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EDITOR: ANDREW HUNT

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Contributions, editorial correspondence and books for review should be sent to the Editor,
Andrew Hunt, 35 Carrongrove Avenue, Carron, Falkirk FK2 8NG.

Cover: A cigarette card, produced some time in the earlier 1930s, of George V laying the wreath on behalf of the nation at the Cenotaph on Remembrance Day. My thanks to JD Henderson for providing the card, and to WD and HO Wills, London for their permission for SATH to use this card without charge.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

PROFESSOR EDWARD J COWAN, FRSE taught at the Universities of Edinburgh, Guelph (Ontario) and Glasgow before taking up his present position as Director of the University of Glasgow's Crichton Campus. Professor of Scottish History at Glasgow, he is much in demand as a speaker, journalist and broadcaster. He has published widely on various aspects of Scottish History and has been a Visiting Professor in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. His most recent publications are *For Freedom Alone: The Declaration of Arbroath 1320* (revised edition 2008), *The Wallace Book* (2007) and *Folk in Print: Scotland's Chapbook Heritage* (2007).

DR ADAM IP SMITH, a Senior Lecturer in American History at UCL, is a regular contributor the *Times Literary Supplement* and other journals. He is the author of two books on the American Civil War: *No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North* (Oxford University Press, 2006), a study of party politics and political participation in the Union, and *The American Civil War* (Palgrave, 2007), an overview of the war aimed at students and general readers which draws on all the recent historiography.

DR PHIA STEYN is a lecturer in African Environmental History at the University of Stirling. She has written several articles and chapters on the history of South African environmentalism between the 1960s and the 1990s, ethnic minority campaigns against multinational oil companies in Ecuador and Nigeria, the politics of water, the history of food consumption amongst the Basotho people of Lesotho, and the history of Shell-BP in Nigeria. She is currently working on two monograph projects, namely the history of the rinderpest epidemic in the Orange Free State republic (1896-1898) and an environmental history of apartheid South Africa.

DR ANN PETRIE is a Course Leader at Angus College, Arbroath. Before studying for a postgraduate degree she co-authored '*The Glaxo': 50 Years in Montrose,* published in May 2002. Following this she successfully completed her Ph.D. 'Scottish Culture and the First World War, 1914-1939' in August 2006. She is currently working on a short book entitled *Rent Strikes: An East Coast Perspective*, which is due for publication in the Autumn 2008. Her area of academic interest focuses on the period surrounding the First World War and its impact on the home front in Scotland.

DR CAROLYN KITCHING is Reader in British International History at the University of Teesside. Her publications include *Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament, 1919-34* (1999) and *Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference, 1932-1934* (2003). She is Editor of the newsletter of the British International History Group, and her research interests include disarmament, the politics of the First Labour Government, the League of Nations and the United Nations.

DR NEIL EDMUNDS is Senior Lecturer in Modern European History at the University of West of England, Bristol. He is author of *The Soviet Proletarian Music Movement* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2000) and editor of *Soviet Music and Society under Lenin and Stalin. The Baton and Sickle* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004). His articles on twentieth-century musical life have appeared in numerous journals, including *Slavonic and East European Review*, *Tempo*, and *Contemporary British History*. He is currently researching Russian musicians in Shanghai during the inter-war period.

TIM KIRK is Professor of European History at the University of Newcastle. He is the author of *Nazism and the Austrian Working Class* (Cambridge, 1996) and *Nazi Germany* (Palgrave, 2007). His research interests are in the comparative history of fascism and in central European political and cultural history. He has edited a number of collections in these areas, including *Opposing Fascism* (Cambridge, 1999) and *Working towards the Fuehrer* (Manchester, 2003), both with Tony McElligott; and *The City in Central Europe* (Ashgate, 2000), with Malcolm Gee and Jill Steward, colleagues in the Research Group in European Urban Culture (http://www.europeanurbanculture.co.uk/). He is currently a visiting Research Fellow at the University of Vienna, where he is working on Hitler's Germany and the Balkans.

DR DAVID MARTIN teaches in the History Department at the University of Sheffield. Co-author of *Labour in British Society 1830-1914* (2000) and co-editor of *Ideology and the Labour Movement* (1979), he also contributed to the first ten volumes of the *Dictionary of Labour Biography* (1972-2000). An essay on the Parliamentary Labour Party in 1906 appeared in *Men Who Made Labour*, edited by Alan Haworth and Dianne Hayter (Routledge, 2006).

DR MIKE HAYNES works at the University of Wolverhampton and is especially interested in the history of the former Soviet Union and the wider issue of the human costs of change. He has co-authored *A Century of State Murder? Death and Public Policy in Russia*, (2003) and is co-editor of *History and Revolution: Refuting Revisionism*, (2007).

Editorial

ANDREW HUNT

Just like clockwork; the months roll round, and here we are again in June with the latest volume of the HTR Year Book. In a curious but reassuring sort of way it does just seem to happen like that. Sure enough, there's some organisation and administration to be done; invitations go out, likely leads on a possible contributor are 'chased up', thank you letters and acknowledgments are written, unnecessary but nevertheless appreciated 'reminders' are sent out; and by about Easter the whole thing has arrived on my computer and is ready for the printers to get their hands on; and there you are, 'Bob's your uncle' as Captain Jack Sparrow remarked rather anachronistically in 'Pirates of the Caribbean'. You make take it that this opening paragraph is a back-handed way of saying, once again, that all thanks for the excellence of this issue of the Year Book are due to the generosity and abilities of a great range of contributors. They have been anxious to deliver; often consulting me on the tone, length or complexity of their contribution; and all adhere to an excellent sense of deadlines. SATH thanks them all.

I'm probably banging a well-banged drum [and betraying my age, and Luddite's dismay at the 'short-cut' approach to study via the internet that is so prevalent among young people nowadays] if I take this chance once again to 'bang on' about the value of the Year Book as the sort of academic publication that makes a contribution to our senior pupils' learning. It may well be that, some day, all SATH's stuff including the Year Book, will be on a website as well so then I'll stop ranting, but at the moment this little volume in your hands is a sort of BOOK.. that means you're not logged on, it's not a web page, or a blog, or a set of casual thoughts that some person bunged down, which other folk then uncritically believe, then mindlessly copy off their screen. This collection of articles has an academic pedigree; these contributors have been mulling over their ideas since last July! In more than one case, these ideas have been aired and received public scrutiny, and the authors have responded to it. These contributions take scholarship forward; they show pupils how it should be done; that History is full of angles and insights and intuitions and uncertainties, as well as width and depth. These articles don't possess that closed-circuit, this is the answer, copy me down unquestioningly approach that so often seems to be encouraged in the indiscriminating student by the modern internet. I'll say again that I am glad to be so long associated with this part of SATH's work... I get to be the first to appreciate these articles and reviews for the perspectives they add to my teaching. I think the internet comes a poor second at providing this sort of stuff at this sort of level.

There are a fair number of articles in this issue of the Year Book on different aspects of the theme of war and peace; and I was looking for something suitable for the front cover to illustrate that notion. I came across this cigarette card inside an old World War 2 gas mask case which had been its home for the past 60-odd years, along with hundreds of other cards that had been collected by my colleague's mother before the Second World War. It's difficult to argue that the idea of collective sacrifice and grief and loss can ever be tied to just one historical time frame; but there's still something in you that says 'They, then, in the 1920s and 30s, knew it in a way we have never had to come close to.' This faded and slightly worn card is a reminder of the way that the nation's collective loss shaped those older generations, slightly faded and worn themselves, who have had to live with and so stoutly endure that grief. They have an enduring sense of reverence for those that never came back... after all; they knew them.

Independence for Higher? Robert Bruce and the Scottish Wars of Independence

PROFESSOR EDWARD J COWAN

The following discussion originated in an invitation to address the SATH Conference at Bearsden Academy, 24 November 2007, on the place of the Scottish Wars of Independence in the Higher Syllabus. Relevant initiatives since then merit some comment before proceeding to the main content of this paper.

The Scottish Government recently made the unprecedented announcement that the teaching of Scottish History is to become compulsory in Scottish schools, demanding the hitherto unthinkable requirement that young Scots, like their fellows in every other civilized country in the world, should actually learn something about their own history. Since on numerous occasions in a career spanning over forty years I have made the identical recommendation, I am personally delighted by this initiative signalling that Scotland's governors are no longer terrified by their own history. No doubt there are still those in the teaching profession and elsewhere who have previously told me in no uncertain terms that to teach Scottish History in schools would prove 'dangerous' in a way that the study of the Russian Revolution or Nazi Germany somehow was not, a view which clearly still has considerable support to judge from the correspondence columns of our national press following the minister's announcement. It is of interest that today's nay-sayers employ exactly the same arguments that were advanced a century ago during the debate about the founding of the chair which I presently hold, namely that of Scottish History at the University of Glasgow. When a public appeal for funds realized less than a quarter of the target of £20,000, the committee of mainly newspaper editors, Burnsians and politicians, organized the Scottish Historical Exhibition of 1911, the profits from which permitted the appointment of Robert S. Rait to the chair in 1913.[1]

Richard Lodge, holder of the first chair of History at Glasgow, once made a strong plea for Scottish history, arguing that for everyone the history of their native land 'must always be of pre-eminent interest and importance', and he attempted to teach some it himself. An English correspondent once asked Lodge how he dealt with the 'B battle' to be told that quite simply he avoided mention of it in his lectures![2] The fiercely contested chair campaign was launched in 1907. Many of the arguments *pro* and *contra* the desirability of the chair remain astonishingly fresh and relevant a hundred years later for they were part of wider debates both about the place of Scottish history in the school curriculum and the responsibilities of the universities to society at large. The *Glasgow Herald*, in a perceptive line, suggested that the desire of Scots to study the history of their own country was because 'it is at once the most aristocratic and the most democratic of all histories'.[3]

Glasgow University Senate, however, insisted that students must take the European History course before proceeding to Scottish, believing (and similar sentiments have often been expressed since around the halls of academe) that the prescription of the general course first would remove any tendencies towards 'parochialism, picturesqueness and defective perspective'.[4] In the end though it permitted students to take European and Scottish simultaneously.

At Rait's inaugural lecture the Principal observed that the chair owed its existence to 'a very remarkable manifestation of what might be called national consciousness and a national zeal for the highest education'. Rait, later to be principal of Glasgow himself, was even more outspoken. 'Why', he asked, 'was there a professorship of Scottish History at Glasgow?'.

> Not by the insistence of any University Commission or Government Department, not even by the gracious wish of any munificent benefactor, but because the people of Glasgow and the West of Scotland willed that such a chair should be.[5]

Thus was established the people's Chair of Scottish History.

William Smart, Professor of Political Economy at Glasgow, believed that the study of history generally began at home; to prove his point he surveyed the teaching of national history from Oxbridge to the United States, to Scandinavia, Russia, Bohemia, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Belgium, Germany and France and, needless to say, he found Scotland sadly lacking. In his view the proposed chair's purpose was to promote the teaching and the cultivation of rigorous research methodologies. By subjecting Scottish history 'to the dry light of modern scientific criticism', it would be rescued 'from being the plaything of national passion and sometimes parochial prejudice'.

Echoing Smart, a leader in the *Herald* observed that it was axiomatic that 'a man is unfitted to deal with political and social questions, and has shut himself out from ennobling and vivifying influence, if he does not know, and know well, the story of his native country . . . adequate knowledge of our country's history is essential to an enlightened patriotism as distinguished from noisy chauvinism'.[6]

Not all were in agreement. Professor D. J. Medley of the History department went public to remind people that Scottish was part of general history and that the former was likely to prove 'a narrowing intellectual influence . . . the history of our own country is, after all, but part of the wider history of the world, and should be carefully related to this wider history'. At the root of the debate was the notion that universities ought to provide a knowledge of Scottish history for future schoolteachers. As the *Herald* solemnly warned, 'those are blind readers of the signs of the times who do not see how the development of the schools is bringing ever nearer a complete reorganisation of the University system'. The medievalist W. S. MacKechnie publicly disagreed with his colleague Medley:

A Scotsman's first duty is to know his native land . . . a small field mastered is better than a smattering of wider knowledge; no subject is more likely to rouse his dormant faculties than what lies nearest to his life and home. What the heart grips tightest the intellect will most quickly absorb and memory longest retain.[7]

There was widespread condemnation of the Glasgow School Board when it voted against the establishment of the chair. Medley, as board-member, played a predictable role, claiming that Scottish history was not ignored in his department; he himself devoted the last lecture of his course to Scotland. There was, in any case, insufficient Scottish history to fill up a lecture course, the subject being far too limited, since it was 'a history of some three hundred years'!

Surely it was far more educative for the ordinary individual to be taken to a big, broad, and general subject - where they were dealing with the great elemental forces, where their minds were being widened by the knowledge of what a large place the world is, and how long a time the world has existed.

Furthermore the university was not a place for the training of teachers; 'it was a place for a liberal education'. The campaign to establish a chair was not an educational movement, it was a 'sentimental movement'.

The debate, which generated much reflection on the nature and value of Scottish History in the school and university curricula, had been opened by William Wallace, editor of the *Herald*:

. . . the movement . . . is non-controversial, non-aggressive, rationally patriotic, and, above all things, educational. The belief of the Committee is that the best guarantee of the Scottish citizenship of the future being directed to the attainment of wise and noble patriotic ends, is a full and accurate knowledge of what has been achieved by the Scottish citizenship of the past.

That same debate was effectively closed by Principal T. M. Lindsay, who believed that no arguments could be brought against the chair 'save of the merest pedantry'.

A thousand influences of time and place have helped to make us what we are, and we must know something about them if we are to know ourselves. Granted that many of them do us no great good, tend to cramp rather than to expand the character, make us hard rather than sympathetic, we must learn what they are ere we can set ourselves to correct them. For the most part what comes to us

Scotsmen from the past of our country is the best of our belongings. It forms the common life and that mutual neighbourly trust which keeps a nation united, as its differences and even quarrels give it life and movement . . . What may be expected from a Professor of Scottish History is to describe the makings of the Scottish nation, to make us see the ebb and flow of its life, the impulses which have moved it, the aims which at different periods have inspired it, and the gradual development of characteristics which, educated in national crises, have combined to form the national character.[8]

Critics were greatly alarmed (as some still are) since such subjects as patriotism and the national character were and remain, to say the least, potentially volatile and not easily investigated using the tools and mindsets conditioned by the British empirical school. The superiority of English history was then, as now, mistakenly assumed. For the Medleys, to be English was to be British in a way that to be Scottish was not; hence the charges of narrowness, parochialism, chauvinism and sentimentalism levelled against Scottish history, and echoed once more in the last few months. At the same time, if the pro-chair camp is to be believed, their opponents showed themselves to be lamentably out of touch with Scottish public opinion, which demanded more Scottish history in schools, and expected a greater degree of sensitivity and responsiveness from the universities.

The Scottish Wars of Independence[9] represent one of the most crucial, influential and iconic episodes in all of Scottish History. Between the calamitous accidental death of Alexander III in 1286 and the end of the Bruce dynasty in 1371 the nation of Scots redefined itself. The curious and unique concatenation of historical circumstances in the late thirteenth century ensured that Scotland would never be the same again. It can be argued that in the ensuing struggle there were born certain basic assumptions which almost all Scots now take for granted. Resistance to claims of English overlordship was originally verbal but after the bleak experience of the Balliol kingship and Edward I's conquest the Scots violently resisted, led by such stalwarts as William Wallace and Robert Bruce. Wallace became the greatest hero in Scottish History, an unimpeachable icon for subsequent unionists and nationalists alike, yet his career can be viewed as one of failure ending in his own grisly execution.[10] Did Legend triumph over History in Wallace's case? Is he to be regarded as a success or a failure? Are most Scots heroes, underdogs or losers? Robert Bruce[11] is seen as more of an opportunist swaying in political winds, yet he enjoyed outstanding success although never embraced by posterity with such passion and enthusiasm as Wallace. Often depicted as 'the man from nowhere' who came to the fore in his country's hour of need, the 'ordinary man' who rescued Scotland from its supine aristocracy, Wallace was nonetheless a nobleman himself, a Guardian, a governor who announced that Scotland was open again for business following Stirling Bridge, a multi-lingual diplomat and a martyr. Yet where did this paragon acquire his education and his military skills? How can it be that most of what we know of this hero derives from enemy sources?

The military tactics of both Wallace and Bruce merit study, as do those of other commanders such as Andrew Murray or the Black Douglas. How is Wallace's defeat at Falkirk, following his stunning victory at Stirling Bridge to be explained?[12] To what is Bruce's military success, notably at Bannockburn,[13] to be attributed? Why did Bruce destroy the castles which he re-took from the English? What was the idea behind sustained attacks upon Northern England[14] and the apparently pointless campaigns in Ireland[15]?

Yet success in battle was not the whole story. Bruce also conducted a propaganda war following on from the rhetorical exchanges of the 1290s. The Declaration of the Clergy (1309-10) and the Irish Remonstrance (1317) fore-grounded ideas about kingship and government that were to be fully articulated in the remarkable Declaration of Arbroath (1320) which advocated the contractual theory of monarchy, namely that a king was elected by his subjects and could be deposed by them, and which proceeded to eulogise Freedom. Where did the Scots acquire such inspirational and universal ideas? How could such notions have developed, uniquely, in a country which was perceived in the 14th century to exist at the very edge of the world?

Following the dazzling victory at Bannockburn, how did Bruce go about the reconstruction of his kingdom? Parliamentary legislation, particularly of 1314, 1316 and 1318, affords a clue. Yet there was still opposition to Bruce as the Soules Conspiracy of 1320[16] reveals; there were still those who supported the Balliol cause and who still bitterly resented Bruce's slaying of the Red Comyn in

Dumfries in 1306. Why after such consistent refusal did the English eventually recognise Bruce as legitimate King of Scots in 1328? After his death the wars resumed. Why? Civil war saw the Balliols apparently triumph. David Bruce[17] was not the match of his father and to make matters worse he suffered defeat at Neville's Cross in 1346 and a subsequent eleven-year imprisonment in the Tower of London. Scotland appeared to have reached some kind of nadir which, to make matters worse, was accompanied by deteriorating seasons and the disaster of the Black Death. Nonetheless David II is now regarded as a successful monarch, at least from 1357 onwards, whose reign witnessed the production of John Barbour's heroic poem *The Bruce* and John of Fordun's patriotic *Chronica Gentis Scotorum*. What then was the true legacy of the Bruce dynasty? What is the true meaning and impact of the Scottish Wars of Independence? Hopefully many other questions and sub-topics will suggest themselves to readers in briefly examining the period, for convenience through the career of Robert Bruce though, of course, many other approaches are possible.

On 25 March 1306, Robert Bruce was coronated at Scone in the presence of four bishops, five earls and 'the people of the land'. Heralded as legitimate claimant, a golden circlet was placed upon his head. The date was auspicious for Lady Day commemorated the Annunciation of the Virgin Mary, supremely a day of new hope, salvation, liberation and redemption.

Yet this was no celebration in which the nation at large could rejoice. Robert Bruce was an excommunicate, for having blasphemously defiled the sanctuary of the church by killing John the Red Comyn, at the altar of Greyfriars in Dumfries. Furthermore a majority of Scots believed that Scotland already had a king; John Balliol had been judged to have the best claim to the kingship by Edward I of England in 1292, who dismissed the bid advanced by Bruce's 80-year-old grandfather. For three years the English master attempted to manipulate the puppet-monarch who valiantly strove to cut the strings before he was ultimately forced into ignominious surrender, as 'Toom Tabard' or empty coat, humiliatingly stripped of power, honour, and respect. Edward then proceeded to conquer Scotland placing English garrisons in almost all of her major castles.

The dazzling, inspirational flame of resistance kindled by Wallace was now no more, his nation subjected to the second English conquest in a decade. Edward[18] was undoubtedly growing old but he was still arguably the most powerful ruler in medieval Europe. The slaughter of Comyn, provoked civil war with his family and supporters, not to mention powerful allies, for John Balliol was his uncle.[19]

As Bower the chronicler observed, Bruce was indeed engaged upon a mighty undertaking supported by very few 'who in comparison with the multitude of the other side were like a drop of water reckoned against the waves of the sea, or a single grain of seed against a great number of grains of sand'. Posterity, he argued, could barely comprehend the misfortunes, flights and dangers, afflictions, hunger and thirst, the watches and fasts, scanty clothing and chills, ambushes, captures, imprisonments, killings, personal bereavements and the ruination inflicted upon kinsmen and followers, which he suffered at the commencement of his campaign.[20] It is truly remarkable that individuals of the stature and accomplishment of Wallace and Bruce should have appeared in the same generation but over the centuries the Scots have been readier to accept Wallace as the country's incomparable hero, the straightforward single-minded warrior who refused any compromise with foe or friend, to meet his epiphany on the Smithfield scaffold. His countrymen have shown little willingness to warm to Bruce the aristocrat, the apparent vacillator who seemed all too willing, at different times, to find some accommodation with the enemy. Such attitudes fail to comprehend the complexity of the man and his heritage, his obligations, priorities and responsibilities, above all to his family and kindred. Bruce was a prisoner of his past in a way that Wallace was not.

There is a story that Bruce's mother, the Countess of Carrick, a widow, essentially abducted her future husband, the first of a series of 'gutsy ladies' that Bruce encountered in the course of his life and whose brief details convey something of fourteenth century gender relations; she produced a family of five boys and seven girls. Bruce thus grew up a Gaelic speaker in Carrick while remaining mindful of his Annandale interests. Yet large though the Bruce land-holdings were in Scotland they never came near in extent to those in England.[21] It is true that the Bruces were part of an Anglo-Scottish aristocracy to whom frontiers meant little and although his aged grandfather was buried at

the family foundation, Guisborough Priory in Yorkshire, the future king was emphatically a Scot; indeed, as has often been observed, more of a Scot than Edward was an Englishman, and one whose greatest contribution was to eventually confer a political sense of Scottish identity upon a majority of his people. It was Robert's own experience of family loyalty and kindred commitments that led him to eventually promote the idea of the Scottish nation which he eventually recognised as a mechanism for uniting his people in a noble cause much greater than the sum of their individual selfish interests and concerns.

Little is known of Robert's early life; indeed he barely figures in the first third or so of Geoffrey Barrow's much acclaimed biography. In 1292 his father resigned the earldom of Carrick to him. When Balliol became king the Bruces refused his lordship and ignored the summons to military service as a consequence of which Annandale was granted to the Comyn Earl of Buchan. The Bruces were not therefore regarded as model Scottish subjects and indeed when John Comyn initiated the first hostile military action of the Wars of Independence, he targeted Carlisle Castle which was held on behalf of Edward I by Bruce father and son. Robert's grandfather and father both exhibited an element of pragmatism; some might say opportunism, so far as advancing their claims to the kingship were concerned. Early in the English campaign of conquest the father requested that he be given the throne to which Edward famously retorted, 'Have we nothing else to do but win kingdoms for you?' Both *père et fils* subscribed the Ragman Roll accepting Edward's overlordship but whether they fell into the category of those magnates whose hearts were far from the English king however close their persons might be is uncertain. Their main priority was the well-being of the House of Bruce.

However, Robert Bruce surprisingly declared for the 'patriot cause' in the Spring of 1297 as Wallace began to stir. He was motivated by the best of reasons – because he was a Scotsman. 'No man holds his own flesh and blood in hatred and I am no exception' said he. 'I must join my own people and the nation in which I was born'. This may have been a ploy in which his father conspired, to ensure that the Bruce holdings remained intact whatever the outcomes but it can also be interpreted as arising out of genuine conviction. Bruce was a member of an emerging West of Scotland faction which included the Stewarts as well as Wallace and Bishop Robert Wishart of Glasgow, who declared that warring against Edward was the equivalent of fighting against the Saracens in the Holy Land, that Independence was a crusade.

In 1298 Bruce and John Comyn became joint Guardians of Scotland in succession to Wallace, somewhat discredited by his defeat at Falkirk. The notion of 'Guardian' is an interesting one which developed out of the phenomenon of the kingless kingdom.[22] When Alexander III was accidentally killed in 1286 he left no heirs. A parliament held in Scone appointed six Guardians to rule in his stead – two earls, two magnates (each with a Comyn representative) and two bishops, one of them Wishart. When the Scots became aware that John Balliol had overstepped the mark in 1295 by refusing Edward military aid he was set on one side and twelve Guardians replaced him. This was not, however, an outright deposition but rather a contrivance designed to negate his impending unseating by Edward I. What transpired was a constitutional revolution because a separation of the powers took place.[23] Inspired by theories of canon law John retained the dignity of office while his powers of administration were conferred upon the Guardians. Thus it was that Wallace and indeed Bruce, though it must have pained him greatly, stated in official documents that they acted 'in the name of the eminent prince Lord John, by grace of God the illustrious king of Scotland, with the agreement of the community of the realm'. A Guardian council held at Peebles in 1299 was severely disrupted when two quarrelsome knights drew their daggers on one another and before long Comyn had leapt at Bruce seizing him by the throat. A Comyn supporter claimed that nothing less than treason and lese-majestie were being plotted, remarks of particular interest in view of what was to happen at Dumfries seven years later. Soon after, Bruce resigned his position.

Bruce's movements and motives are rather difficult to chart during the next five years. Wallace had conducted an embassy to France and the papacy aimed at securing the return of Balliol as King of Scots. Consequently Bruce's enthusiasm for the cause apparently waned and around the turn of 1301-2 he jumped the fence. His position was unenviable, trapped between the forces of family loyalty, his obligation to preserve the Bruce estates, noble rivalry, and the preservation of face, honour and

dignity while confronted with an apparently invincible English king. Yet it is difficult to accept just how comprehensively Bruce became Edward's man in a comparatively short time. He campaigned against the Scots and he was made sheriff of Ayr and Lanark. He was part of a force which attempted to capture Wallace in February of 1304, while later the same year he contributed to the fall of Stirling Castle when it surrendered to the English.

What seems to have galvanised Bruce was the death of his father in April 1304, for he could now act alone. Less than two months later he made a pact with Bishop Lamberton, promising 'to be of one another's counsel in all their business and affairs at all times and against whichever individuals'. On the very same day and on the same terms, Bruce and the Red Comyn agreed a contract of mutual support. Comyn was the last to enter Edward's peace in 1304, the man most widely recognised as the true leader of the Scottish political community, the representative of a distinguished family which had been associated with the patriotic party for some fifty years. Given his own track record, not to mention the rather uninspiring career of his opponent, Comyn must have been astounded to discover that Bruce regarded himself as a candidate for the kingship, but it also seems probable that he nurtured unspecified schemes of his own.

The chroniclers have tales about how Bruce approached Comyn with his plans 'to finish the endless tormenting of the people' and of how the two men made some kind of deal about compensating the other if one was to be successful in attaining the prize. Comyn's response would have been that Bruce was not only guilty of treason (as he probably was himself) but, worse, that he was a usurper for, by making his bid he was setting aside the very man that Comyn already regarded as the legitimate king of Scots, his own relative king John. To the medieval mind such an act of usurpation would have been anathema.

Both men were due to attend court in Dumfries on 10 February 1306, the one as Lord of Annandale, the other as keeper of Dalswinton Castle. It is pretty obvious that if Bruce were to be successful he had to find some way of buying off or neutralising Comyn. The fact that they met in a church suggests that because of previous antipathy neither trusted himself to trust the other, or his own actions. Oaths as guarantees for good behaviour were probably also required. All the indications are that Bruce struck first, at the very least severely wounding Comyn. Even Bruce's greatest admirer, the poet John Barbour, states that he acted wrongly because he did not respect the sanctuary; it was due to that pernicious deed that such misfortune later befell Bruce, though he would eventually triumph over personal adversity. The suggestion that Bruce only knifed Comyn, leaving others to finish him off has been seen as a plea for exoneration; he struck the blow but did not actually kill anybody, a truly specious argument. Bishop Wishart's pardon for Bruce's action a month later was outrageous and unlawful. Looking at the evidence overall, and considering the deportment of the two main protagonists, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that John, the Red Comyn, has suffered, at the hands of posterity, one of the greatest betrayals in all of Scottish history. As for Bruce, as Lord Hailes long ago shrewdly noted, his alternatives were to be a fugitive or a king.

Bruce took impressively swift action to capture a number of castles from Dumfries to Ayr, as well as Dunaverty in Kintyre while making a bid for Dumbarton. Some forward planning can be assumed. At Scone the new king was inaugurated though the traditional seat, the Stone of Destiny, had been removed to Westminster by Edward in 1296,[24] a blatant act of cultural genocide.

John of Fordun was the first of numerous Scottish chroniclers and historians who simply could not understand how William Wallace, the dazzling victor of Stirling Bridge and many other encounters could lose so convincingly at Falkirk, and he attributed the disaster to patrician contention in general, and to Robert Bruce in particular. Soon every single account of the battle would include a fictitious postscript in which Bruce and Wallace encountered one another on opposite banks of the River Carron. When Bruce asked William why he resisted the might of Edward and the will of the Scottish nobility, he replied,

It is your inactivity and womanish cowardice that spur me to set authority free in your native land. But it is an effeminate man even now, ready as he is to advance from bed to battle, from the shadow into sunlight, with a pampered body accustomed to a soft life feebly taking up the weight

of battle for the liberation of his own country, the burden of the breastplate – it is he who has made me so presumptuous perhaps even foolish, and has compelled me to attempt or seize these tasks.[25]

According to Bower it was this exchange that caused Bruce to have a change of heart, 'like one awakening from a deep sleep . . . he no longer had any thought of favouring the views of the English'. Though the story lacks credibility it is remarkable that Bruce should have been so comprehensively indicted, that each time the episode was repeated right down to the end of the nineteenth century, listeners or readers were confronted with the notion, reinforced from generation to generation, of aristocratic quisling-like treachery on the one hand and on the other a kind of inspirational folk-nobility. Historically Robert Bruce would not have counted Wallace as his 'faithful friend', for his rank would not permit it. Since medieval times many investigators have sought nothing less than the creation of a fictive historical political community that would embrace both Wallace and Bruce in the name of the nation, a phantom which at the time simply did not exist. But it was Bruce who, following his coronation took on the self-appointed task of creating both a kingdom and a new national identity. In so doing he was to prove that he was truly the father of his nation.

By far the most colourful account of Bruce's adventures on the perilous road from Scone to Bannockburn is to be found in John Barbour's great vernacular poem *The Bruce* composed in the 1370s.[26] Barbour was adamant that Bruce committed a mortal sin in stabbing Comyn at the altar. Due to that act he was beset with such calamitous misfortune as the poet had never heard of even in a romance, before he eventually survived to enjoy good fortune. The story which it tells – and Barbour stresses that his tale is true – is conventional enough in that it is concerned with how one man achieves redemption, overcoming colossal odds through the quest, wanderings in the wilderness, and through feats of arms which are almost credible though verging on the superhuman. The poem is also about chivalry, about an elite whose task it is to right appalling wrongs, such as a nation in distress. It concerns a band of brothers which included the likes of James 'the Black' Douglas, who enjoys almost equal billing with Bruce. Also known as 'the Good', he is described as 'not so fair that we should speak greatly of his beauty', but pale-faced and black-haired and, like Hector of Troy, many of whose characteristics he shared; he spoke with a lisp, a sign of manliness in the Middle Ages. Curiously, given Bruce's sad track-record of vacillation, Douglas is depicted as devoted to loyalty, a quality which enabled men to live righteously but without which they were worthless. He is, in some respects, Bruce's alter ego. Another important player is Edward Bruce the king's brother, a fiery, impetuous and somewhat flawed character, who profoundly mourns dead comrades, but who appears to operate on a short fuse. Another devotee of loyalty is Thomas Randolph Earl of Moray, a very perfect courageous knight; dedicated to honour, generosity and righteousness he exudes goodness and munificence and he embodies all the virtues. Scotland had never seen the like of such men!

Historians have always been uncomfortably aware that Barbour's opus contains significant amounts of fiction but they simply cannot do without him for he provides a narrative to be found nowhere else. He excels at depicting the personal pain and deprivation accrued in the struggle for the kingdom's liberation, poetically communicating the immediacy, squalor, chaos and carnage of battle-scenes, but his stance could be described as aristocratic rather than nationalistic. This is not to suggest that his impressive eulogy on freedom should be overlooked for it will surely be remembered as long as Scots retain the ability to read. But that when Barbour penned, 'Freedom is a noble thing', he stated exactly what he was inclined to believe, namely, that freedom was more likely to be found among the kingdom's natural governors, the nobility, rather than the commoners.

Barbour also exhibits an unprecedented comprehension of Scotland's geographical extent and diversity, brilliantly conveying the revelation that Bruce had an intimate knowledge of the Scottish landscape unrivalled by any other monarch. In pursuit of his quest Robert also showed himself to be possessed of a near immutable energy and capacity for activity, though occasional health breakdowns serve to humanise him while signalling his mortality.

On departing from Scone following his coronation, Bruce appears to have been active in Strathearn, desperately seeking supporters or surrenders, before leading a force into Galloway where, faced with English pressure, he was forced to retreat again northwards, to face a rout at the Wood of Methven near Perth. Allegedly accompanied by the queen and her ladies Bruce fled westwards through Breadalbane

and Glen Dochart to be worsted in an encounter with the MacDougals of Lorne, who were Comyn adherents, at Dail Righ near Tyndrum. This was the occasion when the victors supposedly tore the famous Brooch of Lorne, now in the National Museum of Scotland, from the king's cloak. Robert then retreated southwards across Loch Lomond to the friendly shelter of the Lennox before taking to the Clyde and sailing to Rathlin Island off the Irish coast where he probably wintered. Ironically Barbour depicts the periods between defeats as almost idyllic as Douglas organised deer hunts and the provision of 'engines' to catch fish, everything from salmon to minnows. Bruce found time to encourage his troops with tales of Roman valour and before embarking upon Loch Lomond he read them a romance! Equally surreal was the female contingent vacationing in the Highlands before being sent off for safe-keeping to Kildrummy Castle where they faced the inevitability of subsequent capture. Deadly serious was their later barbarous incarceration in cages.

It should never be forgotten that Bruce was, from 1306 onward, an excommunicate who was thus a non-person and potentially the victim of anyone who opted to assassinate him. He must have spent much of his time looking over his shoulder. When Edward I learned of Bruce's actions 'out of his wits he well-nigh went', immediately ordering the raising of the dragon, the symbol of no mercy. Within a year many of Bruce's adherents, including three of his brothers one of whom, Alexander, was a luminary of Cambridge and Dean of Glasgow, suffered the same ghastly fate as Wallace. Knights and clerics as well as 'simple country folk and laymen' were hanged. Edward's wrath knew few bounds.

