of the government. But to Lloyd George and most of the Conservatives this epitomised the dilatory style of government of which they were increasingly critical. As setback followed setback for the allied forces in 1916 the calls for more decisive leadership grew steadily louder, eventually producing the ministerial crisis of December which led to Asquith's resignation and to Lloyd George's appointment to the premiership in his place.

The details and significance of this crisis have been endlessly discussed.[20] The extent to which Asquith was the victim of a Lloyd George 'plot' has naturally attracted divergent views. Lloyd George certainly allied himself with leading Conservatives in an attempt to persuade Asquith of the necessity of establishing a small War Committee to direct war policy, and it was seen as essential to the success of the plan that someone other than Asquith should be the committee's chair. Asquith saw the proposal as one which would publicly undermine his authority as prime minister, and his resignation may have been a ploy to outwit those he had come to see as his opponents by demonstrating his own indispensability and the lack of support for an alternative government. In this, of course, he was mistaken. Lloyd George was able to form an administration which had the backing of the Conservatives, the Labour party and about half the Liberal MPs. But this does not mean that he had deliberately conspired to oust Asquith, still less that he was seeking to damage or destroy the Liberal party of which he was still a member.[21] Indeed, he attempted to maintain party unity by securing Asquith's endorsement of the new coalition and inviting other leading Liberals to serve in his ministerial team. These overtures were rebuffed, however, and the Asquithians withdrew to the opposition benches.[22] Despite Asquith's assurances that he wanted to avoid an 'organic division' of the party, the personal and political differences between the two wings of the Liberal camp became increasingly apparent, climaxing in the Maurice debate of May 1918, when Lloyd George was forced to defend himself against Asquithian charges of having misled parliament about the strength of the British army in France. Lloyd George won the vote (by 293 to 106), but 98 Liberals went into the anti-government lobby.[23]

Even then the possibility of preserving Liberal unity had not completely evaporated. There was as yet no formal division of the party organisation or of the Liberal party in the country. As late as November 1918 Lloyd George was still offering Asquith the chance to rejoin the government. But once these negotiations had failed, the die was cast. Before the war ended, Lloyd George was planning a general election to secure a new mandate for his government following the passage of the 1918 Representation of the People Act.[24] He favoured a 'grand coalition' in which a reunited Liberal party would enhance the government's 'national' character. Asquith's refusal to serve rendered this impossible. As an alternative, Lloyd George had to improvise his own 'Coalition Liberal' organisation and to agree an electoral pact with the Conservatives under which he and Bonar Law approved a 'couponed' slate of pro-coalition candidates.[25] The sudden conclusion of the war in November 1918 did not delay the plans for an election, which was rapidly turned into a celebration of victory. The coalition secured a landslide majority, winning 526 seats in the new House of Commons, including 383 Conservatives and 133 Coalition Liberals. The Asquithians were completely routed, taking only 28 seats, with Asquith himself being one of the casualties at the polls. In one sense, Lloyd George's victory came at Asquith's expense. Lloyd George dominated the campaign and attacked his erstwhile colleagues in quite dismissive terms. Yet the Asquithians also contributed to their own downfall. They seemed unable to decide whether to support the coalition or oppose it. They had no definite programme and could not present themselves as a credible alternative government. The Liberal party would in any case have struggled in 1918 under Asquith's leadership, its members blamed by the electorate for the failures of the early part of the war and finding it difficult to gain a footing in post-war politics under the extended franchise and in the face of the first independent national challenge from a Labour party which fielded over 300 candidates and won 57 seats.[26] Their one chance might have been to sink their differences with Lloyd George and shelter behind the shield of the conquering hero, but this they were unwilling to do, leaving uncertainty as to who would carry the banner of Liberalism into the post-war political world.

1918 and after

The period of the post-war coalition, from 1918 to 1922, was when Lloyd George's relationship with the Liberal party was at its most tenuous and his impact on its fortunes most adverse. Lloyd George was personally estranged from most of the Asquithian leadership, his coalition government was in conflict with the independent Liberals at the polls and, in May 1920, Coalition Liberal MPs were forced to withdraw from a meeting of the National Liberal Federation because of the hostility

of their former colleagues. Asquithians were critical of some of the 'illiberal' aspects of coalition policy (for example the employment of the notorious 'Black and Tans' in Ireland), of the closeness of Lloyd George's alliance with the Conservatives, and of what was perceived as the increasingly corrupt nature of his personal rule. But even in this situation a certain paradox remains. The Lloyd George government pursued a number of policies that had a broad appeal to sections of Liberal opinion. It fulfilled the pre-war demand for Welsh Disestablishment. In 1919-20 a series of social measures were promoted as part of a plan of post-war Reconstruction which extended the provisions of the New Liberalism of 1906-14. In foreign and imperial affairs, while Lloyd George was not always successful, the administration was attempting to follow the path of imperial devolution and international conciliation.[27] At the same time, although Lloyd George was deliberately projecting himself as a 'national' figure, he was also the leader of the largest group of Liberal MPs in the House of Commons.In the spring of 1920 he attempted to bring about a 'fusion' of the Conservative and Coalition Liberal organisations into a single party which would provide him with a platform to extend his hold on power, but he was prevented from doing so when his Liberal followers rejected any move which involved abandoning the historic 'Liberal' label and turning their backs on their party traditions. With the failure of fusion, Lloyd George had to devote more time to his party role, creating what eventually became the National Liberal Party in 1922.[28] When the Conservatives withdrew from the coalition following the Carlton Club meeting in October 1922, it was the 'Lloyd George' Liberal party on which the former premier had to rely to maintain his political position at the ensuing general election.

Cut adrift from his power base in the coalition, Lloyd George gravitated back to his Liberal roots. The Lloyd George and Asquith factions reunited at the 1923 election in opposition to Baldwin's plans to replace Free Trade with an economic policy based on protection. The party failed to regain power, finishing third behind the Conservatives and Labour, and Asquith's decision to support a minority Labour government was rewarded only by the near obliteration of the Liberals at the 1924 election, when they were reduced to only 40 seats. But thereafter it was Lloyd George who was the prime mover in attempts to restore Liberal fortunes. This was often in the face of Asquithian resistance and obstruction. When Lloyd George, as chairman of the parliamentary party (Asquith having again lost his seat in 1924), took a more conciliatory line towards the unions in the General Strike than did the other Liberal leaders, they attempted to force him out of the party's shadow cabinet and were prevented from doing so only by a rank-and-file reaction in Lloyd George's favour. After Lloyd George had become effective leader of the party on Asquith's resignation in 1926 the leading Asquithians, including Viscount Gladstone and Edward Grey, formed a 'Liberal Council', the purpose of which was to maintain the supposed purity of their Liberalism undefiled by Lloyd George's corrupting genius. Nevertheless, Lloyd George gradually imposed himself once again on the party and its policies.[29] He installed Herbert Samuel as head of the party organisation and began rebuilding the party's electoral machine, resulting in a series of by-election victories and growing optimism about the party mounting a major challenge at the next general election. By then, too, Lloyd George had galvanised the party's brightest thinkers, already meeting since the early 1920s under the auspices of the annual Liberal Summer Schools, to produce a programme of policies to address the economic and social problems of 1920s Britain in a distinctively Liberal manner.[30] The centrepiece of this programme was the outcome of the Liberal Industrial Inquiry which Lloyd George chaired, the so-called 'Yellow Book', *Britain's Industrial Future*, published in 1928. This offered an extended version of the pre-war New Liberalism in the form of industrial co-partnership and state-sponsored economic development as an alternative to the capital-labour conflict of the other two parties and a 'third-way' between the extremes of socialism and protectionism which they represented. These ideas were crystallised into the pre-election pledges contained in the title of the 1929 pamphlet *We Can Conquer Unemployment*, the 'Orange Book' which provided the springboard for Lloyd George's general election campaign.

The Liberal bid for power failed. The party polled 5.3 million votes and won 59 seats but was unable to escape from its third party position. However, its MPs held the balance in the Commons between MacDonald's minority Labour government and the Conservative opposition, and Lloyd George did his best to turn the situation to party and national advantage. Learning from Asquith's

experience of 1924, when the Liberals had initially supported the first Labour government but received nothing tangible in return, Lloyd George attempted to use the party's bargaining position in a more constructive way, trading support for the government for concessions in policy and the prospect of electoral reform.[31] By mid-1930 Lloyd George and the Labour leaders had entered into detailed discussions over policies for the reform of agriculture and the relief of unemployment, and the government had indicated that it would introduce a Bill to provide for the use of the alternative vote in parliamentary elections. That these manoeuvres were not eventually more productive was not Lloyd George's fault. His efforts were undermined partly by the lukewarmness of Labour's response. Some Labour leaders were keen to cooperate with Lloyd George but MacDonald was suspicious of the former prime minister and was reluctant to do anything that might make it more difficult for Labour permanently to supplant the Liberals as the main party of the left. Equally damaging was the fact that Lloyd George's strategy provoked dissent in Liberal ranks, where MPs on the right of the party, led by Sir John Simon, would have preferred an alliance with the Conservatives to one with Labour. By June 1931 Simon and two colleagues had resigned the Liberal whip, and this was symptomatic of wider disunity within the parliamentary party, with internal feuds continuing to be fuelled by Asquithian antipathy to Lloyd George's leadership. The final straw which ended Lloyd George's experiment was the financial crisis of August 1931 which swept away the Labour administration and replaced it with an all-party National Government.[32] This gave the Liberals a tantalising return to the corridors of power but was ultimately destructive of party unity. Lloyd George was prevented by illness from participating in the government's formation; he then opposed the government's decision to hold a general election and resigned the party leadership to fight an independent campaign. The Liberal party itself divided into opposing camps, one led by Simon, the other by Lloyd George's official successor, Sir Herbert Samuel. The Simonites remained allies of the Conservatives throughout the 1930s. The Samuelites left the National Government in 1932 and moved into outright opposition in 1933, but were reduced to only 21 MPs at the 1935 election. Independent Liberalism continued to survive, and even made its peace with Lloyd George, but the existence of both was increasingly precarious and underwent no major revival before Lloyd George's death in 1945.

Viewed from the perspective of these later years, Lloyd George's relationship with the Liberal party might seem one productive only of dissension and decline. Apart from the halcyon days of the Edwardian period, when Liberalism was in the ascendant and Lloyd George its driving force, the rest of the story seems a sorry tale. Lloyd George was instrumental in provoking the Liberal split during the First World War, even if he was not its sole cause. At the 1918 election and between 1918 and 1922 he took a hostile attitude towards the independent Liberals and attempted to submerge the historic Liberalism of his followers in a fusion with the Conservatives. Even after he returned to the Liberal ranks in 1923 he was a disruptive presence and a focus of resentment for the Asquithian old guard, many of whom preferred to see the party beaten at the polls rather than prospering under Lloyd George's leadership. These personal divisions in turn reflected a deeper uncertainty in the party about the role of Liberalism in the post-war world and a debilitating dilemma as to where the party should position itself on the left-right spectrum of a Conservative-Labour political system.

Yet this should not be the final verdict on Lloyd George's contribution to the Liberal party or the Liberal cause. In the First World War he put country before party, but Asquith and his followers contributed to the Liberal split and their refusal to reunite under Lloyd George's leadership doomed the party to division and accelerated its decline. In the immediate post-war period Lloyd George could be forgiven for thinking that the Asquithian Liberal party was dead and for looking for alternative means of preserving his power and pursuing Liberal policies in an increasingly illiberal world. In this context, as has already been mentioned, the post-war coalition had a not unimpressive record, despite its failures and Lloyd George's need to work with a largely Conservative parliamentary majority. Kenneth Morgan certainly has claimed that in its social policies at least the Lloyd George coalition was in many ways a reincarnation or natural extension of the New Liberalism of pre-1914.[33] This strand of continuing inventiveness in relation to Liberal policy was demonstrated again by Lloyd George later in the 1920s, with the plethora of coloured books and the alternative economic strategy of 1929. Expert opinion might be divided about how practical Lloyd George's policies were, or how effective they would have been, but at least he was redefining what Liberalism meant in terms of

the new political agenda of the 1920s and providing the Liberals with a blueprint for a 'middle way' between a Conservative party of big business and a Labour party dominated by the trade unions. In this, as in his use of the Liberal party's diminished parliamentary power to broker deals and initiate a new era of what a later generation would call 'partnership politics', Lloyd George was pointing the way towards a future strategy for the party as it sought to escape from the wilderness of its third party status and work its way back to the centre of the political stage.[34] In these ways Lloyd George's relationship with the Liberal party and his longer term importance for the revival of Liberal fortunes can be cast in a more positive light, and a political tradition can be traced that links the age of Lloyd George to the more recent eras of Grimond and Thorpe, Steel, Ashdown, Kennedy and Campbell

NOTES

1. Trevor Wilson, *The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914-1935* (London, 1966). More recent historiographical summaries are G.R. Searle, *The Liberal Party: Triumph and Disintegration, 1886-1929* (London, 1992) and David Dutton, *A History of the Liberal Party* (Basingstoke, 2004).

2. According to one leading Asquithian, Sir John Simon, ' "The man who won the war" was also the man who engineered the Liberal collapse'. Viscount Simon, *Retrospect* (London, 1952), p 121.

3. R.J. Scally, *The Origins of the Lloyd George Coalition: the Politics of Social Imperialism, 1900-1918* explores Lloyd George's connections with the advocates of coalition before 1916; Martin Pugh, *Lloyd George* (London, 1988) offers a view of Lloyd George as representative of a 'centrist' tradition in British politics. On this general theme see also G.R.Searle, *Country before Party: Coalitions and the idea of National Government in Modern Britain, 1885-1987* (London, 1995). The best exposition of Lloyd George as unprincipled opportunist is probably Donald McCormick, *The Mask of Merlin* (London, 1963).

4. On the background to the *Cymru Fydd* ('Young Wales') movement and Welsh Liberalism in the period, see Kenneth O. Morgan, *Wales in British Politics, 1868-1922* (3rd ed, Cardiff, 1980).

5. Kenneth O. Morgan, *David Lloyd George: Welsh Radical as World Statesman* (Cardiff, 1963); Emyr Price, *David Lloyd George* (Cardiff, 2006). But see also Morgan's more nuanced view in Kenneth O. Morgan, 'Lloyd George and Welsh Liberalism' in J. Loades (ed), *The Life and Times of David Lloyd George* (Bangor,1991), pp 1-16.

6. John Grigg, *The Young Lloyd George* (London, 1973). Both Welsh Disestablishment and Welsh Home Rule (as part of the idea of 'Home Rule All Round') were Liberal party policy.

7. Quoted in Herbert Du Parcq, *The Life of David Lloyd George* (London, 1912-13) vol IV, p 618.

8. Michael Freeden, *The New Liberalism* (Oxford, 1978) examines the ideological background to this change.

9. Kenneth O. Morgan, *The Age of Lloyd George: the Liberal Party and British Politics, 1890-1929* (London, 1971), chapter 2.

10. The 'People's Budget' itself appealed to 'New Liberals' through its emphasis on progressive taxation and social reform while also satisfying, for example, temperance and land reformers by increasing taxes on alcohol and providing for a new tax on the unearned increment from land. Bruce K. Murray, *The People's Budget, 1909-10* (Oxford, 1980).

11. J.A. Hobson, *The Crisis of Liberalism* (London, 1909). The book consisted of a series of chapters on aspects of Liberal policy, drawing on articles published by Hobson over the previous two years. Lloyd George's personal awareness of the need for a 'new Liberalism' is seen clearly in his speeches, such as the one on 'Social Reform' at Swansea, 1 October 1908, reprinted in Du Parcq, *Op. Cit.*, vol IV, pp 638-644.

12. Ian Packer, *Lloyd George, Liberalism and the Land: The Land Issue in Party Politics in England, 1906-1914* (London, 2001).

13. F. Donaldson, *The Marconi Scandal* (London, 1962).

14. George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England* (London, 1935).

15. The impact of the war on the Liberal party is dealt with in Wilson, *Downfall of the Liberal Party* and in the histories of the party by Searle and Dutton mentioned above. For wartime politics generally, see John Turner, *British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict, 1915-1918* (Yale, 1992). Lloyd George's wartime career is covered in two volumes by John Grigg, *Lloyd George: From Peace to War, 1912-1916* (London, 1985) and *Lloyd George: War Leader, 1916-1918* (London, 2002).