It was at Rathlin that Bruce experienced arachnoid inspiration, in the shape of a spider which completed its web after several attempts and thus led him from a series of depressing defeats to another venture. Since the tradition cannot be dated any further back than Sir Walter Scott's *Tales of a Grandfather* (1828) this popular and familiar icon has nothing to do with Bruce and all to do with the incredible impact that Scott had on the Scottish imagination. The original story was associated with the Douglas family. However galvanised, though most likely due to the beneficent and even alluring influence of Christiana of the Isles, a kind of Hebridean queen, Bruce returned via Arran to his Carrick estates and soon triumphed in a minor skirmish at Glentrool in Galloway. Shortly thereafter he won another victory at Loudoun Hill, pursuing the enemy to Ayr. A contemporary letter reported that Bruce had never enjoyed the goodwill of his supporters or the people in general to the degree he did now. Preachers had discovered and circulated a prophecy of Merlin which stated that after the death of 'The Covetous King' the Scots and the Welsh would unite and have full lordship, living in peace together until the end of the world. Shortly before his death Edward I had two English preachers executed for claiming that Bruce was indeed the subject of the 'Prophecies of Merlin' which predicted that a second Arthur would lead the Irish, Welsh, Scots, Cornish and Bretons, nothing less than a pan-Celtic alliance, against the English and then rule as the Emperor of Britain. There is some indication that later in his reign Bruce actually attempted to bring about the fulfilment of these prophecies. In 1307 he sent a letter to Irish chiefs rejoicing that 'our people and your people, free since ancient times, share the same national ancestry', urging both to come together, united in common custom and common language, to strengthen and maintain the special friendship between them so that Scotland might recover her ancient liberty. Edward's dying wish at Burgh by Sands on the south side of the Solway was that his bones be carried at the head of the English army as it marched into Scotland. Bruce retorted that he feared the bones more than he did the old king's son and successor, Edward II.

Bruce concentrated his attacks on the territories of the Balliols and their Comyn allies, namely Galloway and the north, capturing Inverlochy Castle, Urquhart Castle and Inverness all in the Great Glen. He proceeded to campaign through the winter attacking Elgin and Duffus. Having recovered from a serious illness he then hit Balvenie Castle at Dufftown, before raiding the Black Isle and penetrating as far north as Dornoch. In the summer of 1308 he defeated the Earl of Buchan at Inverurie and finally waged warfare, literally with a vengeance, on the Comyns in the episode known as the 'herschip', or ravaging, of Buchan. The entire earldom was destroyed, crops burned, livestock slaughtered and Comyn supporters butchered. He then turned on the MacDougals in Argyll, smashing them at the battle of the Pass of Brander while his brother Edward partially suppressed the folk of Galloway. And so the work went bonnily on. Even success can become tedious. Castle after castle fell to Bruce,

though not all, we may suspect, as described by Barbour. Linlithgow, for example, was supposedly taken when a hay cart packed with men contrived to jam the portcullis, a story as unbelievable as would be any suggestion that another stronghold had accepted the gift of a wooden horse.

By 1309 Bruce was secure enough to summon a parliament to St Andrews. That same year the 'Declaration of the Clergy of Scotland' furnishes the first real evidence that Robert's propaganda department was up and running. He had recently secured the services as chancellor of Abbot Bernard of Arbroath a highly talented individual that we may believe was the hand behind this declaration and that of Arbroath in 1320, as well as possibly others. The document explicitly stated for the first time the completely false claim that most people had regarded Bruce's grandfather, and thus Bruce, as Alexander III's true heir, so implying that Edward I had deliberately selected the weaker candidate for his own ends. To relieve the suffering caused by invasion and war, the people, 'by divine prompting', distinguishing their need for a captain and leader, accepted Robert as king: 'By their authority he was set over the realm and formally established as king of Scots, and with him the faithful people of the realm wish to live and die, as with one who, by right of birth and by endowment with other cardinal virtues, is fit to rule, and worthy of the name of king and of the honour of the realm'. This fascinating text also contains a reference to 'the consent of the whole people' which seems somewhat more all-embracing than the 'community of the realm'.

Bruce's military tactics were as ingeniously straightforward as they were unconventional. In Scottish terms he pioneered guerrilla raids and attacks eschewing set piece battles. He was dependent upon infantry and hobelars, small ponies which permitted rapid movement but which made the transportation of booty difficult if not impossible. For defensive purposes he favoured scorched earth tactics, the heart-breaking precaution of destroying any crops and livestock which might sustain the enemy but which would almost inevitably result in the starvation and deprivation of the defenders. Folk had to feel totally passionate about their cause to adopt this tactic, or else they had to be made to feel at sword-point that they had no other option. Bruce also insisted that captured castles were reduced or demolished, ensuring that they would not be serviceable should there be any reversal of fortune. He avoided sieges wherever possible as consumptive of time and men. He also levied blackmail to prevent lands being laid waste whether the enemies were English or Scots, a significant number of whom adhered to Edward II.

It is tempting but wrong to regard the great victory at Bannockburn as the climax of Bruce's campaigns. Even Barbour seems to have ended the first version of his poem there until persuaded to supply a sequel. On 23 and 24 June 1314 the king was forced into the type of situation he had so assiduously avoided for eight years, namely a conventional battle. Bruce chose the site but his troops were inferior in number and in arms to the well-equipped enemy. As he told his followers, they had three great advantages. They had right on their side, and they were fighting on their own turf, but above all they were defending their lives, and families as well as their freedom and their land. It was a close-run thing, hard-fought and bloody, but fortune favoured the righteous. On that day Robert Bruce and his generals delivered the greatest victory in Scottish history and yet, colossal though it was, it barely marked the half-way point in the Wars of Independence.

As the Scots triumphed at Bannockburn the poet John Barbour expressed pity for the vanquished who fled in all directions, some drowning as they attempted to swim the Forth. The Bannock Burn itself was so choked with the bodies of men and horses that it was possible to cross it dry-shod. He described the plight of the hapless English, trapped between drowning in the tidal burns or being despatched by the Scottish soldiery who moved among them. The victory represented a great economic as well as a psychological boost and yet it accomplished little politically. The victory over one of the largest-known English armies should have resulted in instant recognition of Bruce's claim to the Scottish kingship, as well as a peace treaty, but it achieved neither. He was defeated by the Whitehall mentality which over the centuries has tenaciously viewed as irrelevant whatever happens north of the Humber. In the years after Bannockburn King Robert faced at least two great tasks. He had to somehow maintain pressure on the English to recognise his claim and title, but at the same time he had to attend to the reconstruction of his kingdom, as is necessary after any war, not least one that combined civil and national elements.

The process of consolidating his kingdom was swiftly underway. At a parliament held in Cambuskenneth Abbey it was adjudged that all who had died in opposition to the king or who, by that date, had omitted to enter his peace, should be disinherited for evermore of their Scottish lands and hereditary rights. A double allegiance would no longer be tolerated; landowners now had to choose between their possessions in England or Scotland. Bruce personally understood the agony of such a choice which must have cost him much heart-searching between 1297 and 1306. By this act he created 'The Disinherited' who would nurture resentment and resistance well into the reign of his son David. Yet the legislation was not as final as might have been expected. Despite its harsh language Bruce left the door open for later submission or compromise but whether his policy should be seen to display flair or folly is somewhat contentious. It is difficult to come close to Bruce the man but there is at least a suggestion that his reluctance to cultivate complete intractability did not make his life any easier.

Another concern was legislation, some of it rather conventional such as, for example, the defence of the rights and freedoms of the Scottish church, the provision of justice for poor as well as rich, and the safeguarding of the economically important salmon fisheries. Other statutes stressed the need for discipline to defend the rights and liberties of the kingdom. Anyone disobeying the king was a traitor. No Scot was to trade with the enemy. The nobility were to behave peacefully. Feuds were to be quenched and the number of armed retainers curbed. Provision was made for service in the army and for wapinshaws, or weapon inspections, to ensure that all men between 16 and 60 were properly equipped to fight. In order to facilitate the policy of Reconstruction the king was voted the tenth penny, a tax of 10% which to be levied only during his lifetime.[27]

Devolution is a word that has become familiar in Scotland's political vocabulary during the last generation. There is some indication that Robert Bruce may have contributed to, or fostered, a certain Scottish fondness for this type of delegation, condemned in some quarters as a serious governmental weakness, yet seen by others as commendable empowerment. Bruce created regalities large and small throughout his kingdom, essentially territorial jurisdictions which enjoyed virtually regal powers and which were granted to the king's most loyal associates, 'in free regality'. Lesser units, which nonetheless enjoyed courts with limited powers, were conferred 'in free barony'. By such means royal government attempted to cope with Scotland's awkward and inconvenient geography as the king himself was represented regionally and locally by his delegates. Similarly, for excellent economic reasons, Bruce enhanced the power and self-government of the burghs which began to exercise their political muscle for the first time during his reign.

In terms of foreign policy Bruce pursued a campaign of terrorisation in the North of England, levying blackmail and orchestrating raids so effectively that eventually one-fifth of Edward II's kingdom is reckoned to have become tributary. Edward Bruce was despatched to Ireland to open up a new front where he had himself recognised as High-King before his death in battle in 1318. Bruce himself campaigned there in 1317 and he returned for reasons unknown in the very last year of his life. Ireland could be regarded as England's breadbasket and thus any way of debilitating food production aided the Scottish cause but it is likely that Bruce also harboured some ambition of fulfilling Merlin's prophecies of a Celtic revival led by himself. Scottish efforts led to a truce with England in 1323 and peace five years later in the Treaty of Edinburgh which recognised Bruce's title and the independence of his kingdom, 'separate in all respects from the kingdom of England, in its entirety, free and in peace, without any kind of subjection, servitude, claim or demand' as in the time of Alexander III.

It was not all plain sailing. Bruce was faced by a rebellion on the part of 'The Disinherited' in 1320, some of the participants having put their seals to the Arbroath Declaration only a few months earlier. The rebels apparently sought to replace Bruce with Edward Balliol, son of the late King John, a man who was to become something of a fourteenth century 'Young Pretender' thereafter. Several of the conspirators had Comyn connections thus demonstrating that the Greyfriars episode remained to haunt Bruce.

Robert was a man of conventional piety who was generous to the Kirk and went on pilgrimages to Tain and Whithorn. He defied excommunication but he would not have been human if he had not

occasionally feared the tortures of eternity. The sentence, never entirely lifted, was re-imposed as a consequence of Scottish raids upon England. Indeed all who supported the king faced a similar threat to their mortal souls.

Thus it was that in 1320 the nobles, barons, freeholders and 'the community of the realm of Scotland' sent a letter to Pope John XXII, urging him to pressure Edward II into recognising Bruce as the legitimate King of Scots. Composed in a high-flown rhetorical style the document preserved the fiction that Bruce knew nothing of it, but that his subjects were prepared to fight to the death to preserve their king and their nation. It contained at least two inspirational ideas which so far as most Scots are concerned, became political assumptions for, over the centuries, the document was to acquire a mythic or parahistorical significance far beyond what might be expected of a missive to the pope. First it states that Bruce had become king 'with the consent and assent of all of us', a clear reference to the idea of popular sovereignty, and it goes on to assert that if he gives up what he has begun, 'threatening to submit us or our kingdom to the king of England or the English (an inconceivable eventuality) we would strive at once to drive him out as our enemy and a subverter of his own right and ours, and we would make some other man who was able to defend us our king'. This is the first articulation of the contractual theory of monarchy in a practical political context in European history, arising out of the unique circumstances of the Scottish Wars of Independence. It proceeds to make an inspirational, universal appeal to human dignity and freedom. 'For as long as a hundred of us remain alive, we will never on any conditions be subjected to the lordship of the English. For we fight not for glory nor riches nor honours, but for freedom alone, which no good person gives up except with life'. Such was the legacy of Good King Robert.

Towards the end of his life Bruce purchased an estate at Cardross in Dunbartonshire so that he could retire to Gaelic-speaking Scotland, the world in which he was nurtured. There he built an unfortified manor house with a garden, a hunting park, a shelter for falcons and a fish-trap on the River Leven, where he kept a 'great ship'. Somewhere on the premises a live lion was on display. It was at Cardross that Robert Bruce died on 7 June 1329, having charged the Black Douglas with taking his heart on pilgrimage to the Holy Land. More economically the canny Sir James journeyed to Spain where he fell in battle with the Moors. His body was returned to Scotland, as was the heart, for burial at Melrose Abbey. Thus departed 'the People's King', the man who truly put the 'Scot' into Scotland and preserved the land for her people.

The most recent mythologisation of the Arbroath Declaration involves the establishment of the document's date, 6 April, as 'Tartan Day' in Canada, the US and elsewhere, a day to celebrate Scottish heritage and culture, as well as a people who learned to control their kings and who were prepared to die for freedom which was the only reason for living.[28]

NOTES

1 For a fuller discussion of this topic see Edward J. Cowan, *Scottish History and Scottish Folk*, Inaugural Lecture, Chair of Scottish History and Literature, University of Glasgow 15 March 1995, (University of Glasgow 1998), pp. 3-10.

2 Andrew Browning, 'History' in *Fortuna Domus. A series of Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in Commemoration of the fifth Centenary of its Foundation* (Glasgow 1952) p. 53

3 *Glasgow Herald, 16.5.1913*

4 *Glasgow University Archives, Records of the General Council, vol. v, p. 90*

5 *Glasgow Herald, 17.5.1913*

6 *Proposed Chair of Scottish History and Literature. Newspaper Extracts Chronologically Arranged The Scottish History and Literature Chair Committee (Glasgow 1908) pp. 4-11*

7 *Proposed Chair, pp. 38-43*

8 *Proposed Chair, pp. 68-9*

9 The standard works will be well known to all: G. W. S. Barrow, *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland* (London 1965), now in its 4th edition (Edinburgh, 2005); Ranald Nicholson, *Scotland the Later Middle Ages* (Edinburgh, 1974) *pp. 1-183;* Alexander Grant, *Independence and Nationhood: Scotland 1306-1469* (Edinburgh, 1998) *first 3 chapters; Colm McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland 1306-1328* (East Linton, 1997); 'Independence, Wars of', *in The Oxford Companion to Scottish History* ed. Michael Lynch (Oxford, 2001) 333-336; Michael Brown, *The Wars of Scotland, 1214-1371* (Edinburgh, 2004) pp. 157-254. Invaluable and essential is *Regesta Regum Scottorum V The Acts of Robert I,* ed. A. A. M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1988) which contains a book-length introduction.

10 Edward J. Cowan, "The Wallace Factor in Scottish History". *Images of Scotland.* (eds.) R. Jackson and S. Wood in *The Journal of Scottish Education Occasional Paper*, No. 1 (Dundee, 1997) 5-17. See also Andrew Fisher, *William Wallace.* (Edinburgh, 1986; 2002), Graeme Morton, *William Wallace Man and Myth.* (Stroud, 2001), Chris Brown, *William Wallace: The True Story of Braveheart.* (Stroud, 2005) and Edward J. Cowan, ed. *The Wallace Book* (Edinburgh, 2007) all of which include extensive bibliographies.

11 The most recent study of the king is Colm McNamee, *Robert Bruce Our Most Valiant Prince and Lord* (Edinburgh, 2006). A useful collection of primary source material is Chris Brown, *Robert the Bruce, A Life Chronicled* (Stroud, 2004)

12 Pete Armstrong, *Stirling Bridge & Falkirk 1297-98 William Wallace's Rebellion* (Oxford, 2003).

13 Aryeh Nusbacher, *The Battle of Bannockburn 1314* (Stroud, 2000), one of a stream of books on the battle, soon to become a flood. See too William Scott, *Bannockburn Revealed* (Stirling, 2000)Pete Armstrong, *Bannockburn 1314: Robert Bruce's Great Victory* (London, 2005), John Sadler, *Bannockburn Battle for Liberty* (Barnsley, 2008) and Chris Brown, *Bannockburn 1314* (Stroud, 2008)

14 Jean Scammell, 'Robert I and the North of England', *English Historical Review*, 73 (1958), pp. 385-403.

15 Sean Duffy, ed. *Robert the Bruce's Irish Wars: The Invasions of Ireland 1306-1329* (Stroud, 2002)

16 Michael Penman, '*A fell coniuration agayn Robert the doughty king*: the Soules Conspiracy of 1318-1320', *Innes Review* 50 (1999), pp. 25-57.

17 Michael Penman, *David II 1329-71* (East Linton, 2004).

18 The best study remains Michael Prestwich, *Edward I*, (Newhaven and London, 1988). See also Fiona Watson, *Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland, 1286-1306*, (East Linton, 1998) and 'The Enigmatic Lion Scotland, Kinship and National Identity in the Wars of Independence' in *Image and Identity The Making and Re-making of Scotland Through the Ages*, eds. D. Broun, R. Finlay and M. Lynch (Edinburgh, 1998) pp. 18-37.

19 Alexander Grant, 'The Death of John Comyn: What was Going On?', *Scottish Historical Review*, lxxxvi (2007) pp. 176-224. See also, Alan Young, *Robert Bruce's Rivals: The Comyns, 1212-1314* (East Linton, 1997).

20 Walter Bower, *Scotichronicon*, 9 vols. Ed. D. E. R. Watt (Aberdeen and Edinburgh 1987-97), vol. 6 p. 317. This edition of the complete text and translation, fully annotated, is one of the great achievements of 20th century Scottish medieval historiography, and an accessible and indispensable source for anyone interested in the subject under discussion.

21 Ruth M. Blakely, *The Brus Family in England and Scotland 1100-1295* (Woodbridge, 2005).

22 N. H. Reid, 'The kingless kingdom: the Scottish guardianships of 1286-1306, *Scottish Historical Review* lxl (1982) pp. 105-29.

23 Edward J. Cowan, *'For Freedom Alone': The Declaration of Arbroath, 1320*, (East Linton, 2003) pp. 63-5.

24 *The Stone of Destiny artefact and icon*, eds. R. Welander, D. J. Breeze and T. O. Clancy, Society of Antiquaries of Scotland Monongraph Number 22 (Edinburgh, 2003); Nick Aitchison, *Scotland's Stone of Destiny Myth, History and Nationhood* (Stroud, 2000)

25 Bower, *Scotichronicon*, vol. 6, p.95. The passage is also a useful indicator of attitudes towards women at the time.

26 John Barbour, *The Bruce* ed. A. A. M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1997). This excellent edition and translation is crucial for any study of Bruce's career.

27 The 'Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707' are now available online, http://www.rps.ac.uk with original text and translation, an absolutely brilliant resource achieved through the initiative of Professor Keith Brown of St Andrews University.

28 Cowan, *Freedom Alone*, chapter 6. A revised edition of this book will appear in 2008.

The Final Arbiter: Public Opinion and Union Victory in the American Civil War

DR ADAM IP SMITH

The Civil War just won't go away. According to one estimate 60,000 books on the bloody conflict of 1861-1865 had been published by the end of the twentieth century. That's more than one a day since the fighting stopped.[1] What, it might reasonably be asked, can still be said? In truth, every generation has re-formulated the basic questions that the war posed, including the most basic of all: why the South lost. This is an issue that retains its centrality to scholarly discussion of the war because in the last two or three decades, historians have begun to reconnect the battlefield with the home front, shedding new light on this oldest of questions.

To the makers of the myth of the Lost Cause in the late nineteenth century, the explanation for Confederate defeat was obvious: the South lost a heroic struggle against overwhelming odds. General Lee set the tone for this interpretation with his message to his men after the surrender at Appomattox: "After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude," he told them, "the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.[2]" If Lee was right, historians need not look south of the Mason-Dixon line to explain the war's outcome. It was certainly the case that, by the end of 1864, the North had found ways of making its industrial and manpower superiority count on the battlefield. Grant and Sherman had large, well-fed and well-equipped armies at their disposal. The northern economy was more efficient than ever at churning out arms and military supplies. The extent of the greater resources available to the Union is indicated by the fact that, thanks in large part to the increasing mechanization of farming, the North actually doubled its exports of wheat, corn and pork to Europe during the war, despite the demands of the Union army and the loss of agricultural manpower.[3] Large parts of the South, in contrast, had been devastated, crops and buildings burned, plantations left in disarray, and armies depleted by unimaginable losses. Technological and industrial superiority also had some clear military advantages for the Union. This was especially true of the naval war. The South was never able effectively to contest the Union blockade. Steam-powered Union gunboats also had a huge advantage in river-based warfare, able to move fast enough to have a good chance of evading Confederate batteries.

Although the North always had more men and greater industrial resources, Union generals failed to capitalise on this advantage for much of the war. That began to change after Grant took command of all Union armies in early 1864 and adopted a harsh strategy designed to destroy the Confederacy's capacity to wage war. There were three elements to his plan. The first was to move on all fronts simultaneously, thus stretching the South's limited resources. The second was to keep up the pressure: rather than fighting set-piece battles and then retiring to lick their wounds, the Army of the Potomac's spring 1864 campaign involved relentless attacks on Lee's army, day after day and week after week. The losses on the Union side were horrendous, but proportionally less than the South was suffering, and Grant—dubbed "Butcher Grant" by some in the North—had made the grim calculation that the Union army could withstand losses more easily than the Confederacy. The third, final and most controversial strand to Grant's new strategic approach in 1864 was to use grand raids, most famously Sherman's march to the sea after the fall of Atlanta, to destroy not only the crops, factories and railroads that sustained the Confederate war effort, but also to break the will of the Southern people to keep on fighting with a demonstration of the military supremacy of the North. When Sherman's men burned the public buildings in Columbia or Atlanta, their purpose, to borrow a phrase, was to shock and awe the local population.

So, in the final analysis, it appears that the South was battered into submission. Union officer Charles S. Wainwright noted after Appomattox that for three years the Army of Northern Virginia had "withstood every effort of the Army of the Potomac; now at the commencement of the fourth,

it is obliged to succumb without even one pitched battle." The rebellion, he concluded "has been worn out rather than suppressed."[4] The Lost Cause myth of gallant southern armies crushed by an industrial behemoth does have some basis of truth, therefore, but—crucially—only when applied to the last few months of the war when the Army of the Potomac outnumbered Lee's Army of Northern Virginia by more than three to one.

But the unequal combat of the final months was not the whole story of the war. In fact, the answer to the question of why the South lost the Civil War changes depending on at what point in the war the assessment is made. If by the end of 1864, final defeat was only a matter of time; the picture earlier in the war looked very different. Like their Revolutionary forebears in their struggle against the mighty British army, the Confederates could have won against superior odds because they had compensating advantages: a resilient population, talented military leaders, the advantage of fighting a defensive war in country they knew, and, above all, a cause for which the vast majority of white southerners were prepared to make great sacrifices. At the start of the war, few foreign observers thought that the North could conquer and occupy such a large area against determined opposition. The logistical and military challenges seemed too great. Thomas Jefferson's grandson, George W. Randolph, who was later to become one of no fewer than six successive Confederate Secretaries of War, expressed a common view in the South when he predicted in 1861 that "the Yankees may overrun our frontier states and plunder our coast, but, as for conquering us, the thing is an impossibility.... History offers no instance of a people as numerous as we are, inhabiting a country so extensive as ours, being subjected if true to ourselves."[5]

If Randolph was right (and Lee at Appomattox was wrong), then the causes of Confederate defeat were internal rather than external. In recent years this search for "internal" explanations for southern defeat has preoccupied many historians, most of whom have, after all, always been more interested in the South than the North. One set of "internal" explanations focuses on the supposed political divisions and institutional weaknesses that beset the Confederacy. According to this view, the Confederacy was hoist by its own petard: its devotion to de-centralized government, endless checks on executive power, and obsession with individual liberty undermined its unity and capacity to fight. Jefferson Davis acidly told a political opponent in 1864, "if the Confederacy falls, there should be written on its tombstone, 'Died of a theory.'"[6] The theory he had in mind was states' rights. Perhaps, in David Donald's striking phrase, the South "died of democracy." Certainly, Davis battled with sometimes blinkered parochialism from state governors, but for all the bluster, it is difficult to pinpoint how these political arguments affected the military capacity of the South. A related idea is Eric McKitrick's theory that the South suffered in comparison to the North because it did not have a functioning two-party system. Lincoln certainly benefited from having an organized network of party loyalists who used patriotic rhetoric to corral men to the polls in support of the administration. Jefferson Davis, who had to rely on general appeals to patriotic virtue rather than the tools of patronage to compel loyalty, could certainly have done with some Confederate equivalent of the grass-roots Union leagues. But the notion that the opposition in the North was kept in manageable bounds because it was secured within a two-party system[7] would have amazed anyone at the time.[8] Although it is true that in certain respects, Jefferson Davis's non-partisan approach may well have resulted in weaker appointments, for example to his cabinet, than Lincoln made, it is now clear that in many other respects he was far from the hapless figure that he was once regarded as being. Indeed it can be argued that in terms of the co-ordination of manpower and resources, the efficiency of the Confederate government, even without a party system, exceeded that of the Lincoln administration, at least in the early stages of the war.

Another theory is that the difference was made by the men in charge. Lincoln was undoubtedly more psychologically astute and far more adept at handling difficult personalities than Davis. Lincoln could sum up his thinking in a few well chosen words. Compare, for example, Lincoln's brisk but effective letter warning Hooker to "beware of rashness, but with energy, and sleepless vigilance, go forward, and give us victories" to the cold 10,000 word legal brief that Davis penned to Johnston after Bull Run explaining why, even though the battle had been won, Johnston's strategy had been wrong. The difficulty Lincoln had finding a successful general in the Virginia theatre, was paralleled by Davis's problems with his generals in the west. Both men were hampered by political pressure to appoint or to retain "political generals". But Lincoln was better at putting aside his personal frustrations

and animosities. Lincoln was a political genius with an unparalleled capacity for communication. His sparse, elegantly constructed prose spoke to northerners as no other politician could. Yet even Lincoln was not indispensable to the Northern commitment to the Union.

More compellingly, historians in recent decades have focused on the fault lines in southern society. A lack of southern commitment to the cause has become a familiar theme. The South, it is argued, was not a proper nation. The southern people were sustained in the fight only by their religious faith and their desire to defend their racial order. When the tides of war turned against them they began to doubt God's favour, and when it became clear that the independent Confederacy could not protect their slaves from Yankee invaders, their confidence in the cause collapsed. More specifically, women, it has been argued, undermined the Confederate war effort by protesting against the sacrifices they were making, and encouraging the desertion of their sons and husbands. Drew Gilpin Faust has speculated that the "alienation of southern women from the war effort" may well have caused the South to lose the war.[9] Women certainly played a critical role in encouraging desertion, especially in the final months of the war, but in many cases, women not only encouraged enlistment of their men folk in the first place, they sustained them in the army through words and deeds until the war was over. In southern communities that were occupied by the enemy, women frequently took the lead role in campaigns of subversion and resistance—not just by emptying chamber pots over the heads of Union soldiers in occupied New Orleans but in thousands of less memorable, but more effective ways also. In some instances, women even attempted to regularize their military service. In December 1864, twenty-eight women from Harrisonburg, Virginia, in the Shenandoah Valley, sick of the depredations of Philip H. Sheridan's men, petitioned the Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, to allow them to "raise a full regiment of ladies—between the ages of 16 and 40—armed and equipped to perform regular service." The women pledged that they were prepared to "leave our hearthstones — to endure any sacrifice — any privation for the ultimate success of our Holy Cause."[10]

It should not be surprising that there were divisions and tensions within southern society. War, especially a war that engages all available men of military age and exposes the civilian population to deprivation, invasion, destruction of property and occupation by a hostile army, can be expected to place a society under severe strain. In the case of the South in the Civil War, only in the final months, when Union military superiority became invincible did a failure of morale tangibly affect the ability of Confederate armies to resist. As late as August 1864, Colonel Alvin C. Voris—an antislavery officer from Ohio—was convinced that "the South are far from being reduced, either by famine, stress of war or broken finances." They had demonstrated a "zeal and fortitude that challenges my admiration and certainly worthy of a better cause."[11] The big picture is that southern divisions were overshadowed by the remarkable durability of the white South's commitment to the cause in the face of sacrifices that were immensely greater than anything the North had to deal with. About 38 percent of southern men died in battle or of disease compared with only one in six of northerners who fought. Furthermore, the South lost two thirds of its assessed wealth—much of that total in slave property—and the war killed 40 percent of its livestock and devastated much of its countryside. Southern will collapsed only when the writing was already on the wall for the Confederacy. Only pressure from the Yankee invaders destroyed the South. Not until April 18, 1865, did Eliza Andrews finally concede in her diary that "the spell of invincibility has left us and gone over to the heavy battalions of the enemy."[12] The loss of will thesis, in other words, appears to confuse cause and effect.

The problem with all these internal explanations for Confederate defeat is that they are all susceptible to what James McPherson has called the "fallacy of reversibility." In other words, for every southern weakness and apparent failure of will, a problem of at least equal seriousness can be found in the North. If Richmond and other southern towns saw bread riots, they were not on the same scale of destructiveness as the draft riots in New York, Boston and other northern towns. If southern society exhibited class and geographical divisions, so too did the North. Even the lack of a coherent southern nationalism had its counterpart in the Union's struggle to define and explain the meaning of the war. Desertion devastated the Confederate army in the final months of the war, but the Union army was beset by the same problem. Perhaps as many as 85,000 Americans fled to Canada to escape the draft, and the draftees and substitutes who came into the army in 1864 were notorious

skedaddlers. The main difference was that Union ranks could be more easily replenished.

The only potential southern weakness that did not apply to the North was slavery (at least not once the Border States were secured for the Union and the process of emancipation got underway there.) Slaves who fought for the Union army confronted the leaders of the Confederacy with the falsehood on which their rebellion rested. In other even more fundamental ways, slavery hampered the ability of the South to pursue the policies that might have maximized its chances against the enemy. For example, the Confederacy could never have conceded territory and fought a guerrilla war (as some historians have suggested they should have done) because slavery was a vulnerable institution that had to be protected, and slave-owners wielded a political influence vastly disproportionate to their numerical strength in the South. Slavery enabled a far greater mobilization of white men into the army than would otherwise have been the case, and slaves were never the internal "fifth columnists" that some abolitionists predicted—and some historians wish to have been the case. There is much evidence that slaves became harder to manage once the war began, and there was a massive escalation of tool breaking, arson, petty resistance of all kinds, and desertion. And in areas of the South that were touched by the war, slavery collapsed completely. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the presence of slaves made southern society more vulnerable. Nevertheless, without the incursions of the Union army and the collapsing capacity of the Confederacy to resist, slavery would probably not in itself have defeated the South.

Some historians have speculated that tensions and even a suppressed "guilt" about slavery hampered the Confederate war effort. For the authors of *Why the South Lost the Civil War*, southerners' commitment to slavery was "essentially ephemeral." After the Emancipation Proclamation aligned the government of the United States with that of Britain and France in opposing slavery, southerners, these historians argue, were "unable to bear the weight of world moral disapproval".[13] Charles G. Sellers thought the problem lay in the awareness of southerners that they were fighting to defend an institution that was regarded as immoral by the rest of the world. Slavery, he concludes, "simply could not be blended with liberalism and Christianity."[14] Kenneth M. Stampp has gone even further, arguing that "a large number of white Southerners, however much they tried, could not persuade themselves that slavery was a positive good, defensible on Christian and ethical principles." These arguments overstate the case. Thousands of sermons delivered on every Sabbath and day of prayer and fasting in the Confederacy testify to the ability of southerners to reconcile slavery with their faith in liberty, and even with capitalism and progress. It is true that some southerners cursed slavery for bringing death and destruction upon them, and there are fleeting revelations that the end of slavery was sometimes a relief as well as a shock. "We felt lighter some how than usual," reported George Browder a Kentucky planter and Methodist minister who awoke one morning in early 1865 to find that "his negroes" had deserted. He and his family "felt poorer, but freer, more dependent, yet more self-reliant."[15] Such comments bolster Bell Wiley's contention that "uneasiness about slavery gnawed at numerous Southern consciences," although it should be added that Reverend Browder's sense of a burden having been lifted did not prevent him from keenly seeking the recapture of his slaves and regretting the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.[16] Almost all white southerners, even those who had never owned slaves, even those whose diaries and letters reveal moments of insight and empathy with the plight of black people, remained stubbornly wedded to slavery and regarded its passing with regret and anxiety for the future. Stampp's notion that the "moral burden of slavery" was so severe that large numbers of white Southerners "unconsciously felt that they had less to gain by winning than by losing," is simply not supported by the large body of evidence left by white southerners.[17]

If weaknesses in southern society don't in themselves explain Confederate defeat, does that return us to Lee's original explanation at Appomatox—that the North was simply too strong? In a sense, yes, but with a crucial caveat: so long as the North remained determined to crush the rebellion by force, it was always likely that their superiority in manpower and resources would tell in the end. The critical element in the calculus of Northern victory and Southern defeat, then, is the maintenance of that northern commitment.

The North was never subjected to anything like the level of social and economic disruption that affected the South, yet, even so, there were serious strains within northern society, and no certainty

that a war to keep the South in the Union by force could be sustained for as long as it would take to defeat a determined and resourceful Confederacy. Northerners may well have deserted Lincoln's administration in the Presidential election of 1864 (indeed as late as September 1864 Lincoln himself was extremely pessimistic about his chances of re-election). Certainly, the Confederates understood that a divided North was their only path to victory. Throughout the war, the driving purpose of southern military strategy was to undermine the Republican Party and encourage the northern opponents of the war. In a letter to his wife in December 1863, Robert E. Lee predicted that "If we are successful this year, next fall [i.e. in the presidential election of November 1864] there will be a great change in public opinion at the North. The Republicans will be destroyed & I think the friends of peace will become so strong as that the next administration will come in on that basis. We have only therefore to resist manfully." [18]

Public opinion, then, rather than Union armies, was ultimately the true target of Confederate military strategy. The South could only "win" the war when the North stopped fighting. That would happen only when public opinion would no longer sustain the fight. It followed that the importance of the fighting on the battlefield was at least as much how the outcome would be received back home as on the opposing army.

Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones have argued that public opinion fundamentally and persistently misread the strategic significance of battles. Civil War Americans, according to Hattaway and Jones, were fixated on the outdated and irrelevant issue of which side was forced to retreat after a battle. Battles in and of themselves resolved little, they assert; what mattered to the military outcome was the proportional losses that each side suffered.[19] Battles that appeared to be Confederate victories—such as the two battles of Bull Run, or Chancellorsville—in fact did more damage to the South than the North because the Confederates lost a higher proportion of their men. This grim analysis may be correct as far as the fighting capacity of each side is concerned. Lee won so often against larger forces that even he perhaps failed to appreciate the ultimate importance of numbers until it was too late. But Hattaway and Jones miss the bigger picture: the whole point of Lee's strategy was that, recognizing that the North had more men and more industrial capacity, he wanted to hit them where they were most vulnerable—popular commitment to the cause, without which the war would not continue. Events on the battlefield, in other words, mattered at least as much for their impact on home front morale as on the strategic position of the armies.

Nineteenth century America was a newspaper-reading society, and cheap and readily available print had done more than any other technological development to shape a national culture before the war. Between 1861 and 1865, newspapers' ability to bring news—albeit often no more than unreliable gossip—to the home front within hours of a battle taking place struck people at the time as marking a dramatic shift in the nature of the war experience, bringing civilians even closer to the action and even shaping the ways in which soldiers themselves understood the meaning of what they were doing. The war as experienced on the home front—the war of the public imagination as it might be termed—was closely related to the "real war" but it was viewed through a distorting lens that magnified some events at the expense of others. In particular, the relationship between the war and northern electoral politics, is, I would contend, the key to understanding the war's outcome. A famous example of the impact of military news on a political campaign was the huge boost that Sherman's capture of Atlanta gave to Lincoln's flagging re-election campaign in 1864, but there are many other examples as well.

Northern spirits sank low in the winter of 1862-1863, with the defeats at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville the critical factors. The mood in the North was jubilant at news of Gettysburg and the capture of Vicksburg, but a year later, in the summer of 1864, it had soured and sunk to new depths after the bleeding of the Army of the Potomac at Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor. The fall of Atlanta transformed the mood again. There was nothing inevitable about the outcome of these battles. McClellan's defeat in his spring advance on Richmond in 1862 was not inevitable, and nor was Lee's dispiriting defeat at Gettysburg. We need to be careful not to confuse war weariness with a willingness to give in. From at least 1862 onwards most northerners and most southerners wanted peace. The question was on what terms. While only a small minority of southerners were

prepared to return to the Union as the price for peace, only a minority of northerners were prepared to accept Southern independence, however great the price. This was especially true of Union troops who, after all, bore the brunt of the sacrifices. After six weeks of constant engagement with the rebels southeast of Richmond, Colonel Alvin C. Voris of Ohio, expressed the combination of weariness and determination that radiated from countless similar letters. "I see so much of horror and suffering in the army that I sometimes wish for peace at almost any terms," he admitted,

> I know this war *would* never have been had the people anticipated half the evils it has already entailed. But being in it, when I think earnestly, I of course insist that we must punish the enemy till we crush out all opposition to the just requirements of the Government. We have expended too much to quietly yield now. But I do wish I could see a speedy resolution of this question. I want to get home.[20]

At about the time that Voris was writing these words, *New York Tribune* editor Horace Greeley was imploring Lincoln to explore a negotiated settlement, albeit on the basis of the illusion that the Confederates would voluntarily return to the Union after having fought tenaciously for more than three years for their independence. Voris balanced exhaustion with the escalating human cost of the war with his determination to finish the job. His spirits were low, but he never reached the stage of disillusionment. But it is perfectly conceivable that war weariness may have led, had McClellan won the 1864 election for example, to a stampede for an armistice which in turn would have given the Confederacy the time they desperately needed to rebuild their shattered country. The North could very well have lost the war, but only if it had lost the will to win.

NOTES

1 Drew Gilpin Faust, "'We Should Grow Too Fond of It': Why We Love the Civil War", *Civil War History* 50: 4 (2004), p. 373.

2 Clifford Dowdey and Louis H. Manarin, eds., *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), pp. 934-935.

3 Paul W. Gates, *Agriculture and the Civil War* (New York: Knopf, 1965).

4 Charles S. Wainwright, *A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1861-1865,* ed. Allan Nevins (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), pp. 520-521.

5 Quoted in Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: *A Military History of the Civil War* (Urbana: University of Illinois Pres, 1983), p. 18.

6 Jefferson Davis, *The Rise and Fall of Confederate Government* (2 vols, New York: Appleton, 1881), 1: p. 518.

7 Eric McKitrick, "Party Politics and the Union and Confederate War Efforts" in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds. *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 117-151.

8 *For more on attitudes towards politics and partisanship in the North, see Adam I. P. Smith, No Party Now: Politics in the Civil War North* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

9 Drew Gilpin Faust, Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

10 Irene Bell, Annie Samuels, and others to James A. Seddon, December 2, 1864, quoted in Gary Gallagher, *The Confederate War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 77.

11 Jerome Mushkat, ed., *A Citizen-Soldier's Civil War: The Letters of Brevet Major General Alvin C. Voris* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2002), p. 180.

12 Eliza Francis Andrews, *The War-Time Journal of a Georgia Girl* (New York: D. Appleton, 1908), p. 153. Entry for April 18, 1865.

13 Berringer, Archer, Hattaway, Jones and Still, *Why the South Lost the Civil War,* pp. 439-440, 425-426

14 Sellers, "Travail of Slavery," pp. 51-2.

15 Richard L. Troutman, ed., *The Heavens are weeping:* the diaries of George Richard Browder, 1852-1886 (Zondervan Publishing House: Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1987), p. 179 [Diary entry for June 8, 1864].

16 Wiley, *Road to Appomattox,* pp. 104-5.

17 Kenneth M. Stampp, *"The Southern Road to Appomattox," in Kenneth M. Stampp, The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 260, 264-7.

18 Lee to his wife, April 19, 1863, in Clifford Dowdy and Louis H. Manarin, eds, *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), p. 438.

19 Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won*, p. 692

20 Mushkat, ed., *A Citizen-Soldier's Civil War*, p. 188.

J M Barrie and the First World War: Propagandist; Philanthropist and Apologist

DR ANN PETRIE

James Matthew Barrie is one of the most controversial writers in Scottish history. Largely remembered for *Peter Pan* his reputation has faded spectacularly in the twentieth century considering the professional height that he achieved during his lifetime. Rolling out hit after hit he dominated London's West End from the 1890s until the mid 1920s, which not only made him fabulously wealthy, but internationally renowned. Moreover, he could name Presidents, Prime Ministers and Kings as friends, reaching a social standing that must have been unthinkable to him as a young boy growing up in Kirriemuir. The reasons underlying his declining status are beyond the enquiries of this paper albeit to note that he has certainly been treated dismissively by generations of Scottish historians who have failed to bring either the man or his work to the attention of their readers.[1] In addition to critical reservations, however, there have also been more assiduous and disparaging reasons for Barrie's corroded standing. Most notably his fascination with the innocence of childhood in combination with his unusual personal circumstances has generated the persistent rumour that Barrie was a paedophile. This unfounded gossip has done much damage to his respectability and distracted from the work he created.[2] Nevertheless, it would be misleading to give the impression that Barrie has slipped entirely from view as he continues to provoke interest, but consideration of his response to the First World War and his war plays has been conspicuously short or absent in previous studies and the purpose of this paper is to revise this aspect of his life and work.

Barrie's war career is in many ways a matter of public record in biographies, such as, Mackail's *The Story of J. M. B.;* Dunbar's *J. M. Barrie: The Man Behind the Image* and Birkin's accomplished *J M Barrie and the Lost Boys: The Real Story Behind Peter Pan.*[3] None, however, concentrate exclusively on the war as an important feature in Barrie's life or in the development of his art despite it being recognised by one commentator as marking the crossroads of his critical acclaim.[4] This paper aims to complement earlier studies, but also to go beyond them by concentrating on a few key elements of Barrie's wartime experience. His involvement in government propaganda, for example, which has hitherto been interpreted in a simplistic manner, will be re-explored here, as will his hospital work. Moreover, previous commentators have indicated Barrie's war experiences were closely related to those of the Llewelyn-Davies boys, George, Jack, Peter, Michael and Nico, whom he adopted in 1910. As a result, their fates will be taken into consideration and Peter's letters during the war to Barrie, which have relatively recently been discovered, will be incorporated in a narrative of this kind for the first time. Finally, there will be an in-depth analysis of how and in what way the war influenced the work of Barrie as a playwright.

Barrie's War

In July 1914 Barrie was on holiday in Scotland with three of the Llewelyn-Davies boys in Argyllshire. Oblivious to the outbreak of war he received the news a day late on August 5, when Peter arrived with a letter for George appealing for all young men to enlist.[5] No record exists of Barrie's immediate response, although his subsequent views suggest he was supportive.[6] Some time later, however, jotting down a possible outline for a one-act play he imagined his reaction:

> War Play. The Last Cricket Match. One, or days before war declared - my anxiety - boys gaily [?] cricket, &c, seen from window - I know they're to suffer - what it really means for them. I seem to see dropping out - fewer & fewer.[7]

In the event he travelled to London immediately to be available to George and Peter who had set off ahead of him to volunteer. He also wanted to see if there was anything he could do, as although at age 54 he was too old to serve in the military he hoped to assist in other ways. When he arrived

he found little to occupy him and apart from the promise of financial support, which he offered his friend Lord Lucas on discovering he had turned his Bedfordshire home Wrest Park into a hospital, Barrie found himself at a loose end and returned to Scotland.[8]

By September 2, 1914 he was back in London as C F G Masterman called him to Buckingham Gate, along with several other writers of repute, such as Thomas Hardy, to attend an important meeting.[9] There he was informed of the government's plan to orchestrate a propaganda war against the Central Powers and was asked to put his literary talent at their disposal. Barrie was thrilled at the prospect and agreed to travel to America for the purpose, leaving Liverpool onboard The *Lusitania* housed in its children's playroom on September 12.[10] While crossing the Atlantic his presence onboard was made public, largely as a result of his celebrity, and by the time he arrived in New York he was greeted by a mob of reporters and two letters; one from the British Ambassador and another from a friend discouraging him from interfering with American neutrality. He told the reporters they had been misinformed about the nature of his visit and that he had come on private business.[11] His lack of anonymity certainly impeded his movements as was clear in a letter he wrote to George: "...I am mostly in hiding. Great placard out Barrie exonerates the Kaiser & c Barrie Says War Will Be Long varied with more social ones such as Barrie Likes Our Virginia Ham."[12] That he had not given up on his task was also clear: "I am going to stay with Rossevelt [sic]."

Press attention of the type described above continued during his stay, but one article is of particular interest as Barrie wrote it himself.[14] 'Barrie At Bay: Which Was Brown?' was framed as an imaginary interview with his servant, and appeared in the *New York Times* on October 1, 1914. In it Barrie weaved comedy with subtle persuasion, and poked fun at the Kaiser, with whom he fancied he had shared his voyage,

> ...a very small, shrunken gentleman, with a pronounced waist and tiny, turned-up moustache, who strutted along the deck trying to look fierce and got in other passengers' way to their annoyance until Sir James discovered that he was the Kaiser Reduced to Life Size.[15]

But he also set down what he considered the absurdity of a neutral position:

So anxious...is Sir James to follow the President's bidding that he has enjoined Brown to be neutral on...all subjects...to express no preference on matters of food, for instance, and always to eat oysters and clams alternately, so there can be no ill-feeling. Also to walk in the middle of the streets lest he should seem to be favouring either sidewalk, and to be very cautious about admitting that one building in New York is higher than another.

These points blended with heavy sarcasm related Barrie's admiration for the Kaiser when he wept (with which eye he wondered) over the destruction of Louvain, and for the German Ambassador in Washington - "England's greatest asset."[16] He ended by differentiating Allied decency from German barbarity as although Germans had destroyed art treasures in Belgium and France, Berlin would not suffer such rudeness at the hands of the Allies; and should the Hohenzollerns feel the necessity to vacate their palace, "for any reason best known to themselves (such as the wish for a sunnier location)...a nice villa should be provided for them...."

If this article had been all Barrie achieved while in America it would have constituted propaganda, but he also undertook visits to Princeton, Yale and Harvard Universities (as "University Principals and Professors are politicians as well as teachers [and could influence] President Wilson") and lunched with former President Roosevelt at least twice.[17] In addition one manuscript survives at the Beinecke Library, which on its deposit was described as a public speech given by Barrie on this visit, but unfortunately it was written in pencil and is no longer legible.[18] A final curious piece of evidence in Barrie's own hand is a series of notes that he made discussing American attitudes to the war in 1914. It appears to be preparatory notes for a report, possibly for Masterman, and details American concerns undoubtedly based on his discussions, such as, Roosevelt's worries about the size of their standing army; President Wilson's entrenched neutrality; the estimated cost to the United States of getting involved; the power of the pro-German American press and American belief in the insanity of the war as Germany as far as they could determine was fighting for freedom just as the Allies were.[19] Nevertheless, despite these

efforts, most of Barrie's time was spent with Charles Frohman, the theatre impresario, and as Barrie found New York hot, sticky and tiring he decided to make his way home, travelling onboard *The Lusitania* on October 14.[20] He was not finished with propaganda, however, and his most obvious play of this type *Der Tag*, discussed below, was opened at the Coliseum in London on the December 21, 1914.

In January 1915 George was posted to the Western Front. Leading up to his departure Barrie fretted over his equipment, buying him field glasses and trying to secure a colt revolver, but was obviously proud as well as anxious.[21] After some rehearsals, for example, he wrote to George and reflected on the shame that people whose sons were shirking back must feel: "It was not pleasant to see 20 or 30 young men in the chorus who should be better employed. I believe they were dressed as soldiers too!"[22] But he was under no illusions,

> We seem farther away from July this year than that July was from the days of crinolines. There is certainly some gain – a stirring of manhood but at a terrible cost...I see that 8 per cent of Etonians have been killed...In the army all over...the total casualties (wounded, prisoners & killed) is 57,000.[23]

He reassuringly continued that he had dinner with Asquith and Kitchener who had been "hopeful" and "encouraging."[24] Indeed, Barrie clung to every scrap of information about the war he could find, and his letters to George in 1915 display a mixture of optimism about the war: "As far as I can judge from one thing and another there seems more reason to hope that the war won't go beyond this summer...", with worry; "I have not heard from you since the postcard...and you warned me there might be these pauses. So I grieve and I hear it's not worth grieving."[25] In the meantime he kept busy.

Barrie had fulfilled his promise of financial support for Lord Lucas's hospital at Wrest Park, but also took an active interest in its affairs and visited the wounded several times. He set up billiard competitions, spent hours with them deep in discussion and was pleased to make acquaintance with a veteran of the Christmas truce.[26] In September 1915 his involvement grew when Lord Lucas left to join the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and asked him to undertake a more managerial role. This Barrie agreed to and continued until the hospital was severely damaged by fire in 1916 and closed down.[27] In May or June 1915 he also opened and financed another hospital for orphaned children in France called the Chateau de Bettancourt, near the river Marne. It was organised on his behalf by Elizabeth Lucas in conjunction with the Quaker Society of Friends, but owed its existence, he later recalled, to his "lamentable weakness for children and old ladies."[28] In actuality it was a very generous gift. He donated £2,000 for its initial outlay and paid for all associated, and some additional costs (£200 for cigarettes and a cask of whisky for French troops) throughout its lifespan.[29] He remembered:

> I started with eight [beds]...In two or three months we had about 100...On the very first day we opened the hospital those eight were all asleep in one room...and that night, unfortunately, part of the ceiling fell down. The nurse rushed into the room, wondering why she did not hear the children screaming...thinking it was a bomb...When she opened the door she found all those eight little Roman Catholics kneeling by their bedsides praying.[30]

Prior to opening Bettancourt, however, the war caused Barrie considerable personal distress in another quarter. In March 1915 Guy du Maurier, the Llewelyn-Davies boys' uncle and Barrie's friend, was killed. Barrie wrote to George to let him know, and shortly after receiving it on March 15, George was shot through the head and died instantly.[31] Nico recalled:

> Suddenly there came a banging on the front door, and the...door-bell ringing and ringing. Mary got out of bed and went downstairs, while I sat up with ears pricked etc. Voices soon came up the stairs and seemed to stop just short of our floor...Uncle Jim's voice was of the eerie, Scots, Banshee wail sort of thing..."Ah-h-h! They'll all go, Mary – Jack, Peter, Michael, and even little Nico – this awful war will get them all!" A little later, realising I was awake, he came and sat on my bed for a bit...I vividly remember all the brothers being there the next day...and I can see Jack standing by the dining-room window looking down the square with big tears dropping to the floor.[32]

Two days later Barrie received a final letter from George dated March 14:

> I have just got your letter about Uncle Guy. You say it hasn't made you think any more about the danger I am in. But I know it has. Do try not to let it. I take every care of myself that can decently be taken. And if I am going to stop a bullet, why should it be with a vital place? But arguments aren't any good. Keep your heart up, Uncle Jim & remember how good an experience like this is for a chap whose been very idle before. Lord I shall be proud when I'm home again & talking to you about all this. That dinner at the Savoy will be grand...Meanwhile dear Uncle Jim you must carry on with your job of keeping up your courage.[33]

Thereafter loss became a central feature of Barrie's war experience. A month later, in April 1915, he invited Charles Frohman to Britain. Frohman agreed, and travelled from America on May 1 onboard *The Lusitania.* On May 7 it was hit by a German U-boat and sank off the Irish coast. Frohman was amongst the dead. He had been Barrie's friend since the mid 1890s and in the intervening period they had created some of the most spectacular successes on the London stage.

Outwardly, at least, Barrie was stoical and perhaps with George's entreaty to keep up his courage in mind he went to France in July 1915 to visit Bettancourt for the first time. It replenished his sense of purpose. On his return journey he wrote to Elizabeth Lucas, who had remained in charge of the hospital:

> ...I had the firm conviction that you really were doing something in a small way for mankind. Helping to build up the people of the future. It is like a tree we have planted which will bring forth good fruit long after the German invasion is but a memory... [34]

He also described his visit to a friend:

I went to France to see that little hospital I told you of...The guns are to be heard in the distance all day, and I was usually wakened in the morning by aeroplanes...The villages in that part are in a dreadful condition, some of them have about one house standing in fifty...There are thousands of Germans buried thereabout, and a grim notice has been issued on the Marne ordering all people to chain up their dogs at night. The dogs have taken to wandering and digging.

He was nevertheless, charmed by the Chateau's inhabitants, later recalling:

> They were really dreadfully sharp little children...They had a very artful way of trying to get me to come out and play with them very early in the morning. They learned a few Scotch words...like 'Reeky-reeky', 'Tam Shanter', and 'pot-ae-toes'...[and] they gathered under my bedroom window in the early morning and all shouted out those words to lure me down, usually quite effectively. They had a name for me. They called me 'Monsieur Auld Reekie.'[36]

There were also other distractions. Writing to his American publisher, Charles Scribner, for example, Barrie excitedly related sighting a Zeppelin raid on London:

It was a dark night with a few stars, and the Zeppelin stood out very clearly in the searchlights. The firing went on for about 20 minutes or so...London seemed very still...it was very eerie waiting. What it must have felt like to be up there![37]

On another occasion he sat up with Hardy, H G Wells, George Bernard Shaw and Arnold Bennett watching the London searchlights sweep the sky from his top floor Adelphi flat.[38] He also maintained his interest in national affairs and wrote to Asquith supporting the War Loan Scheme at an important juncture in its establishment.[39] Moreover he was writing plays. During the war, Barrie wrote five one-act plays, two full-length plays and several shorter charity productions including, *The Fatal Typist,* which was presented in aid of wounded Australians; *Shakespeare's Legacy* for the war work of the YMCA; six short scenes linked as *Reconstructing the Crime* to support the Cavendish Square War Hospital Depot and *La Politesse* for Countess Lytton's Hospital. Revivals of his old plays *Peter Pan*, *The Little Minister* and *The Professor's Love*, were also presented and as each was rehearsed for many weeks with Barrie in attendance, the theatre kept him reasonably occupied. Moreover he

spent his time organising charity auctions soliciting donations from his literary friends and donated his own manuscript of *The Little Minister* to the Red Cross Christies auction in 1918. Finally, the four remaining Llewelyn-Davies boys took up his time.

Barrie tried to keep up the pretence of normality for the two youngest boys, Michael and Nico. In August 1915, for example, he took them on their annual holiday to Scotland despite his thoughts being elsewhere as demonstrated in a letter he wrote to Hardy's wife:

> ...the Highlands are as bare of man this year as if it were the day before creation.... I was on the Marne in France and I saw an old lady knitting placidly by the door of her new wooden house. On the same spot she had been ill-treated by two German soldiers in the dash for Paris, and they destroyed her home. Now they are buried beneath her potatoes and she is there knitting. It grips me like a poem by your husband.[40]

Nevertheless, while it was still within his power to protect the younger boys and make sure that their lives were kept as carefree as possible he would do so, and the annual holidays, thereafter in Wales as well as Scotland, continued throughout the war. The fates of the remaining older boys Jack and Peter, however, were out with his control and a source of ceaseless worry. Jack was in the Navy, and in the summer of 1916 it was Peter's turn to go to the Western Front.[41] In contrast to George's letters relating the early stages of the war, Peter's offered a much franker account of the trenches. The first four months correspondence in particular chronicle his transformation from an eager recruit to a cynical veteran, and it was an experience that Nico believed Peter never recovered from.[42]

Initially Peter was keen to get to the Front and was glad when he arrived in June 1916, but his first sight of the front line was a revelation:

> It opened my eyes a bit more as to the difference between war as it is and war as the illustrated papers would have it. None of those beautifully sand-bagged and floor-boarded affairs one sees in photographs (usually taken in England). No beautiful dug-outs, with vast oaken supports and iron roofs.[43]

His first night in a trench was deeply unpleasant:

> I have messed about in a foot and a half of mud and water, with no shelter to speak of, and successfully plastered myself with dirt from top to toe. I have got half my platoon with me in a little saphead lately occupied, about 120 yards from the Boche. Unfortunately the trench, water and all, is not more than six feet deep at any point, so I am gradually adopting a permanent stoop. All night we strove to pile up sandbags and pump out water, but no use: the rain never stops, nor do the sides of the trench refrain from falling in continuously...[44]

Within two weeks any enthusiasm had evaporated:

> Not long ago I can remember rather looking forward to taking part in a fight. My curiosity has been satisfied, and I shall never have any such desire again. Honestly, Uncle Jim, I can't write about it - I don't believe anyone could, and I'm not particularly anxious that anyone should. There isn't a single attractive feature from beginning to end. Modern artillery fire is damnable beyond all powers of description. There is none of the exhilaration that may have been in the pitched battles of a few years ago. You crouch down in the bottom of your trench and listen helplessly to the whispering noise which comes before the crash of each heavy shell. Each near one seems to be coming straight at you. It's rather like that dream one has of falling through space, and waking up before one reaches the bottom, only instead of waiting for the bottom one waits for the burst of the shell.[45]

Peter's initial contact with the war was at the Somme and his increasing bitterness was plain, even during periods of rest: "...we don't expect to fight again for a fortnight. So for 14 days, I suppose, we shall drill ourselves into more efficient instruments of slaughter and more unflinching cannon-fodder than we were before", and referring to his superiors as "immaculate brass-hatted demi-gods" was enraged by their lack of empathy with the men on the front line.[46] If Barrie had still been under

any illusions about the reality of the war prior to Peter's debarkation to France he can have been left in no doubt of its terrible physical and mental toll on the younger generation after receiving Peter's angry description during the summer of 1916. In addition, two of Barrie's nephews were killed at the Somme, with the report of their deaths tragically arriving on the same day, as well as Percy Lucas, and the son of one of his oldest friends, T H Gilmour.[47] As already mentioned above, Wrest Park hospital, previously a welcome diversion, was destroyed by fire in the Autumn of 1916 and coincidentally Elizabeth Lucas exhausted by running Bettancourt also shut that venture. Then towards the end of what must have been a crushing year his friend and the son of the Prime Minister, Raymond Asquith, was killed in September and Lord Lucas was killed in an aeroplane dogfight in November, which was later immortalised in John Buchan's novel *Mr Standfast.*[48]

In September 1916 Peter was invalided home to recover his health. In 1917 he returned to the front and despite the events of 1916 we can deduce from Peter's letters that Barrie retained his conviction in the war:

You talk with greater confidence than I should have expected of victory...Is it still believed that we shall beat the Germans? That is, that we shall obtain the very uncompromising terms for which "we" have said "we" are fighting? If so, on what grounds? I certainly haven't got any opinion myself, but I should say that the majority of people with whom I come in contact no longer believe so.[50]

Nevertheless, Barrie reiterated his support in a letter to Scribner after America entered the conflict in 1917:

> ...you have now like us to face a long war with stout hearts...and I feel sure that the majority on both sides of the Atlantic are seeking the freedom of the world and not merely of the bits of it to which they happen to belong. We should do everything in our power to make the German people also believe this.[51]

In July 1917 Barrie visited France for the second time. He spent 48 hours with Peter, enjoyed the spectacle of airmen parachuting to earth, and found George's grave.[52] Indeed, with the war entering its fourth year Barrie became fixated by the loss of George three years earlier in 1915. Without George the oddly configured family had been dramatically altered, as Peter later reflected: "....when he died, some essential virtue went out of us as a family...as it was circumstances were too much for J.M.B. left solitary...."[53] Barrie's grief was exacerbated by the knowledge that Michael was rapidly reaching military age, and there was no end in sight: "...in a year or less [Michael] is eligible for the army. The depression of it all! I shy at thinking of it but it has no doubt a great deal to do with the gloom in which one seems to get enveloped."[54] Peter wrote to comfort him:

> I'm afraid it becomes more and more miserable for you...I only hope you're feeling that this year will see the end, and may prove less of a disappointment than the thoughts and hopes of '14, '15, '16, and '17. He, Michael, will probably be better off in the Guards than elsewhere.[55]

As it was Michael was spared front line service when the tide of war turned in his and the country's favour in July 1918.[56] In October Barrie received a final and last opportunity to visit France when the American Army invited him as their guest. He left on November 8 and spent a few days being driven up and down the front line sightseeing. On November 11, he was dining in Paris with the Antarctic explorer Captain Scott's widow, Kathleen. His relief at the Armistice in a letter to a friend was plain:

> By far the most memorable thing [in Paris] was the happy faces. Everyone seemed to have changed permanently in a night, and what the faces, as well as the cries said, was 'It is finished' rather than 'we have won'...So it is actually ended!...You can guess how thankful I am. I don't think [Michael] will be wanted for the army now.[57]

The War Plays of J M Barrie

Barrie's first war play was a one-act propaganda piece, *Der Tag*, written at the government's bidding in 1914.[58] It opens with the German Emperor, Chancellor and an Officer discussing whether

to sign the declaration of war. The Emperor is portrayed as a vacillating and sympathetic character who first asks if they can make peace with France until after Russia is muzzled, questions whether or not Britain will definitely be kept out of the war and then balks at sending his troops into Belgium, preferring instead to invade through Alsace and Lorraine. He refuses to sign and is then left alone. The Spirit of Culture visits him and then proceeds to flatter him as a "worthy King" applauding Germany's "golden granaries...busy mills and furnaces, its outstretching commerce and teeming peoples and noble seats of learning...."[59] She persuades him to avoid a war and this section of the play must have confused the audience in 1914 considerably. Their appetite to accept such a sensitive German Emperor cannot have been high, and to have him praised by Culture must have been equally distasteful to them. In addition the Emperor disparages Britain. At one point, for example, he weighs the impact of a possible British intervention and concludes: "Britain has grown dull and sluggish: a belly of a land she lies overfed, no dreams within her such as keep Powers alive...'I was' her epitaph." While this might have been a good device to arouse indignation it was nonetheless a surprising tactic. The following day *The Scotsman* found *Der Tag* a

...keen and searching insight [in to] the fundamental and ultimate issues of the vast conflict which is raging...But there is in it none of the fume and fret of anger...Passion burns in it, indeed, but it is a passion for right and justice – no mere wild rage against the enemy.[61]

A few months later, however, when the play arrived in Edinburgh *The Scotsman* was more reserved:

> Some critics have found in the little play an apology for the Kaiser. There seems slight ground to justify such a charge. It is very likely to be historically true that the German Emperor needed little or no pressing to sign the deed that plunged Europe into the horrors of war.[62]

In the closing pages of the play we discover that what has preceded has been a dream as the Emperor falls asleep and the Spirit of Culture returns to the stage to wake him clutching a wound in her breast with the boom of guns in the background. She tells him that in reality he alone caused the war, ruined Belgium in the process, and, in a final miscalculation on Barrie's part, tells him that England had indeed "grown degenerate, but [that the Emperor had] made her great again."[63] The blame for the war was, however, placed squarely, in Barrie's interpretation, at the Emperor's feet. It was his arrogance that brought about hostilities albeit aided by the complicity of his people. As a result Germany was witness to growing, never-ending lines of the dead. The Emperor despairingly asks that God would surely not let Germany be destroyed to which Culture closes the play answering: "If God is with the Allies, Germany will not be destroyed!"[64] As a piece to present to a British audience in the first fevered throes of war it was much too fair-minded, and its real propaganda value, and indeed its more likely intended purpose may have been to present it to an American or German audience. As it was, its subtlety ended Barrie's career as an overt propagandist, and his other war plays were written from a foundation of personal experience or based on firmer emotional ground, and were, as a result, correspondingly more successful.

The New Word, written in January 1915, was set in an average British drawing room, where the Torrance family have collected to see their nineteen year old son Rogie, on the eve of his departure for the front, in his uniform for the first time.[65] The most prominent theme is pride, but Barrie also explores masculinity – that "stirring of manhood" that he had commented on in a letter to George in November 1914 - through a rare unguarded conversation between the Torrance father and son. The father confesses, "when we realised in August 1914 that myriads of us were to be needed, my first thought wasn't that I had a son, but that I must get fit myself", a sentiment that Barrie possibly identified with, recalling his earnest journey to London in August 1914 and disappointment when he found nothing to do.[66] In the course of the discussion, however, the father in *The New Word* recognises that his son has become the head of the house and he its defender.[67]There is no evidence that Barrie had also come to such a conclusion, but the new word of the title is 2nd Lieutenant, and it is hardly coincidental that at the time of writing, George Llewelyn-Davies had only just departed on active service for France, something Barrie was physically unable to do. In addition, the Torrance family's pride in their son doing his bit for the war appears to convey some of Barrie's own pride in his son

going to the front and not "shirking" as the men in his chorus line he disapproved of had done. As a recruitment tool this play may also have served the government's purposes and as well as capturing Barrie's private support for the war illustrates his skill as a propagandist. Tragically *The New Word* opened at the Duke of York's in London on March 22, 1915 seven days after George the inspiration for the play was killed at St Eloi.[68]

Barrie's next play, *A Kiss For Cinderella* was his only full-length war play. Based on the timeless fairytale, the Cinderella in this instance is a philanthropic pauper who has taken in refugee children, including a little German called Gretchen whose bed is covered in barbed wire, as she is prone to biting the others. A policeman, concerned about prohibited displays of light from London's domestic landscape and spies, is the substitute Prince Charming and a Red Cross nurse doubles as the Fairy Godmother. Other characters, such as, the Censor, who is conjured in Cinderella's mind as Death complete with long black cloaks and carrying an executioner's axe, and Lord Times, the only character unafraid of the Censor, are clearly informed by the war. Cinderella's ball takes place in her imagination and in reality she has fallen asleep on a London Street and caught pneumonia. In Act III we find Cinderella in a convalescent home near a hospital for wounded soldiers; the children having been taken in by her friend. The Policeman, who has fallen in love with her, visits her in hospital, bringing her glass slippers as an engagement ring and closes the play by kissing Cinderella. When *A Kiss for Cinderella* opened on March 16, 1916 it was an immediate success running for 156 performances.[69] Barrie had invested the play with his experience of Wrest Park and Bettancourt paying tribute to the many Cinderellas throughout the country whose war efforts on the home front and abroad were given selflessly, but Cinderella is also closely based on Elizabeth Lucas, who undertook her war work saving refugee children at Bettancourt. *A Kiss for Cinderella* presents a portrait of wartime London through the fear of spies and bombing raids, which interested Barrie and combined his wartime impressions, but re-packaged them in a cheerful and bright story in order to raise the morale of the British public. His conversion of the darkness of war in to a romantic fairytale may appear ridiculous in light of his own experience, but might also have been part of a propaganda campaign, and was indicative of the type of courage Barrie perceived to be his duty during the war. Cheering the nation was a unique role that he could play in society. During the war itself *A Kiss For Cinderella* was reprised at Christmases, but in its aftermath its heavy war related overtones caused it to date and its popularity waned.

Barrie's third one act war play *The Old Lady Shows Her Medals* like *The New Word* deals with the issue of pride, but in this instance Barrie tackles the subject from the opposite angle, as the childless Mrs Dowey is consumed by shame that she has no one at the Front: "[The war] affected everybody but me. The neighbours looked down on me. Even the posters, on the walls, of the women saying, "Go, my boy," leered at me."[70] As a result she has gone to great lengths to invent a son by adopting a Private K Dowey of the 5th Battalion, Black Watch, whose name she came across one day in a newspaper. She has moved house, collected old envelopes from the front in other people's bins, re-addressed them to herself and shows the bundle boastfully to her friends. Coincidentally the local minister encounters the real Kenneth Dowey on leave and brings him back to Mrs Dowey's basement room where she fears exposure. Compared to Rogie Torrance, Kenneth Dowey is an altogether rougher type, but after a row with the old lady he relents and in the course of the action they do become like mother and son after all. Shortly after returning to the front, however, he is killed and Mrs Dowey is left his medals and Black Watch bonnet, which at the end of the play she triumphantly pulls from a drawer where these treasured items have been put for safekeeping.

If George inspired *The New Word* Peter's experiences had at least a passing influence on *The Old Lady Shows Her Medals*, which was written in January 1917.[71] Not in terms of the plot, or even in the characterisation of Kenneth Dowey, but certainly Peter's honest depiction of the war's brutality influenced its tone. The naivety of the Torrance family excitedly waving off their son to war in *The New Word* and the jocularity of *A Kiss For Cinderella* had been replaced in *The Old Lady Shows Her Medals* with a darker atmosphere and perceptible anxiety on the home front. Noticeably, the discrepancy between Mrs Dowey and Kenneth Dowey's understanding of the war, like Barrie and Peter's, is total. For example, in conversation Kenneth does not share the pride that Mrs Dowey

longs for by association:

> KENNETH: I'm no great shakes at the war.
> MRS DOWEY: Yes, you are. How many Germans have you killed?
> KENNETH: Just two for certain, and there was no glory in it. It was just because they wanted my shirt.
> MRS DOWEY: Your shirt?
> KENNETH: Well, they said it was their shirt.
> MRS DOWEY: Have you took prisoners?
> KENNETH: I once took half a dozen, but that was a poor affair too.
> MRS DOWEY: How could one man take half a dozen?
> KENNETH: Just in the usual way. I surrounded them.
> MRS DOWEY: Kenneth, you're my ideal.
> KENNETH: You're easily pleased.[72]

The Old Lady Shows Her Medals utilised Barrie's characteristic twists of sentiment, and was greatly enjoyed by the audience, but by far the most revealing of his one-act war plays, in terms of his own response to the war, were the last two, both written in 1918 – *A Well-Remembered Voice* and *Barbara's Wedding*.