16. The text of the memorandum is reprinted in John Grigg, *Lloyd George: The People's Champion, 1902-1911* (London, 1978), pp 362-8.

17. G.R.Searle, *The Quest for National Efficiency* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1971).

18. The events leading to the formation of the Asquith coalition are described in Cameron Hazlehurst, *Politicians at War, July 1914 to May 1915* (London, 1971). See also Turner, *British Politics and the Great War*, pp 56-61, and R.J.Q.Adams,*Bonar Law* (London, 1999), pp 180-87.

19. House of Commons, 20 December 1915, quoted in Bentley B. Gilbert, *Lloyd George: Organizer of Victory, 1912-1916* (London, 1992), p 281.

20. Turner, *British Politics and the Great War*, pp 124-41 provides a balanced summary. Lloyd George's role is fully analysed in Gilbert, *Lloyd George: Organizer of Victory*, chapter 10.

21. Although Lloyd George's relations with Asquith deteriorated as the crisis developed, eventually leading Lloyd George to tender his own resignation from the government, the balance of evidence suggests that Lloyd George would have been willing for Asquith to continue as prime minister and leader of the Liberal party in return for greater control of the war effort.

22. Of the two leading Asquithians approached by Lloyd George, Herbert Samuel refused the offer of the Home Secretaryship. Edwin Montagu declined to join the government in 1916 but became Secretary of State for India in 1917. Lloyd George also braved Conservative opposition to bring Churchill back into government in 1917 as Minister of Munitions.

23. The significance of the Maurice debate is discussed in Turner, *British Politics and the Great War*, pp 298-302, and Wilson, *Downfall of the Liberal Party*, pp 109-11.

24. The Act tripled the size of the pre-war electorate, from 7.9 to 21.4 million (including 8.4 million women voters) and introduced new constituency boundaries. The standard work on the 1918 Act is Martin Pugh, *Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906-1918* (London, 1974). For a briefer summary of its effects see G.I.T. Machin, *The Rise of Democracy in Britain, 1830-1918* (London, 2001), pp 143-7

25. The so-called 'Coupon' was in fact a letter of support from Lloyd George and Bonar Law to their approved candidates.

26. The Labour party formally withdrew from the coalition after the armistice, although some individual Labour ministers remained a members of the government.

27. The fullest study of the post-war coalition is Kenneth O. Morgan, *Consensus and Disunity: the Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-1922* (Oxford, 1979).

28. The fusion episode is treated more fully in David Powell, *British Politics, 1910-35: the crisis of the party system* (London, 2004), pp 96-101. On the Coalition Liberals, see Kenneth O. Morgan, 'Lloyd George's Stage Army' in A.J.P. Taylor (ed), *Lloyd George: Twelve Essays* (London, 1971), pp 225-56.

29. The most detailed examination of this phase of Lloyd George's career is John Campbell, *Lloyd George: The Goat in the Wilderness* (London, 1977).

30. On the Liberal Summer Schools, see John Campbell, 'The Renewal of Liberalism' in Gillian Peele and Chris Cook (ed), *The Politics of Reappraisal, 1918-1939* (London, 1975), chapter 3. Lloyd George's other contributions to the policy debate within the party included the publications *Coal and Power, The Land and the Nation* (the 'Green Book', from the colour of its cover), and *Towns and the Land* (the 'Brown Book').

31. By the late 1920s the Liberals realised that the first-past-the-post electoral system, which worked against third parties with evenly distributed support, was a major obstacle to their political recovery.

32. On the formation of the National Government R. Bassett, *Nineteen Thirty One: Political Crisis* (London, 1958) is still valuable, although there is a more recent account in Philip Williamson, *National Crisis and National Government: British Politics, the Economy and the Empire, 1926-1932* (Cambridge, 1992). For Lloyd George's role, see Campbell, *Goat in the Wilderness,* chapter 11.

33. Morgan, *Consensus and Disunity*, p 84.

34. There is a fuller treatment of this theme in David Powell, 'Lloyd George's Legacy to Liberalism' in Loades (ed), *David Lloyd George*, pp 101-114.

The Russian Civil War: Three Views on When it Began

DR MURRAY FRAME

In 1992 the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences convened a roundtable discussion on the Russian civil war, in connection with a projected new six-volume history of the conflict. In a lively and stimulating exchange of views, several fundamental problems of interpretation were considered, including the question of when the civil war actually started. The participants offered a number of alternative answers, ranging from the months before the October Revolution of 1917 to the spring of 1918. The timing of the roundtable might suggest that the discussants benefited from an ostensible post-Soviet academic liberalism, enabling them to explore, for the first time, a plurality of interpretations. Such an assumption, however, would be mistaken. Even during the Soviet period, when rigid official orthodoxies restricted the scope for scholarly debate (if not empirical research) on Russia's past, there was little consensus among historians about when the civil war began. Lenin had once declared that 'on the 25th of October 1917 civil war in Russia was a fact', and this prompted some Soviet historians to regard the October Revolution as the start of the conflict.[1] This line was followed, for instance, by S. F. Naida and his editorial team in their multi-volume history of the civil war published during the late 1950s.[2] Yet Lenin had also suggested that the civil war was not a 'fratricidal' conflict (a struggle of Russians against Russians), but rather a 'national resistance against international imperialism'.[3] This led other Soviet historians to date the beginning of the civil war to the onset of foreign intervention, notably by the Central Powers immediately prior to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on 3 March 1918, and by the Allies in the north, south and far-east of Russia during the summer and autumn of 1918. Historians of Russia in Britain, the United States and elsewhere likewise have provided a variety of perspectives on this matter.

Behind each interpretation of when the Russian civil war started lies a nuanced conception of what the conflict was fundamentally about and, controversially, who was to blame. The issue of blame, in particular, underlines the fact that, despite the receding distance of the civil war in time, scholars have often found it difficult to approach the topic dispassionately. In many respects, this is not surprising. The Russian civil war was one of the most brutal conflicts of modern times — it has been estimated that between seven and ten million people died in the conflict[4] — and it was a key moment in Russian history, a formative stage in the emergence of the Soviet system and all that entailed for the wider world. It would be wrong, however, merely to ascribe to each viewpoint an over-simplistic ideological or moral position about responsibility, since each has its empirical and interpretative merits, as well as its shortcomings. Broadly speaking, there are three main views about when the civil war began.

The first view, found in most studies of the civil war, is that the conflict began in the spring of 1918, when large-scale fighting erupted on the territory of the former tsarist empire. Contrary to popular myth, the opposing sides were not Reds and Whites (that is to say, the forces of the Bolshevik government versus the armies led by the White generals) but rather the Red Army and the units allied to the so-called 'democratic counter-revolution'. When the Bolsheviks seized Petrograd in October 1917, other revolutionary parties, notably the leftist group of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (the Left SRs), were persuaded that Lenin and his comrades were committed to the Constituent Assembly, elections to which were imminent. The Left SRs, in fact, formed a coalition government with the Bolsheviks partly on the basis of this assumption. However, when the Bolsheviks failed to secure a majority in the elections, held in November 1917, they proceeded to close down the Constituent Assembly after its first meeting in early January 1918. In the estimation of Vladimir Brovkin, 'More than any other event this was the watershed which set the chain of events in motion leading to the civil war'.[5]

Two other developments compounded the growing alienation of the Left SRs from their coalition partners. The first was the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which ended Russia's involvement in the First

World War. Like many members of the Bolshevik Party, notably Nikolai Bukharin, the Left SRs fervently believed that it was the duty of the new regime to continue the fight against the Central Powers in order to spread the revolution beyond Russia's borders. They anticipated initially that the Bolsheviks intended to use the treaty to gain a 'breathing space' before resuming the struggle against Germany and Austria-Hungary in the full expectation that revolution was about to break out in those countries. It soon became apparent that this was not Lenin's intention, and in consequence the Left SRs withdrew from the coalition government. The second development was the implementation of a grain requisitioning system in May 1918 in order to procure grain for the Red Army and for urban areas. The Socialist Revolutionary party was largely an agrarian organization which claimed to represent the interests of the peasantry, and its members objected to the harsh measures meted out to its electoral base by grain-requisitioning detachments. In the view of Geoffrey Swain, it was these events above all that brought about the civil war. 'Although it flickered in autumn 1917,' writes Swain, 'the civil war proper was ignited by Lenin's twin decisions in spring 1918 to sign a peace treaty with Germany and to start the construction of a socialist state by socializing Russia's agriculture'.[6] Swain further suggests that the latter policy was the most significant in bringing about the civil war, which, he attests, effectively began with 'a clash between the Bolsheviks and the peasantry'.[7]

A major role in the militarization of the growing stand off between the Bolsheviks and their erstwhile coalition partners was played by the famous Czechoslovak Legion. The legion was formed during the First World War from Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war on Russian territory. Prior to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, it was regarded by the Bolsheviks as a potentially useful weapon, insofar as its aim was to help defeat the Central Powers and to establish an independent Czechoslovak state. It was for this reason that, in May 1918, the legion was *en route* to France, via Siberia, in order to augment Allied forces on the Western Front. After the Bolsheviks signed a separate peace with the Germans, however, the status of the legion changed. The Germans were wary of the legion because it was an anti-German force, and they requested that it be disarmed. The Bolsheviks, in order to placate the Central Powers and to ward off a military assault against their fledgling regime, duly endeavoured to comply. The legion, however, resolved to continue its journey east, and in the process of resisting attempts by local soviets to force it to disarm, it seized control of key areas along the Trans-Siberian railway, including Samara, an important city on the Volga. The Left SRs, as well as moderate SRs, seized this opportunity and joined forces with the legionnaires. They were natural allies, since they also opposed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. These developments resulted in the formation in Samara of the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly (known as Komuch from its Russian acronym) in mid-June 1918. Brovkin describes this as 'the beginning of the frontline civil war'.[8] The combined forces of the Czechoslovak Legion and Komuch posed the first serious military threat to the Bolsheviks. On 8 August 1918, they captured the strategically important city of Kazan, which held the entire stock of Russia's gold reserves. These events sparked the Bolsheviks into action. The Red Terror began in earnest, and Trotsky stepped up his efforts to forge a Red Army, which soon pressed back the forces of Komuch, recapturing Kazan, and then Samara itself in September 1918. Komuch was then subsumed under the Directory, the name of the government set up by the Union for the Regeneration of Russia in Ufa in September 1918 to run the non-Bolshevik parts of Russia. It was dominated by Right SRs, Popular Socialists and some Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), and its primary aim was to organize new elections to a Constituent Assembly.

It was not the Bolsheviks, however, who finally put paid to the democratic counter-revolution. Instead, in November 1918, the Directory (which had since relocated from Ufa to Omsk) was overthrown by the reactionary figure of Alexander Kolchak, who proclaimed himself supreme ruler of Russia, an act which drove the SRs back into the camp of the Bolsheviks. This renewed 'alliance' between the Bolsheviks and the SRs was possible for two reasons. First of all, the SRs were not prepared to support an undemocratic, militaristic regime of the sort envisaged by Kolchak. And secondly, the end of the First World War in November 1918 (the same month as Kolchak's coup) effectively nullified the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, thus removing at a stroke one of the main reasons why the Left SRs had abandoned the coalition with the Bolsheviks and pursued a civil war with them. This marked the beginning of a new phase of Russia's civil war, one that saw the major battles between the Reds and the Whites. This interpretation of the outbreak of the civil war

has much to commend it. It focuses on how large-scale fighting commenced, and, as emphasized by Brovkin and Swain, it reveals the complexity of the conflict. According to this view, the civil war began not as a struggle between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution, but between the Bolsheviks and the representatives of the Constituent Assembly (hence the term democratic counter-revolution).

A second view is that the civil war began earlier, namely with the October Revolution of 1917. As Evan Mawdsley points out, the conventional emphasis on the events of 1918 as the starting point of the civil war is problematic because 'it suggests a peaceful start to Soviet power, increases the weight of "foreign intervention" (the Czechoslovaks), and links radical Bolshevik policies to the outbreak of fighting'.[9] Mawdsley's own view is that the conflict began with the October Revolution: 'The Russian Civil War, then, began in the autumn of 1917. To be precise, it began on 25 October during the evening.'[10] In his history of the civil war, published in 1975, J. F. N. Bradley suggested that the conflict started with the Bolshevik decision to seize power. The Bolshevik coup against the Provisional Government, he argued, was a minority assault on a broadly representative government, and it was this that made civil war likely. This is also the view of E. G. Gimpelson, a scholar at the Institute of Russian History, who argues that 'it was the October Revolution that directly embroiled Russia in the Civil War' because it led to a dictatorship which was bound to provoke opposition.[11] Advocates of this interpretation point to the military skirmish on 30 October 1917 at Pulkovo Heights on the outskirts of Petrograd as evidence that the Bolshevik coup provoked the initial confrontation of the civil war. David Footman, for instance, writes of the fighting beginning 'haphazardly' at Pulkovo Heights.[12] Alexander Kerensky, the deposed Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, had rallied the small Cossack force of General P. N. Krasnov against the Bolsheviks. They were met by troops led by Colonel M. A. Muraviev, a radical SR who was turning to the Bolsheviks in the belief that soviet power was about to be declared by Lenin. That Krasnov was later part of the White movement should not obscure the fact that, at Pulkovo Heights, he was fighting, it seemed, for Kerensky (himself an SR), not for the reactionary Whites.[13] It is also worth noting that contemporaries referred to the October Revolution and the ensuing skirmish at Pulkovo Heights as 'civil war', although that in itself should not unduly influence *historical* interpretations.[14] Shortly after these events, the anti-Bolshevik forces of the Volunteer Army began to coalesce in the Don Cossack territories to the south-east. After they were pushed back by the Red Army into the Kuban steppe in the famous 'Ice March', the remnants formed the basis of General Anton Denikin's White forces.

This interpretation of when the civil war began is also problematic. It suggests that the civil war started as resistance to the Bolsheviks, and implicitly apportions the burden of responsibility to them. Lenin, of course, had always anticipated civil war, but this did not necessarily make him responsible for it.[15] It is important to remember that the Bolsheviks were only one component of an increasingly fractured and polarised political and social environment in 1917, and one of the pitfalls of dating the civil war from their takeover of Petrograd in October is that it obscures growing signs of civil war prior to October. This brings us to a third view of when the conflict started. When Geoffrey Swain noted that civil war 'flickered in autumn 1917' he was referring primarily to an early White counter-revolutionary conspiracy, namely the Kornilov affair, as well as to the Bolshevik insurrection against the Provisional Government. Is there a case, then, for dating the outbreak of civil war to the months prior to October 1917? During the 'April crisis' of 1917, a political and social confrontation in Petrograd prompted by Foreign Minister P. N. Miliukov's 'secret' note to the Allies (in which he confirmed Russia's commitment to the war), the commander of the Petrograd military district, Lavr Kornilov, advocated the use of force against street demonstrators. The Provisional Government rejected this approach, which Kornilov regarded as symptomatic of its inherent weakness in the face of the Petrograd Soviet and popular forces. Soon after these events, an organization called the Society for the Economic Rehabilitation of Russia was formed, consisting of key industrialists concerned about what they regarded as growing political chaos. They looked to Kornilov, among others, as a potential saviour, a 'man on horseback', and began plotting a right-wing coup against the Provisional Government. The Russian Army, meanwhile, launched the disastrous June offensive, the failure of which was blamed by military leaders on revolutionary elements, especially the soviets. On 18 July, in the wake of the failed offensive, Kornilov was made Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Russia's

armed forces, and not long afterwards, on 23 July, Kerensky became Prime Minister. The new head of the Provisional Government was confident that he could contain Kornilov, whom some regarded as a potentially dangerous figure. Kerensky, however, either misunderstood or underestimated Kornilov, who attempted to stage a coup on behalf of conservative elements at the end of August. When it became clear to Kerensky that Kornilov wanted to replace him as Prime Minister, he appealed to the Petrograd Soviet which rallied support against Kornilov and had him arrested.[16]

The major consequence of the Kornilov affair was the further polarization of Russian politics and society, and the Bolshevik insurrection can only be explained in this context. If the civil war is defined broadly as a struggle between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution, then the evidence suggests that this struggle was underway before October 1917. Moreover, it did not start as a struggle between the Bolsheviks and their enemies, but between the Whites and the Provisional Government (itself a revolutionary regime, a fact which occasionally gets lost in analyses of the Bolshevik insurrection and the civil war). V. I. Petrov of the Institute of Russian History, however, disputes the notion that the Kornilov affair was an episode of the civil war. It is wrong, he suggests, to confuse the use (or attempted use) of armed force against a government with civil war as such. What makes civil war different is that 'fundamental social questions are resolved through armed force'. Petrov suggests that the civil war began soon after the October Revolution, although he does not consider that event to have been part of the conflict as such. Rather, the months from October 1917 to February 1918 were a 'prologue' to civil war. For Petrov, what sparked off 'large-scale civil war' was the German and Austro-Hungarian invasion of February 1918 because it stimulated anti-Soviet forces.[17]

The answer to the question 'when did the civil war begin' depends to a large degree on definitions, bearing in mind the general understanding of civil war as a violent struggle for political control of a country. Each of the three views outlined above has its merits and its shortcomings. Emphasis on the events of 1918 concentrates attention on when large-scale fighting began, and it reminds us that a significant aspect of the civil war was the struggle between the Bolsheviks and the representatives of the Constituent Assembly. It is possible to argue, however, that the beginning of large-scale fighting should not be confused with the start of the conflict as such. The civil war, after all, involved much more than a military clash between the Bolsheviks and the democratic counter-revolution, and some of the key issues were being contested already before 1918. Emphasis on the earlier date of October 1917 and the clash at Pulkovo Heights focuses attention on the key role played by the Bolshevik insurrection, yet it deflects attention from the fact that the insurrection itself was symptomatic of a process of political and social polarization that had already started in the spring of 1917. The merit of the third view is that, although it focuses on a period when military conflict had not yet started, it takes us back to the inception of counter-revolution, without which there might have been a more peaceful resolution of Russia's dilemmas.