During and after the war there was a marked upturn in the popularity of séances and other methods of communicating with the dead.[73] In a short questionnaire that Barrie filled in during his holiday in July 1914 his answer to the question "do you believe in spiritualism?" was an emphatic "No." [74] As the war progressed, he, like many others, became increasingly fascinated by the paranormal and consumed by the concept of a thin veil that separated the dead from the living, as demonstrated in his private correspondence as well as his fiction.[75] In addition, the wish to commune with the dead and the alleviation of grief were impulses that he could easily understand. *A Well-Remembered Voice* explores spiritualism, and opens with Mrs Don trying to reach her dead son, Dick, through a Ouija board. Mr Don is a sceptic, but after he is left alone, it is to him that Dick appears. They chat about old times – fishing trips and other memories, what it was like to die and how Dick's mother and girlfriend are in his absence.[76] Dick insists that his father remains cheerful as he gets good marks for it on the other side, and is pleased when he learns his father has been trying to carry on with normal life as much as possible. Mr Don asks why when he was closer to his mother he has come to him and not to her, to which Dick replies that he could only come to one and: "I didn't know that you were the one who would miss me most; but I know now."[77] In common with *The New Word*, *A Well-Remembered Voice* is one of the few plays that Barrie emphasised the father/son relationship rather than the mother/son relationship. That both were written during the war when Barrie's guardianship of the Llewelyn-Davies boys was under such exceptional external strain hardly appears fortuitous. Moreover, Dick's primary message from beyond the grave for his father to "keep a bright face" evokes George's appeal to Barrie to "keep up his courage."[78] Finally, if there were any doubt that Barrie was drawing on experience the description of Mr Don seems strikingly like a self-portrait:

> He stands fingering the fishing-rods tenderly, then wanders back into the ingle-nook. In the room we could scarcely see him...He sits on the settle and tries to read his paper. He breaks down. He is a pitiful, lonely man.[79]

Barbara's Wedding compares the new world created by the war with the one before 1914. It tells the story through a senile old Colonel, a veteran of the Crimean War, who forgets that the 1914-1918 war is being fought at all, and when reminded does not comprehend its mechanistic modern character. Throughout the Colonel's mind drifts as he talks about an idyllic life filled with cricket and tomfoolery. Among other things, he thinks his grandson Billy and his German friend Karl are off fishing for a mythological giant bull-trout that he also tried to catch as a young man, and that Barbara of the title, Billy's sweetheart, is with them. This dialogue is addressed to Dering, his gardener - an unimaginative man from the lower classes with little or no future. When the church bells ring he is brought to his senses and remembers that it is someone's wedding day. His wife comes home and

prompts him:

> WIFE: Sit down, dear, and I'll tell you something again...My dear, there is a war again, and our old land is in it. Such a war as my soldier never knew...You knew about it quite clearly this morning. We stood together upstairs by the window listening to the aircraft guns.
> COLONEL: I remember! I thought it was a thunderstorm. Dering told me he heard nothing.
> WIFE: Dering?
> COLONEL: Our gardener, you know. Haven't I been talking with him, Ellen?
> WIFE: It's a long time since we had a gardener, John.
> COLONEL: Is it? So it is! A war! That is why there is no more cricket on the green...Is Billy boy dead? [She nods]...Ellen, who is the soldier? He comes here. He is a captain.
> WIFE: He is a very gallant man, John. It is he who was married to Barbara to-day.
> COLONEL: She has soon forgotten
> WIFE: She hasn't forgotten, dear. And it's nearly three years now since Billy died...
> COLONEL: Karl will be sorry. They were very fond of each other, those two boys, Ellen.
> WIFE: Karl fought against us, John. He died in the same engagement. They may even have killed each other...John, I had Barbara married from here because she has no people of her own. I think Billy would have liked it.
> COLONEL: That was the thing to do, Ellen. Nice of you. I remember everything now. It's Dering she has married. He was once my gardener!
> WIFE: The world is being re-made, dear...[80]

Barrie was certainly not forgetful, and quite cognisant of the war although unable to start his life over again. After the war, Barrie became increasingly reclusive and wrote only two more full-length plays, one of which is worth noting here. *Mary Rose* opened at the Haymarket in London on April 22, 1920, and like *A Well-Remembered Voice* examined spiritualist matters. Mary Rose disappears on an island in the Outer Hebrides leaving behind her husband of three years and young son. When she returns she has not aged at all and the mystery of where she has been is never solved, which caused Compton Mackenzie, whose sister Fay played the lead role in the original production, to consider its plot "impossible."[81] Mary Rose lives an ethereal existence of eternal youth, but she is a tortured soul incapable of achieving serenity because she pines for her lost child – a harrowing scenario to present an audience with in 1920, which would undoubtedly have been filled with bereaved mothers. In the final act Mary Rose meets her child who has grown up in the interim and become an Australian soldier, after which she is able to move permanently to the spirit world. Although, other than the fact that the child has become a soldier, the war does not feature at all in *Mary Rose*, it is clear from its ghostly theme that Barrie continued in the aftermath of the war to be pre-occupied with the dead and what happened to them.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the war Barrie travelled to St Andrews University to deliver his Rectorial address on May 3, 1922. He took as his theme, perhaps remembering George's painful entreaty in 1915 – 'Courage' - and focused on the war. Structured as advice from a member of the elder (and "betters") generation to Youth his speech revealed a mixture of pride and discomfort:

> Your betters had no share in the immediate cause of the war – we know what nation has that blot to wipe out; but for fifty years or so we heeded not the rumblings of the distant drum...and when war did come we told Youth, who had to get us out of it tall tales of what it and of the clover beds it leads to really is. We were not meaning to deceive, most of us were as honourable and as ignorant as the Youth themselves, but that does not acquit us of stupidity and Jealousy...If you prefer to leave things as they are we shall probably fail you again. Don't be too sure that we have learned our lesson, and are not at this very moment doddering down some brimstone path. I am far from implying that even worse things than war may not come to a state. There are circumstances in which nothing can so well become a land as I think this land proved when the late war did break out and there was but one thing to do...The end will indeed have come to our courage

and to us when we are afraid in dire mischance's to refer the final appeal to the arbitratment of arms....

In his cautionary view of the future, there was no room for his generation, which may go some way towards explaining his increasingly hermetic lifestyle in the 1920s:

> Your Betters have done a big thing; we have taken Spring out of the year...[which] lies buried in the fields of France. By the time the next eruption comes it may be you who are responsible for it, and your sons who are in the lava. All perhaps because this year you let things slide. We are a nice and kindly people, but it is already evident that we are struggling back into the old grooves. That is what we mean by saying that the country is settling down. We are too old for any others; that is the fundamental differences between us and you...[The dead] want to know if you have learned from what befell them, if you have, they will be braced in the feeling that they did not die in vain. Some of them think they did. They won't take our word for it they didn't. You are their living image; they know you could not lie to them, but they distrust our flattery and our cunning faces...Courage my children and 'greet the unseen with a cheer'.[83]

It is unsurprising that Barrie, as part of the literary establishment and personal friend of most of the English aristocracy supported the war. That he continued to do so despite the heavy personal losses that he experienced underlined his conviction. Moreover, his support was not of a passive kind, as he actively contributed to the war effort by covertly writing propaganda on behalf of the Government in the United States, producing charity matinees and organising auctions, as well as anonymously donating large sums of money to maintain two hospitals. His three visits to France in 1915, 1917 and 1918, did not alter his belief system; he was proud of the nation's resolve and retained his faith that the war was being fought for the freedom of the world. During the war itself, Barrie had been determined, outwardly at least, as George had advised, to keep up his own brand of courage, and although his courage was not of the bravery type, his consistent advocacy of the business as usual attitude was nonetheless courageous. But, he was also ashamed of his generation's lack of foresight to offset the war in the first place and was unavoidably and acutely sensitive that the price was paid not by his generation, but by the generation of young men that the Llewelyn-Davies brothers belonged to. By November 1918, however, Barrie's world had been irrevocably transformed; bereft by the loss of friends and family and shocked by the ferocity and length of the conflict he grieved for the pre-1914 world that had been lost to him. In the aftermath of the war Barrie who had written voluminously before only wrote two more full-length plays and one short novel and so his war plays constituted his last sustained burst of creative activity. Without substantiating the war's important contextual influence upon them and appreciating how this related to Barrie's own experiences they cannot be wholly understood and for this reason Barrie's view and role in the First World War should be a central component of any consideration of his life and work.

NOTES:

1 For a full bibliographic account of the works written about Barrie see, Ann Petrie, Scottish Culture and The First World War, 1914-1939, (University of Dundee, unpublished Ph. D thesis, June 2006), pp. 42-51

2 Much of this gossip originated with Barrie's divorce from Mary Ansell in 1909, when it was widely intimated that Barrie was impotent. In addition modern observers tend to feel uncomfortable about his unusually intense relationship with the five Llewelyn-Davies boys. When Nico was asked directly by Birkin about their relationship, he wrote: "I'm 200% certain there was never a desire to kiss (other than the cheek!)... All I can say for certain is that I...never heard one word or saw one glimmer of anything approaching homosexuality or paedophilia: had he had either of these leanings in however slight a symptom I would have been aware." The inclination to accept Nico's testimony is strong when taken in the context of his open co-operation with Birkin in every other way. Andrew Birkin, *J M Barrie and the Lost Boys: The Real Story Behind Peter Pan*, (New Haven and London, 1979, 2003 edition), p. 130, pp. 176-177, p. 180, p. 191, p. 196, p. 293; www.jmbarrie.co.uk, Nico Llewelyn-Davis to Andrew Birkin, 29/12/1975

3 Denis Mackail, *The Story of J. M. B.*, (London, 1941); Janet Dunbar, *J. M. Barrie: The Man Behind the Image*, (Newton Abbot, 1970) and Birkin, *J M Barrie and the Lost Boys*

4 R D S Jack, *The Road to the Neverland: A Reassessment of J M Barrie's Work*, (Aberdeen, 1991), p. 14

5 George was the oldest, aged 21 in August 1914, then Jack who was about to turn 20. Peter was 17, Michael 14 and Nico the youngest at 10

6 Mackail, *The Story of J. M. B.*, p. 472

7 www.jmbarrie.co.uk, notebook #35, accessed 5/1/06

8 Auberon Thomas (Bron) Herbert, 8th Baron Lucas of Crudwell and 5th Lord Dingwall – politician and airman, see www.oxforddnb.com

9 Mackail, *J. M. B.*, p. 473; Charles Frederick Gurney Masterman – Liberal politician, Thomas Hardy – English writer – see www.oxforddnb.com

10 Mackail, *J. M. B.*, p. 474 His biographers have tended to view this trip as farcical, see for example, Mackail, *J. M. B.*, pp. 473-476; Birkin, *J M Barrie and the Lost Boys*, pp. 224-228

11 Viola Meynell, (Eds), *The Letters of J. M. Barrie*, (London, 1942), p. 110

12 Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, MSS A3, James Matthew Barrie to George Llewelyn-Davies, 24/9/1914, hereafter abbreviated to BRBML and JMB to GLD. Edited versions of these letter's have also been printed in Janet Dunbar, *J M Barrie: The Man Behind the Image*, (Newton Abbot, 1970), and Birkin, *J M Barrie and the Lost Boys*

13 BRBML, MSS A3, JMB to GLD, 24/8/1914; Theodore Maynard Roosevelt – President of the United States of America 1901-1909, Roosevelt disagreed with President Wilson's decision to remain neutral at the start of the war, and was supportive of the Allies

14 BRBML, MSS A3, JMB to GLD, 2/10/1914

15 *The New York Times*, 1/10/1914

16 Ibid

17 BRBML, MSS A3, JMB to GLD, 2/10/1914; MSS W68

18 Ibid, MSS A27

19 Ibid, MSS A3, JMB to GLD 14/2/1915; MSS W68

20 BRBML, MSS A3, JMB to GLD, 24/9/1914; 2/10/1914

21 See, for example, ibid, 8/11/1914; 15/11/1914; 22/11/1914

22 Ibid, 8/11/1914

23 Ibid, 15/11/1914

24 Ibid Herbert Henry Asquith – British Prime Minister, see, www.oxforddnb.com

25 BRBML, MSS A3, 8/11/1914; 15/11/1914; 22/11/1914; 8/2/1915; 13/1/1915; 15/1/1915

26 Ibid, 30/11/1914; 13/1/1915; 15/1/1915 and 8/2/1914

27 Birkin, *J M Barrie and the Lost Boys*, p. 257

28 Elizabeth Lucas – the wife of the journalist E V Lucas, see Mackail, *J. M. B.*, p. 322; J M Barrie, 'Speech at the Opening of the Edinburgh Health Exhibition, January 27, 1932', in J M Barrie, *M'Connachie and J. M. B.*, (London, 1938), p. 224

29 Mackail, *J. M. B.*, p. 486

30 Barrie, *M'Connachie and J. M. B.*, p. 225

31 BRBML, G43

32 www.jmbarrie.com.uk Nico Llewelyn-Davies to Andrew Birkin, 21/12/1975; Birkin, *J M Barrie and the Lost Boys*, p. 243; Mary Hodgson – nurse and housekeeper, who shared the responsibility of looking after the boys with Barrie, see, ibid, pp. 154-155;

33 National Trust of Scotland, Barrie's Birthplace, GLD to JMB, 14/3/1915

34 Meynell, (Eds), *Letters of J. M. Barrie,* JMB to Elizabeth Lucas, 31/7/1915, p. 87

35 Ibid, p. 111

36 Barrie, *M'Connachie and J. M. B.*, p. 227

37 Meynell, (Eds), *The Letters of J. M. Barrie*, JMB to Charles Schribner, 16/9/1915, p. 64

38 Ibid, 26/10/1917, p. 65 George Bernard Shaw – Irish playwright and polemicist; Enoch Arnold Bennett – writers, see www.oxforddnb.com

39 BRBML, MSS A3, Thomas Gilmour to JMB, 15/6/1915; Thomas Gilmour to PM Asquith, July 1915; Thomas Gilmour to *The Times*, 17/1/1916

40 Meynell, (Eds), *The Letters of J M Barrie,* JMB to Mrs Thomas Hardy, 15/8/1915, p. 143

41 Peter destroyed most of Barrie's correspondence with his brothers before he committed suicide in the 1960s, and no letters survive to or from Jack during the war

42 www.jmbarrie.co.uk Nico Llewelyn-Davies to Andrew Birkin, 24/11/1975; 11/12/1975

43 Ibid, PLD to JMB, 7/8/1915; 1/6/1916; 5/6/1916; 14/6/1916

44 Ibid, 15/6/1916

45 Ibid, 2/7/1916

46 bid, 27/7/1916; 8/8/1916

47 Percy Lucas - Brother of Barrie's friend E V Lucas, who was married to Elizabeth – not to be confused with Lord Lucas whose name was Auberon Herbert; Thomas H Gilmour – A journalist friend of Barrie who became Lord Rosebery's private secretary, see Mackail, *J. M. B.*, p. 495; p. 88

48 Raymond Asquith – Scholar and army officer, see www.oxforddnb.com Asquith was killed on 15/9/1916, www.cwgc.org, see also, John Buchan, *These For Remembrance*, (1919); John Buchan, *Mr Standfast*, (London, 1918, 1938 edition), pp. 410-412 Lord Lucas was killed on the 3/11/1916, www.cmgc.org

49 www.jmbarrie.co.uk, PLD to JMB, 12/9/1916

50 Ibid, 5/12/1917

51 Meynell, (Eds), *The Letters of J M Barrie*, JMB to Charles Scribner, 26/10/1917, p. 65

52 Ibid, p. 123

53 Dunbar, *J M Barrie*, p. 212

54 Meynell, (Eds), *The Letters of J M Barrie*, JMB to Elizabeth Lucas, 29/1/1918, p. 88

55 www.jmbarrie.co.uk, letter from PLD to JMB, 5/7/1918

56 Michael drowned in 1921, see, Birkin, *Barrie and the Lost Boys*, pp. 291-294

57 Meynell, (Eds), *The Letters of J M Barrie*, JMB to Mrs Lewis, 22/11/1918, p. 125

58 J M Barrie, *Der Tag*, (London, New York and Toronto, 1915)

59 Ibid, pp. 23-25

60 Ibid, pp. 12-13

61 *The Scotsman*, 22/12/1914

62 Ibid, 9/3/1915

63 Barrie, *Der Tag*, p. 37

64 Ibid, p. 40

65 J M Barrie, 'The New Word', in J M Barrie, *Echoes of the War*, (London, New York and Toronto, 1918), reprinted incorrectly as 'The New World' in Trudi Tate, (Eds), *Women, Men and the Great War: An anthology of stories*, (Manchester, 1995)

66 Barrie, 'The New Word', in Barrie, *Echoes of the War*, pp. 86-87

67 Ibid, p. 236

68 BRBML, G43

69 A E Wilson, (Eds), *The Definitive Edition of the Plays of J M Barrie*, (London, 1928), p. 876

70 J M Barrie, 'The Old Lady Shows Her Medals' in, Barrie, *Echoes of War*, p. 28

71 Mackail, *J.M.B.*, p. 502

72 Barrie, 'The Old Lady Shows Her Medals', p. 40

73 See J M Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European cultural history*, (Cambridge, 1995), Chapter 3

74 Birkin, *J M Barrie and the Lost Boys*, p. 220

75 Meynell, (Eds), *The Letters of J M Barrie*, JMB to Elizabeth Lucas, 20/2/1918, p. 90 and Mackail, *J. M. B.*, p. 533

76 Barrie, 'A Well-Remembered Voice' in, Barrie, *Echoes of the War*, pp. 146-151

77 Ibid, p. 141

78 Ibid

79 Ibid, pp. 138-139 Barrie's Adelphi flat had a large ingle-nook fireplace that only Barrie, who was 5 foot and 3 inches tall, could fit in comfortably. He had a large settle that he used to sit on placed inside it and to the side hung George's old school cap. Almost everybody who knew Barrie personally commented on his loneliness, see, for example, Birkin, *J M Barrie and the Lost Boys*, p. 262; p. 267; pp. 282-3

80 J M Barrie, 'Barbara's Wedding' in, Barrie, *Echoes of the War*, pp. 117-120

81 Compton Mackenzie, *My Life and Times: Octave Five 1915-1923,* (London, 1966), p. 186

82 National Trust of Scotland, Barrie's Birthplace, manuscript of Barrie's Rectorial Address, 3/5/1922, 'Courage'

83 Ibid. For a history of the mythology surrounding the 'lost generation' see Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914*, (London, 1914), pp. 85-121. Wohl's analysis may also be applied to illuminate the increasingly strained relationship between Peter and Barrie during the war, an estrangement which continued until Barrie's death in 1935

Early Soviet Cultural Policy and Experimentation

DR NEIL EDMUNDS

It is easy to forget at a time in which Communism is primarily associated with repressive, failed political systems that the coming to power of the Bolsheviks in October 1917 resulted in arguably the greatest expression of real and symbolic utopian, social and cultural experimentation seen in the Twentieth Century. This cultural experimentation first took place in the midst of brutal civil warfare, massive hunger and famine, and the draconian policies of War Communism. Its perceived importance was such that it occupied the revolutionaries' attention even when everything around them seemed to be falling apart. This essay provides an introduction to this experimentation and the debates surrounding the nature of Bolshevik culture and art during the immediate post-Revolutionary period. It also considers the objectives of the regime with regard to its cultural policy, and provides examples of attempts to fulfil these objectives and turn vision into reality.

Figure 1 – Lenin giving a speech in front of Sergei Konenkov's of Marx and Engels (1919). Source: Salisbury, H.E., *Russia in Revolution* 1900–1930 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978), p.239.

Early Soviet cultural experimentation was characterised by creativity and diversity. This was a result of the belief that all things bourgeois should have no place in a dictatorship of the proletariat, and needed to be replaced with something new and different. It also resulted from differences of opinion over what form this 'something' was going to take and the open-mindedness of the minister in charge of the culture and education from 1917 until 1929: Anatoly Lunacharsky. That Marx or the leaders of the Bolshevik Party had written very little about the nature of culture in the post-revolutionary Communist utopia, in addition to the lack of historical precedents to act as guides encouraged diversity of thought, although less sympathetic commentators would describe it as confusion. However, out of this confusion emerged two general schools of thought on the nature of Bolshevik culture and what the aims of the new regime should be in the cultural field. There were those who supported Lenin's pragmatic view that educating the proletariat and encouraging it to support the new regime should be the Bolsheviks' first priority. Then there were those who advocated an immediate transformation of society and the creation of a new, proletarian culture irrespective of whether most of the populace had heard of Marx or could even read or not. They included Nikolay Bukharin and Aleksandr Bogdanov, the former leader of the Bolshevik section of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party[1], and advocated that not only had the past to be swept away immediately, but a new type of person who was selfless, honest, incorruptible, a dedicated Party member, an all-round artist and a compassionate judge had be born out of the October Revolution. This was a belief that Leon Trotsky also shared. He described what became labelled 'New Soviet Man' as 'a higher biological type, a race of supermen who would rise to the level of Aristotle, Goethe, or Marx, and beyond'[2].

The creation of 'a higher biological type' was, though, just one aim of the Bolsheviks that shaped their cultural policy and fuelled experimentation. Another was to create art forms that were richer in aesthetic content and technical mastery than their bourgeois antecedents. These socialist art forms were to be accessible to the masses, and could thus be differentiated from the bourgeois art that was created solely for the pleasure of a social elite. Hence, Lenin in conversation with Klara

Zetkin claimed: 'Art belongs to the people. It must have its deepest roots in the broad mass of the workers. It must be rooted in and grow with their feelings, thoughts and desires. It must arouse and develop the artist in them'[3]. The art deemed most suitable for a future post-revolutionary proletarian utopia, however, was a matter for debate. These debates mirrored those over the nature of Bolshevik culture in that two camps emerged, and the individuals who occupied the different camps tended to the same. There were those who believed that all art of the past should be destroyed because of its bourgeois connotations, and out of the rubble would emerge the new proletarian art of the future. Then there were those who argued that the best examples of past art – i.e. 'best in the Arnoldian sense of art that stood the test of time – should be preserved, since they would form the basis upon which the art of the socialist utopia would be built. These camps were reflected in the two organizations that administered artistic affairs in areas of the country under the Bolsheviks' control during the period of the Civil War: Narkompros and Proletkult. Narkompros, an abbreviation of the Russian for People's Commissariat of Enlightenment, was the ministry of education and culture and headed by the aforementioned Lunacharsky. It tended to attract those who favoured using the 'best' art of the past as the basis for creating the art of the future and took the pragmatic view that educating the proletariat should be the main priority of the new regime[4]. Proletkult, an abbreviation of the Russian for Proletarian-Cultural Organisations, tended to attract those who favoured an immediate transformation of society and the creation of a new proletarian culture that was completely divorced from the past. It was in the studios and laboratories of Proletkult that the 'a higher biological type' of which Trotsky wrote was to be invented, and the proletarian art of the future socialist utopia created[5].

Whether they were the pragmatic preservationists of Narkompros or the utopian iconoclasts of Proletkult, there were three distinct problems to solve on which they all agreed. Firstly, they recognised the need to explain their ideas to the masses in order to bestow legitimacy on the new regime. Secondly, they recognised the need to attack their enemies, such as the Whites and their foreign allies, and the remnants of the old regime, most notably the church and aristocracy. Thirdly, they recognised the need to present a model for a socialist society. The first and second of these problems were relatively easy to attempt to solve in theory, if not necessarily successfully solve in practice, by use of artistic propaganda or iconoclastic methods. Consequently, there were numerous instances of statues torn down, churches closed and defaced, and palaces turned into workers' clubs or cinemas. To replace those statues, some 60 new statues of revolutionary heroes were erected. No living revolutionaries were amongst those on the list to be honoured by this form of so-called monumental propaganda, but there were some notable non-Marxists, including Danton, Robespierre, and Bakunin. Other left-wing icons, such as Karl Liebknecht, Heinrich Heine, and Rosa Luxemburg amongst others were also honoured, but inevitably the first statue to be erected was of Marx and Engels **[Figure 1]**. It was sculpted by Sergei Konenkov (1874–1971), and unveiled by Lenin in 1919 in front of the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow. It was eventually removed during the Stalin period, because it hindered the movement of troops if the Kremlin ever needed to be defended. Many of the other monuments, however, never even lasted that long, since they were hastily erected and built out of poor materials[6]

In addition to these monuments of revolutionary heroes, new symbols and rituals were introduced to replace pre-Revolutionary ones. The imperial eagles were replaced by the hammer and sickles, and red flags replaced icons. Saint's days and religious holidays were abolished as part of the atheistic and anti-clerical campaign, and replaced by socialist ones, such as May Day or the anniversary of the October Revolution. Red weddings and red baptisms replaced their Christian equivalents and new rituals accompanied them. There were also cases of children being given revolutionary names, and attempts made to abolish the bourgeois nuclear family and replace it with the various schemes for communal living along lines suggested by Aleksandra Kollontai, the Commissar for Social Welfare, who advocated a strictly egalitarian life style and the practice of free love[7].

With regard to artistic propaganda, emphasis was placed on visual and aural genres, because the authorities realised that they were particularly useful in educating what outside the main urban centres was a largely illiterate population. Trade unions, various commissariats, and local soviets therefore commissioned posters, the style of which varied considerably, because the artists who

designed them were so diverse. There were figurative artists, for example, such as Viktor Deni (1893–1946) and Dmitri Moor (1883–1946), whose work left nothing to the imagination, and thus proved an ideal agent of propaganda **[Figure 2 and 3]**. Then there were radical, abstract artists; members of the artistic avant-garde being amongst the first supporters of the new regime amongst those working in the arts, because of the ease with which they equated political revolution with cultural revolution. Their posters, *Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge* (1919) **[Figure 4]** by El Lissitsky (1890–1941) being a typical example, often contained abstract images and are of great artistic interest, but often prompted violent criticism from the press over their suitability for propaganda purposes.

Figure 2 – Viktor Deni. *Capital* (1919). Under the image is a satirical poem by Demian Bedniy. Source: http://www.iisg.nl/exhibitions/chairman/sov05.php

The aural equivalent of the propaganda poster was called *agitmuzyka*, an acronym of the Russian for 'agitational music', and often composed by composers working for the Agitational Department of the Music Sector of the State Publishing House (Agitotdel)[8]. Most *agitmuzyka* was vocal with its overt propaganda message contained in the text, and Agitotdel had published twelve collections of choral music as well as 104 individual compositions by August 1924[9]. In addition to song, another genre of *agitmuzyka* that was prevalent in the mid-1920s was called the vocal placard. The vocal placard was not a song (i.e. a text that is sung), but neither was it a simple declamation (i.e. a text that is spoken), nor does it contain the lyricism inherent in its nearest relation operatic recitative. It could perhaps therefore be best described as a declamatory recitative and was usually performed by an unaccompanied soloist, because the superfluous sounds of accompanying instruments would distract from the propaganda message of the text [10]. However, there were also attempts to politicise instrumental pieces by composers associated with Agitotdel. They did this by incorporating melodies or motifs from revolutionary songs into an original composition, or by evoking concrete images by composing programmatic music and combining it with explanatory titles and subtitles[11].

Figure 3 – Dmitri Moor. *Soldier, Farmer and Worker* (1919). The text at the top reads 'Proletarians of all countries, unite'. Source: http://www.iisg.nl/exhibitions/chairman/sov01.php

In the field of theatrical propaganda, mass open-air spectacles similar to the French revolutionary *journees* proved particularly popular during the years immediately after the October Revolution, and were an ideal way to politically educate thousands of people at the same time. There were four of these mass spectacles staged in Petrograd during 1920 alone. The first was entitled *The Mystery of Liberated Labour*, and staged symbolically in front of the former stock exchange on May Day. Over 4,000 people took part in the production, and an estimated 35,000 watched it. The next two mass spectacles were staged during the summer. The first was called *The Blockade of Russia* and depicted the Red Army rescuing an island from Polish forces. The second was entitled *Towards a World Commune* and staged to celebrate the first anniversary of the founding of the Third International. It began with a scene depicting the execution of the Paris Communards while



Figure 4 – El Lissitsky. *Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge* (1919). Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Lissitzky

the leaders of the Second International, portrayed as bookish intellectuals, looking on disdainfully without interest. The final and most spectacular of the mass spectacles held in Petrograd during 1920 was *The Storming of the Winter Palace* **[Figure 5]**. It was performed on the third anniversary of the October Revolution to an audience of over 100,000, including Victor Serge and Emma Goldman. Since it used live ammunition and tanks, *The Storming of the Winter Palace* reportedly caused far more damage to the building and casualties amongst its 6000 participants than the actual event itself three years earlier[12].

These mass theatrical spectacles that were staged in Petrograd in 1920 and in other parts of the country served a dual purpose. They provided an education in revolutionary history for thousands of workers and reminded them who were the good guys and who were the class enemies, and the opportunity for mass collective participation in an event. This was the ideal training for people who one day were to live in the collective Communist utopia, and illustrated how art could be an organiser of society as well as an educator. Their influence could also be detected in Soviet cinema of the mid-1920s, in particular in the three early films of Sergey Eisenstein (1898–1948): *Strike* (1925), *The Battleship Potemkin* (1925), and *October* (1927). Each of these films provided an example of the power of the collective action. In *Strike* it was how workers united and overthrew callous and exploitative factory bosses **[Figure 6]**. In *The Battleship Potemkin* it was how proletarian sailors mutinied against their aristocratic officers during the Russian-Japanese war of 1905. In *October* it was how workers and revolutionaries united to instigate the October Revolution. In all three films, Eisenstein used ordinary workers rather than professional actors. Some were specially trained, but the rest were just plucked off the streets of Petrograd or Odessa. Fulfilling Lenin's definition of Bolshevik art, collectives of workers in collaboration with Eisenstein and his chief cameraman Eduard Tisse wrote the screenplays to the films, and the films themselves were full of scenes of mass collective action. As in the mass theatrical spectacles, participation in them therefore socialised thousands of workers (11,000 in the case of *October*) in what it was like to live in a collectivised, Communist utopia of the future. Those in the audience meanwhile were left in no doubt as to who were the heroes and who were the class enemy thanks to the films' stereotypical images; images reminiscent of the images depicted in the posters of Deni and Moor[13].

Figure 5 –The power of collective (i). Scenes from *Storming of the Winter Palace*. Source: Bibkova, I., Cooke, C., and Tolstoy, V. (Eds.), *Street Art of the Revolution. Festivals and Celebrations in Russia* 1918–1933 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1990), p.135.

Eisenstein's films and the mass theatrical spectacles therefore addressed the third problem that the Bolsheviks faced: the need to present a model for a socialist society. This was a more difficult task to achieve than recognising the need to explain ideas or attack the remnants of the tsarist regime, because of conflicting visions over the exact nature of the future Communist utopia. However, there was general agreement that the future Communist utopia was going to be a scientifically regulated technocracy based on large-scale, heavy industry. Such a vision of the future may have sinister overtones for us today, but at the time it was considered bold, revolutionary thinking that was daringly modern. It was also the complete opposite to what Russia had been and what it was at the time. Although this vision of the future was primarily associated with the radicals of Proletkult and articulated most clearly by

Figure 6 – The power of the collective (ii). Scenes from Eistenstein's Strike. Source: Salisbury, H.E., *Russia in Revolution 1900–1930* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978), p.254.

Bukharin and Evgenii Preobrazhensky in their pamphlet *The ABC of Communism* (1919), even Lenin was won over by the idea as illustrated by his famous slogan: 'Communism is Soviet Power plus the Electrification of the whole Country'. It also partly explained why his favourite art form was the Cinema, although he appreciated the propaganda potential that film offered as well, and why he was particularly attracted to a recently invented electric musical instrument called the termenvox (see below)[14].

The vision of a future Communist utopia whose inhabitants would pray to the gods of the machine and science had wide ranging cultural ramifications. Machines became a bridge between art and industry, and standardisation and synchronisation the watchwords of the life to be lived by a now cybernetic New Soviet Man. Artists perceived themselves as engineers or scientists, and as the painter Yuri Annenkov asserted in 1924: 'Art will attain the high point of its flowering only after the artist's imperfect hand has been replaced by the precise machine'[15]. The vision of a scientific and industrial Communist utopia was most clearly realised in the work of the group of artist known as the Constructivists. The design that came to symbolise both their work and what of course was an unrealised vision of a scientific and industrial Communist utopia was Vladimir Tatlin's 'Monument to the Third International' (1920). Intended to straddle the River Neva in Petrograd, Tatlin's 'Tower' **[Figure 7]** as it was commonly called was to be at least 400 metres high and constructed out of what were considered the most modern of materials materials: iron and glass. Like a machine, its various sections were to rotate at different speeds to symbolise the dynamism of the revolutionary proletariat. It was also to house the headquarters of the Third International, three conference centres and a radio mast[16]. Tatlin's Tower' was therefore no socially useless work of art, but a functional machine that would broadcast from the birthplace of the Revolution, and a beacon for the world proletariat to home in on. Much of the work of the Constructivists was also devoted to creating objects of art that were as functional as machines, such as items of clothing and furniture. The Constructivists therefore embodied the socially useful role that artists should play in the future Communist utopia, but what they created was still perceived as works of art.



Figure 7 – Vladimir Tatlin's 'Tower'. Source: Salisbury, H.E., Russia in Revolution 1900–1930 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978), p.230.

The vision of the industrial Communist utopia also clearly influenced developments in music. Between 1918 and 1923, there were five so-called 'Symphonies of Sirens' staged in various cities. They were created and 'conducted' by Arsenii Avraamov (c.1890–c.1943) an employee of Proletkult, and involved the use of specially prepared factory whistles and sirens to intone well-known revolutionary songs. However, in the symphony staged in Baku on the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution, Avraamov got a little carried away and included the foghorns of the Caspian Sea fleet, two batteries of artillery, machine guns, and choirs in addition to the factory whistles, while he conducted the performance by the waving of flags from a platform positioned at the top of a telegraph pole **[Figure 8]** [17]. There were also indoor versions of the *Symphonies of Sirens* performed by groups who acquired the label 'Engineerists'. One of the most famous of these groups was the First Experimental Synthetic Chamber Ensemble. It was

Figure 8 – Arsenii Avraamov conducting a *Symphony of Sirens*. Source: http://societyofalgorithm.org/B22F/

founded by Leonid Varpakhovsky in 1923, and often performed its 'shumnaya muzyka' ('noise music') in the same concerts as jazz, which had been introduced to the Soviet Union in 1922 by a Russian émigré living in Paris called Valentin Parnakh. A number of mechanical and electronic musical instruments primarily intended for proletarian usage were also invented. The termenvox **[Figure 9]**, to which I referred earlier, was the most famous. It was invented by Lev Termen (1896–1993) in 1921 and had a number of compositions written especially for it, but other less well-known instruments invented during the 1920s in the Soviet Union included the pichchiton, the sonar, and the ekhvodin[18]. Many of these instruments were also designed to play music composed from micro-tonal scales – as opposed to what was perceived as the 'bourgeois' eight-note scale – that members of the Scientific-Technical Section of the Music Department of Proletkult, including the aforementioned Avraamov, had developed. Cybernetic New Soviet Man could thus play music of a scientific exactness that had never been attempted before on an instrument that was a machine in his Communist technocratic utopia. However, if by any strange possibility conventional (i.e. bourgeois) instruments survived, they would be used for performing works, such as Aleksandr Mosolov's *The Iron Foundry*, Vladimir Deshevov's *Relsy* [*Rails*], and Leonid Polovinkin's *Teleskop II* [*Telescope II*]. All these works dated from the mid-1920s and imitated various machines. If the impending Communist utopia would invariably be a technocracy based on heavy industry and every proletarian would be familiar with machines, the ideal music had to reflect this. As one writer put it at the time:

What is closer to the proletariat, the pessimism of Tchaikovsky ... or the precise rhythms and excitement of Deshevov's *Rails*? [...] Proletarian masses, for whom machine oil is mother's milk, have a right to demand music consonant with our era, not the music of the bourgeois salon[19].

In the field of dance, one of the most obvious expressions of the vision of a scientific and industrial Communist utopia was found in the work of the choreographer Nikolai Foregger (1892–1939). In Foregger's *Dance of the Machines* (1922), the dancers were required to imitate the movements of a flywheel gyrating around an immovable axis, a train by swaying, stamping their feet, banging sheets of metal together, and waving burning cigarettes in the air, or even various sizes of hammer[20]. Dance also provided a particularly good illustration of how the work of Russian émigrés was as influenced by the vision of a scientific and industrial Communist utopia as those who remained in the homeland. Sergey Prokofiev's *Le Pas d'Acier* [*The Steel Step*] (1925) was a celebration of the Soviet industrialisation programme that two recent commentators claimed 'is the only known ballet to have combined a Soviet revolutionary theme with a Soviet Constructivist staging. Yet, ironically, it was staged not in Moscow, but in Paris and London'[21]. The staging for *Le Pas d'Acier* consisted 'of large platforms, ladders, wheels and 'constructions' evoking industry and the machine age', while its music evoked 'the humdrum lives of machines'[22].