The Russian civil war was a profoundly complex struggle, and ascertaining when it began also partly depends on which aspect of the conflict one has in mind. In many respects, it makes more sense to refer to multiple civil wars occurring in Russia from 1917 to the early 1920s, all of which commenced at different times and created a complex, multilayered conflict. It might therefore be appropriate to conclude with the assessment of Yury Igritsky (Institute of Scientific Information in the Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences), which has much to commend it: 'there was a chain of prerequisites and sequentially ordered preludes to the Civil War in Russia, and this chain included all the events and landmarks of history that various researchers believe to mark the start of the Civil War itself'.[18]

NOTES

1 Quoted in J. F. N. Bradley, *Civil War in Russia 1917-1920* (London and Sydney, 1975), p. 10.

2 S. F. Naida *et al.*, *Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny*, vols 2-5 (Moscow, 1957-60).

3 Bradley, *Civil War in Russia*, p. 11.

4   Evan Mawdsley, *The Russian Civil War* (Boston, 1987). p. xi.

5   Vladimir N. Brovkin, *Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War: Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918-1922* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1994), p. 11.

6   Geoffrey Swain, *Russia's Civil War* (Stroud, Gloucestershire, 2000), p. 27.

7   Swain, *Russia's Civil War*, p. 19.

8   Brovkin, *Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War*, p. 18.

9   Mawdsley, *Russian Civil War*, p. 3.

10   Mawdsley, *Russian Civil War*, p. 3.

11   'The Civil War in Russia: A Roundtable Discussion', *Russian Studies in History*, vol. 32, no. 4 (spring 1994), p. 76.

12   David Footman, *Civil War in Russia* (London, 1961), p. 22. Footman then went on to state that: 'The first round of the Civil War proper dates from January, 1918, when the Bolsheviks, with such troops as they could scrape together, launched a two-pronged offensive against the Ukraine and the Don, whose locally established governments had proclaimed their independence' (p. 22). Again, the underlying message is clear – it was the Bolsheviks who launched the civil war.

13   Swain, *Russia's Civil War*, pp. 33-4.

14   Brovkin, *Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War*, p. 9.

15   By 'civil war', Lenin generally meant a more violent incarnation of 'class war'. See Robert Service, *Lenin: A Biography* (Basingstoke and London, 2000), pp. 356-57.

16   For further details on the Kornilov affair as a 'failed White counter-revolution', see Geoffrey Swain, *The Origins of the Russian Civil War* (Harlow, Essex, 1996), chapter one.

17   'The Civil War in Russia: A Roundtable Discussion', p. 75. The view that the months from October 1917 to February 1918 constituted a prologue to civil war was advanced in 1976 by Vasily Polikarpov of the Institute of General History, part of what was then the Soviet Academy of Sciences. For a discussion, see John Erickson, 'Pens versus Swords: A Study of Studying the Russian Civil War, 1917-22' in Chris Wrigley (ed.), *Warfare, Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor* (London, 1986), pp. 120-41.

18   'The Civil War in Russia: A Roundtable Discussion', p. 85.

Communists against the Weimar Republic: New Perspectives in the Post-Cold War World

DR NORMAN LAPORTE

Introduction

The historiographical debates on communism during the Weimar Republic turn on one quintessential question: the extent to which its origins, development and, ultimately, political failure were a result of endogenous or exogenous factors.[1] In other words, was the German Communist Party (KPD) a movement of German militants or was it merely Moscow's marionette? It is a debate with a long history, which was revived after the end of communism in 1989/90 with the availability of new documentation that had previously been located behind the Berlin Wall. Although the debate is more nuanced than it is sometime credited with,[2] the main adversaries in the dispute during the 1990s took polarised positions. Hermann Weber, the author of the highly influential 'Stalinisation' thesis, held to his earlier assertions that the KPD was transformed during the mid-1920s from a mass movement rooted in the German workers' movement into a 'foreign legion fighting for Stalin's USSR'.[3] The most vociferous challenger of this interpretation was Klaus-Michael Mallmann, who asserted that the strongest influence on German communism was the local milieu in which the movement was located. If Berlin's directives on Moscow's behalf did not make sense to local militants, they were reshaped or abandoned by them.[4] However, the emphasis of these interpretations on the party, on the one hand, and the movement, on the other, fails to bring out the complexities of a wide range of interactions between the party and the movement in Germany, as well as between the party leadership in Berlin and Moscow. While concurring with Weber that the influence of the Bolshevik Revolution is central to any understanding of the character and development of German communism, this essay will focus on areas of interaction between Moscow and Germany. It will also draw attention to an understated consensus in the literature: German communism was the irreconcilable enemy of the Weimar Republic.

Communism as Mass Movement

It was not until the end of 1920 that German communism became a mass movement. Admittedly, at the turn of 1918/19 the KPD was founded as the fusion of a number of revolutionary sects, most prominently the Spartacist League and the International Communists of Germany. However, their inherent political and ideological incompatibility led to the party's fragmentation in October 1919. German communism had played almost no part in the Revolution of 1918, the movement of workers' and soldiers' councils or the vast industrial protest movement that spread throughout wide sections of the country's economic heartlands in 1919.[5] Importantly, however, the conflicts in German society providing the basis for a mass communist movement had begun to take shape. The war and then the extended period of 'revolution' and socio-political upheaval divided the German workers' movement into two mutually hostile camps. In 1917, the SPD (Social Democratic Party) split into a 'majority' wing, the MSPD, and the Independent Socialist Party (USPD), which opposed the MSPD's support for the Kaiser's war effort and the policy of 'civil peace'. When the old regime fell in the autumn of 1918, the MSPD limited its aims to the introduction of a universal franchise. In government, the party's leadership tried to stabilise the new republic using the troops of the old imperial army to suppress the protests of radical workers and the remnants of the councils formed in the November Revolution. The *Noskepolitik* – named after the eponymous MSPD Minister – left a deep and enduring division between radicalised and moderate workers in the localities witnessing these conflicts.[6] Similarly, more radical workers were alienated from the so-called 'Weimar Compromise' by the 'Central Working Agreement' between the MSPD, the Free Trade Unions and the employers, which failed to include industrial workers' demands for the nationalisation of heavy industry. Hammering on the social

on the social cleavages that grew out of the austerity of the war-time economy, the social tensions of 1918/20 fuelled the rise of the USPD. By 1920, the party had over 750,000 members and gained 18.3 percent of the votes in that year's Reichstag elections – only three points behind the SPD.[7] Importantly, there was no longer majority electoral support for the parties of the 'Weimar Compromise' – the MSPD, the Catholic Centre Party and the Democrats.

For the now dominant leftwing of the USPD, however, electoral success had come with no tangible political successes. Disappointment with the course of developments in Germany increased the attraction of the Bolshevik Revolution. It led the majority of the USPD's membership to endorse membership of the Communist International (Comintern), on the basis of the '21 Conditions' of entry laid down by Moscow. Accepting these conditions meant that the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) in Moscow could issue binding policy directives and expel recalcitrant individuals, even entire communist parties, for non-compliance.[8] It was a relationship of mixed blessings. As the Bolsheviks began to stabilise their rule in Russia the so-called 'revolutionary tide' in Europe ebbed. Increasingly, the KPD's policy was caught between representing its constituency in Germany and the demands of Soviet foreign policy. One telling early example of this was the so-called 'March Action' of 1921. Comintern emissaries in Germany put the party leadership under pressure to initiate an uprising. Yet, the main purpose of this 'action' was not to launch the German revolution, but almost certainly aimed to bring down Germany's anti-Soviet government and to distract world attention from the anti-Bolshevik Kronstadt Rising in Russia. When the VKPD's (United Communist Party) chairman, Paul Levi, publicly expressed his hostility to these events and their devastating impact on the party, he was 'purged' for breaking 'party discipline'.[9]

However, association with Moscow and its seeming alternative to the Weimar Republic among important sections of the working classes made the KPD the largest communist party outside of Soviet Russia. In December 1920, the VKPD's membership exceeded 350,000; although this figure fell dramatically as a result of the 'March Action', it exceeded this level during the crisis year of 1923. During the years of 'relative stabilisation' (1924-1928), party membership fell to around 100,000; then, following the impact of the Great Depression, again reached some 360,000. Electoral support for the KPD also served as a political barometer. In June 1920, before the merger with the USPD, the party gained 2.1 percent of the vote; this rose to 12.9 percent in the May 1924 election, falling slightly in the elections of 1928, before peaking at 16.9 percent in November 1932 – a figure almost equalling the SPD vote. Crucially, the KPD's constituency increasingly reflected a sociological split in the German working class. During the mid-1920s, the process of industrial rationalisation created structural unemployment; it was these workers, and underemployed unskilled 'mass workers', who saw the KPD as a vehicle to voice their rejection of the Weimar Republic.[10] In this respect, the KPD was firmly located in the party system. With the exception of the Catholic Centre Party, every party representing middle-class interests that entered government lost wide sections of its supporters who felt unwilling to shoulder the compromises necessary to stabilise the new democracy. The impact of inflation culminating in hyperinflation, followed by the currency stabilisation of 1923/24 and then the Great Depression fuelled the rise of the Nazi Party.[11] Similarly, the KPD increasingly represented those workers who felt that the SPD's compromises in government failed to account for their interests. Radicalisation and polarisation were the key features of political life.

More recent research also illustrates how the seminal experience of most of the KPD's membership – in 1928 some 80 percent were between 25 and 40 years of age – was the Great War. The brutalising and radicalising impact of the war drew them to the KPD's political intransigence and aggressive street politics.[12] The communist presence on the streets provided a crucial function. It enabled the party to transmit its anti-system political message, counter-posing the KPD's political activism and outright hostility to Weimar with the SPD's role as the parliamentary-based 'party of state'.[13] Even in the years of 'relative stability' the KPD was able to use extra-parliamentary means to express these discontents. In 1925, the scale of the KPD's presence on the streets of Berlin – the seat of government – prompted the Reich Commissioner for Public Order to conclude that the level of disorder was part of a communist plan for a 'second revolution'.[14]

Soviet Inspiration and Stalinist Domination

According to Weber, the 'Stalinisation' of German communism was made possible by the KPD's increasingly close financial, political and ideological dependence on Moscow, which inevitably subordinated German interests those of Soviet Russia.[15] Of course, much of this is absolutely accurate. The party needed 'Moscow's gold' to staff the bureaucracy of full-time officials – the movement's 'professional revolutionaries' – and to published an array of theoretical journals and newspapers. From the mid-1920s, these officials were trained at the International Lenin School in Moscow, which produced a cadre of ultra-loyal *apparatchiks* who were charged with ensuring Comintern policy was put into practice. In the KPD, the most important of these figures was Walter Ulbricht, who notoriously monitored dissent in the KPD's leadership and helped organise the purges of Stalin's German critics.[16] The centralisation of authority was symbolised by the mimetic cult of leadership which emulated Stalin's role in the Soviet Union. The German leader, Ernst Thälmann, was the prototype of the new 'resolutely proletarian' leadership being installed throughout the international communist movement. Yet the Thälmann cult, like other aspects of the party's relationship with Moscow, helped offer the party a sense of identity and belief that resolute support for the Soviet Union was the surest guarantee for the future German revolution. One example of this was Thälmann's role as chairman of the party's paramilitary organisation, the League of Red Front Fighters (RFB). In what amounted to displays of communist strength in the capital city, Thälmann – attired in a uniform modelled on the Red Army's – addressed thousands of militants in speeches emphasising the party's irreconcilable hostility to the 'Weimar system' and readiness to defend the Soviet Union. With its clenched fist emblem and shouts of 'Red Front' and 'Heil Moscow', the RFB symbolised the militant, combative temper of Weimar communism.[17]

Seeing the new dawn rising in the East was also ingrained in the KPD's campaigning, from the annual celebration of the October Revolution to repeated actions organised under the slogan 'Hands off Soviet Russia'.[18] Of course, identification with Bolshevism as a means of fulfilling a social-psychological need was most pronounced among higher-ranking officials. Karl Retzlaw, a senior *apparatchik*, believed that 'leaving the party was as much out of the question as for a bishop to leave the church'.[19] Heinz Neumann, one of the party's three leading figures during the early 1930s, was unable to imagine a meaningful life outside the communist movement. According to his wife's autobiography, Neumann had 'extraordinary powers of self-deception', which allowed him to overlook what was going wrong with the development of Soviet communism. His inability to break with Stalin after a dispute with him over KPD policy in 1932 led to his execution by the Soviet secret police in the 'Great Terror' of the mid-1930s[20] – an experience far from unusual among KPD leaders. It was these psychological mechanisms that help explain why so few leaders of German communism felt able to break with Bolshevism.

'First Hitler, Then Our Turn!'

The KPD's relationship with Moscow had its most devastating impact during the early 1930s.[21] Tied to the 'general line' imposed on all of the Comintern's member parties at the World Congress of 1928, the KPD was unable to respond adequately to the rise of the Nazi Party as a mass movement. Instead, the KPD held to the ideology of the Comintern's so-called 'Third Period' of wars and revolution, which asserted that 'social fascism' – as the SPD was now labelled – was communism's 'main enemy', which had to be destroyed before revolution was possible. As we have noted, there were reasons for the KPD's supporters to maintain their hostility towards the SPD during the early 1930s. In Prussia, by far the largest of the German *Länder*, the SPD continued to lead a coalition government until mid-1932. Here, and at local level throughout Germany, they were held responsible for administering cuts in unemployment benefits and pay, and closely identified with the repeated crises of capitalism in post-war Germany.[22] However, in Saxony, for example, Communist and Social Democrats were abundantly aware that they had a common enemy, and fought together – or, at least, defended themselves – against Nazi violence on the streets.[23] In the KPD leadership, by contrast, there was no serious revision of the view that the SPD was the 'main enemy'. The tensions within the KPD

leadership that did cause a number of shifts in policy emphasis came, rather, from disagreements on how far to enter into *de facto* collaboration with the Nazi Party against the SPD.[24]

Two examples illustrate the extent of the KPD leadership's readiness to harness the Nazis' hostility towards the SPD for their own purposes. In 1931 the KPD finally opted to take part in a referendum campaign initiated by the Nazis and Nationalists which, under the Weimar constitution, had the potential to bring down the SPD-led Prussian government. The KPD's participation was forced by Moscow as a means of exerting influence on the direction of German foreign policy. Chancellor Brüning, who headed a 'presidential cabinet' (i.e. without a parliamentary majority) was seeking to improve relations with France and, more generally, the West, which intensified Soviet fears of being encircled by hostile powers. It was a policy that the SPD supported. Again in 1932, the Comintern's Executive Committee intervened to reinforce the 'principal struggle' against the SPD. In the autumn of 1932, the KPD tried to mobilise its supporters to bring about strikes against another wave of pay cuts. In its efforts to prevent the Social Democratic-led trade unions settling these disputes through arbitration another *de facto* collaboration took place with the pro-Nazi workers. The most significant development was the Berlin Transport Workers' strike, which brought the capital to a standstill during the November Reichstag elections producing another 'red scare'. In the summer, the KPD had joined a 'strike committee' which included Nazi representatives. To the horror of the party's older members, new recruits to communism stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Nazis on picket lines. This policy was expressed in the party slogan, 'First Hitler, Then Our Turn!' It encapsulated the KPD's choice of destroying the Weimar Republic and its 'party of state', the SPD, in a manner preventing any meaningful co-operation with the SPD to 'save' it.

Conclusions

Although it is impossible to understand the dynamics and character of German communism without close reference to the influence exerted by Bolshevik Russia, it was the specific developments in Germany that made communism a mass movement. More recent comparative studies demonstrate that, while all communist parties adopted the structures and ideology of Bolshevism, world communism was not a monolithic movement marching in lockstep.[25] Communism in the Third World was very different to communism in Europe, and communism in differing European countries was sufficiently specific to talk of 'communisms' in the plural. For example, while the British and French parties maximised their societal influence during the relatively moderate 'popular front' policies of the 1930s, the development of Weimar Germany as a failed state disposed the KPD to ultra-leftism and an irreconcilable struggle against the state. Equally, the mechanisms subordinating the KPD – and other communist parties – to Moscow's policies were not only the threat of expulsion and the loss of financial resources. Belief in the Bolshevik Revolution became central to the identity of party leaders and rank-and-file activists, who saw 'defence' of Soviet Russia as part of their own struggle to overthrow capitalism at home.

NOTES

1   For a valuable English-language review of the literature, see Richard Croucher, 'Shifting Sands: Changing Interpretations of the History of German Communism', in: *Labour History Review* vol. 68, Nr.1 (2003), pp. 11-31.

2   Regional studies were often more suited to differentiating between the party and the movement, see Norman LaPorte, *The German German Communist Party in Saxony, 1924-1933* (Peter Lang: Bern, 2003).

3   Hermann Weber, 'The Stalinisation of the KPD: Old and New Views' (trans. Ben Fowkes), in Norman LaPorte, Kevin Morgan and Matthew Worley (eds.), *Stalinisation and Beyond. Problems and Perspectives in International Communism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008). Weber has been writing on this topic since the 1950s.

4   Klaus-Michael Mallmann, *Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik. Sozialgeschichte einer revolutionären Bewegung* (Wissenscahftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt, 1997)

5   Hans Bock, *Syndikalismus und Linkskommunismus von 1918-1923* (Anton Hain: Meisenheim am Glan, 1969).

6   K.-M., Mallmann, 'Milieu, Radikalismus und lokale Gesellschaft. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Kommunismus in der Weimarer Republik', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 21, 1 (1995), pp. 5–31.

7   The classic study remains, Robert Wheeler, *Die USPD und Die Internationale* (Ullstein: Berlin, 1984)

8   Hermann Weber, *Kommunismus in Deutschland 1918-1945* (Wissenscahftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt, 1983), p.46

9   Jean-François Fayet, 'Paul Levi and the Turning Point of 1921', in: LaPorte/Morgan/Worley (eds.), *Stalinisation and Beyond*.

10 The literature is extensive; for a review of it see, LaPorte, *German Communist Party*, pp. 21-30.

11 See the essays in Conan Fischer, *The Rise of National Socialism and the Working Classes in Weimar Germany* (Berghahn: Oxford, 1996).

12 Mallmann, *Sozialgeschichte,* pp. 106-118.

13 M.-L. Ehls, *Protest und Propaganda. Demonstrationen in Berlin zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin, New York, 1997), p. 229.

14 Ibid., pp. 113–118, 227–82.

15 Weber, op. cit.

16 Mario Frank, *Walter Ulbricht. Eine deutsche Biographie* (Berliner Tachenbuch Verlag: Berlin, 2001), esp. pp. 72-104.

17 Norman LaPorte and Kevin Morgan, 'Kings among their subjects? Ernst Thälmann, Harry Pollitt and the leadership cult as Stalinisation', in idem (eds.), *Stalinisation and Beyond*.

18 Eric D. Weitz, *Creating German Communism, 1890-1990. From Popular Protest to Socialist State* (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1997), pp. 233-79.

19 K. Retzlaw, *Spartakus. Aufsteig und Niedergang. Erinnerungen eines Parteiarbeiters* (Frankfurt/M, 1972), p. 294.

20 M. Buber-Neumann, *Von Potsdam nach Mokau. Stationen eines Irrweges* (Munich, 2002), pp. 148–71.

21 For a fuller discussion of these events, see Norman LaPorte, 'Presenting a Crisis as an Opportunity: The KPD and the Third Period, 1929-33' in: Matthew Worley (ed.), *In Search of Revolution* (I B Tauris: London, 2004), pp. 38-64.

22 E. Rosenhaft, *Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence, 1929-33* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1983).

23 LaPorte, *German Communist Party*, esp. 329-44.

24 See M. Frank, *Ulbricht*, pp. 86-100.

25 Norman LaPorte and Matthew Worley, 'Towards a Comparative History of Communism: The British and German Communist Parties to 1933', in: *Contemporary British History* (forthcoming: 2008).

Making Fascists out of Italians: Mussolini's 'cultural revolution'

DR PHILLIP MORGAN

The infamous words, 'when I hear the word "culture", I reach for my revolver', were attributed to the Nazi leader, Hermann Göring, and have served to characterise fascism in general as an essentially violent and anti-intellectual political movement. The political and social historical studies of fascism, which used to dominate the field, usually dismissed the cultural output of the fascist regimes as 'just' propaganda (I get the same reaction from my final year students on the Third Reich module), deliberately designed to disguise the reality of what fascism was actually like.

How things have changed. These days, culture is very much at the centre of studies of Italian Fascism, at least, and is regarded by cultural studies historians as the key to understanding the real nature of Fascism.[1] The recent shift to studying Italian Fascist culture and Italian Fascism as culture, is part of a wider shift towards cultural studies in history. This cultural turn was propelled initially by the impressively wide-ranging work of the American intellectual historian, George Mosse, a founding editor of the *Journal of Contemporary History*, on the 'nationalisation of the masses' in the modern era, and the work of Michel Foucault, Monica Ozouf and the rest on the multifaceted 'text' which is the French Revolution. The new wave of cultural studies also draws on post-modernism, with its often playful and always relativist approach to 'texts' and their capacity to convey and reveal an infinite variety of readings and meanings; and on a growing academic and popular interest in psychology and psychoanalysis, again because these disciplines alone seem capable of getting to the deep, subterranean meanings and motivations of human conduct and behaviour.

In Italy, and among Italian historians of Fascism, the shift marks a very significant historiographical break. A group of conservative nationalist historians have taken the lead from Renzo De Felice, whose lifetime's work was an unfinished multi-volume biography of Mussolini, which is largely unreadable, and certainly untranslatable. Since the 1970s, this group worked to 'revise' what it claimed was the official Marxist-dominated anti-Fascist reading of Italy's unpalatable Fascist past, which had been used to legitmise Italy's post-war parliamentary Republic. In what amounts to a 'post-Fascist' historical rehabilitation of Mussolini and Fascism and yet another postponement of Italians properly coming to terms with that Fascist past, the De Felician school has attempted to show that many (most?) Italians 'consented' to Fascism in the 1930s, and that Fascism was not some alien violent force occupying the country against the will of its citizens. By emphasising the mechanisms and means by which the Fascist regime secured 'consent' among Italians, rather than its innate repressiveness, these 'revisionist' historians have changed the historical perception of Fascism. If Fascism was consensual (and 'consensus' is something different from 'consent', but that is another story), then it could not have been a force for bad, after all. The history of Fascism in Italy now often looks like a branch of the heritage industry, popular, banal, conflict-free, inconsequential. People had a relatively good time under Fascism; it was just a pity about the war.

What, then, is the contribution of the cultural studies wave to our historical understanding of Italian Fascism? For a straight-down-the-line narrative and analysis empirical historian like myself, the cultural studies approach is certainly challenging. Its way of doing things is social scientific rather than conventionally historical. The hypothesis and conceptual framework precede the empirical analysis, which verifies the hypothesis. Simply as a reader of these books, I feel that they are, from the start, weighed down by their conceptual baggage. It is a real effort to want to move beyond the introductions, which are an exhausting and demanding read. Would you want to complete the reading of a study offering 'a conjectural paradigm of investigation based on clues leading to identify structural, unconscious, or simply submerged levels of historical agency'[2]? I think that I can work out what this means, but it is a kind of torture to do so. These are very serious, po-faced histories, with scarcely any lightness of touch, and they are generally not written with you, me or our students in mind. Yet, as a conventional historian, I know that I have to rise to the challenge and effectively

retrain in the disciplines of psychology, sociology and anthropology, for reasons which I hope will become apparent.

It is certainly the premise, as well as the outcome, of these studies that 'violence is not the defining feature of fascism, old and new'[3], and that terror and repression were not how the Italian people experienced Fascism, and were not what Fascism was nor how Fascism represented itself. I have to say that this does help to produce a much more nuanced view of 'totalitarianism', a concept and term largely discredited by its Cold War origins and uses, but now being re-applied in different forms to the study of fascism. The Fascist totalitarian state was a unique and paradoxical mix of the repression of dissent and the manufacture of consent, and the one made possible the other. By removing alternatives to Fascism, and preventing their re-emergence, Fascist policing cleared the decks, as it were, for the mobilisation of consent which took place in and through the Fascist Party's proliferating network of collateral organisations. During the 1930s, these agencies extended their reach into class, gender and age groups and into regions and localities of the country often previously untouched by the Fascist movement.

The study of Italian Fascism as a cultural phenomenon means viewing and assessing Fascism on its own terms, using its own framework of reference, and in turn, using contemporary Fascist sources and 'texts', all of which is guaranteed to make anti-Fascist historians apoplectic. De Felice blazed the trail, here, in the use of Fascist sources, attempting to reconstruct the ways in which the Fascist regime chose to represent itself. Although De Felice is often criticised for an over-literal and face-value reading of Fascist sources, he has turned us all into archive rats, and the exposure of contemporary Fascist material to historical scrutiny is, perhaps, the most important contribution of his life-and-times biography of Mussolini.

What Fascists themselves told us was that Fascism was envisaged as a 'spiritual' or 'cultural' revolution, which aimed through the totalitarian organisation and indoctrination of Italian society to create the New Fascist Man. The goal of 'cultural revolution' was to remould Italians in the image of the original Fascists, transforming them into warlike adventurers capable of founding by conquest, and then running and settling an empire, which alone could make Italy 'great'. Fascists saw 'culture' in suitably totalitarian terms as an all-embracing way of life, a way of behaving, which involved the inner transformation of Italians' consciousness and sense of themselves and others. It is perhaps no wonder that the cultural approach to Italian Fascism has fed into the recent revival of a rather old inter-war interpretation of fascism as a political or secular religion.[4]

If Fascism was about 'cultural revolution', then one of the means the regime adopted to realise it was through the 'aestheticisation' of politics. Working from Mussolini's intuition that politics was art, and art politics, there was a concerted attempt to engage the emotions and feelings of Italians in what the cultural studies people annoyingly call the 'Fascist identity project'[5]. The expectation was that Italians would not only have come to believe and follow the *Duce* because they had to, and because there was no alternative, but because they wanted to, because they 'felt' Fascism. This is why the cultural studies of Italian Fascism concentrate so much on the regime's staging of public spectacle, ceremony and ritual, no longer seen as the trappings of a bread-and-circuses regime, but as its very essence. Through its monopolistic control and use of public space, the Fascist regime attempted to imprint a distinctively Fascist identity on the Italian people, and create what a territorially unified but internally divided country had never experienced, a 'national community' gathered around the charismatic figure of the *Duce* and imbued with a common collective sense of national purpose. This was the totalitarian dream, or nightmare.

The more intelligible of the cultural studies of Fascism demonstrate just how successful Fascist cultural policies were, at least at one level, and just how much they differed from those of Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany, at least until the very late 1930s, when there was growing convergence with the other totalitarian systems' prescriptive and monochrome cultural measures. In a quite brilliant display of cultural eclecticism, Mussolini and the regime's cultural bureaucrats successfully co-opted to the cause a generation of Italian intellectuals, artists, sculptors, writers, architects, simply by refusing until very late on to adopt any one artistic and cultural style. All styles and schools vied for cultural supremacy, in order to become 'official', and each claimed to embody Fascist 'culture' in itself, while,

in effect, transmitting the regime's ideological and 'nationalising' messages in their many and varied ways. In one sense, it just did not matter whether artists or architects actually believed the words and rhetoric of Fascism which they had to use in order to win State and Party commissions and patronage. The Fascist regime got the pictures, sculptures and buildings (even new towns) it wanted, in a kind of Faustian pact with the country's cultural producers, who became what the regime expected them to be, not artists for art's sake, but didactic 'makers' of the nation.

Again according to the regime's intentions and expectations, art was no longer high brow and elitist, but popular and accessible. The famous cultural festival, the Venice *biennale*, was transformed into a showcase and celebration of popular, modern media and art forms, including cinema. The Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution, a daring, innovative and experimental clash of artistic genres and techniques staged in 1932 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of Fascism's coming to power and to mark past achievements and future glories, attracted mass audiences of nearly four million people, about one in ten of all Italians, in its two years of opening.

The cultural studies of Fascism are able to reveal the intentions and aims behind the regime's cultural policies, what should be, in other words. But they find it much more difficult to measure and assess the impact of such policies and practices on their target audience, the Italian people. This is partly because some of these studies seem unable to distance themselves sufficiently from the contemporary Fascist sources and self-representations which they reproduce. There is a real sense in these studies that what you see is what you get, that Fascism was, what it said it was. The way that people received the messages conveyed by, say, public spectacles, can be assumed or deduced by simply decoding the messages. One has to say that this was how Fascists themselves saw things. Put a civil servant in uniform at his place of work, ban the unhygienic and over-familiar handshake for the raised arm Fascist salute, oblige him to discard the fawning, foreign impersonal 'lei' form of 'you' for the comradely, fraternal, yet still hierarchical and altogether more manly 'voi' form of 'you', all aspects of the regime's grotesque attacks on the 'bourgeois' life style in the 1930s, and you were well on the way to making a warrior out of a bureaucrat. The external appearances and modes of behaviour conveyed the signs of an internalised 'Fascistisation', of an inner transformation of consciousness.

In often assuming that the intention was the reality, cultural studies have unbalanced that mix of repression and consent which marked Fascist totalitarianism. In the Fascist regime, all expressions or demonstrations of consent occurred within an essentially repressive context, even if that repressiveness did not always take the form of overt violence or coercion. Every Fascist public meeting was preceded by the police's preventive round up and detention of known 'subversives'. Most of the people who attended the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution in Rome were transported to the city from all parts of Italy on subsidised excursions organised by the Fascist bodies to which they belonged. The Fascist totalitarian state organised and orchestrated spontaneity and enthusiasm, and the very act of organising was bound to affect the quality of the outcomes of its public 'happenings'.

I have looked through the photographs of the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution, and from these inert images, you can still sense that it was an impressive staging of Fascist artefacts and motifs, likely to affect and even disorientate the people who came. But art is very much in the eye of the beholder, even when it was intended to impart the same 'nationalising' messages. None of us necessarily come away from a trip to the theatre with the same aesthetic view of the play and the performance. The few people who actually saw a new Fascist play where the protagonist was a FIAT truck, might well have found it hilarious, or worse, ridiculous. Any work of art could, and can, have unintended consequences once received and appreciated by its audience. The same point could arguably be made for any of the members of any Fascist organisation during the 1930s.

Some cultural studies tackle this issue of how Fascist culture was actually received, often in quite ingenious ways. A few do attempt to deduce reception from intention, by arguing that the Fascist regime's endless repetition of the same rituals with the same messages on the continuous production line of public spectacle, was an indication in itself that the messages were working, that they were getting through. There remains the possibility, of course, that the constant bombardment might have induced boredom, annoyance and ridicule.