Figure 9 – Lev Termen performs on the termenvox (theremin). Source: http://www.obsolete.com/120_years/machines/theremin/index.html

In literature and drama, the industrial utopia was depicted in a number of novels from the early 1920s, most notably Feodor Gladkov's *Cement* (1924), the heroes of which were

workers rebuilding factories destroyed by the Whites during the Civil War, and plays, such as Sergei Tretiakov's *Gas Masks* (1924). *Gas Masks* was directed by Eisenstein, his last foray into the theatre, before turning to film. As in his first film *Strike*, *Gas Masks* was set in a factory, performed by factory workers rather than professional actors, staged in the Moscow Gas Works, and depicted workers doing very little else other than going about their everyday tasks. Anybody seeking a manifesto as to what the Communist technocratic utopia of the future was going to be like, however, need look no further than the poetry of Aleksei Gastev (1888–1939). The first stanza of the opening poem of his collection *Shock Work Poetry* (1918), which was to be recited to the accompaniment of factory whistles, was a paean to collectivism and the synchronicity of the machine:

> We shall begin together at the identical minute.
> A whole million of us take our hammers at the identical second.
> Our first hammer blows resound in unison.
> What do the hooters sing of?
> It is our morning hymn to unity[23].

Gastev was an engineer by training who like many Bolsheviks, including Lenin, was also fascinated by the time and motion studies of the American cybernetician and engineer F.W. Taylor that attempted to remove all superfluous or unproductive movements from a worker in order to increase production levels. In order to undertake further research into the Scientific Organisation of Labour, as Taylor's ideas were called in the Soviet Russia, Lenin appointed Gastev in 1920 to head the Central Institute of Labour (TsIT) in Moscow. In this capacity, Gastev came up with the idea of applying the Scientific Organisation of Labour not only to workers in the factory place, but to all aspects of a worker's everyday existence in order to ensure maximum productivity and machine-like efficiency. Gastev therefore envisioned a society run by the machine within which New Soviet Man was in essence no more than a production unit happily living a lifestyle synchronised to the rhythms of industry. He even went as far as inventing what he described as a 'social engineering machine' to create this ideal human type **[Figure 10]**[24].



Figure 10 – Aleksei Gastev's 'social engineering machine'. Source: Stites, R., Revolutionary Dreams. *Utopian Visions and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), Illustration 28, after p.164.

The idealism and sheer enthusiasm that October Revolution instilled, and which Gastev personified, can of course be easily overlooked or at least overshadowed with the aid of hindsight and our knowledge of the disparity between vision and reality. That so much time, energy and money was devoted to cultural matters at a time of such hardship, however, illustrated its importance to those who had observed the old order disappearing into the flames of revolution and truly believed that they could shape the future. Many of their ideas also did not disappear when they themselves in certain cases were persecuted or even purged during the Stalinist period. The Central Committee of the Communist Party, for example, ordered a study into music and the Scientific Organization of Labour to try and solve the problem of falling production levels as late as June 1983[25]! What changed was that the means by which they were expressed often became less experimental as those who worked in the cultural field tried to adapt to the vagaries of Socialist Realism and other government or Party directives[26]. They remained, though, nevertheless. As the activities of those artists discussed above also illustrate, the 1920s proved to be more than a prelude to the imposition of totalitarianism in cultural life. It was the period when members of the cultural and artistic intelligentsia defined its relationship with the regime. Some worked with the regime so that it could achieve its goals, and

some gained inspiration from the regime. In return the regime offered patronage and artists took advantage of what the state could offer: a privileged lifestyle compared to the average Soviet citizen if on occasions a precarious existence. This two-way relationship ensured that artistic life flourished until the Soviet Union's collapse.

NOTES:

1 Bogdanov had already presented at the time of the October Revolution a model that of a Bolshevik utopia on Mars in his science fiction novel *Red Stars* (1913) that he was determined should be recreated on Earth. For more information about Bogdanov's ideas, see Biggart, J., et al. (Eds.) *Alexander Bogdanov and the Origins of Systems Thinking in Russia* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).

2 Trotsky, L., *Literature and Revolution* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), p.256.

3 Zetkin, K., *Reminiscences of Lenin* (London: Modern Books, 1929), p.14.

4 Although this was generally the case, one has to be somewhat wary of generalisations, since there were individuals who had close links to both organisations: Lunacharskii, for example. For further discussion of these debates and their intricacies, see Sochor, Z.A., *Revolution and Culture: The Bogdanov-Lenin Controversy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

5 For more information about Proletkult, see Mally, L., *Culture of the Future. The Proletkult Movement in Revolutionary Russia* (Oxford: University of California Press, 1990).

6 For more information about the monumental propaganda movement, which in Moscow was headed by the artist Vladimir Tatlin (1885–1953), see Lodder, C., 'Lenin's Plan for Monumental Propaganda', in Cullane Bown, M. and Taylor, B. (Eds.), *Art of the Soviets. Painting, Sculpture and Architecture in a One Party State 1917–1992* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp.16–32.

7 Lenin spelt backwards – Ninel – was reportedly a favourite name for girls. For a list of favoured revolutionary names, see Stites, R., *Revolutionary Dreams. Utopian Visions and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.111–112.

8 Agitotdel was founded in 1922 to co-ordinate the composition, publication and distribution of musical propaganda. It was headed by the composer Lev Shulgin (1890–1968).

9 Figures from Edmunds, N., "Lenin is always with us': Soviet Musical Propaganda and its Composers during the 1920s', in Edmunds, N. (ed.), *Soviet Music and Society under Lenin and Stalin. The Baton and Sickle* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), p.108.

10 The vocal placard was primarily associated with the Ukrainian composer Aleksandr Davidenko (1899–1934). See, Edmunds N., *The Soviet Proletarian Music Movement* (Oxford/Bern: Peter Lang, 2000), pp.219–241 for more details about Davidenko.

11 Klimentii Korchmarev's set of variations on the melody of the French revolutionary song *La Carmagnole* called *Revolutionary Carnival* (1924) is an example of the former, while Mikhail Krasev's collections of piano duets for children *Pionery v gorode* [*Pioneers in the Town*] and *Pionery v lagere* [*Pioneers in the Camp*] of 1926 are examples of the latter.

12 These mass, theatrical spectacles have been well-documented, although figures for numbers of participants and spectators vary. For further details, see Bibkova, I., Cooke, C., and Tolstoy, V. (Eds.), *Street Art of the Revolution. Festivals and Celebrations in Russia 1918–1933* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1990), pp.131–135; Von Geldern, J.R., *Festivals of the Revolutions 1917–1920: Art and Theater in the Formation of Soviet Culture* (Ann Arbour: University Microfilms International, 1990); and Von Geldern, J.R., *Bolshevik Festivals 1917–1920* (Berkley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).

13 The work of Eisenstein is well documented in English. A particularly useful text, however, is Bordwell, D., *The Cinema of Eisenstein,* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).

14 The termenvox was a forerunner of today's synthesiser invented in 1921 by the acoustical engineer Lev Termen. It is better known in English as the theremin. For further information about the theremin or termenvox, see Glinsky, A., *Theremin: Ether Music and Espionage* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000).

15 Annenkov quoted in Arwas, V., (Ed.) 'The Great Russian Utopia', *Art and Design Profile*, No.29, 1993, p.43.

16 For more information about Tatlin, his 'Tower', and the Constructivists, see Lodder, C., *Russian Constructivism* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1983). It should be noted, however, that images of an industrial Communist utopia also found its way into the paintings of more conventional artists than the Constructivists during the 1920s and especially the 1930s, such as Yiuri Pimenov (1903–1977) and Nikolai Dormidontov (1898–1962).

17 Avraamov, A., 'The Symphony of Sirens (1923)', in Kahn, D. and Whitehead, G. (Eds.), *Wireless Imagination. Sound, Radio and the Avant-Garde* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992), pp.245–252.

18 Thirty such instruments were designed between 1928 and 1933 alone. Edmunds N., *The Soviet Proletarian Music Movement*, p.76.

19 Orest Tseknovitser quoted in Schwarz, B., *Music and Musical Life in Soviet Russia, 1917–1981*, enlarged ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p.53. There were also non-Soviet equivalents of music that imitated machines composed at about the same time as their Soviet equivalents, as well as mechanical and electronic instruments invented by Americans and Western Europeans, and composers who were experimenting with micro-tonal scales. However, the main difference between developments in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and developments in other countries was the question of ideological motive: i.e. the desire to compose the ideal music and invent the ideal instrument for the scientifically advanced, future Communist utopia upon which proletarians could perform.

20 Gordon, M., 'Songs from the Museum of the Future Russian Sound Creation (1910–1930), in Kahn, D. and Whitehead, G. (Eds.), pp.221–223. The same essay also contains further details of Avraamov's *Symphonies of Sirens* (pp.219–221).

21 Sayers, L-A. and Morrison, S., 'Prokofiev's *Le Pas d'Acier*: How the Steel was Tempered', in Edmunds, N. (ed.), *Soviet Music and Society under Lenin and Stalin*, p.81.

22 Ibid, pp.86 and 96.

23 Even though the reference to 'hymn' in the last line illustrated how the past could find its way into even the most committed of revolutionary's art.

24 For more information about the work of Gastev, see Bailes, K.E., 'Alexei Gastev and the Soviet Controversy over Taylorism', in *Soviet Studies*, Vol.14, No.3, 1977, pp. 373–394, and Johansson, K., *Aleksey Gastev: Proletarian Bard of the Machine Age* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1983). For further discussion of the idea of creating a robotic-like person and its influence on the arts, see Clark, T., 'The New Man's Body: A Motif in Early Soviet Culture', in Cullane Bown, M. and Taylor, B. (Eds.), pp.33–50.

25 This study resulted in the publication of Pavlova, N.G., *Muzyka i nauchnaya organizatsiya truda* [*Music and the Scientific Organisation of Labour*] (Moscow: 1983).

26 Socialist Realism was the state-sponsored method to which Soviet artists, composers, and writers had to adhere after it was introduced at the first Congress of the Soviet Writers' Union in 1934. It is interesting to note in the context of this essay that recent writers have suggested that the avant-garde was the antecedent, rather than antithesis, of Socialist Realism as has been traditionally argued. See, for example, B. Groys, *The Total Art of Stalinism* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992).

The League of Nations and Disarmament: A Lost Cause?

DR CAROLYN KITCHING

Disarmament under the League

As the First World War continued to inflict horror and hardship on a war-weary world, international statesmen began to develop plans to ensure that such an event could never occur again. Ideas on how to ensure that the prevention of war became a reality rather than an ideal eventually resulted in the concept of a League of Nations. One of the chief architects of this body was Britain's Lord Robert Cecil,[1] and another was the American President Woodrow Wilson. The League embodied the principle of collective security, rather than the old balance of power and alliance system which was seen to have been responsible for the fact that the First World War spread from a relatively minor dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia into a world-wide conflagration. Under the League concept, no one power would ever again be able to mount a campaign of aggression against another, because all the other members of the League would immediately impose sanctions on the aggressor, and he would be isolated within the world community.[2]

However, the maintenance of peace was not to depend solely on a system of collective security. Following the outbreak of war in 1914, the prevailing view amongst world statesmen was that it was the arms race, the almost frantic acquisition of armaments by the major Powers, which had led to the outbreak of war. This view has been summarised in the oft-quoted words of Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary in 1914:

> The moral is obvious: it is that great armaments lead inevitably to war .... The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them – it was these that made war inevitable.[3]

If this theory is correct, then the reduction of armaments would lead automatically to an end to war. Proponents of this point of view, such as Britain's Lord Robert Cecil and Philip Noel-Baker, would work tirelessly for disarmament via the League throughout the inter-war period. However, the other side of the disarmament debate argues equally passionately that it is not arms races which cause wars, but the tensions which cause states to believe they must build up their arms. Hans Morgenthau succinctly summed up this side of the debate:

Men do not fight because they have arms. They have arms because they deem it necessary to fight. Take away their arms and they will either fight with their bare firsts, or get themselves new arms with which to fight.[4]

This theory emphasises the need for security and stability: only when men cease to feel threatened will they dare to put away their weapons, and the creation of an atmosphere in which all states felt secure was going to be a much more difficult exercise than simply decreeing that they reduce the level of their armaments. Nevertheless, disarmament was placed firmly on the international agenda when the victorious Allies met in Paris to draw up the terms of the peace treaty with Germany. The Treaty of Versailles imposed stringent penalties on Germany. Her disarmament was dealt with under Part V, the Disarmament Clauses, the Preamble to which stated:

> in order to render possible the initiative of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow

These clauses reduced Germany's armed forces to 100,000 men, prohibited her from possessing 'aggressive weapons', from building battleships over 10,000 tons, from possessing military aircraft, and severely limited her naval capability. When presented with these terms the Germans asked for clarification of the Preamble, to which the French leader, Clemençeau, on behalf of the Allies, replied that the Allied requirements in regard to Germany armaments were not made solely with the object

of rendering it impossible for Germany to renew her policy of military aggression. They are also the first step towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.[5]

A commitment to disarm by all the members of the League of Nations, which Germany was not invited to join, would therefore seem to be implicit, and it was the recognition that if they did not fulfil this commitment Germany would consider herself released from this aspect of the Treaty, which drove the powers to at least appear to be seeking a general disarmament agreement.[6]

The Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted on 10 January 1920, and by the end of March had been signed by representatives of 45 states (not all of whom ratified the agreement) who agreed, with varying degrees of commitment, to carry them out fully and faithfully. The Article which dealt with the commitment to disarm, Article VIII, stated that

The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments .... After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council....

The League Council was, therefore, committed to formulate plans not only for the consideration, but for the *action* of the Powers and it is this commitment to formulate such plans with which this article is concerned, with particular emphasis on the reasons why such attempts were unlikely to succeed.

Security vs. Disarmament

The first hurdle which could not be negotiated successfully has already been identified: the question of which comes first – security or disarmament. To begin the search for agreement from the angle of arms reduction, as contained in Article VIII, could well be to attack the problem from the wrong end. Significantly, following the failure of the second major attempt to implement Article VIII, the then British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, informed Cecil that he did not believe 'that we can get a political condition which will make a policy of disarmament successful until we get a more complete political settlement' and that 'we ought to advance the political side a bit further before we can expect any good result from a direct approach to the problem'.[7] Nor were the French any more inclined to tackle the disarmament question from the angle which Wilson would have preferred. They have traditionally been seen as even less inclined to disarm than the British; in his classic study of French disarmament policy, Maurice Vaïsse concluded that '[T]he goal of French policy was not how to disarm but instead how not to disarm',[8] although Peter Jackson has recently analysed this view more closely and concluded that the debate was really about 'how to achieve the necessary conditions for disarmament'.[9] The French position was, therefore, very similar to that of Britain: security first, disarmament later, and throughout the inter-war period France consistently, and unsuccessfully, sought a guarantee of security from Britain. The two major powers of the League, therefore, both had doubts about the League's Wilsonian approach to disarmament, which did not bode well for successful implementation of the disarmament clauses.

Responsibility for Disarmament

The next point which seemed destined to undermine the search for a general disarmament agreement was the question of *who* was to be responsible for formulating this plan. Article VIII laid the responsibility firmly on the League Council, but here again, difficulties soon surfaced. Article IX of the Covenant had decreed that 'a permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles I and VIII and on military, naval and air

questions generally' and implementation of this Article proved relatively easy and straightforward. A resolution concerning the Permanent Advisory Commission was adopted by the League Council on 19 May 1920, and comprised one military, one naval and one air representative from each nation represented on the Council.[10] The Commission would then be divided into three sub-commissions: the Military, Naval and Air sub-commissions. Whilst the composition of these sub-commissions was agreed without difficulty, there was some apparent contradiction in forming a Commission to advise the Council on the means of drawing up a disarmament agreement, which was composed purely of military men. As Cecil pointed out later 'it is as useless to expect most military and naval experts to be in favour of disarmament as it is to expect cobblers to be opposed to the use of leather'.[11]

However, the establishment of the Commission was relatively simple compared with the enormity of the task which it was set up to undertake, and one of the main reasons for this lay with the other side of the disarmament debate: disarmament would *follow* not *lead to* the establishment of an atmosphere of international security. Whilst peace may have been agreed in Paris in 1919, a state of uncertainty and mistrust amongst the world's nations still remained, and was hardly conducive to a disarmament agreement. There are numerous examples of members of the League Council voicing their concerns in this area. The Norwegian delegate, Professor Fridjof Nansen,[12] commented that 'even the most naïve persons could hardly believe that the aspirations of Article VIII of the Covenant of the League could be realised at the present time', and that 'in the present position of the world it would be useless to advise the Powers to proceed to limitation of armaments on a large scale'.[13] This view was reflected in the first General Report of the Permanent Advisory Commission, presented to the League Council on 12 December 1920, which concluded that 'no reduction was at present possible'.[14] The Council decided to 'ask the Commission to continue its study of the problems before it' and approved a questionnaire relating to the current state of their armaments, which the Commission had drawn up for submission to member states.

It was not that the members of the League did not *want* to see a reduction in the level of armaments, but it was usually the smaller powers which expressed the most conviction in the virtue of disarmament. For example, at a public meeting of the 6th Committee in November 1920, Dr Lange, the Norwegian representative, declared that 'the question of disarmament cannot and should not be further delayed. The peace of the world demanded an immediate solution' and although the League Council had already been engaged on this problem, its efforts 'ought to be supplemented by those of a special Committee whose members would have more leisure'.[15] The Chinese delegate, Mr Wellington Koo, thought that this would be premature 'until the result of the work of the Committee of military experts was known and had been tested'.[16] At a meeting 5 days later, the French delegate, M Leon Bourgeois, declared that it was for the Council of the League 'to ensure the application of Article 8 of the Covenant' but that it would be 'wiser to delay for a short time the reduction of armaments than to take measures which were ill-considered and premature'.[17] 'Armaments must', he declared, 'be reduced according to a uniform plan and the immediate reduction of armaments was not possible.' Stressing the necessity for a system of mutual control to guarantee that the provisions of Article VIII would be strictly obeyed he asked 'which was the more dangerous – to postpone for a time the reduction of armaments or to set to work upon imprudent plans?' 'There were still some centres of trouble in the world,' he pointed out, 'and if limitation of armaments were not carried out effectively and at the same moment by all, the consequences might be very dangerous to those States which fulfilled their obligations in good faith'.[18] Given that Bourgeois has been described as the 'spiritual father' of the League,[19] and that he was President of the French Association for the League of Nations, his views ought perhaps to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, it would seem that every course of action was blocked by an *impasse* of one kind or another and progress was scarcely discernable by the end of 1920.

One reason for this was articulated by the British Military Representative on the Permanent Advisory Commission, General Clive, when he pointed out that the Commission was, in fact, 'engaged on a theoretical task' in devising a questionnaire which would 'enable the Council to compare existing armaments' and as such they were 'engaged on an exercise such as might have been given to a group of officers at one of our Staff Colleges'.[20] Clive went on to point out that in addressing other difficult issues such as the establishment of Permanent Court of Justice and the

Financial Commission in Brussels, the United States had been invited to send a representative, and in each case this invitation had been accepted. His reason for suggesting that a similar invitation be extended in the case of the question of disarmament highlighted the intrinsic flaw in the League. 'I need hardly point out the added weight that would attach to the work of the League in this respect in the eyes of the world generally, if it were felt that the United States were co-operating in it.'[21] The League Council agreed with Clive's suggestion and invited the President of the United States of America to send an American representative to assist the Commission 'in the study of the problem of the reduction of armaments'[22] whilst pointing out that the presence of American representatives would 'in no way commit the American Government to whatever opinions may be finally put forward in the report of the Commission'.[23] The American Government, in this instance, did not respond.

By March 1921 the League Council was no further forward, in fact, if the evidence of M. Léon Bourgeois was to be believed, it was actually in reverse. At the 12th Session of the Council, M. Bourgeois declared that the task of executing the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaty did not lie with the Council. 'The responsibility', he declared, 'lay wholly with the Powers which had signed the Treaties of Peace. The League of Nations would only be able to begin its work of investigation under the Treaties when the disarmament imposed by the Treaties had been carried out'.[24] It would seem that the League was, at this point, abdicating responsibility for implementing Article VIII of its own Covenant, and placing the onus back onto the Powers themselves.

The Fatal Flaw?

This leads to consideration of the third factor which contributed to the failure of the League Council to implement the disarmament articles of the Covenant: the absence of the United States of America from both the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. Whilst Wilson had been the driving force during the creation of both Treaty and Covenant, the decision of the United States' Congress not to ratify either left the remaining powers in a difficult position. As a result of the absence of the United States, the burden of carrying out the League's commitments fell almost exclusively on the two remaining major powers, Britain and France. The Covenant which resulted from the Treaty of Paris in 1919 was not the one which Britain and France had wished to see: 'it was a very different structure from that which the British and French thought appropriate to the international system they believed existed in 1919'.[25] Yet lacking the conviction of the American President, this Wilsonian ideal was the one with which they had to grapple, and arguably the questions of security and disarmament were the most intractable.

The British and French had been less convinced than was Wilson that disarmament could, and should, be included in the Covenant in the first place. There is little doubt that both Wilson and his Chief of Staff were in favour of disarmament *per se*. Whilst Congress may not support Wilson when the decision had to be made on acceptance or rejection of the League, his Chief of Army Staff had very strong views on the desirability of disarmament. In Paris for the peace negotiations, General Tasker Bliss responded strongly to a draft prepared by Dr Mezes, Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence of the Commission to Negotiate Peace. 'I do not like the provision "national armaments should be limited to the requirements of international ... security ...". There is only one way to carry the principle into effect, and that is to disarm. And the burning question is, "has not this war made us reasonably ready for it?" If not, God help us.'[26] Bliss saw only two alternatives, one being a League which was disarmed for the purpose of international war, 'or a League of four or five heavily armed nations who will impose their will upon the world and who will keep the peace among themselves only so long as each thinks that it is getting its share of the rest of the world.'[27] He believed that if the nations themselves did not deal with the matter, the people of the world would. He hoped that America would have the courage to lead the people and 'if I understand at all the President's views, I believe we will'.[28] Such strong support of Wilson's actions and beliefs by his Chief of Army Staff clearly demonstrates that the American delegation was sincere in its quest for a League of Nations in general, and one which would bring about world disarmament in particular. However, as previously observed, the British and French did not support this angle of the disarmament debate: for them it was a case of 'security first'.

Thus far, this article has examined the early indications that implementation of Article VIII of the Covenant was unlikely to proceed smoothly. Whilst its inclusion in the Covenant was understandable, given the prevailing view of the role of arms in the causes of war, this theory had perhaps not been thoroughly tested: it was an ideal rather than a practical solution, and the chief idealist, Woodrow Wilson, was soon withdrawn as a factor in its successful implementation. It was left to Britain and France to implement Wilson's ideal, and their view of armaments tended more to the dimension of *realpolitik*. The story of the search for a disarmament agreement during the inter-war period has been told in detail elsewhere.[29] For the purposes of this article it is sufficient to place the reasons for the failure of the first three attempts to reach a general disarmament agreement in the context of the flaws in Article VIII itself. The Esher Plan, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the draft Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, or Geneva Protocol of 1924, all demonstrate the weakness of Article VIII: in the final analysis agreement would be left to the individual Powers, which meant chiefly Britain and France, and they preferred to start with the concept of security rather than disarmament.

Between November 1921 and February 1922, a naval disarmament treaty, and Pacific security agreement, had been reached at Washington, and the apparent success of this Conference raised hopes at Geneva that this success could be emulated in regard to the armaments of all states, rather than the limited number of naval states who signed the Washington Agreements.[30] Unfortunately it was not until the chief Naval Powers, Britain, the United States and Japan, attempted to take the Washington agreements further, at the Coolidge Conference of 1927, that it was accepted that the Washington Treaties had been successful because they had omitted all the major contentious items, and concentrated solely on the classes of vessel which the powers were content to see reduced. Therefore, when the first attempt was made to extend the naval ratios agreed at Washington to the issue of land armaments, problems arose which proved to be insurmountable.

In 1922, Britain's chief delegate to the League of Nations, Viscount Esher, became frustrated with the lack of progress made by the Permanent Advisory Commission, and produced a plan which he presented to the League Council. Esher's proposals limited armaments and fixed a ratio for each country, this ratio to be based on a unit of 30,000 men of all ranks serving either voluntarily or compulsorily, and including all permanently armed police forces and permanent staffs of reserve or territorial forces.[31] The ratios would have involved substantial reductions by some countries and Esher stated that limitation of armaments would not, of itself, bring about an ending of the possibility of war, but he did contend 'that it brings within narrow limits the possibility of sudden attack by one nation upon another. For this reason the experiment is worth trying, always assuming that the people of the world are serious in desiring to reduce the chances of war'.[32]

Although the French were willing to at least use Esher's plan as basis for discussion, the British were not. According to the British War Office the ratio allotted to Britain would 'certainly not suffice'[33] and his plan was rejected in favour of a proposal by Sir Robert Cecil - the Treaty of Mutual Assistance (or Guarantee, as it later became known). Very briefly, the TMG would offer regional security agreements to states which had previously reduced their peace-time military forces in accordance with plans prepared by the League Council. Any state which felt itself to be 'menaced by the preparations or action of whatever kind of any other State' should submit a case to the Council, and if the Council decided, by not less than a three-fourths majority, that there was 'reasonable ground for thinking that the said preparations or action constitute a menace as alleged' they would make provision for military support for the menaced State in case of attack. The guarantee would only come into force if the victim of aggression had already reduced the level of its peace-time armaments in line with plans to be drawn up by the League. Failure to carry out this reduction would mean that the State would have its rights under the treaty suspended, and would risk the imposition of financial and economic sanctions until such time as it should conform to the terms of the treaty.

The proposed treaty would operate on a regional basis, so that European security would be maintained by European states, Asian security would be maintained by Asian states, and American states would be responsible for maintaining security in the American continent. Cecil pointed out that whilst the Draft Treaty did not go into detail of actual levels of disarmament, by confining the

guarantee to those states which had already disarmed 'sufficient inducement to disarm would be given'.[34] His view was that

Without an effective guarantee of security, there could be no hope of disarmament and ... without a reduction and limitation of armaments, a guarantee of security was impracticable.[35]

Whatever the good points of the Draft Treaty may have been, the Treaty suffered from the problem which the Permanent Advisory Commission had identified in that it was really down to the Powers themselves to reach agreement; without this agreement the League Council itself was powerless. Unfortunately, the British Government at least, was hostile towards Cecil's scheme, objecting to it on both political and military grounds. Political objections included claims that 'such a treaty can only add unnecessarily to our military commitments and increase the danger of dragging us into wars in which we have no real interest',[36] the extent of Britain's Empire meant that she would be involved in all corners of the globe,[37] and risked becoming 'committed to intervening in conflicts which we should otherwise keep clear of'.[38] The Admiralty and General Staff also objected to Cecil's Draft Treaty maintaining that the regional limitations hardly applied to Britain because the extent of the British Empire would commit her 'to possible operations in all parts of the world', and far from leading to a reduction of forces, any further commitments imposed by the Treaty would make it necessary to increase her naval forces.[39] The Admiralty were also concerned about the possibility that should the United States declare war on Mexico – 'a not improbable contingency' – Britain would then be required to send forces 'to coerce the United States of America'.[40] The General Staff objected on the grounds that by a four-fifths majority, the League Council could place British forces under the command of a foreign General Staff, and that the stipulation in the Draft Treaty that the Council could take up to four days to make the decision as to which state had committed an act of aggression meant that the aggressor would have four days in which to consolidate a military advantage. These are just some of the grounds on which Britain opposed the Draft Treaty, but they are sufficient to demonstrate the nature of opposition.[41] The TMG did, however, at least attempt to create an atmosphere of security before any commitment to disarm was required of the powers.

The TMG was rejected by Ramsay MacDonald's first Labour Government, and its own offering, the draft Geneva Protocol of 1924, which attempted to solve the question of definition of aggression, met a similar fate at the hands of the incoming Conservative administration of Stanley Baldwin. Thus by 1924 the pattern was set; without a guarantee of international security, the major powers, France in particular, would not agree to limit the level of their armaments, and all attempts to reach agreement by tackling the level of armaments before tackling this question of security, were doomed to failure. Whether the adherence of the United States to the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations would have made any essential difference to the position of the major European powers is, of course, in the realms of counter-factual history. However, the absence of the United States thrust the onus for the implementation of Article VIII firmly on the shoulders of Britain and France, neither of whom subscribed to Wilson's idealistic approach to disarmament. Therefore it would seem that, as the League Council itself declined to accept responsibility for implementing Article VIII, and the major Powers were reluctant to disarm until that state of international security which the League was meant to bring about had actually been achieved, successful implementation of the disarmament clauses of both Treaty and Covenant was a lost cause.

NOTES:

1 Lord Robert Cecil, Conservative MP, Lord Privy Seal, 1923, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1924-7

2 For a more detailed description of both the founding and the ideal of the League of Nations see, for example, R B Henig, *The League of Nations*, (Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1973) and F P Walters, *A History Of The League of Nations*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1952)

3 Viscount Grey of Falloden, *Twenty-Five Years*, (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1928) pp 160-2

4 H J Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations,* (Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1984), p. 398

5 Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace (16 June 1919), *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol. 6, p.954

6 For a detailed account of the search for disarmament during the inter-war period see C J Kitching, *Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament, 1919-1934*, (Routledge, London, 1999)

7 *Cecil Papers*, ADD51081, ff. 18, MacDonald to Cecil, 25 February 1924

8 M Vaïsse, *Sécurité d'abord: La politique française en matière de dèsarmement, 9 décembre 1930-17 avril 1934* (Pedone, Paris, 1981), p. 25

9 P Jackson, 'France and the Problems of Security and International Disarmament after the First World War' in *The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, April 2006,* p. 248

10 American Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No.4

11 *Cecil Papers*, ADD51103, ff. 3-23, 6 June 1923

12 Later, the League's High Commissioner for Refugees, and Nobel Peace Prize winner

13 FO371/7041/2, Warner to Curzon, January 1921

14 FO371/7041, Minutes of eleventh meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, November 14th to December 18th, Notes on 11th meeting (private) held on 12 December 1920

15 FO371/7048, Extracts from Journals and Reports of Committees of the Assembly. Proceedings of Committee No. 6 on 'Armaments, Mandates and the economic Weapon', from the Assembly Journal of November 21st, 1920

16 Ibid.

17 FO371/7048, Extracts from Journals and Reports of Committees of the Assembly, Proceedings of Committee No. 6, Third Meeting, November 25th 1920

18 Ibid

19 This description is contained in the biography of Benes on the web-site of the Nobel Prize Organisation itself

20 FO371/7041, No. 271, Annex 137a, Letter from General Clive to the President of the Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions, November 19th 1920

21 Ibid.

22 FO371/7041, No. 271, Co-operation of a Representative of the United States in the Consideration of the Reduction of Armaments

23 Ibid, Annex 137a, Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions, Communication from the Council to the United States Government on December 1st, 1920, at the suggestion of the Permanent Advisory Commission

24 FO371/7042, Minutes of the Twelfth Session of the Council of the League of Nations (Paris) Monday February 21st to Friday March 4th 1921, Seventh Meeting, February 25th 1921

25 Ibid.

26 FRUS, *The Paris Peace Conference*, Volume 1 (1919), Bliss to Mezes, 26 December 1918

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 See, for example, C J Kitching, *Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament, 1919-34*, (Routledge, London, 1999), B J C McKercher, *The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929*, (Cambridge University Press/London School of Economics, London 1984), Dick Richardson, *The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the* 1920s, (Pinter, London, 1989), and M Vaïsse, *Securité d'abord,* (Pedone, Paris, 1981)

30 For a detailed account of the Washington Naval Conference see E Goldstein and J H Maurer, (eds. *The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbour*, (Frank Cass, Ilford, 1994)

31 *Lloyd George Papers*, F/16/7/82, 24 February 1922

32 CAB4/8, CID Paper No. 339-B, 3 April 1922

33 CAB4/8, CID Paper no. 341-B, 6 May 1922

34 Cecil, *A Great Experiment*, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1941) p. 152

35 Ibid.

36 CAB23/161, Cabinet Memoranda, CP311(23), Memorandum by Leopold Amery, 4 July 1923

37 CAB4/9, CID Paper 420-B, Note by Lord Salisbury, 7 May 1923

38 CAB23/161, Cabinet Memoranda, CP311(23), Memorandum by Leopold Amery, 4 July 1923

39 CAB4/9, CID Paper No. 406-B, Memorandum by the Admiralty, 15 February 1923

40 Ibid.

41 For a more detailed analysis of the British Government's view of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee see C J Kitching, Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament, 1919-1934, (Routledge, London, 1999), chapter 5

Opposition and Accommodation in Nazi Germany: An overview of Perspectives

PROFESSOR TIM KIRK

In December 1941 Gestapo officers in Vienna reported a curious incident in St. Stephen's Cathedral during a service conducted by Cardinal Innitzer on the evening of the feast of the Immaculate Conception. Shortly before the end of the service at half past eight, some twenty young people staged a demonstration and were turned out of the church by one of the priests. When Innitzer left the church after the end of the service however, he was confronted with an even larger crowd of youths shouting anti-Catholic slogans. The Cardinal duly remained in the church until the crowd had dispersed. The uniformed police were called, but 'had no reason to intervene', and only one arrest was made. This was a fifty-nine year old pub landlady, Marie B., who had called out to the crowd: 'A decent Jew is better than you Bolsheviks', a remark she claimed had been prompted by one of the youths calling out 'Jew!' (presumably at the Cardinal). She was released from police custody once her details had been taken. The report was filed by the Gestapo as one of the instances of political opposition that generally comprised the major part of their regular reports, yet it is unclear at first sight who is opposing whom and why. In the absence of any further reports, – and Frau B's release presumably meant there was no court case from which further information could be gleaned – it is unclear who the demonstrators were, but it seems likely they were Nazis, harassing a public figure associated with 'reactionary' clerical-conservative circles (despite his enthusiastic support for the Anschluss in 1938). Since the only arrest was Frau B it seems that the police understood her to be the miscreant in the case, and – rather improbably – considered her off-the-cuff response to the provocative behaviour of the youths in the cathedral to be an instance of opposition from the 'Catholic movement'.[1] This incident is interesting because it does not fit neatly into conventional histories of resistance and persecution during the Nazi dictatorship, where it would seem a relatively insignificant and even trivial incident. Alternatively, it also prompts us to re-examine the historiography of anti-Nazi resistance three quarters of a century on. What follows is an attempt to recapitulate some of the problems historians have encountered in assessing the extent and nature of opposition, accommodation and – not least – enthusiastic collaboration in a dictatorship.

'Military, church and bourgeois youth', as Detlev Peukert once caustically remarked, long dominated West German histories of the resistance.[2] With the recent beatification of the Austrian conscientious objector Franz Jägerstätter, and the release of films about Sophie Scholl and (imminently) Stauffenberg, the emphasis seems to remain very much on the same heroic narratives, at least in terms of popular perceptions. But it is not so much that our understanding of resistance has not changed as that – as with so many aspects of the history of the Nazi regime – there is something of a gulf between persistent popular perceptions of the period and the results of increasingly detailed and extensive historical research. Peukert's was part of a more general critique – and revision – of the Cold War perspectives prevalent in the Federal Republic that essentially served to re-legitimise institutions and social groups in German society that had only intermittently, or belatedly opposed the regime.[3] Similar, more urgent strategies of legitimation were used in East Germany, where the focus of official histories was the Communist working class, and in Austria, where the Allies had explicitly made the restoration of an independent state dependent on evidence that Austrians had contributed to the country's liberation. In all three successor states to Nazi Germany it seemed that narratives of resistance had to be subordinated in order to establish functional founding mythologies.