The cultural studies approach naturally encourages a *longue durée* view of history, often emphasising cultural survivals and continuities, and suggesting that cultural change operates on a different time and explanatory scale to political and social change. The basic view of those who interpret fascism as political religion is that with the long decline over time of religious practice, people had to satisfy their need for belief and identity with the *ersatz* religion of the worship of the State and the great leader. This approach sets twentieth century fascism in a very long and deep process of historical evolution, indeed. The cultural studies 'take' on Italian Fascist 'culture' is that the Fascist message penetrated Italians' consciousness to the extent that it successfully appropriated and made its own, the deeply-embedded cultural motifs, practices and value systems of ordinary Italians, built around motherhood, the family and catholicism. This conclusion at least corresponds to how non-cultural historians like Ian Kershaw have attempted to gauge the effects and impacts of Nazi propaganda in the 1930s.[6] Kershaw's commonsensical view is that propaganda worked best when it met an already existing and established set of popular beliefs and prejudices among its recipients, which pre-disposed them to absorb the regime's message, as intended. But, applied to the case of Italian Fascism, this might suggest that Fascism, in adopting the ritualistic style of catholicism or in attempting to graft a national patriotism onto the presumed solidarity of the extended family, ended up by strengthening these communal bonds among Italians, rather than what was meant to replace them, which was Fascism.

The issue of how Italians actually received or responded to the Fascist regime's attempts to change them, is likely to remain open, and probably can never be closed, if only because of the inherent contradiction of the totalitarian process itself, that consent was manufactured in a coercive context. Historians have used, and will continue to make use of, what is available on gauging how people felt during and about the Fascist dictatorship. These sources run from police and informers' reports on the public mood, which often reproduced, because they had to as part of the reporting process, the different, necessarily low key expressions of popular dissent (jokes exchanged in bars, graffiti and slogans scrawled on the walls of factory toilets); to private diaries and letters, especially those written or exchanged in wartime, whether censored or not, which can reveal something of the extent to which the correspondents felt that they were fighting a 'Fascist' war between 1940 and 1943; and to the post-war oral testimonies taken from middle-aged and elderly people reminiscing about their youth under Fascism, on the understanding that memories might well be selective and a form of forgetting, but are, nevertheless, some indication of a person's 'culture'. All these sources are problematic for historians to use, but perhaps no more problematic than any other kinds of historical sources, and certainly no more problematic than a retraining in those disciplines which historians still need if they are to understand the cultural meaning of, say, a joke about Mussolini, in a totalitarian society.

In the meantime, if you yearn for the return of dictatorship in studies of Italian Fascism, then a kind of counter-attack on cultural studies is being staged. Paul Corner, who is meant to be writing a general history of Fascism, has emphasised the repressive and coercive dimensions to practically all the relationships forged between the Fascist regime and Italians.[7] Richard Bosworth's recent biography of Mussolini starts with a head count of the many people who died in or as a result of Fascism and its wars, while his even more recent book on Italian Fascism suggests that most Italians adapted, rather than adopted, the 'Fascistisation' to which they were subjected by the regime during the 1930s.[8]

NOTES

1. For a sample, see R. Ben Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922-1945* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001); M. Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self. The Political Culture of Interwar Italy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997); E. Braun, *Mario Sironi and Italian Modernism: Art and Politics under Fascism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); S. Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle: the Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997); C.Fogu, *The Historic Imaginary. Politics of History in Fascist Italy* (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2003); R.J. Golsan (ed.), *Fascism, Aesthetics and Culture* (Hanover, N.H.: University of New England Press, 1992); K. Pinkus, *Bodily Regimes: Italian Advertising under Fascism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); J.T. Schnapp (ed.), *A Primer of Italian Fascism* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), and

Staging Fascism: 18BL and the Theater of Masses for the Masses (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); 'The Aesthetics of Fascism', special issue of the *Journal of Contemporary History* 31 (1996); R. Griffin, 'The Sacred Synthesis: the Ideological Cohesion of Fascist Cultural Policy', *Modern Italy* 3 (1998).

2. Fogu, *The Historic Imaginary*, p.7.

3. Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self*, p. 3.

4. See E. Gentile, *The Sacralisation of Politics in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and his 'Fascism as Political Religion', *Journal of Contemporary History* 25 (1990).

5. Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self*, p. 5.

6. I. Kershaw, 'How Effective Was Nazi Propaganda?', in D. Welch (ed.), *Nazi Propaganda: the Power and the Limitations* (London: Croom Helm, 1983).

7. P. Corner, 'Italian Fascism: Whatever Happened to Dictatorship?', *Journal of Modern History* 74 (2002).

8. R.J.B. Bosworth, *Mussolini* (London: Arnold, 2002); *Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Dictatorship, 1915-1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2005).

Caste and the Rise of an 'Untouchable' Middle Class in Contemporary India

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Over the course of the past century, 'caste' has been a thorn in the side of the Indian nation's desire to acquire the status of a modern, developed nation. During the colonial period, the caste system was identified by British imperialists as evidence of India's backward social system and consequential inability to self-govern. After Independence, caste remained such a national stigma that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru refused to acknowledge it as an important social institution, preferring instead to deal with the socialist category of class as well as with linguistic regional identities. While the Indian Constitution of 1950 prohibits the practice of 'untouchability', apart from this legal act, issues of caste identity and caste discrimination were perceived in the public sphere of post-colonial India as un-modern, outmoded, and highly irrelevant to the new democratic Indian nation.[1] To talk about 'caste' in post-independence India was to mark oneself out as a backward-looking traditionalist in an age of new political democracy and idealistic five-year development plans. However, this shift towards public denial of caste did not mean the importance of caste identities, particularly in realms such as marriage, employment and many basic forms of social interaction, declined in India. In fact, for many Indians even today caste identity continues to be one of their primary identities, a social order which structures much of their lives.

Dalits, previously known as 'untouchables' due to their extremely low-caste identity, have perhaps been the most vocal group to resurrect the issue of caste in contemporary India. Although low-caste assertion in India predates the twentieth century, it was the Dalit leader Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar who famously fought for the eradication of caste in the first half of the twentieth century. Since his inspirational leadership, the Dalit movement against caste discrimination has spread into every state of the Indian nation. Dalit activists have argued that the practice of untouchability continues unabated in contemporary India and prevents the establishment of true social equality in the country.

This essay will, first, discuss early studies of so-called 'untouchable' communities. Section two examines the historical development of the Dalit movement in India in the political, social, religious and cultural arenas, focusing particularly on the post-colonial period. Section three will show how the system of 'reservations' for untouchables in government employment and higher education instituted by the Indian Constitution provided a new avenue for members of the Dalit community to enter the Indian middle classes. The rise of a Dalit middle class has caused serious controversy within Indian society, occasionally resulting in violent clashes. Section four will argue that despite many members of the Dalit community gaining greater economic security and higher class status, despite the strength and vocal character of the contemporary Dalit movement, and despite the claims made by the Indian state to a progressive, caste-less society, Dalits continue to face social discrimination and marginalisation due to their low-caste identities. In so-called 'modern' times, this caste-based discrimination has often taken on new and arguably more insidious forms, as is revealed in contemporary Dalit protest literature.

Known by various terms including untouchable, Scheduled Caste and Harijan, members of the Dalit community inhabit the lowest position within the Indian caste system and were historically considered 'polluted' due to their hereditary occupations as sweepers, leather-workers etc.[2] Today, Dalits continue to suffer severe discrimination due to their hereditary low-caste identity. Economically they are the majority of the poor, and in rural areas, most are landless agricultural labourers. Socially, individuals from Dalit castes face significant discrimination, most evident from the continuing occurrence of Dalit atrocities in rural areas, but also clearly a problem in spheres such as education, as literacy rates among Dalits are much lower than the national average.[3] Scholars Mendelsohn and Vicziany have argued that a 'new civic culture of tolerance' is emerging in cities such as Delhi and Bombay based on the anonymity and the practicalities of urban lifestyle (for instance, the fact that unlike in

the village, it is impossible to know the caste-identity of the owner of every shop one frequents, every passenger one sits beside on the bus etc.).[4] However, as we shall see further in section four, caste-based discrimination cannot be avoided by Dalits even in cities such as Delhi despite the disguise of anonymity. Rather, Dalits continue to face discrimination in the workplace where, for example, colleagues persistently ask revealing questions until the caste identity of their fellow workmate is exposed, or urban landlords refuse to rent to individuals of Dalit castes etc.

Studying 'untouchables'

Early studies of low-caste 'untouchable' communities were carried out by anthropologists who tended to stress the continuity between the Dalit communities under investigation and the larger village community.[5] The structural anthropologist, Edmund Leach, for instance, argued that Dalits' experience of the caste system was one of interdependence and claimed that Dalits do not only feel excluded and oppressed but also feel privileged to perform certain jobs (i.e. sweeping, leather-work etc.) that they may claim as exclusively their domain. Louis Dumont typifies this idea of social unity in his famous *Homo Hierarchicus* (1966) by constructing a theoretical axis of purity and impurity on which the Dalit and the Brahman represent extreme poles and mutually define each other's existence. In this sense, Dumont writes, "The impurity of the Untouchable is conceptually inseparable from the purity of the Brahman."[6] Thus, regardless of how different the roles of the low-caste Dalit and the upper-caste Brahmin are in society, they remain essential parts of a holistic system. According to these scholars, if the Dalit community does not display all the characteristics of upper-caste culture, it is not because they have rejected it, but rather because they have been denied these aspects (i.e. knowledge of Sanskritic, participation in Hindu rituals etc.) of culture.

In contrast, more recent scholars have perceived a great distance between Dalit and upper-caste Hindu culture. For instance, Mark Juergensmeyer suggests an alternative interpretation of caste and untouchability not simply in terms of a slight difference in the perspectives of upper and lower castes, but through his recognition of an entirely new and equally valid low-caste culture. Juergensmeyer, for instance, writes, "As a concept, untouchability connotes an attitude, a prejudice: it refers to a pattern of relationships seen from the point of view of a person of higher status. From that standpoint a person of much lower status is deemed impure: he or she literally cannot be touched…Only an upper caste perspective portrays them as persons potentially injurious to piety."[7] Scholars such as Gerald Berreman (1981) and Joan Mencher (1983) view the existence of dissonance and imbalance as indicative of caste, as a system of social fragmentation and economic exploitation. Furthermore, Pauline Kolenda (1978), Seale-Chatterjee (1994), Gail Omvedt (1995) and Ghanshyam Shah (2001) all argue that the Dalit worldview is essentially different than that of the caste Hindu since many Dalits reject high caste notions of *karma*, *moksha*, etc. and perceive Hinduism as a system of oppression.

An attempt has been made to resolve the contradictions between these two theories of unity and separation by Robert Deliege who proposes that the existence of both inclusive and exclusionary social forces are integral to the life of the Dalit community. For Deliege, the Dalit stands both inside and outside society, and it is this marginal status that defines him.[8] Yet questions remain over the Dalit individual's experience of this ambiguous social position, and beg further research regarding how the identity of 'Dalit' is experienced privately, as an individual. If Dalits are partially integral to Indian society, do they internalize certain aspects of the high-caste Indian meta-narrative, and if so, which aspects? If Dalits are partially excluded from Indian society, then what is the present experience of social discrimination and how do Dalits attempt to avoid discrimination when, for example, the very fact that one's surname often denotes their caste-identity means that distinctions of social status remain and can be acted upon?

Ambedkar and the Dalit movement

As early as the 1920s, Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar, a Dalit who received his higher education at Columbia University in the United States through the patronage of a wealthy Indian reformer, returned

to Bombay and began to lead protests against caste discrimination. Most famous were his protests against the upper-caste Hindu practices of barring untouchables from entering Hindu temples and preventing them from drinking from village wells. Ambedkar's early protests also included the symbolic burning of the *Manusmriti*, an ancient Hindu text which set out severe social restrictions for members of the lower castes. By the 1930s, Ambedkar had established the Independent Labour Party (ILP) where he attempted to join with the socialists working on lower class issues to fight for the rights of peasant agricultural labourers and textile workers in Bombay.

However, collaboration with the socialists, Dalits' seemingly natural allies, brought on new complications when party leaders began to demand 'Who is your true leader, Ambedkar or Marx?'. Further conflicts over the relative importance of class versus caste issues in the party agenda lead to a split in the ILP, and Ambedkar moved away from a broader, inclusive political agenda to form the Scheduled Caste Federation (SCF), a political party focused specifically on the special interests of the Dalit community. The SCF became widely successful as both a political party and focal point of Dalit mobilisation. Several years after its creation in west India, the SCF spread to north India where it joined with another group of Dalit activists associated with the Adi Hindu movement there. The ensuring electoral successes of the SCF reveal the growth of Dalit mobilisation at the grass-roots level, which had been encouraged by Dalit activist leaders throughout the previous decades.

Just before his death in 1956, Ambedkar expanded the Dalit movement into the religious arena by publicly converting from Hinduism, a religion he considered to be based on the caste system, to Buddhism, a religion with a social egalitarian philosophy.

Ambedkar was joined in his act of religious conversion by thousands of Dalit activists in both north and west India, all of whom had made a new link between religious conversion and political protest. Since Ambedkar's conversion, Buddhism has become an important way for members of the so-called 'untouchable' castes to mark themselves as politically conscious Dalits.

Ambedkar remains the most respected leader of the Dalit movement throughout India, and many political parties have formed in his name including the Republican Party of India, a reincarnation of the SCF, which experienced significant electoral successes against the dominant Congress Party in the mid-1960s. However, by far the most important Dalit political party to emerge in the post-independence era, both in terms of its electoral successes as well as its grass-roots mobilisation efforts, has been the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).[9] Formed as an offshoot of a Dalit labour organisation which lobbied for the rights of low-caste government employees, the BSP relied on the social networks of its parent organisation to make vast inroads into the Dalit community of north Indian throughout the 1980s. It also campaigned in villages via bicycle tours known as 'Ambedkar on Wheels', linking the iconography and popularity of Ambedkar to this new political party. Through these campaigns, the BSP eventually gained enough support to make significant electoral gains, and from 1995-2005 has formed four coalition governments in the State of Uttar Pradesh with a Dalit woman, Mayawati, acting as Chief Minister. However, while the BSP has certainly made a positive impact on the lives of some rural Dalit communities, the BSP has significantly deviated from Ambedkar's original aim to eradicate the caste system, and instead has promoted caste identities as part of its strategy of using identity politics to win votes and maintain power. The BSP has also been accused of helping only a certain section of the Dalit community, namely the Chamar leather-workers, and marginalising other groups such as the Bhangi sweepers.

The Politics of Reservation

In the context of the increasing strength of the Dalit movement and Dalit politics, another force has worked at a more subtle level to uplift members of the 'untouchable' castes—the system of reservation. Under the influence of Ambedkar, the Indian Constitution included articles ensuring *reserved* places for untouchables (Scheduled Castes) in higher education institutions, government jobs, and the legislature.10 Comparable to anti-discrimination measures in other countries (such as *positive discrimination* found in the USA), this system of reservation was originally meant to be a temporary aid that could be withdrawn once the situation of Dalits improved. However, reservation

for Dalits has continued to be extended to the point where, at present, discussion of withdrawing reservation is rarely even considered. These reservation measurements have been the single most important act by the state regarding the welfare of Dalits.

Access to higher education and stable, well-paid government employment has meant that more and more members of the so-called 'untouchable' castes are now moving into the Indian middle class. Entering the urban middle-class opened up a new range of possibilities for Dalits including access to certain middle class cultural practices, values and spaces, the ability to both consume and produce middle-class cultural commodities, and the power to redirect economic wealth towards new political goals. For a small percentage of these, joining the middle class also meant new opportunities for their children such as private, English-medium education and access to better health care. Through their position as members of the middle class, Dalits found themselves in a position to powerfully question and contest dominant cultural representations of what it means to be an Indian citizen—representations previously generated by the upper-caste dominated middle-class. For example, as we shall discuss further in the next section, Hindi Dalit writers are attempting to redefine what it means to be middle-class in north India by incorporating the element of caste identity, an act which directly counters the existing middle-class claim to a 'casteless' modernity since the time of Nehru.