Such perspectives changed most quickly in West Germany, where the marked shift to the political left in the late 1960s did not just mean that the considerable role of the left and the organised labour movement in resisting Nazism both before and after 1933 was acknowledged; it also enabled changes in German academic life which led to new methodological approaches to the history of Nazism. As prevailing 'intentionalist' interpretations of the role of Hitler were challenged by 'structuralist' and

'functionalist' analyses of high politics, similar approaches were applied to studies of the conflict between regime and society, particularly in the context of the large scale study of Bavaria undertaken at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich.[4] The 'history from below' that was the hallmark of the Bavaria project reflected the belief that ideological commitment and political intention alone were no more wholly adequate in explaining the actions of ordinary people caught up in the upheavals of the time than they were in explaining the actions of political leaders and the implementation of policy. The conditions for opposition – or for that matter compliance – were determined by a range of factors such as class, gender, occupation (and occupational status), age and geography – as well as prior political commitment. People were selective in what they opposed, what they tolerated, and what they acclaimed; and opposition ebbed and flowed with the popular mood, which was in turn dependent on pragmatic considerations such as wages and prices, shortages, and above all the unpredictable fortunes of war: in short, on shifting perceptions of 'good times and bad times'.[5]

Skilled industrial workers, for example, who sensed a wind of change in the labour market in the mid-1930s, were able to exploit their new found bargaining position, and their determination to work for the highest wage presented the regime with serious economic problems, which it sought to resolve by regulating labour allocation and criminalizing breach of contract. Could this kind of 'structural' opposition to the war effort also be resistance? Certainly, in many cases industrial workers remained committed Socialists, and the strategy of the SPD leadership was to rely on the thorough 'schooling' in trades unionism and social solidarity that generations of its rank-and-file members had undergone, rather than on the riskier methods of the organised Communist resistance; but opposition to the regime was, presumably, scarcely ever the first motive in seeking a better job, and, arguably, such structural problems made little impact on the government's rearmament programme, even if the open hostility towards the austerity measures in the War Economy Decree of 1939 unnerved a leadership that believed too strongly in its own 'stab-in-the-back' agenda. It might even be argued that the relative prosperity of working-class households in the 1930s eroded hostility to Nazism more than the working-class patriotism – something that seems to have surprised bourgeois commentators then and now – that reinforced Hitler's authority during the early war years.

In terms of explaining such behaviour the focus moved from political organisations such as the illegal Communist Party, whose underground organisation – along with some radical Social Democratic and other left-wing groups – delivered most of the active, organised, political resistance to the Nazis during the 1930s, to working-class communities, their experience, their concerns and their attitudes to the regime. As a community, it was argued, industrial workers who had been integrated into the politics and culture of the labour movement were relatively immune (resistent) to Nazi ideological penetration.[6] Their opposition to the new regime might have been contained, but winning them over would be far more difficult, if not impossible. Similarly Catholics, comfortable with the traditions and values of the church were also – relatively – less inclined to accept Nazi demands, particularly in relation to matters concerning the family, education and certain aspects of sexual morality. There were of course important differences: the Catholic Church could not be closed down or Nazified, and relations with the regime were regulated by the Concordat of 1933. Within months of the agreement however, there were the first attempts to restrict Catholic associational life, and these persisted, along with intermittent ideological onslaughts against the church and the harassment of priests. Catholic priests responded largely from the pulpit, and occasionally in the press, but this kind of ideological conflict between the Catholic church and the demands of secular political authorities, the tension between the village priest and the 'modernising' mayor, was scarcely unusual in modern European history. German Catholics could draw on strategies for responding to such measures that dated back to Bismarck's time, and the Düsseldorf Gestapo reported in November 1935 that the Nazi party's official propaganda had unleashed such a spirit of Kulturkampf that political Catholicism had only been boosted by it. This generated some robust, but selective, and primarily defensive responses to Nazi policies. The best-known case is perhaps the 'Oldenburg crucifix struggle' of 1936, when the order to remove crucifixes from schools was successfully resisted.[7] It clearly demonstrates the potential for effective collective resistance, and the hesitation of the regime to risk alienating a large section of the population and a powerful institution over a minor issue, but was in itself an unusual incident. The Church's response to the regime generally remained very much on the level

of ideological engagement: a Jesuit from the Rhineland later recalled that he had only ever engaged with Nazism ideologically (weltanschaulich), never politically, adding: 'I did not consider that to be my task.'[8] Similarly Protestants, who were subject to far more intervention in state affairs, responded essentially on a theological level to the attempts of the regime to create a 'national' church.

While Catholic and Protestant opposition to the regime has been covered very comprehensively in histories of resistance, the more forthright approach of the Jehovah's Witnesses, a marginal religious sect that recruited almost exclusively from the lower classes, has received much less attention. Although they had initially been inclined to accommodate themselves to the new political order if that had been compatible with their own beliefs, the Jehovah's Witnesses were explicitly opposed to the regime and its demands and, equally problematically, uncompromising in their pacifism. In relation to its size the sect produced more, and more determined activists than any other organisation involved in resistance, and its methods, particularly, its propaganda activity, have been compared with those of the underground left. With just under 20,000 members in 1933, the Jehovah's Witnesses were a small and relatively marginalised group, however, even within their own communities, and had no powerful friends in the establishment. The regime had no reason not to proceed ruthlessly against them, and did so. More Jehovah's Witnesses were arrested, imprisoned and killed, relative to the size of the movement, than from any other anti-Nazi group.[9] The relative neglect of their sacrifice by historians can be ascribed to their modest social profile and the perceived eccentricity both of their religious faith and their behaviour, and this sheds a revealing light on the way the post-war history of resistance and persecution was constructed: without powerful or articulate advocates seeking to appropriate their experience as a part of their own narrative, Jehovah's Witnesses remained among those groups considered outsiders both before and after 1945.

It was only with the purge of conservatives from positions of power and the radicalisation of the regime that resistance began to emerge among the elites who had hitherto worked with Hitler rather than against him. Military leaders critical of the Führer's diplomatic brinkmanship and ill-judged military plans were the first to think along these lines, but were wrong-footed, first by Britain's appeasement policy, and then by the series of foreign-policy coups which reinforced both the political authority of the regime and Hitler's personal popularity. From 1940 members of the Kreisau circle, a group largely made up of conservative aristocrats and priests, met regularly to discuss plans to rebuild Germany along Christian lines after the overthrow of Hitler. After the arrest of its leader, Helmuth James Graf von Moltke in January 1944 the group fell apart, but some members joined the group forming around Stauffenberg. It was only during the war, and especially after the defeat at Stalingrad that serious plans to overthrow Hitler and seize power were formulated by the people who were best placed to do it, and although the bomb plot failed it is still, rightly, at the centre of any history of resistance that makes sense. More controversial as a reference point for the legitimation of West Germany's post-war democracy were the conspirators' plans for the future of Germany – and for that matter of Europe, where talk of excluding raumfremde Mächte (extra-regional powers) echoed the regime's own propaganda attempts to recast the war as a defence of European Christendom. against the Bolshevik hordes and American 'plutocracy'.[10]

Over half a century of reflection, then, has made historians sceptical of heroic narratives of resistance in the service of post-war political agendas, and disinclined on the whole to find the kind of national resistance (either in Germany or in other parts of Europe) that governments need for the creation of a 'usable' past. Instead opposition has come to be examined alongside compliance, acclamation and collaboration, as social histories have revealed the extent to which many ordinary Germans were prepared to take the rough with the smooth. The furious grumbling about the detail of government policy was never quite furious enough to unsettle the authorities, and was rarely if ever translated into anything more serious. The lower middle classes, for example, most loyal of all the party's supporters from its very earliest days, found that few of their expectations were met by the new regime; in fact they felt beleaguered. Farmers objected to increasing regulation, and small business people complained both about increasing contributions to the Nazi trade and commerce organisation and about shortages of the goods and raw materials they needed for their businesses. Similarly, many people from the educated middle classes, who had been fascinated by Hitler, were dismayed by the

regime's cultural policies, the pressure on the churches and interference in the administration. Large businesses, on the other hand, benefited from lucrative arms contracts, and for most middle-class Germans the 'positive' aspects of the regime seemed to far outweigh the negative.[11]

The location of opposition and dissent in the broader context of everyday life and popular opinion in Nazi Germany has raised the more general question of the regime's stability and popularity. For one reason or another resistance was the concern of very small, very marginal groups of individuals. Beyond this opinion among substantial sections of the population remained as oppositional as it had been when the Nazis had been rejected by voters in 1932 in much of urban, industrial Germany and in the Catholic heartlands of the Rhineland and the south-west. That this opposition was not translated into rebellion puzzled and disappointed contemporaries – both German exiles abroad and left-wing activists at home – and the absence of mass working-class protest in particular has intrigued historians.[12] Explanations have focussed on the 'success' of Nazi economic policies, and full employment in particular, the impact of 'modernisation' in general on perceptions of class and status, and the development of a consumer society in particular, both of which hastened the dissolution of traditional solidarities.[13] The Nazis, arguably, used modern cultural and technological means to achieve modern political ends. The goal was not merely to contain opposition, although that was a prerequisite, but to mobilise active support, compel participation and elicit acclamation, and this was to be achieved not just through propaganda but by re-organising society in the proliferating organisations set up by the regime: the Labour Front, Strength through Joy, Beauty of Labour, the Hitler Youth, NS-Frauenschaft, and not least through the countless professional organisations which made up German associational life.[14] It was not enough for people to keep their heads down, they were expected to join in; and that is why the apparently inconsequential carping of the most reluctant members of the Volksgemeinschaft matters, why the 'immunity' of some communities to the bullying and cajoling of the authorities is important. By denying the regime the enthusiasm it required they were thwarting the project to colonise and politicise the private lives of individuals in the service of the national community. It was not just that dissenting behaviour and opinion was criminalised, but that failure to assent vociferously, or to participate in the multifarious rituals, marches, assemblies and gatherings organised by the regime was also suspicious. In the Third Reich it did not do to be 'off message'.

This is not to say that there was not a great deal of willing support for the regime. The Nazi takeover of power was accompanied by a veritable wave of euphoria that lasted for several months, by which time a level of acceptance was established, which remained more or less intact until the worst days of the air war. Middle-class and professional organisations enthusiastically 'co-ordinated' themselves. Civil servants and professionals were happy to abandon the Weimar experiment with democracy and welfare as too costly and ultimately unsustainable; and they embraced Nazism as an alternative to chaos and Bolshevism. The movement's brand of biological racism meant that expensive social policies for society's 'failures' could be dispensed with, and resources redistributed to the strong. The war extended this principle to occupied Europe, which provided slave labour, food and natural resources to sustain the living standards of Germans. Many Germans, it has been argued, not only did not experience the 'coercive or terroristic side' of the regime, but welcomed the crackdown on those the Nazis labelled criminals.[15] By implication the stability of the regime was not achieved by a combination of coercion and manipulative propaganda, but by the manufacture of consensus at the expense of outsider groups in society.

We should be wary, however, of the notion that the Third Reich was a 'dictatorship by consent', with its suggestion of a very broad positive reception of the regime and its policies, or the notion that coercion played only a minor role. Certainly, some of the discriminatory policies of the regime found a resonance among otherwise largely hostile sections of the population; and there is also no doubt that the promotion of sport, leisure and popular culture reinforced popular acceptance. The most interesting and revealing evidence of support and collaboration has come not from those studies which assume a popular consensus 'backing Hitler' and seek to explain it, but from studies of the relationship between the regime and the professional and business elites whose co-operation were essential to the running of it. In the case of many of the regime's policies intellectuals and technocrats were not only supporting the direction of policy (the fight against disease, the regulation of safety and hygiene in the workplace,

the securing of food supplies) but were the driving force behind it.[16] We have been used to seeing responses to Nazism in terms of opposition or accommodation to a regime that was essentially imposed on society from above, while non-party experts – the obvious example is Albert Speer – have presented themselves either as naïve or as servants primarily of their own professionalism or disinterested research objectives. While there is little new to be said about the limits of resistance in the Third Reich, there remains a great deal to be discovered about this kind of collaboration.

NOTES:

1. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, 04 Karton 385 Staatspolizeistelle Wien, Tagebericht 4, 8-9 Dezember 1941
2 Detlev Peukert, 'Der deutsche Widerstand 1933-1945', in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Beilage zur Wochenzeitung das Parlament* B 28-29/79, 14 July 1979, p. 22.
3 See Hans Mommsen, 'The German Resistance against Hitler and the Restoration of Politics' in Michael Geyer and John W. Boyer (eds) *Resistance against the Third Reich* 1933-1990 (Chicago and London, 1992), pp. 150-166, here esp. pp. 150-153.
4 Martin Broszat, Elke Fröhlich and Falk Wiesemann (eds), *Bayern in der NS-Zeit*, 6 vols, (Munich, 1977-83)
5 Ulrich Herbert, 'Good Times, Bad Times': Memories of the Third Reich', in Richard Bessel (ed.), *Life in the Third Reich*, pp. 97-110.
6 Part of Martin Broszat's essay 'Resistenz und Widerstand', from *Bayern in der NS-Zeit* vol. 4., *Herrschaft und Gesellschaft im Konflikt* (Munich, 1981), pp. 691-709, is translated into English in Neil Gregor, *Nazism* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 242-4
7 Jeremy Noakes, 'The Oldenburg Crucifix Struggle', in Peter Stachura (ed.), *The Shaping of the Nazi State* (London, 1978)
8 Reinhard Mann, *Protest und Kontrolle im Dritten Reich. Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft im Alltag einer rheinischen Großstadt* (Frankfurt, 1987)
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12 For example Tim Mason, 'The Containment of the Working Class in Nazi Germany' in Tim Mason (Jane Caplan, ed.), *Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class* (Camridge, 1995), pp. 231-273 (originally published in 1982) Ulrich Herbert, 'Arbeiterschaft im "Dritten Reich". Zwischenbilanz und offene Fragen', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 15 (1989) pp. 320-60 summarises the literature to that point.
13 The relationship between modernisation (or modernity) and Nazism has been a controversial one. A useful introduction is Mark Roseman, 'National Socialism and Modernisation' in Richard Bessel, *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 197-229
14 Peter Reichel, *Der schöne Schein des Dritten Reiches. Faszination und Gewalt des Faschismus* (Frankfurt, 1993) explores the appeal of the Nazis' cultural policies. The concluding points are translated into English in Gregor, *Nazism*, pp. 226-9.
15 Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler (Oxford, 2001). Here p. 257.
16 See for example Margit Szöllösi-Janze, 'National Socialism and the Sciences: Reflections, Conclusions and Historical Perspectives', in Margit Szöllösi-Janze (ed.) Science in the Third Reich (Oxford and New York, 2001), pp. 1-36.

Nancy Astor and Hamish Henderson's 'The Ballad of the D-Day Dodgers'

DR DAVID MARTIN

In July 1943 soldiers of the Eighth Army, many of them veterans of the campaign in North Africa, began the invasion of Sicily. By early September the island was occupied and preparations had been made for a landing on the Italian mainland. As it began, the politicians who had recently replaced Mussolini sued for peace. However, any hopes that Italy would take no further role in the war were soon disappointed. Anticipating surrender by the new government, the German Army stood ready to face an Allied invasion. The long and arduous campaign that followed led to tens of thousands of casualties. Not until 4 June 1944 was Rome captured, two days before 'D-Day', the landings by the Allies in Normandy. Although fighting in Italy was not to end until the surrender of Germany in May 1945, many of the soldiers in Italy believed that attention had shifted away from their struggles, which became those of an almost forgotten army.

Writing of his wartime experiences in Italy, Denis Healey, who later became a leading political figure, recalled the harshness of the campaign:

> The Appennines [sic] were bitter cold, and the Germans fought hard every inch of the way. Men who had come through the desert and Cassino without breaking, collapsed with the strain of the Gothic Line. There was bitter resentment when Lady Astor described them as 'D-Day Dodgers'. They replied with a song ...

He went on to quote three verses of the song, including the following verse specifically directed at Lady Astor:

> Old Lady Astor please listen, dear, to this,
> Don't stand upon the platform and talk a lot of piss;
> You're the nation's sweetheart, the nation's pride,
> But your bloody big mouth is far too wide;
> That's from the D-Day Dodgers – out in Italy.[1]

Similar sentiments were expressed by others with some knowledge of the Italian campaign. For example, the Lord Justice of Appeal, Sir Stephen Sedley, has recalled:

Lady Astor did not have a good press in my family. My father had served in North Africa and Italy with the Eighth Army, which Nancy had asserted in the House of Commons in 1944 was 'dodging D-Day'. They returned singing to the tune of 'Lili Marlene':

> Dear Lady Astor, you think you're mighty hot,
> Standing on a platform talking tommy-rot.
> You're England's sweetheart and her pride:
> We think your mouth's too bleeding wide.
> We are the D-Day Dodgers way out in Italy.[2]

This short essay seeks to look at the song in more detail. In doing so it considers the woman who, to her dismay, was regarded as inspiring 'The D-Day Dodgers' and asks whether she was unfairly criticised. It also examines the role of Hamish Henderson, then a young left-wing intellectual who became a leading figure in Scottish cultural life.

As the two verses quoted above by Healey and Sedley show, the ballad existed in more than one version, something to be expected of songs that spread orally and were adapted according to the

concerns of different soldiers. The version popular among Canadian forces serving in Italy made no reference to the British politician Lady Astor.[3] However, in one form or another, the song became, and has remained, widely known. Sometimes the words used were less angrily phrased than those sung by Denis Healey; for example a more benign version runs:

Here's to Lady Astor, our pin-up girl out here,
She's the dear old lady who sends us such good beer,
And when we get our Astor band,
We'll be the proudest in the land,
For we're the D-Day Dodgers out here in Italy.

Another offered the riposte that Healey quoted, but in more restrained tones:

Oh, Lady Astor listen to us please,
Don't stand on the platform talking at your ease,
You're the 8th Army's sweetheart and nation's pride
But shut your mouth it's far too wide,
That's from the D-Day Dodgers, the boys in Italy.

But in the version offered by the original author, Astor is admonished in these lines:

Dear Lady Astor, you think you know a lot,
Standing on a platform and talking tommy-rot.
You, England's sweetheart and her pride,
We think your mouth's too bleeding wide –
That's from your D-Day Dodgers—in far off Italy.

The words throughout the song were similarly powerful. With some humour, the earlier verses (quoted in the appendix) caricatured the comfortable nature attributed to the Italian campaign. After these, usually follows the verse in criticism of Lady Astor's insinuations that the campaign was less arduous than that which had begun with the Normandy landings on 6 June 1944. The final verse was an emotionally charged statement of what the men of the Eighth Army were really facing (sometimes when sung, the last line was, very quietly, repeated):

Look around the mountains in the mud and rain—
You'll find the scattered crosses—(there's some that have no name).
Heartbreak and toil and suffering gone,
The boys beneath them slumber on.
They are the D-Day Dodgers who'll stay in Italy.

Brilliant though the words were, they carried an extra force from being set to the tune of 'Lili Marlene'. The plaintive cadences of this popular German song – a favourite of soldiers on both sides – ideally suited the author's words.

For some time it was assumed that authorship of 'The D-Day Dodgers' was shared by a group of soldiers and that, as the song spread it was adapted and added to. Its oral dissemination did lead to variations in the words, but eventually the author of the earliest version was recognised as Hamish Henderson, a left-wing officer serving with the 51st (Highland) division.[4] Born in Blairgowrie, Perthshire, on 11 November 1919, the son of a nurse and orphaned at twelve, Henderson was so gifted academically that he received scholarships to Dulwich College and Cambridge University. Influenced at home by the hardships of the economically depressed Scots and by the rise of fascism abroad, he espoused socialism while still in his teens. In the summer of 1939 he travelled to Germany as a courier on behalf of a group of Quakers who were trying to get Jews out of the country. The war saw him commissioned in 1941 as an officer who was active as an intelligence officer in north Africa and then involved in fighting alongside the Italian partisans. These anti-fascists introduced him to the ideas of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) (who continued to influence

Henderson's thought; in the 1980s he translated a collection of Gramsci's prison letters). After the war Henderson, who taught at Edinburgh University from 1951 to 1987, became highly regarded as a writer of poems and songs. Of these, probably the best known are 'The John Maclean March', first performed in 1948 to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of Maclean's death, and 'Freedom Come All Ye', written for a Scottish CND demonstration in 1960 and sometimes described as the unofficial anthem of Scotland. Henderson died on 8 March 2002.[5]

On 27 March 2002, to commemorate Henderson's life and cultural work, the Scottish Parliament held a debate. Several SMPs spoke of his many qualities. The Conservative member for the Highlands and Islands, Jamie McGrigor, concentrated on the contribution Henderson made to the composition and collection of Scottish folk songs. Towards the end of his speech, he observed:

> I was privileged to know and sometimes sing with another great folk singer, Hamish Imlach. One of his favourite songs was called 'The D-Day Dodgers', which had been written during the Second World War by a Major Hamish Henderson of the 51st Highland division in indignant response to an ill-considered comment by Lady Astor in the House of Commons. In a stupid speech, she had suggested that those soldiers who were stuck in Italy, and many of whom had died fighting the Germans in particularly bloody campaigns such as Cassino, were in some way dodging the D-day Normandy invasion.[6]

Here McGrigor echoed, as we have seen, the statements of others. Similar views continue to find expression. In 2004, in a piece for the BBC, the distinguished military historian Richard Holmes, referred to the 'so-called D-Day Dodgers', an expression which 'originated in an ill-considered remark made by the Conservative MP Lady Astor'.[7] It has sometimes been suggested that Lady Astor had gone even further. One self-proclaimed 'Dodger', Tom Canning, recalled not only her remarks that led to the ballad but 'that the so-called "lady" also recommended that all 8th army personnel on landing (if ever) back in the U.K. wear a yellow armband to denote that they were from Italy and were possible carriers of venereal diseases'. This largely repeats the charge against Nancy Astor referred to by Martin Page in his collection of soldiers' songs:

> She was also said to have opined that as so many had spent so much of their time in brothels, the incidence of VD among them was extremely high; and that when they came home on leave, they should be made to wear yellow arm-bands, so that British womanhood could identify them for what they were, and be warned.[8]

More potently, the song entered the repertoire of many folk singers. As well as Hamish Imlach, among the many singers who have recorded it are Ewan MacColl, Dick Gaughan, Ian Campbell, Pete Seeger, the Clancy Brothers and the Yettis. Denis Healey has rendered it on several occasions, once on television being moved to tears.[9]

While the song retains much of its power, the reputation of the woman who incited it, Nancy Astor, has, up to and beyond her death in 1964, been dogged by an 'ill-considered' and 'stupid speech'. Her remarks could be taken a typical of a woman who seemed to court controversy.. By 1944 the British public had long been familiar with her often unpopular opinions, while the wealth and political influence of the Astor family was widely deplored.

Born in Virginia in 1879, after a brief first marriage she became in 1906 the wife of the American-born and Eton-educated newspaper proprietor, Waldorf Astor. Among their wedding presents was one from Lord Astor, her father-in-law – Cliveden, the country house at which she was notoriously to hold court. In 1919 when Waldorf Astor succeeded to his father's peerage, Nancy successfully contested the Sutton division of Plymouth, her husband's parliamentary seat. She was thus the first woman to sit in the House of Commons (the Countess Markiewicz, elected as a Sinn Fein candidate in 1918, did not take her seat). Her widely reported campaign, in the view of her critics, fed further her appetite for publicity. A few years earlier she had converted to Christian Science and was a fervent teetotaller – views that she lost no opportunity to press on others (it was reported that even Stalin, whom she visited in 1931, was not excepted). In the Commons her tendency to heckle other MPs,

including Conservatives, caused some resentment and later made her the butt of anecdotes, most of which were probably apocryphal. However, the most quoted of these, which according to Christopher Sykes originated before the First World War, 'is well authenticated'. Churchill and Astor had spent an argumentative weekend at Blenheim Palace. Sykes noted: 'At breakfast one morning Nancy said to him: "Winston, if I was married to you I'd put poison in your coffee.' Winston Churchill replied: "Nancy, if I was married to you, I'd drink it."'[10]

Although in the Commons she was often a loose cannon, speaking over-spontaneously and sometimes eccentrically, her energy, humour and zeal helped to secure friendships in all parties. She got on well with radicals such as Ellen Wilkinson and Margaret McMillan, proposing at one point the creation of a political party for women only – an idea dismissed by critics as typical of her poor judgement. Her aptitude for friendship sometimes overrode her prejudices, such as a predisposition against Roman Catholics. Writing after the war, the journalist Hugh Cudlipp, an editor of the *Daily Mirror* in the 1930s, placed her in a context that made her appear newsworthy but unserious:

> But there are other things that matter in life – record-breaking exhibitions and daffy animals, for instance; pole-squatters, Siamese twins, teetotallers who die aged 102, the Dionne quintuplets, Nancy Lady Astor, phoney mediums, beer-drinking cats, Jack Solomons, brides in glass coffins ...[11]

However, in the later 1930s, as the rise of continental fascism continued, it was widely believed that the Astors' Cliveden home functioned as a centre of appeasement. In part due to the journalistic cunning of the Communist Claud Cockburn, in his newsletter *The Week*, the impression was created that the family exerted all the influence it could on behalf of Nazi Germany. In March 1938 the Communist Party issued a pamphlet adding to the sense that those active in the 'Cliveden Set' were working behind the scenes against the interests of the British people.[12] Although von Ribbentrop, the German ambassador, was once invited to lunch, the occasion ended in an ill-tempered argument. One possible consequence of this (though it did not become known until the end of the war) was that Nancy Astor's name appeared on the list of prominent individuals to be arrested in the aftermath of a German occupation of Britain. The list identified her by a single word – *deutschfeindlich* (anti-German).[13]

With Britain's declaration of war in September 1939 the policy of appeasement was exposed as a failure. A barrage of recrimination and criticism raked Chamberlain's government, epitomised by the work of 'Cato', *Guilty Men* (1940). This tract was one of several published by Victor Gollancz designed to discredit the Conservative Party.[14] The Astor family had already featured prominently in one of Gollancz's Left Book Club titles, *Tory M.P.*, which dwelt on the unsavoury origins of the family's huge wealth.[15] In a short book said to have sold 200,000 copies, *Your M.P.* (1944), Nancy Astor was one of the Conservative MPs selected for scrutiny. Readers were reminded of her role as the hostess of Cliveden, where 'Germans, sent here to explain the unselfishness of Hitler and Goering, could find a rewarding and appreciative audience at her table.' By the time of this book's appearance, the Soviet Union was a highly regarded ally and Astor's criticisms of Communism as anti-religious seemed to strike the wrong note, as did her remark 'the Russians are fighting for themselves, not for us'.[16] An observation of 1937, that Stalin 'is a very nice little fellow, brown, bright-eyed, and well-conducted', was, as the Conservative MP Quintin Hogg in his attempted rebuttal of left-wing propagandists allowed, 'charmingly absurd'.[17]

During the war, it is generally accepted; public opinion moved leftwards, a shift encouraged by democratically minded publishers. Allen Lane, the founder of Penguin Books, though less partisan than Gollancz also issued some widely read titles of a leftist character. As the number of conscripts increased, the *Daily Mirror* positioned itself as the voice of the men and women in the services. While never explicitly calling on its readers to vote Labour, in the general election campaign of 1945 it urged the civilian population to vote for those in the services unable to cast their votes and the 'men who fought and died that their homeland and your might live ... – vote for THEM'.[18] On a weekly basis, *Picture Post* also developed similar arguments that post-war Britain had to be one of fairer

shares. A new political party, Common Wealth, expressed this popular radicalism; in breaking the electoral truce it won seats previously held by Conservatives. In this context and as a result of her increasingly inept parliamentary interventions, Conservative Party managers came to regard Lady Astor as a liability. She also lacked support from her local Conservative Association. Reluctantly, and under pressure from her family, she announced on 1 December 1944 that she would not stand in the next election.

In the next few weeks the story of her reference to the 'D-Day Dodgers' broke. In discussing it, the historian Paul Addison linked it to the persistence of the 'Cliveden myth'. He cited a story in *Picture Post* in 1941 to the effect that the Astors retained fifteen gardeners and refused to allow their golf course to be ploughed up – allegations for which an apology was eventually received. Further, Nancy Astor 'was the target of a malicious whispering campaign', including that about 'the D-Day Dodgers'; the resulting ballad, he wrote, 'is still sung, immortalizing an entirely baseless rumour'.[19]

To a large extent, Addison is correct. However, like many rumours, it was not entirely baseless. The circumstances from which it arose were set out in the left-leaning *Daily Mirror* on 27 February 1945. In that newspaper's popular 'Live Letters' feature an editorial note claimed that a reader had sent a copy of the services' newspaper *Union Jack* which 'contains the origin of the half-witted story that the men in the C.M.F. [Central Mediterranean Forces]. are called "D-Day Dodgers"'. It then quoted from Lady Astor:

> On December 12 I received an airgraph signed 'D-Day Dodgers' and I thought they had nick-named their particular company with that name, so I wrote back, 'Dear D-Day Dodgers ...'

She was 'hurt and indignant' that it was thought she was critical of the men. Her letter was followed by another editorial comment: '*And from that little friendly letter, the damn-fool story has circulated.*'[20]

It is, therefore, evidently the case that, in an atmosphere of recrimination, a small misunderstanding by a controversial Tory MP, has led to a persistent belief that is essentially mythical. Even so, while consigning into the category of historical myth Nancy Astor's slur on the men of the Eighth Army, a more general point can be made about the nature of history. It is also possible to regard even a falsehood as a form of historical evidence. In the First World War, it was widely believed 'the angels of Mons' had protected British soldiers, a story that resonated long after the battle (as late at 1963 A. J. P. Taylor wrote 'supernatural intervention was observed, more or less reliably, on the British side'). It has since been shown that a work of fiction was misunderstood and taken as an actual occurrence. However, the fact that the public was susceptible to such an extent can be weighed as evidence that in the early months of the war so strong was the belief in the moral rightness of Britain's actions that heavenly forces might be expected to provide assistance.[21] To take other examples, few now believe that Marie Antoinette, when told the people had no bread, recommended them to eat cake, or that as a boy George Washington freely admitted the destruction of his father's cherry tree. Yet these myths do reveal, in the societies that accepted their truthfulness, widespread attitudes – the hardships of the French people were callously mocked by the ruling class and a founding father of the United States must always have shown absolute integrity. For many Scots Robert Bruce has been an inspirational figure, although not until five hundred years after his death in 1329 did Sir Walter Scott fabricate the celebrated tale of the persistent spider. During what has been termed the Scottish diaspora, such myths perhaps fortified the resolve of young Scots who were impelled to seek their livelihoods far beyond the country in which they were born.[22]

In considering to the 'D-Day Dodgers' myth, it seems necessary to take account of the context in which it spread. In the heightened atmosphere of war, Lady Astor could easily be identified as not only an out-of-touch representative of a discredited political class, but also an appeaser of fascism who went on to belittle the efforts of men fighting Hitler's forces. Because there was something plausible about the rumour that she had (in the House of Commons, according to most accounts) spoken of the Eighth Army in critical terms, it was widely believed, and has continued to haunt her reputation.

APPENDIX

Ballad of the D-Day Dodgers by Hamish Henderson

We're the D-Day Dodgers, out in Italy—
Always on the vino, always on the spree.
8th Army scroungers and their tanks
We live in Rome—among the Yanks.
We are the D-Day Dodgers, way out in Italy.

We landed at Salerno, a holiday with pay;
The Jerries brought the bands out to greet us on the way.
Showed us the sights and gave us tea.
We all sang songs—the beer was free,
To welcome D-Day Dodgers to sunny Italy.

Naples and Cassino were taken in our stride,
We didn't go to fight there—we went there for the ride.
Anzio and Sangro were just names,
We only went to look for dames—
The artful D-Day Dodgers, way out in Italy.

On the way to Florence we had a lovely time.
We ran a bus to Rimini right through the Gothic Line.
Soon to Bologna we will go
And after that we'll cross the Po.
We'll still be D-Day dodging, way out in Italy.

Once we heard a rumour that we were going home,
Back to dear old Blighty—never more to roam.
Then someone said: 'In France you'll fight!'
We said: 'No fear—we'll just sit tight!'
(The windy D-Day dodgers, way out in Italy).

We hope the Second Army will soon get home on leave;
After six month's service it's time for their reprieve.
But we can carry on out here
Another two or three more years—
Contented D-Day Dodgers to stay in Italy.

Dear Lady Astor, you think you know a lot,
Standing on a platform and talking tommy-rot.
You, England's sweetheart and its pride,
We think your mouth's too bleeding wide
That's from your D-Day Dodgers—in far off Italy.

Look around the mountains, in the mud and rain—
You'll find the scattered crosses—(there's some which have no name).
Heartbreak and toil and suffering gone,
The boys beneath them slumber on.
Those are the D-Day Dodgers who'll stay in Italy.

NOTES:

1 Denis Healey, *The Time of My Life* (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), pp. 62–63.

2 Stephen Sedley, 'In Judges' Lodgings', *London Review of Books,* 11 November 1999, p. 37.

3 The internet – by means of a search for 'D-Day Dodgers' – is the best method of sampling the many different versions. For Canadian soldiers in Italy, see Daniel G. Dancocks, *The D-Day Dodgers* (Toronto: M & S, 1991).

4 Henderson included the 'Ballad of the D-Day Dodgers' in *Ballads of World War II. Collected by Seamus Mor Maceanruig* (Privately printed, Glasgow, [1947]), pp. 9–10 (see too the appendix). The booklet appeared under the imprint of the non-existent 'Lili Marleen Club of Glasgow, to members only', mainly due to the unexpurgated nature of several of the songs it contained.

5 Among the lengthy newspaper obituaries are those by Raymond Ross, *The Scotsman*, 11 March 2002, Timothy Neat, *The Guardian*, 11 March 2002 and Angus Calder, *Independent*, 12 March 2002. The entry by Ken Hunt in *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* includes a good list of sources for Henderson's life.

6 Scottish Parliament – Official Report, 27 March 2002, col. 10692.

7 Richard Holmes, 'The D-Day Dodgers', http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/d_day_dodgers.shtml.

8 Tom Canning, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/32/a4418732.shtml; Martin Page, Kiss Me Goodnight Sergeant Major: *The Songs and Ballads of World War II* (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973), p. 160 The 'D-Day Dodgers' appears on pp. 161–2 of this book.

9 *The Guardian*, 11 March 2002.

10 Christopher Sykes, *Nancy: The Life of Lady Astor* (London: Collins, 1972), p. 127.

11 Hugh Cudlipp, *Publish and be Damned! The Astonishing Story of the Daily Mirror* (London: Andrew Dakers, 1953), pp. 241–42.

12 Patricia Cockburn, *The Years of the Week* (London: Macdonald, 1968), pp. 227–46; Communist Party of Great Britain, *Sidelights on the Cliveden Set: Hitler's Friends in Britain* (London: CPGB, 1938).