Yet despite the positive impact reservation has had on the Dalit community as a whole, this system of positive discrimination has constantly been engulfed in controversy. Opponents of the reservation system, for instance, have argued that reservation only perpetuates an established elite within the Dalit community. In other words, they claim that the positions reserved to assist poor Dalits in gaining a better education and stable, well-paid jobs are now monopolised by the children of middle class Dalit families. However, Mendelsohn and Vicziany's study found no evidence of such a 'Harijan elite' and my own work on Dalit writers in north India revealed that most came from impoverished rural families rather than middle class urban ones.[11] Even more severe critiques of the reservation system have been made by upper-caste medical students who fear that due to the system of reservation, they will no longer find a place for themselves at medical school. Intense protests sparked off in the early 1990s by the extension of reservation to the 'Other Backward Castes' resulted in several medical students self-immolating in protest. Further criticism of the reservation system has come from within the Dalit community itself, where members of the Bhangi sweeper caste have claimed that the benefits of compensatory discrimination schemes are monopolized by the more economically advanced and numerically dominant Chamar caste. Other problems confronting the use of reservation as a tool for Dalit uplift include the lack of enough jobs and the fact that even the available reserved spaces aren't always filled due to either a supposed lack of qualified applicants or discrimination on the part of the employer during the interview process. In addition, since the 1990s the growth of the private sector, where reservation does not apply, means that Dalits are again becoming slowly marginalized in the occupational workforce.[12]

Hence, while the reservation system has been the primary means by which many Dalits have left the slums, rural poverty and/or low-paid labouring jobs and have moved into urban middle-class neighbourhoods, universities and government office employment, there is a psychological impact of the reservation system which is often overlooked. That is, the developing stereotype of the Dalit university student or government employee who 'didn't earn' their position, who could never rely on individual intelligence or hard work to earn themselves a place in that university or government office, who instead must rely on undeserved 'handouts'. At present, such critics of reservation often fail to acknowledge that *even with* superior intelligence and unrelenting hard work, caste discrimination often prevents Dalits from acquiring justly deserved positions in these sectors. For the young Dalit student, struggling to find acceptance within the academic community, such stereotypes simply provide another barrier to social and intellectual advancement. Tragically, many Dalit individuals end up internalising such stereotypes and their own self-esteem and self-image suffers as a consequence.

Dalit voices and the experience of caste in contemporary India

The discourse of social modernity, which claims that the caste system and practices such as

'untouchability' no longer exist in contemporary India, has been so powerful and so appealing to the majority of the upper-caste Indian middle class that, despite the strength of the Dalit movement and the impact of reservation, Dalit activists still have to fight to raise the issue of caste discrimination in the Indian public sphere. Leading this struggle are Dalit writers, who have used their autobiographies, short-stories and poems to expose the realities of caste discrimination in contemporary India.[13]

Dalit literature, and especially Dalit autobiographies, has provided a new public space for a low-caste critique of Indian society. Couched in the language of individual pain and personal suffering, Dalit writers use their autobiographical narratives as evidence of the continued prevalence of caste discrimination in post-colonial India. For example, in his autobiography *Tiraskrit* (Disregarded), Dalit writer Surajpal Chauhan writes, "Just like this, I am suffering from the biting pain of this life. In this country, only those who have experienced it can really know how much pain and insult comes from being born a Dalit. Today, in the whole country, everyone is crying out that there is no caste discrimination and that things have changed in the towns and villages in these thirty-five years [since Indian Independence]. I would really like to discuss with these people an incident which took place in 1987."[14] Chauhan goes on to describe a trip to his hometown on the occasion of his cousin's wedding. As he and his wife walked from the main road towards the village, the heat of the summer sun forced them to seek water from a rest house specifically built for travellers. As he was about to draw water from the well, an upper-caste man in charge of the rest house began to question him—who was he and who was he visiting in the village? When Chauhan replied that he was there to attend his cousin's wedding, the upper-caste man realised Chauhan was a Dalit and began to scream that Chauhan was not to touch the water from the well or he would pollute it. In his autobiography, Chauhan uses this experience to highlight the unchanging attitudes of upper-caste landlords towards members of the so-called 'untouchable' castes in Indian villages today.

In many Dalit autobiographies, the Dalit child living in impoverished circumstances in the village dreams of the city as a place of modern attitudes and the possibility of a new life. Education is seen by the Dalit child as a way to leave this oppressive life behind and find new opportunities in urban areas. However, the idea of the Dalit protagonist's progress from the 'superstitious village' to the 'enlightened city' bursts apart towards the middle of the Dalit autobiographical narrative, since caste discrimination continues to be experienced even in a metropolis such as Delhi. Supposed 'modern' spaces such as trains and other forms of public transportation remain prone to caste practice. For instance, Chauhan's autobiography also relates his experience on a train when a pleasant conversation with fellow passengers turned sour after one couple were able, with careful questioning, to discern his low-caste identity. Particularly significant is the office as a space within the Dalit autobiography which invokes images of modernity but where the Dalit protagonist faces new, insidious forms of caste discrimination. For example, in *Tiraskrit*, Chauhan describes an incident in which an office manager discovers he is a Dalit. Although all the administrative managers had been happy with Chauhan's work and had often praised him and given him significant responsibility in the office, once these managers discovered his Dalit identity, things changed. He writes, "S.S. Mathur was shocked to know my identity. Now his changed view of me was reflected in his behaviour. In the office, he began to make obstacles in my path. S. S. Mathur knew that I was the son of a sweeper. He began to doubt my integrity. He had begun to watch me like this so that I would make some mistake."[15]

Conclusions

While in the colonial period, the caste system and the practice of untouchability was marked out as evidence of India's backward society, the post-colonial period of Indian history has shown strong determination to exorcise 'caste' from contemporary public discourse. Since the time of Jawaharlal Nehru, the majority of social activism in India has centred around socialist, 'class'-based issues and has consciously avoided issues of caste discrimination. However, those at the lower levels of this system of social hierarchy have continued to struggle to put the prevalence of caste discrimination back in the public eye as an issue of national importance. Throughout the twentieth century Dalit activists have fought in the political, social and even religious arenas, and have won significant gains

as we have seen with the electoral successes of the Dalit political party, the BSP, in the 1990s and 2000s in north India. Further activism has taken place in the cultural sphere, where Dalit writers have used literature to expose the nuanced and often insidious forms of caste discrimination in India today.

Does this mean that caste remains *the* defining feature of contemporary Indian society? While this claim was often articulated during the colonial period, the answer remains more complex. In many ways, the old features of the caste *system* have broken down, for instance, the close link between caste and occupation no longer always holds true.[16] For members of the upper-caste Indian middle class, it may indeed seem as if caste identity is no longer relevant in their fast-paced, globalising society. Yet for those at the bottom of the caste hierarchy, who continue to be the majority of the poor, or who continue to face social discrimination despite their high levels of education, white-collar employment and middle class lifestyle, caste identity remains fundamental to their lived experience in India today.

NOTES

1 Article 17 of the Indian Constitution officially abolished untouchability and made its practice punishable by law, and Articles 15(4), 16(4), and 46 all dealt with the state's responsibility regarding the protection and uplift of 'weaker' or 'backward' sections of Indian society.

2 The community previously known as 'untouchables' are divided into numerous caste communities called *jatis,* often characterized by their traditional caste occupation such as the Bhangi sweepers or the leather-workers known in North India as Chamars or Jatavs. The term 'Dalit' is the most recent, a self-ascribed appellation meaning 'oppressed' or 'downtrodden' and inferring a certain political consciousness and assertion. In the mid-20th century, Gandhi promoted the name 'Harijan' meaning 'child of God' in an attempt to move away from the idea of 'untouchable' and promote a new, positive ascription to the community. However, the majority of the contemporary Dalit community now views this term with contempt, perceiving it as demeaning as well as un-political. Finally, the colonial ascription 'Scheduled Caste' or SC is still very much in use as an official bureaucratic term and identity enacted in order to receive state benefits such as reservation facilities.

3 P. Radhakrishnan. 'Ambedkar's Legacy to Dalits: Has the Nation Reneged on Its Promises?' *Economic and Political Weekly* 26, 33 (17 August 1991), 44-73.

4 Oliver Mendelsohn and Marika Vicziany. *The Untouchables.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

5 In fact, as Robert Deliege notes, many of these early scholars including Max Weber, Celestin Bougle, Arthur Maurice Hocart, Claude Meillassoux and Jean Baechler, wrote on the caste system or untouchability based solely on ancient Sanskritic texts and other secondary sources and had no firsthand knowledge of Indian society. Robert Deliege. *The Untouchables of India.* (transl. Nora Scott). Oxford: Berg Publications, 1999, 28.

6 Louis Dumont. *Homo Hierarchicus.* (transl. Mark Sainsbury) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, 54.

7 Mark Juergensmeyer. *Religion as Social Vision: the movement against Untouchability in 20ᵗʰ century Punjab. London:* University of California Press: London. 1982, 11.

8 Deliege. 1999, 8, 30.

9 Sudha Pai. *Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution: the Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh.* New Delhi: Sage, 2002.

10 Ghanshyam Shah. 'Social Backwardness and the Politics of Reservation' in *Caste and Democratic Politics in India.* Ghanshyam Shah (ed.) Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002.

11 S. Sundaram and S.S. Singh. *Emerging Harijan Elite.* New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 1987; Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1999, 138-40, 238-9, 252-7.

12 Mata Prasad. 'Udārīkaraṇ/Nijīkaraṇ Ārthāt Dalitõ kī Gulāmī kā Ghoṣaṇā-patra' *(Economic Liberalisation and Privatisation: a manifesto on the slavery of Dalits),* Dalit Sāhitya 2002, pp. 110-116.

13 Sarah Beth Wilkerson. *Hindi Dalit Literature and the Politics of Representation*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2006.

14 Surajpal Chauhan. *Tiraskrit*. Gaziabad: Anubhav Prakashan, 2002, 30.

15 Chauhan 2002, 56.

16 M.N. Srinivas. "An Obituary on Caste as a System" in *Economic and Political Weekly,* 1 February 2003.

The Wages of Destruction: the Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy   Adam Tooze

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We owe a huge debt to Ian Kershaw and Richard J Evans, supreme among English-language historians of modern Germany. Between them they have ensured the continuing dominance of 'big History', their books characterised by scholarly sweep and enthralling narrative. Rooted in the linguistic theories of Barthes and the deconstructionist views of Derrida, what we conveniently label as 'post-modernism' proclaimed the redundancy of traditional political, diplomatic and military history. The acolytes of this upstart creed trumpeted 'The End of History' and its fragmentation into clusters of social, economic, gender and cultural 'studies'. Further, the context in which such views gained credibility was one in which the sheer volume of data made many a dissertation writer duck for cover and seek solace in ultra-specialisation.

Dropping punctilio and with great clunking fists, Evans, 'In Defence of History', battered the historian-epigones of Barthes and Derrida, while Kershaw skilfully integrated sociological constructs into the conventional format of political biography. Between them they have ensured that while there is a place for the monograph and detailed research, historians can retain the confidence to undertake the big themes, attempt objective analysis and write coherent, challenging and entertaining narrative.

Had post-modernism claimed the campuses, the young economic historian Adam Tooze might have offered us a study of 'The Economic Influence of Developments in Aircraft Building Techniques: The Junkers Factories – a case study, 1933-1945.' Instead, he has written a hugely ambitious book weaving weft threads of political, diplomatic and social history across the warp of economic history. This is no earnest but dull compendium of costive economic data. Certainly economic policy is at its heart. Young readers will require tuition in basic economics, of areas such as fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies and have a grasp of the role of state intervention. But 'The Wages of Destruction' were won and squandered by real people. Tooze's work introduces an eclectic gallery of personalities, among them no gods and precious few heroes.

Central to Tooze's approach is his evaluation of Germany's economic status and potential in the context of its relationship after 1918 with the Allied victors, but especially with the USA. His perspectives on Stresemann will energise our views on this complex figure. With determined courage, informed by stern realism, Stresemann pursued a bold Atlanticist strategy. We are now a world away from the blinkered Eurocentric thought world of Bismarck. America had been the war's outright victor, becoming the world's dominant economy. 'Iron and Blood' had failed in Flanders fields. Germany's greatest asset was its economy, especially those great corporations such as AEG and IG Farben which had survived the political and military collapse of 1918. They possessed clout, export power and financial muscle: 'It was their production potential and credit-worthiness that would enable Germany to pacify its relations with France and to consolidate a new and powerful connection to the United States.' (p104)

But Stresemann died an anxious man. Even before the Wall Street Crash long-term American lending to Germany had contracted, while the protectionist Smoot-Hawley tariff imposed obstacles on German industry's dollar-earning capacity. A scratch became gangrene during Brüning's catastrophic Chancellorship. Disastrous for the republic's emerging democratic consensus, Brüning's rigid deflation enabled Nazism to leap the credibility gap and present itself as Germany's saviour.

In these early years of the 21st century 'globalization' has entered the popular consciousness conveying images of the inexorable surge of the corporate juggernaut. We should be more mindful of how in that decade of hunger and war, the 1930s, globalization retreated as America withdrew beneath the carapace of isolationism. Hitler and Nazism became a serious political force at this juncture.

Hitler dominates *The Wages of Destruction* with Tooze taking great care to make sense of the Führer's embittered fantasies and 'embattled' outlook (p8), neatly contrasting the world views of the quintessentially bourgeois optimist Stresemann with Hitler's bleak chiliasm. For Stresemann the disasters of the Great War might have been repaired through industry, hard work and trade while for Hitler Germany faced a race against time against the force which he saw as the victor of 1918, the 'international Jewish conspiracy' embedded in the power structures of the USA, Britain and the Soviet Union.

In seeking to make sense of how Hitler envisioned Germany's future, historians have focussed on *Mein Kampf* and those passages in which Hitler sets out the inevitability of a reckoning between the Reich and the Soviet Union, the 'Jewish-Bolshevik state': 'The fight against Jewish world-Bolshevization requires a clear attitude towards Soviet Russia. You cannot drive out the Devil with Beelzebub.' (from *Mein Kampf* found in Neil Gregor's entertaining and accessible *How to Read Hitler* (Granta Books 2005) reviewed in SATH's *HTR Year Book* 2006)

But, argues Tooze, to have a fully-formed understanding of what propelled Hitler we must look at his *Zweites Buch* (*Second Book*), written in 1928 but only published after Hitler's death. While America is hardly mentioned in *Mein Kampf*, in the *Zweites Buch* a new strand becomes prominent in Hitler's thinking. This is a compound of the admiration, loathing and fear which Hitler felt for America.

Hitler was enormously impressed by America's take-off into phenomenal economic growth sustained by efficient modes of production, high wages and the availability of a vast array of consumer goods. America owed its dominance in the world economy to the size and wealth of its great internal market. Only through the seizure of 'Grossraum' in the East in the territories of the mortal enemy, The Soviet Union, could a National Socialist Reich aspire to create *Volksgemeinschaft*, a 'People's Community', enjoying material affluence on an American scale.

Yet for Hitler the USA was a cockpit of the 'Jewish world conspiracy' which with Roosevelt as its 'chosen one' posed an 'existential threat' of Germany. Tooze argues that once the Nazis were in power pursuing a raft of anti-Semitic policies which peaked with the Kristallnacht pogrom, it was Roosevelt 'who increasingly positioned himself as the most public opponent of the Third Reich, and he did so in overtly ideological terms.' (p324)

By Winter 1937/38 Hitler had cast aside the doubters among his closest advisors. Schacht, Blomberg and Fritsch were gone; replaced by lickspittles Göring, von Ribbentrop and Keitel. Hitler presided over a regime unique in history: 'No peacetime capitalist economy had ever operated with military expenditure at the level being contemplated in Nazi Germany.' (p255)

Thus Hitler and his cronies cranked up the tension in a series of episodes familiar to all students of 'Appeasement and the Road to War'. Tooze is emphatic that the Nazi leadership contemplated confrontation between the Third Reich and the Western powers through the prism of its anti-Semitic cosmology. This is the context in which Hitler's infamous speech of 30th January 1939 has to be seen. In it he made his chilling prophecy of 'the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe'. Tooze sees this as a barely concealed threat to the USA which as recently as 25th January had been characterised by the German Foreign Ministry as the 'headquarters of world-Jewry.' (pp283/284)

It was a race against time. Certainly Germany since 1933 had rearmed in the most dramatic fashion but at the cost of huge strains and imbalances in the economy. America might as yet lag behind in military hardware and personnel but its potential to challenge and- with its allies – ruin Germany was for Hitler self-evident.

But how had Germany come to be led by a man of such manifestly Manichean views? In 2007 there is presumably still much money to be made from a supernatural explanation for Hitlerism, for the demonic possession of a hitherto civilised people by a destructive, evil force. Witness the publication of Norman Mailer's *The Castle in the Forest* (Little Brown, 2007). Reading Tooze is the best antidote to such tosh, as he methodically charts Hitler's rise to power and presents the reader with a firmly-grounded analysis of the emergent power structure in the Third Reich.

Tooze teases out the issues 'that truly united the nationalist right' and made the coalition of 30ᵗʰ January 1933 workable. With ultra-nationalist conservatives seemingly dominant, the new regime's priorities were rearmament, repudiating Germany's foreign debts and saving German agriculture. The policy of work-creation – for all the propaganda images of a perspiring spade-wielding Führer exhorting Germany's jobless to emulate his example – ran a distant fourth. 'It was Hitler's actions on these three issues, not work creation, that truly marked the dividing line between the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich' (p25)

The author reminds us of how in 1933 a huge part of the German economy was still rooted in peasant agriculture. In 1925, 13 million Germans depended directly on farming for a living and for a substantial minority it was a painfully poor existence tethered by backwardness. In the 1920s German farmers suffered from the global collapse of commodity prices and inelastic demand. The Nazis fashioned a package of protectionist policies which had appealed to many rural voters whose support enabled the NSDAP to make the crucial breakthrough of September 1930. Angry farmers spoke with a loud voice and early in 1933 their leaders lobbied Hindenburg (himself the owner of large estates in Prussia), calling for a coalition between Hugenberg's Nationalists and the NSDAP. Their success prompts Tooze to claim that, insofar as economic interests were responsible for Weimar's collapse and Hitler's installation, 'the group chiefly responsible was not big business or even heavy industry, but Germany's embattled farmers.' (p28)

One of the major strengths of *The Wages of Destruction* is its depiction of the centrality of agrarian policies in the Nazi programme, 'the product of a society still in transition.' (p168) The themes of food and land were to form an integral part of the murderous practices of the racial state.

In the coalition of 1933 Hugenberg's embarrassing ineptitude as Agriculture Minister ensured his rapid replacement by the racial fanatic Walther Darré, ideologue of *Blut und Boden*, author of *The Peasantry as Life-source of the Nordic Race* (1928). In the Third Reich's early period, Darré was a powerful player, seventh in line on the electoral ticket for the all-Nazi Reichstag election of November 1933.

Darré was tasked with pursuing autarky in food supply through the Reich Food Estate and the creation of *Erbhöfrolle* (Hereditary Farms' Roll), a truly radical attempt to protect 'racially pure peasant families' through entail law. In addition, with his closest lieutenant, Herbert Backe, he set up the Reichsnaehrstand (RNS) which ended the free market for farm produce and set up price-setting mechanisms to encourage and channel production. In the everyday life of the Third Reich the RNS mirrored the significance of Robert Ley's DAF (German Labour Front), 'Exercising more or less direct control over more than 25% of Germany's GDP' (p188) It is perhaps not too quixotic to liken Darré as the Third Reich's Bukharin, with his vision of riding into National Socialism on a peasant's nag.

From 1936 Darré's standing in the Nazi hierarchy became less significant. The deflationary policies of the Reich Food Estate proved unpopular. Keeping food prices down squeezed farmers' profits and more and more farm workers quit in search of higher wages in industry. In the competition for steel between agricultural machinery producers and the big guns of the armaments industry there could only be one winner.

Just as significantly, the venomous Backe was able to persuade Himmler and Göring that he was the man to deliver self-sufficiency in food production. Backe receives only fleeting mention in the second volume of Kershaw's biography of *Hitler*, while Evans in *The Third Reich in Power* refers to Backe's dishing his boss on one page. For Tooze, however, Backe is a key figure in the complex inter-relationship between racial ideology and economics that in practice characterized Nazism. When the Wehrmacht launched Operation Barbarossa it was 'intent upon not one, but two programmes of mass murder.' (p476) These were the Final Solution and the Generalplan Ost on the one hand and on the other, the so-called Hunger Plan' agreed in the Spring of 1941.

The 'Hunger Plan' in its murderous criminality strains credibility. In sum it was calculated to avoid the experience of the Great War's 'Turnip Winter' of 1917-1918. It hinged on the entire expropriation by Germany of Ukraine's grain which hitherto supplied the Soviet Union's rapidly

expanding urban population. Upward of 20 million Soviet citizens were to die of starvation.

The key figure behind this planned genocide? Herbert Backe. For Tooze in his reconstruction of the economic factors underpinning Barbarossa, Backe has a pivotal significance similar to that of Werner Willikens to Ian Kershaw (refer Ian Kershaw *Hitler: Hubris*, pp527-532).Tooze, it can be argued, has added a further dimension to the Kershavian concept of 'working towards the Führer'

Seen as a work of art, Tooze's canvas is densely populated, from the banker Joseph Abs to the rapacious businessman Wilhelm Zangan. We are put in mind of the court portraits of Velasquez. At the centre is Hitler, on his right and left is the inner circle of trusted confidents such as Göring, Himmler and Goebbels. Tooze's triumph is to clearly depict the Führer and his inner circle and to bring in from the shadows those Nazis and fellow travellers, the executive force of Hitler's will, the men who planned the economy and the war effort. Their historic role is revealed and analyzed.

The Wages of Destruction can be viewed as a portrait of evil for all that post-modernists might cry 'foul' on History having a moral compass. The apparatchiks of the murderous Nazi military-industrial complex (mic) can be placed in a Dantean construction of Hell, one of concentric circles.

At the centre of the inferno is Hitler. From him radiates an elemental force, fanatical and obsessed, Nazism's 'mission statements', what Tooze encapsulates in the language of Michael Burleigh as 'a violent theology of redemptive purification.' (p xx).

The first circle is a mix of *Alte Kampfer* and arrivés, intimates and ingrates who anticipate the Führer's wishes. These men contend for Hitler's ear, aware of his ambitions and objectives and powerful enough to take up their own radical initiatives, thereby creating what Kershaw has labelled as a process of 'ceaseless radicalisation'. Across the twelve years of the Third Reich, this inner circle changes. Prominent in the critical early years Schacht, Darré then Göring are side-lined; by 1943 the engine of Nazi policy is driven by Himmler, Speer and Goebbels.

Much of this is already familiar to us, but Tooze has added a further circle, inhabited by the apparatchiks and 'fixers', the executive force of the 'Triumph of the Will'. While some of this outer circle are racial fanatics such as Backe and Globocnic, empirical analysis of their numbers leads one to question Burleigh's encapsulation of Nazism as a political religion, the creed of outsiders drawn from the fringes of German society. Time after time Tooze establishes that the executive officers of the mic came from the core of established society.

What motivated these 'mic men'? How did they become hooked, integral to the implementation of Nazi policies? Were they pragmatists, opportunists, men 'on the make' rather than fanatics?

As an illustration we can study General Georg Thomas, head of the military-economic department of the War Ministry. A front-line soldier who remained in the army after 1918, he 'was a fierce proponent of the absolute priority of rearmament over all other national concerns.' (p290) But he was no ingénue. With Schacht he insisted on the need to promote exports and secure Germany's financial stability. Thomas pondered opposition to Hitler's war plans, at critical periods delivering pessimistic strategy papers to the Führers' inner circle on the comparative weakness of Germany in the arms race (p310)

But doubting Thomas was silenced not by the Führer's stigmata but by his own 'ruthless pragmatism': 'Germany's future as a great power was Thomas' only real concern.' Thomas dutifully marched in step with Backe's Hunger Plan. He had been alarmed about the Wehrmacht's supply needs being able to be met by the railways in the invasion areas of Barbarossa. Backe's plan meant that the Wehrmacht could satisfy its demand for food and fodder from local sources allowing the railway system to concentrate on food and ammunition. (p479)

An historian able to research and refine a vast array of source material, Tooze displays a well-honed talent for debate and polemic. Illustrative of this is his analysis and overview of German capitalism in the Third Reich. In the chapter 'Partners: the Regime and German Business' he dismisses

the vulgar Marxist view of Hitler as a puppet of German capitalism.

In 1933 confidence in the German business community was at rock bottom. The collapse of the gold standard and of the free market left the way open for Germany's new leadership, but especially Hitler, Hugenberg and the financier Schacht to set the agenda. Germany moved away sharply from the economic liberalism of the Stresemann years towards dirigiste state intervention. There rapidly ensued a form of *gleichschaltung* with the fusion of existing voluntary business associations into a hierarchy of Reich, Business and Branch Groups (p107), an apparatus designed in part to squeeze imports.

In one of History's ironies, state intervention – that shibboleth of the hard Left – came about not in 1918 but in 1933, delivered by the extreme Right and 'the first years of Hitler's regime saw the imposition of a series of controls on German business that were unprecedented in peacetime history.' (p106) Thus the great German banks, though not nationalised, found themselves strictly controlled by the central Reichsbank. Between 1932-39 the total assets of the 'Berlin Great Banks' rose by only 15% in contrast to overall German output more than doubling. In this same period the Nazis directed small lenders to the savings banks whose assets became a prime asset in the regime's liquidity strategy.

It was not, however, all gloom for German business. The destruction of free collective bargaining, free trade unionism and social democracy ensured wages remained 'relatively static', there was a sharp decrease in foreign competition, rising domestic demand and rising prices. 'It was hard not to make healthy profits.' (p108)

Tooze's detailed analysis of the peculiar features of the recovery of German capitalism is a long but rewarding haul for readers. Just as there were winners too in the Great Inflation of 1923, so also 1933-39 was a complex mix of winners and losers. Like all top-ranking historians, Tooze's scholarship has been sharpened by argument and debate. In particular Tooze effectively dismantles the views of the maverick historian Götz Aly. Readers of *Wages of Destruction* will find a trip to Tooze's website richly rewarding, leading as it does to his 18-page critique of Aly's *Hitler's Volksstaat*.

Tooze demonstrates that while economic recovery did bring benefits to the entire population, the owners of capital were disproportionately favoured. Further, he demonstrates the subtlety of the Marxist analysis of the Frankfurt School of the 1930s and 1940s. Scholars such as Horkheimer stressed that the capitalist captains of the Third Reich were not the bloated capitalist pigs of Soviet caricature, suicidally greedy. On the contrary, these worthies saw the necessity of everyday benefits for 'ordinary Germans' in the 'People's Community'. They envisaged the function of Nazism as sustaining the entire capitalist system. There would inevitably be losers as well as winners.

Tooze's account of Germany's economic recovery reflects such perspectives. He downplays the economic impact of the work recovery programme while recognising its propaganda value as a 'feel good factor'. Far more significant was rearmament. The key figure lubricating the rearmament programme in these early years was Schacht.

Schacht emerges from the pages of *The Wages of Destruction* as a financier whose guile and mastery of the black arts of fiscal and monetary policy make this book compulsory reading for Mr Brown and successive occupants of $N^o.11$.

As Tooze makes clear, when Schacht became an open fellow traveller of Nazism by joining the Harzburg Front in October 1931 he entered into a Faustian compact. With Hitler in power Schacht was appointed first to the presidency of the Reichsbank then to be Reich Minister of Economics. In these posts he devised ingenious stratagems such as Mefo Bills to fund rearmaments, which became the prime factor in Germany's remarkable recovery.

But by 1936 Schacht was beset by doubts. Spectacular growth came at a price, hence the emergent 'Butter or Guns?' debate. The regime lived dangerously, fuelling popular anger by ruthlessly procuring arms at the expense of the agrarian sector and stoking-up unrest among Germans eager to eat well now that good times seemed to be returning. Rearmament, argues Tooze, as planed by Schacht in summer 1933 was 'rearmament within limits' (p207). But in 1935 military

spending had dramatically overshot budget figures. Obliged for so long by the pledges of Versailles to be temperate, Germany's generals binged themselves. Schacht now feared a balance of payments crisis with the Reich unable to pay for imported raw materials.

On 4 April 1936, four weeks after the triumphant remilitarisation of the Rhineland, Hitler appointed Göring as special commissioner for foreign exchange and raw materials. Alterative routes faced Germany. An authoritarian Reich, its prestige and clout now restored could return as an equal partner in a reconstructed international framework of finance and trade. This was the path favoured by Schacht. The other road was for the Reich to prepare for war. The ideology of *Lebensraum* would dominate economic planning.

In August 1936 Hitler decided. Germany was faced with an existential threat. In such an apocalyptic vision detailed economic policy such as balance of payments was a secondary consideration. Schacht's New Plan was replaced by the Four Year Plan, its supremo Göring, a caricature of thuggish energy, his politics calibrated to slogans rather than Schacht's subtleties. Germany was on the road to war.

Given the *Year Book's* readership and the existing examinations in Higher and Advanced Higher this review has focused on the years before 1939. But a work of *The Wages of Destruction's* scope and ambition points up the need for the coming NQ syllabus reforms to embrace the study of Germany *after* 1939 and the 'Second World War'. To halt at 1939 is rather like watching the World Cup Final and leaving the stadium with 89 minutes gone, both sides level and extra time looming.

The publication of Tooze's book along with the earlier *The Dictators* by Richard Overy (2004) and Evan Mawdsley's *Thunder in the East* (2005) provide course writers with the necessary academic base for the construction of vibrant new fields of study, including the Nazi-Soviet war of 1941-45.

Tooze's handling of this mighty conflict is utterly absorbing and insightful. He shatters so many optical illusions, among them that of a fully mechanised Wehrmacht, a well-oiled military machine: 'Weeks prior to the invasion (of the Soviet Union), 15000 Panje carts were issued to the infantry units that would trail behind the fast-moving panzers. The vast majority of Germany's soldiers marched into Russia, as they had in France, on foot.' (p454) On the other hand, Red Army soldiers had paraded on May Day with bicycles (Richard Overy, op cit, p445)

In the unfolding epic battles between the armies of the dictators, victory would go to the side superior in resources, human and material. As Mawdsley reminds us, the USSR had been the first of the great powers to rearm, beginning in 1927. Soviet military policy was one of comprehensive doctrinal and technical modernisation. In tanks, artillery and aircraft the USSR out-stripped its opponent.

And what of the USA, perceived by Hitler as the cockpit of the 'world Jewish conspiracy'? 1942-45 was to see the true flowering of 'Fordism', of the truly motorised army backed up by vast supplies of fuel and materials.

Germany was to be ground into the dust, crushed by the overwhelming strength of its enemies: *nervos belli, pecuniam infinitam* ('the sinews of war, an infinity of money') (Cicero). It is a story familiar to us all but the twist to the tale told by Tooze is to fully explain how the Third Reich remained a fighting force for so long. We are shown how – despite the Wehrmacht's enormous inferiority in manpower and military equipment – it took over three years of the most savage fighting before it was driven back to its positions of June 1941.

The Wages of Destruction is, then, a magnificent book, the most stimulating study of Nazi Germany to emerge in recent years. It elevates its author into the top rank of historians of Germany. Almost certainly, as he pounds out the last weary miles of his own history of the Third Reich, Richard J Evans will have pored over *The Wages of Destruction*. What Evans will have to say on the Third Reich at war will inevitably be measured alongside and compared with Tooze's history.

RON GRANT

The Soviet Union: A Documentary History Vol 2 1939-1991

Edward Acton and Tom Stableford

Many of you will have seen the review of *Volume 1* of this excellent work in last year's issue of the **Year Book**. That volume covered 1917-1940 which is almost exactly the period covered by the *italicised sources* section of the Advanced Higher *[field 10] Soviet Russia* course. This book takes the study on from 1939-1991, therefore covering the last two sections of the Adv. Higher field [Stalinism in World War 2 and Post-war Stalinism in E. Europe and the Cold War], but goes on from that to look at the consequences and developments of all the issues raised in the first volume, as the Soviet state ran its course towards its final break up.