13 The Nazi *Sonderfahndungsliste* – the Special Search List, sometimes termed the Black Book – is reproduced in *Invasion 1940: The Nazi Invasion Plan for Britain*, with an introduction by John Erickson (London: St Ermin's Press: 2000). Astor appears on p. 161.

14 'Cato' was the pseudonym of three journalists, Michael Foot, Frank Owen and Peter Howard. Other books in the series included 'Celticus' [Aneurin Bevan], *Why not Trust the Tories?* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1944) and 'Diplomaticus' [Konni Zilliacus], *Can the Tories Win the Peace? And how they lost the last one* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1944).

15 Simon Haxey, *Tory M.P.* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1939), pp. 160–64. John Jacob Astor had begun to amass the family's wealth by encouraging his men 'in the work of debauching the Indians with liquor in order to get their furs more cheaply' (p. 160).

16 'Gracchus' [Tom Wintringham], *Tory M.P.* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1944), p. 15.

17 Quoted ibid.; Quintin Hogg, *The Left was Never Right* (London: Faber and Faber, 1945), p. 169.

18 *Daily Mirror*, 5 July 1945. See also Martin Pugh, 'The *Daily Mirror* and the revival of Labour 1935-1945', *20th Century British History*, vol. 9 (1998), pp. 420–38, and Michael Bromley, 'Was it the *Mirror* wat won it? The development of the tabloid press during the Second World War', in Nick Hayes and Jeff Hill (eds), *Millions like Us': British Culture in the Second World War* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), pp. 93–124.

19 Paul Addison, *The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975), p. 133.

20 'D-Day Dodgers' [letter], *Daily Mirror*, 27 February 1945.

21 A. J. P. Taylor, *The First World War: An Illustrated History* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963), p. 29; David Clarke, *The Angel of Mons: Phantom Soldiers and Ghostly Guardians* (Chichester: Wiley, 2004).

22 For an early discussion of what the historian might learn from historical myths, see Robert Birley, *The Undergrowth of History:* (London: Historical Association, 1955). More recent considerations of the issue include Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson (eds), *The Myths we live by* (London: Routledge, 1990), in which appears Marinell Ash, 'William Wallace and Robert the Bruce: The Life and Death of a National Myth'.

Industry, Pollution and the Apartheid State in South Africa

DR PHIA STEYN

In the era of decolonization that prevailed in much of the colonial world after World War Two, white South Africans strengthened existing segregationist legislation in an attempt to ensure the continuation of white rule over the country. White support for racist policies found its clearest expression in electoral support for Dr D.F. Malan's National Party (NP) who contested the 1948 elections on the basis of their apartheid policy. This policy, which was a radical intensification of existing segregation laws, aimed to protect the control of white South Africans over the whole country, while at the same time removing the limited rights of the coloured South Africans[1] and ensuring that black South Africans were given no political, economic and social rights on par with that of white people. The position of Indian South Africans, on the other hand, remained essentially the same as it had been since the arrival of Indian indentured labourers in the country 1860: they were still regarded as unwelcome outsiders, who were not given official recognition and citizenship and who were encouraged as far as possible to emigrate back to India.[2] The National Party won the 1948 elections mainly because their apartheid policy was perceived by the voters to be a better policy than that offered by the ruling United Party to address what white people believed to be "the native problem". They remained in power for 46 years – 46 long years in which the majority of the country's population were denied their basic rights in order to ensure the domination of the country by the white minority.

The history of apartheid South Africa is well covered in numerous publications that address a plethora of issues such as the abuses of the apartheid government,[3] the anti-apartheid struggle,[4] sanctions and boycotts against the country,[5] the role of the church both in supporting apartheid and the struggle,[6] and the fall of the apartheid state.[7] A generally neglected topic within apartheid historiography is the environmental impact of apartheid on both the human and natural environments.[8] Admittedly, South African environmental history is still a growing field and it is envisioned that the apartheid-era will become increasing popular with environmental historians once they move away from their current preoccupation with the history of nature conservation, forestry and soil conservation in particular.

This article aims to make a contribution to the field of apartheid environmental history and concerns itself with the way in which the apartheid state regulated resources to the advantage of industry, and failed to regulate pollution control measures which created an environment in which wide-scale industrial pollution became a normal and acceptable occurrence. Industry took its lead from a government that paid lip-service to the new environmental concerns that gripped the post-1945 world, while doing little to address real environmental concerns beyond their outdated conservation agenda. The extent to which this government strategy failed to adequately deal with the country's pressing environmental problems by 1990 was exemplified by the founding of the Industrial Environmental Forum (IEF) in 1990. This body originated from the cooperation between the country's major industries and was an attempt by industry to start regulating their own actions and practices to ensure a safer human and natural environment in South Africa.

The environment was not a concern for the apartheid government.[9] When the NP came to power in 1948 they inherited an environmental agenda that in many ways can be categorised as typical colonial, within the African context, and first-generation in the international context, in that it focused predominantly on the conservation of natural resources, most notably soil conservation, and of fauna and flora species. Little attention was paid to the environment in the NP's first two decades in power, with the consolidation of the apartheid state through the implementation of discriminatory legislation and suppression of the anti-apartheid movement, and industrialisation and economic development topping the list of governmental priorities. Ironically, the promotion of economic and industrial development forced the government to pay attention to environmental issues, in particular to water issues in the 1950s with the passing of the Water Act no 54 of 1956 and pollution in the 1960s with

the passing of the Atmospheric Pollution Act no 45 of 1965. While important pieces of legislation, their function were not environmental protection, but rather, in terms of the Water Act, the regulation of water use and competition between the various water use sectors, and controlling some of the most obvious air pollution caused by industrialisation in terms of the Atmospheric Pollution Act.

International opposition to the apartheid government and the country's increased isolation from the 1960s onwards further hampered the development of environmental concerns on a governmental level. Though the country did participate in the important 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (held in Stockholm), which placed the environment on international and national political agendas, the South African government was slow to adopt an environmental agenda that focused on the so-called second generation environmental issues such as industrial pollution. It also took its time to institutionalise environmental management within governmental structures. An independent Department of Environment Affairs, for example, was only created in 1984 but its minister and all its legislation were made subordinate to all other cabinet positions and legislations enforced by other departments. The government was slow to sign up to sustainable development (promoted by the 1987 Brundtland report, *Our Common Future*) preferring instead in 1988 to adopt the World Conservation Strategy of 1980. International isolation further ensured that the country was not invited to send an official delegation to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (also known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro) which in turn meant that sustainable development remained an elusive concept within both the governmental and non-governmental sectors of the South African environmental movement in the dying years of the apartheid era.

Within governmental circles there was the belief that there were more pressing matters than the environment to attend to, in particular the country's economic survival in the face of widespread sanctions and boycotts. The recession that set in in 1973 was intensified by these sanctions and boycotts and this in turn meant that the government had to pursue a policy of uncontrolled development in an attempt to survive economically. Uncontrolled economic development left little room for environmental considerations, and the consequences of this policy are ultimately to be found in the widespread industrial pollution problems that made headlines in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the obvious inadequacies of the government's environmental management, the apartheid state was slow to acknowledge the failures of its system and quick to lash out against those who criticised it. In the government's view, South Africa had a proud and long history of conservation (notwithstanding the few scandals such as the illegal smuggling of ivory by the army in the 1970s and 1980s) for which the government had to be congratulated. This sole emphasis on conservation, however, proved insufficient in dealing with the many environmental challenges prevalent in an industrialized society, as the next section will show.

Lack of governmental regard for proper environmental management during the apartheid era found expression in many environmental abuses, of which the lack of regulation of the industrial sector was but one. The promotion of economic development was an important component of NP policy from the outset. When they came to power in 1948 the country had finally entered the important industrialisation phase spurred on in no small part by industrial developments during and after the Second World War and the development of the Free State Gold fields from 1948 onwards. These industrial and mining activities soon transformed the South African economy from one based upon agriculture to one based primarily on the industrial and mining sectors. Industrialisation in SA did not only translate into massive governmental support for industries that saw the development of Sasol[10] and the expansion of Iscor[11] into their current Vanderbijlpark site in the 1950s, but importantly also required changes in governmental resources management.

The reorganisation and centralisation of water management became the first important step for the government to ensure the continued industrialisation in the country by ensuring that industrial areas secured a major portion of water resources. Consequently a major component of the 1956 Water Act (no 54) of 1956 was the nationalisation of some catchment areas, which were called subterranean government control areas, where the abstraction, use, supply or distribution of a specific water resource was to be controlled by government.[12] The recognised purpose of water was also changed and the government acknowledged three main purposes of South African fresh water supplies, namely for

agriculture, urban use and industry.[13] Stricter pollution control measures were introduced with the implementation of uniform effluent standards, and industrial effluent and other forms of discharged water (e.g seepage and storm-water run off, and water that arises as a by-product from industrial and mining activities) were made subject to pollution control measures. These measures were increased by later amendments to the Act, notably the Water Amendment Act, No 96 of 1984.[14] In terms of the Act and its amendments, all effluent had to be purified to prescribed standards laid down by the Minister of Water Affairs. These standards were arrived at after consultation with the South African Bureau of Standards. It was further stipulated that treated effluent be returned to the source of origin of the water at the point of abstraction.[15]

Despite good intentions, the Water Act of 1956, which remained on the law books until 1999, aimed at regulating the distribution and utilisation of water resources with a priority placed on making water resources available to any kind of industrial development practically anywhere in the country. If this meant alienating some of the NP supporters, so be it. The Oberholzer District in the Carletonville area (in the former Transvaal) is a good case in point. Despite the fact that there existed a historically close association between the NP government and the white farming community, which not only constituted a very important support base for the NP but also served as a remarkably good source for its politicians, the NP in the 1960s saw no problem in giving preference to the water needs of the mining and industrial sectors when their interests came in direct competition with those of the white farming community. Ample ground water resources in the Oberholzer district facilitated the development of commercial agriculture in this area prior to the twentieth century. The establishment of the Oberholzer Irrigation Council in 1926 structured irrigation farming in this area and made the ground water from the Wonderfontein Eye and the Eye of Wonderfontein available to a large network of irrigation farmers through a system of lined canals. The establishment of the gold industry in this area in 1937 (along the West-Wits Line) initially had a limited impact on irrigation farming.

However, during the 1950s the goldmines started with a process in which they deliberately pumped millions of litres of water per day out of the aquifers to prevent the flooding of mineshafts and tunnels. This in turn lowered the water-table which impacted negatively on irrigated agriculture and created sinkholes. Despite wide-spread resistance from the farming community in the area, an interdepartmental government commission concluded in 1960 that the dewatering of ground water compartments should be made compulsory since the gold mining industry was a national priority. The abstraction of ground water resources by the mines resulted not only in the lowering of the water-table, but more importantly resulted in surface subsidence and in the drying out of bore holes. This forced the majority of irrigation farmers to sell their land, most of which was bought up by the gold mines. The gold mines were also accused of polluting the ground water, but irrigation farmers were never able to prove this.[16]

The Water Act was followed in the 1960s by the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (no 45 of 1965) in which air polluters had to prove that they had adopted the best practical means to control their pollution. In terms of the act, the "best practical means" were seen as measures that were technically feasible and economically viable. The government retained the "best practical means" criterion into the 1990s, ignoring the shift towards the "polluter pays" concept that had been in force in most industrialised countries since the 1970s.[17] This law along with a few other pieces of legislation such as the Forest Act (no 72 of 1968) and the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act (no 88 of 1967) was South Africa's response, in the absence of a better word, to the environmental crisis and corresponding environmental revolution of the 1960s.

In the absence of television to bring the environmental crisis into people's homes, the environmental revolution passed by largely unnoticed by the general public and in turn ensured that there was very limited pressure on the government to act on what already constituted pressing environmental problems. As with so many other pressing issues in SA society throughout the apartheid era, the NP was not willing to acknowledge that environmental problems existed in the country on a wide scale and reacted with typical heavy-handedness whenever they were confronted with scientific evidence that pointed in their view, in the wrong direction. Ironically, it was the Cleaner Air, Rivers and Environment (CARE) campaign launched by *The Star* on 10 March 1971 that changed the nature

of environmental reporting in South Africa and played an important role in educating the general public in South Africa on environmental problems. Headed by James Clarke, CARE set out to expose pollution, indifference towards the country's conservation needs, poor town planning and all abuses of the South African environment.[18]

CARE was instrumental in exposing the real state of the South African environment. Of particular concern to the campaign were the high pollution levels in the country, and they informed their readers that the air in Johannesburg and Pretoria in 1971 was so polluted that to inhale it equalled smoking 15 cigarettes a day. Many state and parastatal industries such as Iscor and Escom[19] were identified as major air polluters in the country, while particular attention was paid to the South African Railways (SAR) whose 2,473 steam locomotives caused serious air pollution throughout the country. With the SAR being the only organisation allowed to cause smoke in smokeless zones, no pollution expert or state department was willing to speak out against the railways industry.[20]

The reason why the country had so many pollution-related problems by the early 1970s was not because of a lack of environmental legislation. Indeed, by 1972 South Africa already had an impressive list of acts that directly or indirectly related to the environment. The existing and new acts covered the whole environmental spectrum ranging from soil protection, nature and built-environment conservation, to the combating of atmospheric, marine, radiation, solid waste, noise, litter, and water pollution.[21] However, the main problem with environmental laws was the fact that the government failed in its attempt to enforce these laws. Soil conservation legislation, for example, was introduced for the first time in 1941; despite educational campaigns by the government and the National Veld Trust among the farming community, soil erosion in South Africa gradually increased.[22] In 1952 the average annual silt run-off in the country's rivers were estimated to be 400 million tons. By 1972 silt sampling in the Orange River, above the Hendrik Verwoerd Dam (now the Gariep Dam), indicated that the surrounding area alone was losing that amount of top soil annually. This in practice meant that the equivalent of 15 cm of the top layer of soil on 137,000 hectares was lost annually.[23]

Enforcing environmental control measures was also difficult due to the government's direct involvement in the South African economy. Through Escom, Iscor and the South African Railways, the government was one of the major polluters in the country and its industries contributed to the rapid depletion of natural resources.[24] Within South African environmental legislation, the near "untouchable" status of the state, and thus also state-owned industries, in turn meant that the state was free to act as it wished where the environment was concerned. Air pollution control measures, for example, did not fully apply to the state. In terms of legislation the state was exempt from implementing measures to combat the control of smoke, and had little responsibility other than to inform the public if complaints were lodged against state-owned industries. In short, there was no mechanism in place that could ensure that the state prescribed to the standards laid down by law.[25]

According to Rabie and Erasmus one of the fundamental problems of South African environmental law is that "the underlying basis of the state's power to control pollution and conserve natural resources is that these powers be used in public interest. There is, however, no legal sanction in terms of which the state can be called to account in this respect".[26] Public objections to administrative decisions by the government, for example if the state decided to build a highway in an ecologically sensitive area, were limited in terms of the administrative laws of South Africa. An applicant seeking a review of the administrative decision, was not allowed access to the court if the person did not establish *locus standi* (i.e. a direct personal interest in the outcome of the decision). Even if *locus standi* was established, the courts showed themselves unwilling to get involved in such questions, and almost never ruled against a project on the grounds that it was environmentally unsound.[27]

As mentioned earlier, the South African government's commitment to its domestic policy of apartheid and its corresponding isolation in the international community from the 1960s, also resulted in the implementation of economic and technological sanctions. Sanctions dated back to the 1962 United Nations General Assembly calls for economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa, but remained largely ineffective until the 1973 Oil Crisis created an economic recession which lingers on into the present. The recession was intensified by industrial actions, fall in commodity prices on

the world market and the intensification of economic sanctions, especially after the Soweto Uprisings of 1976. Combined, these factors had a detrimental impact on the country's economy and forced the government to pursue an economic policy that excluded any consideration for the environment and limitations thereof.[28]

Uncontrolled economic development poses many dangers to both the human and natural environments such as the overexploitation of resources, slack enforcement of environmental laws and wide-spread pollution. In South Africa, numerous environmental problems associated with the country's unchecked economic development have been recorded. These include the siting of industries close to communities (e.g. black townships next to industries), governmental approval to mine in ecological sensitive areas (e.g. St Lucia), lack of adequate governmental action when wide-spread pollution is caused by industries (e.g. Sappi's Ngodwana Paper Mill spill and Thor Chemicals), the reluctance of the government to ban pesticides and insecticides that are harmful to both humans and the environment (e.g. the Tala Valley case), dodgy governmental positions on toxic and hazardous waste disposal, and the failure of the government to sponsor research into alternative and safe energy sources for the country. Sappi's Ngodwana Paper Mill spill and the mercury poisoning by Thor Chemicals serve as good examples of the extent to which the government accommodated industry and neglected to protect the SA environment.

Sappi's Ngodwana Paper Mill spill is probably the best example of industrial environmental neglect and the weak reaction of the government to industrial pollution, and became one of the most publicised cases of pollution in the country. A large spill of soap skimming, which contained smaller amounts of toxic sulphates, occurred at the Ngodwana mill in September 1989. This spill devastated the ecosystems of the Elands and Crocodile Rivers, and killed more than 22 fish species and other forms of animal life in a stretch of river downstream from the mill. The Lowveld Environment Action Foundation, formed by landowners in the area in response to the spill, and the Wildlife Society, took up the issue, and demanded an independent inquiry into the causes of the accident. Sappi was fined only R600 for the spill and the resulting damage.[29]

The Ngodwana spill was part of a general increase in water pollution due to industrial discharges that occurred from 1988 onwards. Other spills included the dumping of toxins in the Vaal River by the SASOL I plant at Sasolburg in 1988, the leaking of poisonous chemicals into the Selati River (which runs through the Kruger National Park) by a phosphate company in 1988, the regular polluting of the Olifants and Crocodile Rivers by toxic heavy metals, phosphate and nitrogen, and the caustic soda spill of the Atomic Energy Corporation into the Moganwe Spruit close to the Hartbeespoort Dam in 1991. In their report on the situation of waste management and pollution control in South Africa, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research found that 59.2 per cent of all the hazardous waste in the country was discharged into water. Major stumbling blocks in the proper treatment of effluent before discharging it, were identified as a lack of technology and lack of proper enforcement of legislation.[31]

A campaign against toxic waste disposal was launched in April 1990 when it became known that workers at a mercury recycling plant in Cato Ridge had suffered chronic mercury poisoning. The company involved, the British-owned Thor Chemicals (Pty.) Ltd which came into existence in 1963, was initially involved only in the manufacturing of mercury (used in the paint, textile and chemical industries) and non-mercurial compounds. In 1976 the company expanded its operations to include the recovery of mercury from spent catalyst. In the 1980s Thor Chemicals extended their operations and obtained contracts to recycle mercury for seven companies from the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom, Italy, Brazil and the Middle East.[32] The first foreign mercury shipments arrived at its site in Cato Ridge in 1986.[33]

Problems at the Cato Ridge site were first discovered by government inspectors in 1988 and late in 1989 it became known that large quantities of mercury were leaking from the plant into the Umgeni River, which flows into the Inanda Dam, Durban's main water source. In February 1990 water and soil samples were taken from the surrounding area, and the tests conducted showed high levels of mercury poisoning, with one sample being over 100 times the recommended limit. Furthermore the

mercury had an organic content of over 30%. In the USA recycling plants refuse to handle mercury with an organic content of over 3%, while the processing of wastes with an organic content of over 4% is illegal in terms of the regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency.[34]

The event that triggered the campaign against Thor Chemicals was a report that two workers had "gone mad", because they were saying and doing strange things and were shaking a lot (typical symptoms of mercury poisoning). The issue was taken up locally by Earthlife Africa, the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU), the residents of Fredville (the affected area) and farmers from the Tala Valley, while Greenpeace mobilised support against Thor Chemicals in the USA. In April 1990 the company and its activities were brought to the attention of a wider audience when demonstrations were held at its site in Cato Ridge and in the USA at American Cyanamid plants. These demonstrations were important because it was the first time that NGOs and trade unions in the country had united in an environmental campaign, and it was the first time that South African environmental interest groups combined forces with NGOs and trade unions in another country (USA) to fight for a common goal.[35]

Amidst the public outcry that followed the campaign, the Department of Water Affairs ordered Thor Chemicals in April 1990 to suspend its operations for four weeks because of heavy rains. The company continued with its activities after the temporary suspension was lifted and even applied for the expansion of its operations, which application was granted by the government in February 1991. In March 1994, after four years of campaigns directed against their activities, Thor Chemicals announced that it would cease to import toxic waste and applied for a permit to incinerate 2,500 tons of stockpiled waste without recovering mercury. Their application was challenged by the Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF) and the CWIU, which led directly to the appointment of a commission of inquiry by the government in 1995. The commission dismissed the demands of the EJNF and the CWIU that the wastes be returned to their senders, and recommended that the company be allowed to incinerate its mercury stockpile.[36]

By 1994 South Africa had a long history of industry-related environmental problems with industrial initiatives based mainly on an economic ethic that excluded any considerations for the natural and human environments in which they operated. Even though the government had gradually reduced their direct participation in the economy through the partial privatization of some state industries in the late 1980s, industries in the main knew that they could count on the full support of the government when faced with angry environmental and local protesters against specific pollution problems. This economic ethic is one of the enduring legacies of the apartheid era in the so-called New South Africa. But, while the apartheid government pursued an economic policy of uncontrolled economic development in the name of economic survival, the African National Congress government has done so since 1994 in the name of poverty reduction.[37] In this process industries have continued with their business as usual, while employing large numbers of lawyers from the country's top law firms to oppose any accusations of environmental neglect. On the whole, industrialisation has brought many advantages to the South African economy, but at the cost of polluting the natural and human environments in their immediate vicinities. Until such time as this state of affairs is rectified, the people living next to these industrial areas will continue to be denied their basic right "to an environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing" as guaranteed in the South African Bill of Rights.[38]

NOTES:

1 In South Africa the term coloured people refer to people who are the offspring of mixed marriages and relationships. The coloured community constitutes a separate group in South African politics and are historically very close to the Afrikaner community in language, culture, religion and customs. During the apartheid era they were considered too black for the white people, and consequently the National Party attempted to remove those concessions that gave coloured people a higher status than black people. This included their removal from the Common Voters' Roll in 1956.

2. Only in 1960 did the South African government finally acknowledge that the Indian community in South Africa was settled there permanently and were they afforded citizenship.

3 See for example A. Krog, *Country of my skull: guilt, sorrow, and the limits of forgiveness in the new South Africa* (New York, 2000); D. O'Meara, *Forty lost years: the apartheid state and the politics of the National Party, 1948-1994* (Randburg, 1996); M. Coleman (ed.), *A crime against humanity: analysing the repression of the Apartheid State* (Johannesburg, c1998).

4 See for example P. Walshe, *The rise of African nationalism in South Africa: the African National Congress, 1912-1952* (London, 1970); F. Meli, *A history of the ANC: South Africa belongs to us* (London, 1989); T. Lodge and B. Nasson, *All, here, and now: black politics in South Africa in the 1980s* (New York, 1991).

5 See for example M. Lipton, *Capitalism and apartheid: South Africa, 1910-84* (Aldershot, 1985); J. Hanlon and R. Omond (eds), *The sanctions handbook* (Harmondsworth, 1987); P.I. Levy, "Sanctions on South Africa: what did they do?", *The American Economic Review, 89, 2*, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1999), pp. 415-420; S.J. Evenett, "The impact of economic sanctions on South African exports", *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* 49, 5 (Dec 2002), pp. 557-573.

6 See for example P. Randall (ed.), *Apartheid and the Church: report* (Publication of the Church Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society, Johannesburg, 1972); R. Elphick and R. Davenport (eds), *Christianity in South Africa: a political, social and cultural history* (Oxford, 1997); R. Tingle, *Revolution or reconciliation? The struggle in the church in South Africa* (London, 1992).

7 See for example R. Harvey, *The fall of apartheid: the inside story from Smuts to Mbeki* (Basingstoke, 2001); A. Guelke, *Rethinking the rise and fall of apartheid: South Africa and world politics* (Basingstoke, 2005); R.M. Price, *The apartheid state in crisis: political transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990* (New York, 1991).

8 Works with a stong historical basis include D.A. McDonald (ed.), *Environmental justice in South Africa* (Cape Town, 2002); L. Bethlehem and M. Goldblatt (eds), *The bottom line: industry and the environment in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1997); J. Cock and P. McKenzie (eds), *From defence to development: redirecting military resources in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1998). Historical works include F. Khan, "Soil wars: the role of the African National Soil Conservation Association in South Africa, 1953-1959", *Environmental History*, 2,4 (1997), pp. 439-459; P. Steyn and A. Wessels, "The emergence of new environmentalism in South Africa, 1972-1992", *South African Historical Journal*, 42 (May 2000), pp. 210-231; P. Steyn, "Popular environmental struggles in South Africa, 1972-1992", *Historia*, 47, 1 (May 2002), pp. 125-158.

9 For a more comprehensive overview of governmental environmental management between 1972 and 1992, see P. Steyn, "Environmental management in South Africa: twenty years of governmental response to the global challenge, 1972-1992", *Historia*, 46, 1 (May 2001), pp. 25-53.

10 Sasol was set up in 1950 to develop oil-from-coal technology in order to make the country less dependent on oil imports. South Africa has no known oil deposits and limited gas deposits located off-shore along the south-eastern coastline (close to Mussel Bay).

11 The state-owned iron and steel company that was set up in 1927 during the country's short first phase of industrialization.

12 Water Act, No 54 of 1956, Section 28.

13 M. Uys, *A structural analysis of the water allocation mechanism of the Water Act 54 of 1956 in the light of requirements of competing water use sectors* 1 (Pretoria, Water Research Council Report No 406/1/96, 1996), pp. 286-287.

14 W. van der Merwe and D.C. Grobler, "Water quality management in the RSA: preparing for the future", *Water SA*, 16, 1 (Jan 1990), p. 49; W. Pulles, "Water pollution: its management and control in the South African gold mining industry", *Journal of the Mine Ventilation Society of South Africa*, 45, 2 (Feb 1992), p. 27.

15 W. van der Merwe and D.C. Grobler, "Development of water pollution control in South Africa", *The Civil Engineer in South Africa*, 31, 10 (Oct 1989), p. 357.

16 E. van Eeden, "Waterkwessies, met spesifieke verwysing na die uitwerking van waterontrekking op die landboubedryf in die Oberholzerdistrik (Carltonville-Gebied), 1959-1972", *New Contree*, 39 (Aug 1996), pp. 78-91.

17 See M.A. Rabie, *South African environmental legislation* (Pretoria, 1976), pp. 93-108 for air pollution control in South Africa prior to 1976.

18 *The Star*, 10.3.1971, p.1; J. Clarke, *Our fragile land: South Africa's environmental crisis* (Johannesburg, 1974), pp. 11-16; Interview: James Clarke, Johannesburg, 5.3.1998.

19 The state-owned electricity company that is the sole provider of electricity in South Africa. Escom was created in 1923, and produced between 80 and 90 per cent of the country's electricity from coal during the apartheid era.

20 *The Star*, 10-31.3.1971. *Ibid.*

21 See *Report of the Planning Committee of the President's Council on priorities between conservation and development* (PC 5/1984, Cape Town, 1984), pp. 16-18 for a list of environmental laws and the departments responsible for their enforcement.

22 R.F. Fuggle, "An overview of lessons that can be learned from efforts to protect the South African environment" in *National Veld Trust jubilee conference, Pretoria, 2 to 4 November 1993* (Pretoria, 1993), pp. 49-50.

23 Rabie, *South African environmental legislation*, p. 16.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

25 F.R. Fuggle and M.A. Rabie, "Air pollution" in R.F Fuggle and M.A. Rabie (eds). *Environmental concerns in South Africa: technical and legal perspectives* (Johannesburg, 1983), pp. 296-298.

26 M.A. Rabie and M.G. Erasmus, "Environmental law" in R.F Fuggle and M.A. Rabie (eds). *Environmental concerns in South Africa: technical and legal perspectives* (Johannesburg, 1983), pp. 48-49.

27 *Ibid.*, pp. 47-49.

28 M.S. Steyn, "Environmentalism in South Africa, 1972-1992: an historical perspective" (MA thesis, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa, 1998), pp. 109-111.

29 *The Weekly Mail*, 29.9.1989-5.10.1989, p. 5; E. Koch, D. Cooper and H. Coetzee. *Water, waste and wildlife: the politics of ecology in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1990), p. 10.

30 *The Weekly Mail*, 29.9.1989-5.10.1989, p. 5; "Pollution critical in SA as perennial rivers run dry", *Chamber of Mines Journal*, 33, 4 (April 1991), pp. 5, 11; *Business Day*, 21.11.1991, p. 5; M. van Eeden, "Besoedelde rivier wek kommer", *Prisma*, 6, 3 (April 1991), p. 36; H. Coetzee and D. Cooper, "Wasting water: squandering a precious resource" in J. Cock and E. Koch (eds), *Going green: people, politics and the environment in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1991), pp. 134-136.

31 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, *The situation of waste management and pollution control in South Africa: executive summary* (Pretoria, 1991), pp. 3, 6-9, 12; Environmental Monitoring Group, *Clean production: a preliminary assessment of the need and potential for the introduction of clean technology in some industrial sectors in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1993), pp. 16-18, 25-26.

32 Borden Chemical and Plastics (USA), Calgon Carbon Corporation (USA), American Cynamid (USA), Margate (UK), Ausimont (Italy), Solvay do Brasil (Brazil), and Red Sea and Gulf (Middle East).

33 Commission of Inquiry into Thor Chemicals, *Report of the first phase* (Cape Town, 1997), pp. 3-5.

34 Earthlife Africa, "Thor Chemicals: chronology of the campaign against Thor Chemicals", <http://www.earthlife.org.za/campaigns/toxic/thor.htm>, 1997; M. Colvin, "Occupational hazards", *Indicator South Africa*, 9, 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 82-83; G. Coleman, "The campaign against Thor Chemicals: trade unions and the environment", *Critical Health*, 33 (Nov 1990), pp. 69-70; Koch, Cooper and Coetzee. *Water, waste and wildlife*, p. 46.

35 R. Crompton and A. Erwin, "Reds and greens: labour and the environment" in Cock and Koch (eds), *Going green*, pp. 82-83; Coleman, "The campaign against Thor Chemicals", pp. 71-74.

36 Crompton and Erwin, "Reds and greens", p. 83; Commission of Inquiry into Thor Chemicals, pp. 9-26; Earthlife Africa, "Thor Chemicals..."; *Vrye Weekblad*, 14.2.1992, p. 4; *Vrye Weekblad*, 3.4.1992, p. 16; *The Daily News*, 21.2.1992, p. 3; *Beeld*, 15.6.1994, p. 2.

37 For more details on the continuing impact of apartheid's environmental problems beyond 1994, see P. Steyn, "The lingering environmental legacy of repressive governance: the environmental legacy of the apartheid era for the New South Africa" in J. Oosthoek and B.K. Gills (eds), *The globalization of environmental Crisis* (London, 2008), pp. 109-120.

38 *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, 1996, Section 24 (a) and (b).

The Comparative Accountancy of Death in War

DR MIKE HAYNES

Do deaths in war matter? Isn't it enough to say that in this war a lot were killed and in that one a lot more? As Stalin is supposed to have said, a single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic. He was wrong. A million deaths is a million lives lost and a million tragedies for those left behind. But to judge from the way that historians carelessly approach the issue of how many died you might think that they agreed with Stalin, or even the US general, Tommy Franks, who infamously said 'we don't do body counts'. Actually historians do give body counts but they do so capriciously and with little regard for accuracy and the problems it poses.

Take a casual example – John Lewis Gaddis's *The Cold War*, published to acclaim in 2005. Here we learn that on September 1 1983 the Soviet air force shot down a South Korean airliner that had strayed into Soviet airspace with the loss of 209 *civilians,* 63 of them Americans. The figures are very precise, even the identification that they were civilians and 63 were Americans. But what of the big numbers? When it comes to the discussion of the Vietnam War there are none. Nor are there any for the illegal bombing of Cambodia. Nor are there any for the no less controversial Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, though most accounts will give you a sense that we need to measure the combined dead of these wars in millions. But Gaddis is not completely hostile to big numbers in this book. Discussing the Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956 he tells us 'some 1500 Soviet soldiers and 20,000 Hungarians' were killed. [1] This looks better but even the general reader will notice that the figures are approximate compared to those of the airliner. But there is worse. They are both completely wrong. There are more or less official figures easily available in the standard historical account. The authors suggest that these are an undercount but nothing like the extent to which Gaddis's data might suggest. The official number of Soviet dead was 669 killed, 1540 wounded and 51 missing. The official number of Hungarians counted were 2,502 dead and 19,226 wounded.[2] Gaddis has therefore unwittingly quoted data which doubles the number of Soviet dead and multiplies the Hungarian 7-8 times. Or perhaps he has made the mistake of confusing dead and wounded with dead – a surprisingly common error in accounts of battles and wars.

When it comes to the Korean War, on the other hand, things look better, 'According to official statistics 36,568 Americans died in combat. No such specificity is possible in calculating other losses, but it is likely that some 600,000 Chinese troops and well over 2 million Koreans, civilians and military personnel, perished during three years of fighting'. This seems much more helpful. But notice the uneven precision. Each American death is seemingly known, each of them a tragedy, a life lost in service to a grateful nation, recorded, memorialised. The margin for error *appears* to be nil. 'No such specificity is possible in calculating other losses' – but why? Did no one know their names? Has no one memorialised them? Or have we simply not bothered to look at 'their' losses with the same care we treat 'our losses' for it may well be that someone has actually counted them with some accuracy. Then what do the numbers mean? Take 'some 600,000' - if 'some' means only a 5% margin of error then this alone is equivalent to 80% of the US dead. Then what does 'well over 2 million Koreans' mean? Gaddis clearly wants to suggest that this rounded figure is a significant undercount but by how much? 100,000 would be 2.7 times the US losses, 200,000 5.5 times and so on. And notice also that the figures for the US are of those who 'died in combat' while those for the Chinese and Koreans are 'perished during three years of fighting'. And where did Gaddis get his data? In this case he tells us 'the figures come from Britannica Online'.[3] This is surely puzzling. The different editions of the Encyclopaedia Britannica are undoubtedly the best general source for war dead figures, but Gaddis is one of the leading historians of the Cold War and his books are meticulously researched. When it comes to the dead, however, he is content to rely on a secondary source in a way we might suspect he would not if he were sourcing a controversial quotation.

These problems – not giving numbers, giving the wrong numbers, failing to explain the different levels of precision in the numbers, failing to clarify differences in meaning and finally taking the numbers at second or third hand are all characteristic of the way that historians deal with the issue of the dead in war. We can see this in another casual example, Donald Featherstone's much older book on *Colonial Small Wars 1837-1901*. This is not major work but it retains its value as a guide to British colonial actions. 'At 11.30am the battle was over. The Dervish army was wiped out. It had lost 11,000 killed, 16,000 wounded and over 4,000 prisoners from a total of about 40,000 men. The Anglo-Egyptian army, numbering perhaps 22,000 men, lost 48 killed and 382 wounded'.[4] Thus the notorious Battle of Omdurman in 1898. The parallels with Gaddis's numbers should be clear. Here is the same problem with precision - apparently exact with the respect to the Anglo-Egyptians, near exact with respect to time and vague with respect to the Dervish army where the implied margins for error are many times the numbers killed on 'Anglo-Egyptian side'. But with a kill ratio of the order of 1:200 we might wonder whether the odd thousand here or there matters that much?