As with the first volume the strengths of this book lie in two related things. The first is the width and variety of the sources; the majority of which are newly translated from a mid 1990's Russian compilation loosely entitled 'The Urals Collection'. This collection has been judiciously supplemented by the authors, in areas that seemed weakly represented, in order to give a fuller and more rounded picture of all aspects of the Soviet story from World War 2 onwards.

The second outstanding strength is the quality and insight of the commentary which weaves its way between the selected sources. I've got used to this style since Kowalski did it so successfully in *The Russian Revolution 1917-21*, and as in *Volume 1*, this volume cannot be faulted in this respect. The informative yet nuanced interpretative views which help link the sources together, tied in with suggestions for what recent literature is worth a further read on that topic, helps bring the reader right up-to-date with present thinking. To help keep things clear, the last 80 pages are general and place indexes, a very good biographical index and a list of all the sources in the book.

This book is worth the study then, not just from a functional use in teaching a War and Post-War Soviet Russian course, but also simply because, *'Much of today's world is inexplicable without an understanding of those decades of Soviet history.'* So how exactly is it set out?

The book is divided into 4 sections, not particularly evenly; with 44 pages of sources and commentary on pre-Barbarossa, and 133 pages on Russia at war up to 1945. The 2 remaining sections are a hefty 166 pages on the stagnation up to 1985 and then 85 pages on the final 6 years of collapse.

There might look a slight preponderance on the 1939-45 years but I've no criticism of that; as the authors say *'The Great Patriotic War ... cast its shadow right up to the last decades of the USSR'.* As we look at so many of the later sources we see that so much else that developed in the Soviet Union seemed to hinge on the legacy that was created out of victory...

The sources vary depending on what section they fit into. Given the nature of those years, the first two sections contain sources like passages from diaries of victims of the war, letters from soldiers, Pravda editorials of military or home front progress and some politburo documents. Topics like Stalin's possible loss of nerve on 22 June 1941 are well done. The source giving Molotov's noon radio broadcast which developed the idea of the *Patriotic* war leads to the question about how far this inspired idea actually emanated from Stalin? True he echoes the sentiment in his own radio broadcast 11 days later, but had he been in a fit state to lay it down as policy in those opening hours when he seemed in a state of shock? Looks like Molotov should get more credit here!

This section offers a rich variety of sources showing the blend of coercion and persuasion with which the Russian people were motivated to fight: the re-introduction of a 100 gram per day vodka allowance to encourage the troops [remember the difference in World War 1 where vodka production had been stopped in order to help the war effort!], the constant emotional and patriotic appeals, but at the same time the threats of dire punishments. The horrors of the war and the resilience of the home population are well told in some diary extracts, but the full story of Russian victory is also explained by evidence in sources showing the Russian ability to maximise production volume [over quality and sophistication] in weapon manufacture and totally out-produce Germany; and also the role of forced labour and lend lease and government inspiration. There is a nice bit of wider contextualisation

on Stalin's *Not One Step Back* speech of July 1942. I mentioned this feature of the quality of the commentary earlier; there is a full page of it to go with the three and a half side document, helping to show the timing, significance and consequences of this policy directive from the top. Something of Stalin's openness, ability to recognise previous errors and publicly explain them comes out in more than one source, the commentary helps open out the understanding.

The second section ends with the era of reconstruction and post-war expectations. There are good sources on the dawning of new hopes; [rehabilitation of the church, new assertiveness of the literary classes] but then after so few pages of these comes the dashing of those hopes: the tightening up of state control with moving sources on the treatment of Ethnic minorities, the church, collectives and the revived importance of Beria and the secret police. The commentary notes that victory entrenched the authority of the generation that had largely come to power in the 1930s – which kept Russian society going under the same expectations of repression, rather than letting some new political order be created. It meant that *'the recipe for rule shaped in the Great Patriotic War shored up the power of the CPSU and its aging elite.'*

The third section starts with the Cold War and has a range of documents showing just how the divisiveness developed. Some of these sources were familiar [Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, Vishinsky at the UN and Comecon's foundation] but the commentary often offered new insights into their context. What becomes obvious in this section is the way the sources show a monolithic state cracking up in the face of so many internal divisions and external pressures. What a pity it didn't look that way in the mid 1960s when I was at secondary school under the flight path from Upper Heyford American air base, home of a tactical bomber wing, with B52s taking off every day to head out towards the North Sea to defend us against the bad guys. It all looked a damn sight less optimistic then.

Now I see all these sources telling me about the SALT talks, Russia getting bogged down over Afghanistan, the aging gerontocracy in 1970s Russia with only their Marxist-Leninist clichés to fall back on, Poland and Solidarity and Russia's terrible economic position with regard to over-stretched defence spending, the breakdown of collectivisation, failure of Virgin Lands, etc, etc, .. all these sources repeating the same story of long term and inevitable Soviet meltdown…. Why didn't someone tell me all that then?? It could have saved me a lot of angst, and plotting where I could go to get under ground when I heard the four minute warning.

What the sources now reveal in the clearest terms is the way Russian government was reduced to a lot of desperate men chucking desperate throws of the dice in a game that was often beyond them; always hoping that a last throw would get them out of gaol. That Novosibirsk Report of 1983 just summed it up; someone honest for once informing the top apparatchiks their game was up and their entire *raison d'etre* was defunct.. That telling critique must have provided Gorbachev with much of the rationale he needed to dismantle the system five years later.

So, for too many years following the Great Patriotic War, the role of the CPSU in the basic architecture of state control remained untouched. In going for radical change, you can see where Gorbachev was coming from, but he obviously had no clear idea of where he was going. It is ironic that a system set up and operated from above [a clear Marxist contradiction anyway] was finished off by largely unintentional actions from above which were trying to salvage the system. Shades of Stolypin being Tsarism's great last hope 80 years earlier and trying the same trick!

The final section of the volume looks at these last 6 years [1985-91] leading to total systemic collapse of the Soviet Union. Many of the sources in this section are Gorbachev's writings or speeches at UN, CC meetings etc. charting his intentions and the progress of his reforms. Incredibly believing that the fundamentals of the Soviet system were robust enough to accept radical change, Gorbachev embarked on a programme of reform of every aspect of the Soviet state which was still living out the faltering legacy of World War Two. He reaped what we now see as the inevitable reward. One by one those 40-year old props that had maintained and sustained a certain type of state were swept away, to be replaced with.. well, nothing much. Soviet Russia's super power status melted away at the same time, as it showed it just hadn't got the resolution to deal with the attacks from all sides.

More shades of Tsarism here; its implosion in early 1917! In the end, of course, Gorbachev had to go; the member states followed their own individual lines which showed just how much the 'Soviet Union' had been an artificial and coercive construct, the rise of Yeltsin, and the disintegration of the CPSU all made his position unworkable. He might have put a gloss on it in his final TV broadcast by talking about his achievements, but the reality was that his policies had exposed the Soviet system for what it was; all smoke and mirrors, and well past its sell-by date by 1991.

All in all then, a wide-ranging set of documents and a perspicacious commentary of the final 50 years of a super-power that we thought was indestructible. Well worth the read.

ANDREW HUNT

The War for a Nation   **Susan-Mary Grant**

Routledge   £18.99   261pp   Pbk   2006   ISBN 0 415 97990 0

The author, Dr Susan-Mary Grant, and this reviewer share two aspects; one is our fascination for the period of the American Civil War; and the second, is the debt of gratitude we owe to our teacher who inspired us so much at university, the late Peter J Parish. His study, *The American Civil War,* published over thirty years ago, is still regarded as one of the best single-volume overviews of what arguably the United States' finest president, Abraham Lincoln, referred to as "this fiery trial".

Writing succinct histories of the Civil War has never been an accusation laid at the door of many historians. Parish's work weighs in at a hefty 750 pages. Perhaps given that the Civil War has been, in human terms, the greatest war the USA has ever fought, then it is appropriate that the writing should also be on an epic scale. Witness Douglas Southall Freeman's four volume study of Robert E Lee; or his trilogy on *Lee's Lieutenants,* or Allan Nevins' heroic four volume study of the Civil War. Yet recent works have shown that it is possible to provide the essence of the character of the Civil War succinctly. Brian Holden Reid's biography, *Lee: Icon of a Nation,* is an admirable example. It is into this category that Susan Mary Grant's book should be placed.

The book forms part of a series published by Routledge on *Warfare and History.* Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the military aspects of the conflict should take precedence but this is far from the case. The author subtly interweaves the military conflict with the social, economic and political impact that such a war engenders. From the European perspective, it is the idea that "The American Civil War was not a war of conquest but a conflict of ideals" that has provided the fascination. What Susan-Mary tries to do, and in the main part succeeds, is to try to balance the arguments put forward by both sides. She herself admits that her aim has been to provide "the general reader a flavour of as much of the war as possible", yet the reader does not feel patronised by the fact that "I have rushed through, completely flanked, or simply not mentioned events, people, and places that were – that are - important". I think the author is being a little too self-critical in this respect.

The first two chapters take a broad perspective on the divisions emerging within nineteenth century American society, some evident from the birth of the nation in 1776. The later part of the decade of the 1850s comes in for closer scrutiny as the nation stumbles towards war, and there is adequate treatment of the main reasons for the outbreak of the conflict.

There is a very compact assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of both sides at the outbreak of the war and the complex motives that inspired men on both sides of the divide to enlist.

"Like a dinosaur, a killing machine with powerful muscles and a tiny brain, the typical Civil War field army was capable of delivering and sustaining a great deal of damage, but unable to produce the kind of conclusive outcome that both the Union and the Confederacy were expecting at the start of the war" is an excellent example of how the author is able to explain one of the reasons why the war lasted so long, without going into minute detail. Such an approach helps keep the narrative moving at a brisk pace (unlike most Civil war armies!) and the reader is borne along on an eventful

journey, akin to white water rafting! Was the Civil War the 'first modern war?', a question beloved of examination setters. The author's answer is brief, as usual, yet nonetheless satisfying- "As far as the industrial, technological, and military developments of the period's weaponry were concerned, the Civil War was more of a testing ground than a full-fledged exploitation of these marvels' potential on the battlefield".

In chapter 5, the author demonstrates her ability to paint a complex picture-in this case - the issue of emancipation - and ties it into the narrative of the war in the second half of 1862. The pressures on Lincoln to emancipate or not form the backdrop to Lee's invasion of the North culminating in the stalemate at Antietam (as a pro-Union sympathiser, I always refer to the battles by the name given by Union contemporaries), which allowed Lincoln to issue his preliminary proclamation five days later. The narrative then swiftly takes the reader onto reactions to such a bold move and also a look at how blacks in Union armies were then faced with discrimination and a brief assessment of the Afro-American military contribution. Confederate atrocities at Fort Pillow are used to explain changing Northern attitudes towards blacks, and as the chapter concludes'

"Emancipation represented the highest ideals to which the mid-nineteenth century-nation aspired; Fort Pillow offered a terrifying glimpse of what it would cost to achieve them".

Chapter 6 is a brief account of the war to July 1863 and its aftermath, culminating in the appointment of General Grant as General-in-Chief of all Union forces in the spring of 1864. Sufficient detail is provided to explain the twists and turns of the fighting of the war whilst end notes and a brief bibliography offer a glimpse of the resources available for the reader to explore aspects in greater detail.

A feature of the work is that every chapter opens with a quote appropriate to the content of that chapter. Susan-Mary Grant has included much primary material that will be familiar to any student of the Civil War, but there is also much that is new. The author uses this material to illustrate the narrative as it unfolds, to back up her opinion.

The impact of the war on the civilian populations is dealt with in the chapter *The People Embodied*. In every sense, as Lincoln stated, this was 'a people's contest'. Politics in both the North and South are covered as is an assessment of the efficiency of both governments in prosecuting the war. A neglected aspect of the contest is the role played by women. Susan-Mary has attempted to redress that imbalance by looking at "The female face of battle" and how women did contribute to the sustaining of the conflict.

"Lee's Miserables" concludes the work with a brief sketch of the war in 1864/1865 and the effect of the taking of Atlanta and the re-election of Lincoln in November 1864. The conclusion hints at the work still to be done in terms of the struggle for the equality of the races in the post-bellum Union, and the failure of the North to fulfil its pledges given in the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. However, despite that, the war did settle "the lingering questions over slavery and states' rights that had undermined the ante-bellum Union, and out of it emerged an integrated state with both territorial and political sovereignty". In a sense this echoes the views of Shelby Foote writing in his three volume *The Civil War.* On the question of the legacy of the war he was of the opinion that before the war Americans talked of the 'United States are...' whereas after 1865 they talked of the 'United States is...'. Such assessments continue to provide fascination for readers on both sides of the Atlantic. Lincoln's belief that "it [the war] can be hushed forever with the passing of one generation" has proved to be very wide of the mark.

Reading this book took me back to my student days in University Gardens. The teaching of Peter Parish very much underpins this title, yet Susan-Mary Grant has added her own particular style to the narrative. I think Peter would have approved very much of her narrative and I commend this title to anyone who is interested in this period of American history.

JIM MCGONIGLE

Gilfillan of Dundee   **Aileen Black**

Dundee University Press   £25   Pbk   280pp   2007   ISBN 1 845 86006 3

If personality can be determined from a portrait then the impression given from this book's striking cover is of determined, proud, independent and daunting character.

George Gilfillan served as Minister of School Wynd United Presbyterian Church in Dundee from 1836 until his death in 1878 when it was the largest United Presbyterian Church in the city. Aileen Black has produced a fascinating account of his ministry setting it within wider developments in mid-Victorian Scotland. The early research for this book must have seemed unpromising since George Gilfillan's wife burnt his private papers fearing some unsavoury insights into his life and their marriage. However, careful use of other primary and secondary sources has allowed Aileen Black to write a book which illuminates many aspects of Scottish life: religious; cultural; literary and political.

Gilfillan's portrait is an accurate representation of his personality as he was anything but a conventional Minister and he challenges the view that religion was the harbinger of a compliant culture. He was a Minister who in many ways championed the working class and preached a message of mercy and forgiveness which ran contrary to belief in a God determined to send all but the elect to eternal damnation. By way of contrast, his preaching had a more modern emphasis on supporting neighbours, charity to weaker members of society and progressing society in line with God's will. In light of Darwin and other theories, the Bible could no longer be regarded as the literal truth on geographic, scientific and astronomical matters, but this did not detract from its divine inspiration and spiritual truth. The Bible remained God's word proclaiming his eternal and universal love. Little wonder that Gilfillan aroused considerable controversy in the United Presbyterian Church with its attachment to the Westminster Confession of Faith.

His personal life also attracted much controversy. He enjoyed a drink, sometimes to excess, and was at best indifferent towards the temperance movement. Aileen Black claims that this allowed him to retain the loyalty of grocers and spirit dealers in his congregation and office bearers, but other United Presbyterian Churches contained similar groups and it would have been interesting to see how cases of intemperance, if any, were dealt with by his Church's kirk session. He was strongly critical of 'respectable' Christians.

Gilfillan provided strong support for many contemporary causes notably the Anti Corn Law League, political reform and the Nine Hour Factory Movement. Much of this support came via his speeches and populist style. His powerful oratory attracted large crowds and drew much support. Aileen Black rightly puts oratory and the sermon at the heart of her analysis of Gilfillan's work which provides a vivid example of Drummond and Bulloch's earlier assertion that 'it was not worship, as normally understood, that drew the crowds in Victorian Scotland, but oratory'.

The nineteenth century witnessed a rapid expansion in writing and publishing and here Gilfillan acted as both an author and mentor and promoter of working class authors. His works included *Galleries of Literary Portraits* and he encouraged many other writers and poets including Alexander Smith and William Thom. Alexander Smith's poem, *Glasgow*, remains one of the most evocative descriptions of an industrial city: 'Draw thy fierce streams of blinding ore/Smite on a thousand anvils, roar…'. Aileen Black contends that Gilfillan was well qualified to act as an intermediary figure and a cultural director to the urban working class.

The author sets out in the preface an ambitious aim to produce a text which both historians and the general reader will enjoy, rather than an academic tome. The book achieves this aim as it is a highly readable account of a fascinating iconoclast. However, readability is not at the expense of scholarship as careful research lies at the heart of this volume. This is a book which will be of interest to the general reader and those with more specific interests in nineteenth century religion and literature. It is a must for those who teach in Dundee. Finally, Dundee University Press deserves congratulations for its support to publishing and Scottish History.

PETER HILLIS

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