What kind of person worries about this? Having co-authored a book on the history of death in twentieth century Russia some of my friends think a strange one.[5] 'I don't understand how you do it,' said a fellow historian of Russia. 'I couldn't finish the death book, it was just too depressing.' Fortunately not everyone thinks this way. Contrary to the post-modernists, getting the facts right is a professional duty. But it is more, it is a way to reclaim life and affirm its importance through bringing the salutary discipline of accuracy to the discussion of some of the most controversial episodes in past and present history.

But are there no easily available compendia to which we can refer for reliable data? Some brave souls have attempted to compile these. The pioneer was Lewis Fry Richardson (1881-1953), a Quaker meteorologist whose stature has grown since his death. Richardson wanted to end war but to do this he had to understand it and being a scientist he needed data to test theories. This led him to collect data about violent deaths, broadly for the period 1820-1950, which were published posthumously in *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*. To do this he had to deal with problems still with us today. How do we define a war, for example? 'One can find cases of homicide which one large group of people condemned as murder, while another group condoned or praised as legitimate war. Such things went on in Ireland in 1921 and are going on now in Palestine'. Once defined how do we then deal with the accuracy issue? Richardson, the scientist, opted to avoid the issue of detailed errors by counting orders of magnitude on a log scale. [6] But Richardson was only as good, as are his successors, as the sources on which they draw. Here knowledgeable amateurs have perhaps a more honourable record than historians in drawing together data, but inevitably they lack the time and sometimes the expertise to go back to the most authoritative sources which are often hidden away and obscure. [7]

So what are the principles that should guide this 'comparative accountancy' of human losses in war? There are two ways in which we can calculate war deaths. The first is to do the 'body count', adding up all the different war and war related deaths. The second is to use population estimates from before and after the war and work out how many people are missing because of the 'abnormal mortality' of war. If we were able to do the body count and population estimates correctly we should arrive at similar figures. In practice we can rarely do this and statistical error means that the two approaches never tally exactly. But they remain a check on each other. To see how they work let us begin with the body count approach.

Three categories of people die in wars (1) uniformed soldiers; (2) ancillaries - which can run from 'private mercenaries' to guerrilla fighters, to civilians involved in supplies, to camp followers and so on; (3) civilians not directly engaged in the war effort but who die as 'collateral damage'. Counting each category poses different problems. Uniformed soldiers are the easiest bit, at least in wars between states with good bureaucratic traditions. Note the pretence of great accuracy that is possible in the figures of the American Civil War losses, 2.75 million 'wore the blue and gray ... 633,026 died and 471,427 were wounded ... The population of the nation was 31.5 million, which means our causalities were 3.5% of the population'.[8] Problems arise if the disruption of war causes a collapse in record keeping. This is especially likely if the war is fought on the territory of one of the states involved. So for example the precision of our data for British and German war deaths in

France in 1914-1918 is good (but there is always a margin for error). For the 1939-1945 war on the other hand the British military deaths have a smaller margin for error than the German military deaths.

If either or both of the states lacks a strong bureaucratic tradition (or collapses) the recording will be weak. It may even be left to the winning side which is unlikely to strive for the same precision about other people's losses compared to its own. This explains the uneven data for Omdurman and other colonial encounters. In fact at Omdurman the British did undertake a battlefield body count which is where the figure of 11,000 comes from. But contemporaries also suggested that 25% of the wounded might subsequently have died giving a figure of 16,000 Dervish dead. They, and we, cannot know precisely but for the Imperial side its dead will usually include those who died of wounds later (at least within a certain time of battle).

A battlefield count, moreover, can only ever be rough. Who counts accurately amidst the stench of rotting corpses? And as firepower has increased so has the level of battlefield damage to humans as well as things. All battlefields are hell but the hell has grown as the power of the sword and arrow gave way to ever more destructive bullets, shells, grenades and so on. By 1860 a chaplain to the British forces in the Third Opium War in China could report the impact of their bombardment on Chinese forces, 'it was indeed an awful sight, limbs blown away, bodies literally burst asunder, one black and livid mess of blood and wounds'.[9] By the time of the First World War the destructive power of bullets and especially shells was such that huge numbers of dead remained unidentified and unidentifiable as bodies were blown to pieces. In this war 60% of British causalities were from shells and grenades. 'How many died?' asked Siegfried Sassoon, in his poem *The Effect*, 'As many as you wish,/ Don't count 'em; they're too many./ Who'll buy my nice fresh corpses, two a penny'. [10] But they were counted. Of the 1.1 million Commonwealth dead in this war 53% had identified burials, 17% unidentified burials and 30% were simply memorialised as, in Kipling's phrase, 'known unto God.[11]

In military history there has been some attempt to measure the lethality of munitions which has grown enormously in the last century and a half. This created the huge asymmetry in warfare which made colonial forces all but undefeatable in open battle. (Custer might not have had to make his last stand if he had taken the Gatling guns he was offered). More recently this asymmetry has been evident in America's conflicts with less advanced states. 'Mechanical war' is argued now to trump 'manpower' wars with large loss of life being a thing of the past as a 'revolution in military affairs' takes place. But this effect is more evident on the side of the big power. Those on the receiving end might see things differently. What is a smart or dumb weapon is controversial as is the balance between them. And smart weapons are only as smart as the dumb human beings who use them. Moreover sooner or later troops have to be deployed on the ground where it is possible to counter some of the asymmetry. And this is to say nothing of what would happen if forces were more equally matched with modern weaponry. [12]

What of those we have called ancillaries? Fighting has always involved more than uniformed troops. In recent years concern has grown that the US is outsourcing war to private contractors but there has always been an element of this even in the most formal of conflicts. Paid private fighters are less uncommon than we imagine and civilian support for armies often extends to the front line. Before the nineteenth century a typical army has been described as 'a rag tag agglomeration of fighting men, speculators, provisioners, wives, prostitutes, a kind of vagabond social system of its own'. [13] We know little of the size of camp followers but some have suggested on occasion they outnumbered fighting troops. Men and women lived alongside the fighting soldiers (sometimes stepping into the breech) fetching, carrying, foraging, cooking, mending, comforting and nursing, providing sex and so on. Even with the later growth of uniformed civilian elements such as nurses, these invisible civilian roles close to the front did not all disappear but just because they are invisible so too are the deaths of 'camp followers' who were caught up when the battle overtook them.

Soldiers, as Hackett once put it, sign a contract of 'unlimited liability' when they join. Civilians have no such contract but they have always died both directly through destruction and indirectly through war's negative health effects. [14] Although we associate this with the total nature of modern

war, which some date back to the Napoleonic Wars, civilians have always died in large numbers whatever the Geneva conventions might say.[15] The German bombing of Britain in World War II killed 60,000; Britain's bombing of Germany an estimated 600,000. Later 150,000-220,000 are estimated to have died in the Nagasaki and Hiroshima atomic bombs alone. The numbers are vague because no-one was sure of the exact numbers in the cities and the destruction was so complete. Beyond this, modern wars, as in the Nazi case, have sometimes assumed a genocidal character (though this term is now widely abused.)[16] But defeating your enemy by disrupting his supplies, destroying his civilian base and inflicting starvation, famine and disease on local populations has always been a part of warfare as has plundering, pillaging and 'living off the land' i.e. the local population. Historians can too easily contrast the 'gentlemanly limited war' of the past to the barbarism of total war and fail to count the earlier civilian victims. Seen in this light, for example, what appears to Europeans as a set of 'small colonial wars' assume a very different character if looked at from the perspective of the conquered populations.

In these wars the aim was often to inflict 'total war' on your opponent. Hannah Arendt argued that it was here that we find the roots of later Nazi genocide, an argument recently echoed by Sven Lindqvist and Marc Ferro.[17] Mass killings and atrocities by European soldiers and their local levies occurred systematically as an essential part of imperial conquest. The brutality of King Leopold's Congo or Germany's extermination of the Herero people in South-West Africa are well known. Less so (or more excused) are cases closer to home. 'The hypocritical British heart beats for all except those their own empire drowns in blood', Lindqvist caustically wrote. [18] For Lindqvist, acquiring and defending European colonial rule involved a double invisibility. People at home were shielded from a view of the full brutality involved while in the colonies themselves 'the art of killing from a distance became a European speciality very early on'. At Omdurman, for example Sudanese fighters could not get nearer than 300 yards to the British lines. In this unequal fight, Churchill, would write of the white soldiers, 'nobody expected to be killed'. War became 'a sporting element in a splendid game'.[19] But it was no less easy to shell and burn villages from afar.

'War is war and savage war is the worst of the lot' said one British officer in Africa. The idea 'of fighting with an uncivilised race with the same feelings of humanity that dictate our wars with civilised races' was a fallacy said an early British 'embedded journalist in Zululand in 1879. Michael Lieven has traced how systematic massacre of prisoners occurred alongside demonstrative battlefield lynching. But he has also shown how extensive were the subsequent reprisals inflicted on the local population – the seizure of livestock, crop destructions and burning out countless villages. Having already lost a significant part of the able bodied population to battle and massacre, the Zulu population was then subject to an economic calamity. 'I have lost my cattle. I have no mealies, I and my people are starving,' said one Zulu in the aftermath. [20]

Sadly such imperial actions were commonplace as Sir Garnet Wolseley made clear. 'In planning a war against an uncivilised nation who has, perhaps, no capital, your first object should be the capture of whatever they prize most, and the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a conclusion. When the enemy could not be touched in his patriotism, or his honour he was touched through his pocket by carrying off his flocks and destroying his crops.' [21] These tactics have given rise to sharp controversy recently in India on the 150th anniversary of the Indian Mutiny which is now often seen as a war of independence. There is little doubt that several hundred thousand died directly and indirectly as a result of reprisals but Amaresh Mishra has recently suggested a figure of 10 million additional deaths for 1857-1867. While his critics condemn this as a 'back of the envelop' calculation, the fact that it is necessary at all is a reflection of the invisibility of the victims.[22]

In the twentieth century came civilian attacks from the air. The young Arthur Harris wrote of Iraq in the 1920s that 'the Arab and Kurd...now know what real bombing means in casualties and damage; they now know that within 45 minutes a full-sized village can be partially wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed by four or five machines'. 'Air control is a marvellous means of bringing these wild mountain tribes to heel. It is swift, economic and humane, as we always drop warning messages some hours before, so that they clear out... An eastern mind forgets quickly, and

if he is not punished for his misdeeds straight way, he has forgotten all about them, and feels his punishment is not merited if delayed,' wrote another of Harris's colleagues of the time. [23]

Body count figures will therefore be liable to be undercounts because of their failures to deal adequately with non-military personnel. But a global body count figure will also be made up of individual figures with different margins of error that reflect the social and political face of war. Essentially a global body count will be made up of a statistic plus an estimate plus a guesstimate. But this does not mean that all estimates are of equal value or that we should simply average a few indiscriminate guesses. We should track down the best estimates and be open about the margins of error.

Counting the dead through the use of population estimates based on census material might seem to be a much less reliable way of dealing with the problem of war dead. But it can be very accurate if what we want to know is the total number of excess deaths. For it to work best we need two things – good and recent census data and good registration of births and deaths. It is therefore more appropriate to analyse war deaths in more advanced and organised societies. What it cannot do (at least with any precision) is to help allocate deaths to the different groups. This method gives us the total who, in Gaddis's terms, 'perished during the years of war'. [24]

To see how this works we can do a simplified estimate of Soviet population losses in World War II. To find out its war time population losses between 1941-1945 we do the following calculation

(1) 1941 population plus births 1941-1945 minus 1945 population = Total losses

But some of these would have died anyway due to natural causes. So we now need to calculate

(2) Total losses minus hypothesised losses 1941-45 on basis of pre-war death rates = additional wartime mortality.

It is this calculation that gives us the widely quoted figure of 26-27 million losses. There will always be a margin for error in the underlying data due to defects in the census and registration of births and deaths. But of these problems can be coped with we can arrive at a good estimate. Interestingly for Stalin's Russia all these problems seem manageable in part because it was bureaucratic state.

But the demographic approach is likely to undercount deaths too. Suppose, for example, a bomb is dropped on an old people's home or a maternity ward in 1941. Some of the old people or young babies would undoubtedly have died of 'natural causes' by 1945. But in this example they clearly died as a consequence of war even though some might have died a little later. It would be hard to convince relatives that they were not war victims. This is not a trivial point. War tends to carry off the weak of all ages but if they died more prematurely than they might have done had there been no war then they are surely war victims. Thus the Soviet war dead figure of 26-27 million should actually be put even though there is still debate as to what addition might be made.

We should also note that in some circumstances applying the demographic method could produce perverse results. Suppose that the war caused the death rate to fall, it might then appear that war is saving lives. This might seem unlikely but to some extent this happened in the UK during World War II. Because no invasion took place the civilian death and missing toll to July 1945 was officially only 60,595 (precision again!). Indirectly the stress of war may have carried off others prematurely, but rationing and the re-organisation of medical service was so successful that there was a significant improvement in *overall* health and life expectancy.

Whether we use the body count or demographic method we also have to consider when to stop. It is not obvious when accounting for war deaths should end - when the fighting officially stops, unofficially, an armistice, a peace treaty or when the casualties stop? But when do they stop? A century on, buried World War One munitions still kill people each year on the western front. More serious numerically is the legacy of land mines and cluster bombs (and depleted uranium) used so often in recent conflicts. The 1950 Japanese census recorded 280,000 survivors of the atomic bombs, a number of whom may have experienced early deaths. The stress of war is also ongoing. It

is alleged that more British Falkland's War veterans have committed suicide than were killed in the war itself. A case is being made for a larger first Gulf War effect and an Iraq and Afghanistan effect on veterans. There is more systematic evidence of a 'Vietnam Effect'. Probably there have been such war effects throughout history but people just accepted them or preferred not to look. Today we are more inquisitive. One hypothesis suggested to explain the rising mortality of adults in late middle age in Russia in the 1990s was this might be a delayed legacy of the physical and mental stress on children in World War II. In the event other explanations seem more credible but the need to pose the question shows that war legacies have both a possible veteran and civilian component.

These arguments are fraught with political implications. Those who wage war are rarely interested in accounting for its full human or economic cost and many of these issues come together in the controversies over the recent history of death in Iraq – one of the most contested issues in contemporary history. Like poorer countries, Iraq has had a high rate of population growth in the last half century with population rising from 5 million in 1950 to 13 million in 1980. Per capita income also rose in these years nearly 5 times (increasing from 20% to 60% of the UK level). Thereafter the controversy begins as the Iraqi people experienced 3 wars, internal repression, more than a decade of economic sanctions (ostensibly designed to be less onerous than war) and occupation.

These two and half decades have not only had a serious impact on the Iraqi people but also the state bureaucracy. Decadal censuses were held in October 1977, 1987 and 1997 but the later one was limited in detail and geographic scope. No census was undertaken in 2007. The Iraqi population grew to 18 million in 1990 and 23 million in 2000, even as people struggled with social catastrophe. One measure of this is income per head which between 1979 and 1990 fell by two thirds (to 15% of the 1990 UK level). In 1991 amidst war it collapsed by a further two thirds (to 6% of the UK level). In the 1990s there was some small recovery but Iraq remains poor with an output per head at the start of the second war close to its level in 1950 (less than 10% of the current UK level and less than 20% of its neighbours).[25]

Measuring the human cost of Iraq's history involves counting deaths directly as well as measuring those which might not have occurred had repression, sanctions and war not intervened. Internal repression in Saddam Hussein's Iraq was considerable and part of the promise of regime change was that there would be a proper accounting. This has not occurred. We can therefore only note estimates of thousands shot and executed, and tens of thousands of victims, Kurds, Shiites, Marsh Arabs of ethnic repression and a further component of death caused by displacement. The Iran-Iraq War left an uncertain toll. Iraq acknowledged 220,000 deaths to which demographers then add different estimates for the unknown dead.

The first Gulf War produced a further surge in deaths. In Kuwait a subsequent retrospective study by Harvard University epidemiologists has claimed to detect a long term mortality effect in addition to the invasion and seven month occupation deaths. On the coalition side there were only 213 combat deaths (plus a significant number of out of combat deaths) in pushing the Iraqi forces back. But on the Iraqi side there is huge controversy. US spokesmen originally argued no numbers could be given but Mary Beth Daponte, a government demographer, had already made estimates which, when leaked, almost led to her dismissal. She initially estimated a death toll of 158,000 including 40,000 soldiers, 13,000 civilians, 70,000 indirect deaths and 30,000 in further repressions of the Shiite and Kurd population but she has since revised this figure to over 200,000.

However other semi-official US estimates have subsequently suggested that fewer Iraqi troops died. [26]

Then there is the debate over sanctions on Iraq which lasted from 1990-2003. When Madeleine Albright was asked in 1996 about an alleged half a million additional child deaths because of these she said that this was 'a price worth paying' to keep pressure on the Iraqi regime. Tony Blair subsequently accepted a similar figure but blamed it on Saddam Hussein's intransigence. Some estimates put sanctions-induced excess mortality at as high as 1-1.5 million for the period they were in place.[27]

More controversial still is the issue of the costs of the occupation since 2003. Four main types of violent deaths have taken place – those of coalition forces and the Iraqi security forces; those

killed by the coalition and Iraqi forces; Iraqis killed by and in relation to the insurgency-resistance; and those that are a product of increased criminalisation. In addition there is also the question of the impact that the chaos of the occupation has had on wider trends in civilian mortality and especially infant mortality and life expectancy.

Violent deaths are not properly counted partly through choice ('we do not do body counts') and partly now because the conditions probably preclude it. Seemingly exact numbers of coalition dead are available and these suggest 4,304 died in the first five years to March 20 2008 (3992 US, 75 UK and 237 others). [28] But these figures do not include over 1000 deaths of 'contractors' (or mercenaries) – part of the privatisation of war.

The real difficulty however is tracing Iraqi deaths on all sides. There have been two attempts at body counts. The Iraqi government began a 'morgue' count but then seemingly abandoned it under pressure as the numbers rose, the head of the Baghdad morgue fled abroad. The unofficial UK Iraq body count undertakes what is called 'passive surveillance' - a count based on morgue and (largely English language) press reports. Its five year violent death total is 82-90,000.[29] Although there may be some double counting here, it is more likely a lower estimate as it is individual deaths and deaths in more remote places will not be adequately captured. Even so this represents a very significant figure.

The second way of assessing deaths is through surveys which have become more difficult as conditions have deteriorated. Surveys can involve a body count element, (who do you know who has died and how did they die?). They can also involve a comparison of mortality over time, (who do you know who died in period X compared to period Y). This should allow additional mortality to be calculated. Surveys published in the *Lancet* have suggested a huge number of post invasion deaths from violence. According to a 2006 survey, by July of that year there had been 650,000 additional deaths, 600,000 of which were due to violence. Other surveys have produced figures between the Lancet surveys and the Iraqi Body Count data. All data points to a huge toll but the Lancet figures have been especially controversial.

Critics have argued that the survey teams have been politically motivated; that technically the surveys have been based on questionable sampling methods; lack of rigour on the part of interviewers; dishonest respondents; that the high figures for deaths imply even more implausibly high figures of wounded. The authors, some of the best known figures in their field, defend their reputations and techniques but also demand that their critics support better structured and more complete surveys rather than risk the accusation that they prefer the bliss of ignorance to the pain of knowing. [30]

We need, however, to be careful. Figures for each element of the long tragedy of Iraq cannot simply be summed. The calculations for sanctions deaths, for example, need to be netted of the effects of the first Gulf War. No less there needs to be consistency between the different elements. If sanctions created a high pre 2003 civilian mortality rate then we cannot assume a low one for calculations of post 2003 additional deaths.

Moreover most attention has been focused on violent deaths, the issue of non violent deaths is possibly consistently underestimated. As we know, relatively well organised states such as the UK in World War II can improve or contain the impact of crisis on civilian health. Is it plausible that the same has been happening in Iraq? Here, according to the UNHCR, we have one of the biggest humanitarian catastrophes still in existence. More than 10% of the population has been displaced (over 2 million abroad and 1.5 million internally). The daily life of the mass of the population is affected by fear, unemployment, inadequately functioning water, electricity, sewage etc and a struggling health service.[31] All this points to significant problems with non violent mortality which the Lancet studies may underestimate in favour of violent death.

The picture then is not a pretty or easy one. But in war it never is. No less than modern day politicians and generals, historians are prone to understate the cost of war and not least when it falls on what Kipling called' the lesser breeds'. The numbers do matter. Frustrations with the difficulties of calculating them often lead to the view that there are 'lies, damned lies and statistics'. This is not so.

The problem is not the statistics but the people who abuse, misuse, lie or more generously fail to understand them. If the numbers are poor then let us work to improve them. Let us make them more accurate, track down the margins of error. Historians who get their dates wrong or mangle their quotes have their competence and professionalism doubted. Our standards are rightly high. They should be no less high when it comes to numbers and not least the numbers of deaths of our fellow human beings.

NOTES:

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4 D.Featherstone, *Colonial Small Wars 1837-1901*, London: David and Charles, 1973, p.194.

5 M.Haynes and R. Husan, *A Century of State Murder? Death and Policy in Twentieth-Century Russia*, London: Pluto Press, 2003.

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7 See R.J.Rummel's website and books http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/ which give very high estimates and Matthew White's excellent amateur site http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm.

8 D.Baucom, 'Technological war: reality and the American myth', *Air University Review*, September-October 1981

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10 J.Keegan & R. Holmes, *Soldiers. A history of Men in Battle*, London; Hamish Hamilton, 1985, p. 151

11 Calculated from, Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Annual Report 2006-2007. (http://www.cwgc.org/). The equivalent Commonwealth figures for World War II are 60% identified burials, 4% unidentified and 36% memorialised. Air and sea casualties affect these ratios which also vary by front).

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18 Lindqvist, *op cit.*, p. 82

19 Lindqvist, *op cit.*, p.46,54

20 M.Lieven,'"Butchering the brutes all over the place": total war and massacre in Zululand, 1879', *History*, vol. 84, no. 276, 1999 October, pp. 614-632.

21 Quoted Featherstone, *op cit*., p. 13.

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REVIEWS AND PERSPECTIVES

Götz Aly: German Historiography's Jonathan Swift?

"There is nothing that rendered the Yahoos more odious than their undistinguished [undiscriminating] appetite to devour everything that comes in their way, whether herbs, roots, berries, the corrupted flesh of animals, or all mingled together: and it was peculiar in their temper that they were fonder of what they could get by rapine or stealth at a greater distance, than much better food provided for them at home."

Jonathan Swift: *Gulliver's Travels* (1726; Penguin Classics, 1985 Edn. p309)

Hitler's Beneficiaries: How the Nazis bought the German People **Götz Aly**

[translated by Jefferson Chase]

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(first published in Germany as ***Hitler's Volksstaat***, 2005)

In 1961 the German literary scholar, Rudolf Walter Leonhardt, encapsulated the Third Reich's twelve years as 'our *unbewältigte Vergangenheit*, or the past we haven't overcome.' (RW Leonhardt: *This Germany: The story since the Third Reich*, 1961, UK edn 1964, p180). A quarter of a century later, historian Ernst Nolte fired the opening salvoes in what was to become the *Historikerstreit* ('historians' dispute') with his article *Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen* ('The past that does not want to pass'). Nolte maintained that the Holocaust should be viewed not as a thing in itself but must be positioned within European history and set against the enormous crimes of Stalinism. Fast forward a further two decades and there is the publication, on the eve of the sixtieth anniversary of VE Day of *Hitler's Volksstaat* by the journalist and author Götz Aly, boldly depicting 'the Nazi regime as a kind of racist-totalitarian welfare state' and claiming that the Holocaust could only be understood in terms of the convergence of the material interests of millions of individuals, Germans and non-Germans, with the anti-Semitic ideology of Nazism (*Hitler's Beneficiaries* [hereafter H.B] pp2;6)

How, then, to make sense of these short years? Were they an aberration, a freakish convergence of historical factors; or did Nazism, this dark passage, have its roots within fatal flaws in 'the German character'? School and university students of History are confronted by over seven decades of explanatory interpretations [or in the neologism – 'metanarratives'] of Nazism.

One of the earliest models, that of Nazi Germany as a panoptic of tyranny, a nation of rabbits transfixed by a stoat, has long been considered superannuated. Students should treat with caution the view that 'the German national character' led to a culture of submissiveness to authority, especially given the ability of the *Führerstaat* to employ the transcendental power of propaganda on its behalf.

It is likewise with Daniel J Goldhagen whose study of 'ordinary Germans and the Holocaust' was published in 1996 to critical acclaim. His premise that virtually all Germans were *Hitler's Willing Executioners* because anti-Semitism was in their blood, has not worn well. Scrutiny of the index of his book is illuminating. There is no entry under 'Poland' yet in any history of anti-Semitism in modern Europe, its theory and practice, the Polish experience is crucial, if only for the purpose of comparison with Germany.

Like Goldhagen, Michael Burleigh write with chutzpah.. after all, it sells books. His *Third Reich: a new history* (2000) characterises the Nazi movement and regime as a political religion. In essence this religious metaphor is the key to Burleigh's overview; but its fragility has been exposed by Neil

Gregor. To illustrate... Burleigh describes the rallies as a combination of 'popular festival, military parade, political meeting and sacred occasion.' at which 'the Fuhrer travelled from mortal to semi-divinity.' (Burleigh pp211/2) Gregor argues, however, that for Burleigh's notion of the Nuremberg rally as an exemplar of mass religious fervour to work as an explanation of mass murder 'the genocide must, implicitly, have been unleashed in a state of collective ecstasy, with individual killings being carried out in a similar state of mind' (Neil Gregor: *Nazism: A political religion?* in *Nazism, War and Genocide*, ed. Neil Gregor, 2005, p14) There is simply no evidence of the motives behind the sordid catalogue of mass murder in the Wild East of Nazism's short-lived empire being attributable to 'political religion'.

The dominant metanarrative of the past twenty years, one that has reached a global audience through his books and their adaptation for a mass television viewership is that of 'a sociology of compliance' (John Breuilly *Personal Reflections* in *Working Towards the Führer*, edited by Anthony McElligot and Tim Kirk [2003], p264) created by Ian Kershaw. It hinges on Hitler's charisma: his character, core beliefs and image and also on the peculiar features of his leadership style. A process of cumulative radicalisation from below, anticipating the *Führer's* will, drove the regime towards an increasingly aggressive foreign policy and anti-Semitic policies culminating in the Final solution.

Then in 2005 Götz Aly's *Volksstaat* was published. His was no modest contribution to the historiography of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. Instead, Aly presented a provocative reinterpretation of the *Führerstaat,* of the dialectics of Nazism and of 'the structural factors – apart from popular racist ideology – that motivated the Wehrmacht to seek the removal of the Jews from the European continent.' (H.B. p280) He set out to 'shed light on the symbiotic relationship between the Nazi *Volksstaat* and the regime's crimes against humanity.' (ibid. p4) Aly claimed that 'The Holocaust will never be properly understood until it is seen as the most single-mindedly pursued campaign of murderous larceny in modern history (ibid p285). Aly drew a ghastly picture of his fellow-countrymen as willing participants in murder and theft. In a phrase redolent of Christopher Browning, a historian admired by Aly, he asked 'what drove ordinary Germans to tolerate and commit historically unprecedented crimes against humanity, in particular the murder of millions of European Jews?' (ibid. p5) Aly's uncompromisingly materialist interpretation of German history demands the closest analysis on account of his remarkable energy and ability as a researcher. Has he succeeded in his decades-long attempt to locate Nazi barbarism within the broader context of 20th century German history? Has he created a new metanarrative of the Third Reich?

Central to Aly's overview of German history is his belief that there was a Nazi social revolution: 'For all those who legally belonged to the German racial community... social divides became smaller.' In contrast to recent historical writing on Nazi society, he argues that in organisations such as the Hitler Youth and the German Labour Front, 'the regime's aim of levelling out class distinctions was realised.' (ibid. p30; cf Richard J Evans: *The Third Reich in Power*, 2005, pp271-81)

Aly tags it as the 'Accommodating Dictatorship' (Chapter 2 of *Hitler's Beneficiaries*). He rejects the view that the Nazi regime was a pawn of industrialists and financiers. Instead, Hitler and his paladins pursued 'policies of socially equitable progressive taxation'. Aly speaks of 'tax rigour for the bourgeoisie', of 'hikes in corporate taxes' and of determination to curtail monetary speculation by forcing investors from stocks to bonds which in the short term could not be traded.' (H.B. pp58; 60; 61; 65)

Provocatively he downplays coercion and terror. The epitome of the police state came after the Third Reich, in Ulbricht's German Democratic Republic. Compared to the omniscient Stasi the Gestapo was a shoestring operation. In Hitler's Germany by the end of 1936 'only 4761 people – some of whom were chronic alcoholics and career criminals- were incarcerated in the country's concentration camps.' (ibid. p28)

Further, Aly argues that the Nazis were successful in creating a *Volksgemeinschaft* [People's Community] which became even more resilient after 1939, when the party, the Wehrmacht and 'ordinary Germans' embarked upon a spree of larceny and plunder in the conquered territories. Hitler and Nazism, in Aly's view, successfully resolved the contradictions which had tested Weimar democracy

to destruction, the conflict of 'putative traditions' with forces of modernity; economic, technical and social: 'Nazi society drew its extreme intensity from the regime's ability to merge opposites; rational and emotional political goals, old and new elites, the interests of the people, the party, and the government bureaucracy.' (ibid. pp17/18)

Nazi success hinged on Hitler's charisma, on 'the accelerated pace of his rule': 'the sheer speed of decisions and events kept his regime from falling apart.' The Nazi *movement* throbbed with youthful energy absorbed from its dynamic, restless leader. In this audacious section of his book, Aly depicts Germany as a nation on a high: 'The majority of Germans succumbed first to the giddiness, then to the full-blown intoxication of history's being made at breakneck pace.' (ibid. pp320/1)

But can we be so certain? While Aly was still in his teens WS Allen researched and wrote *The Nazi Seizure of Power: the experience of a single German town, 1922-45*. His chapter on 'Life in the Third Reich', though short, is something of an antidote to Aly. There is no mention of wartime larceny and plunder reaching the garrison town of Northeim in Hanover. By 1939, 'an equilibrium had been achieved in Northeim. The party expected only acquiescence and ritualistic responses from the people, who gave them just that, in measured amounts.' and by 1941, 'apathy and psychological denial had become a way of life.' (WS Allen, op cit, 1965; 1989 edn, p291) The febrile atmosphere as described by Aly was absent. Was Northeim the only 'Sleepy Hollow' in the Third Reich?

Like all historians of 20th century Germany Aly is compelled to explain what drove Hitler. He argues that a crucial component of his mindset was the calamitous outcome of the Great War. Hitler was haunted by the 'Turnip Winter' of 1917-1918 and the political strikes of autumn 1918 which – in his view – had destroyed the Kaiserreich from within. There must be no repetition of this catastrophe in the Third Reich.

In August 1914 a tidal wave of popular patriotism had propelled Germany's rulers into war. But in the next four years the Kaiser's ruling circle 'condemned itself to extinction, squandering what remained of its popular support through indifference... toward the welfare of the population at large.' (H.B. p69). In September 1939 there began what the popular historian Laurence Rees has labelled as 'the wrong war'. Hitler found himself at war with Britain, despite his clearly stated desire in *Mein Kampf* for an Anglo-German alliance, and partner in a non-aggression and trade pact with the despised home of 'Jewish-Bolshevism', the USSR (Laurence Rees: *The Nazis: A warning from history*, 1997, 1998 edn; p87)

And among the people the mood was flat, if Victor Klemperer is taken as a bellwether of public opinion. His diary for 4th September 1939 records the views of his postman, a veritable Private Frazer: 'You should see the gloomy faces on the troop transports – different from '14. and did we start off with food shortages in '14? We will be defeated, and it can't last four years again.' And Berger, the grocer, 'a soldier in '14, now a wireless operator: You've got it easy now! – I? I expect to be beaten to death.' (*I Shall Bear Witness: the diaries of Victor Klemperer, 1933-1941* entry for 4th September 1939, 1995, 1998 UK edn. pp295-6)

If the Nazis were to ensure pre-War levels of support continued in wartime they would have to succeed both on the war and home fronts. The stunning military triumphs of 1940 and 1941 delivered more than glory. They filled huge treasure chests of booty and plunder. The beneficiaries? 'Ordinary Germans' (H.B. p314), their loyalty bought by the government. The broad mass of Germans, argues Aly, paid little of the war's cost. The burden was borne by Germany's wealthy, by fiscal fiddles in the occupied territories and by the dispossession of Europe's Jews.

This is not, however, virgin soil unturned till Aly's coming. Half a century earlier, combining deep knowledge with a literary elegance that assured a mass readership, a Canadian pondered on the peculiarities of the German war economy: 'Even in the presumably austere and dedicated world of the Third Reich, in the third year of a disastrous war, the average citizen had access to a wide range of comforts and amenities which habit had made to seem essential.' The accompanying footnote contains this: '..Quite a few of the Nazi leaders were sybarites and were thus somewhat handicapped in imposing austerities which they would not practise themselves. A dictatorship which does not quite trust its people is likely to be hesitant in imposing hardships.' (JK Galbraith: *The Affluent Society*, 1958, 1967 edn., p139).

In Aly's judgement, then, the Nazis were remarkably successful, at least until the second half of 1943, in retaining levels of support never enjoyed by the Wilhelmine elites: 'The policy of plunder was the cornerstone for the welfare of the German people and a major guarantor of their political loyalty, which was first and foremost based on material considerations.' (H.B. p291). Aly's use of the word 'material' is crucial, as we shall see.

In the early years of Hitler's rule the foundations of the 'accommodating dictatorship' were established, giving 'a desperate, belligerent and self-destructive people satisfaction for perceived past affronts.' (ibid p37) Nazism's fiscal policies were a staggeringly audacious attempt to effect economic recovery with a large increase in public debt. Aly argues that the only major tax enacted 1933-39 was a dramatic hike in corporate taxes; on the other hand, a range of populist social and tax policies benefited families. The result was an 'exploding deficit', 'a budget crisis in the making' as the economy overheated. (ibid p39) Public servants schooled in classical economics were horrified. In January 1939, Reichsbank directors wrote to Hitler calling for a halt. They were ignored. Instead the regime plunged ahead 'with military adventures that had terrible consequences for millions of people. Dispossession, deportation and mass murder became major sources of state income.'(ibid p40) The first casualties were Germany's Jews. *Entjudung*, their systematic expropriation and social exclusion accelerated after the *Kristallnacht* pogrom.

'Iconoclastic', 'energetic', 'impulsive', 'populist', 'collectivist': all of these labels can be applied to Nazism as a movement (itself a word with resonance). Thus, argues Aly, given their attraction to radical mass politics, droves of rank-and-file KPD and SPD easily converted to fascism after 1933. It was likewise with the youth (refer, ibid., pp14-17). He contemptuously dismisses the record of resistance to Hitler as 'wildly exaggerated – and historically insignificant.' (ibid. p319)

With the coming of war, and accelerating mightily after the victories of 1940 and 1941, the Faustian social contract between Nazis and the German people took on a new dimension. To ensure loyalty to the 'national comrades' and avert the danger of History repeating itself with a recurrent *dolchstoss* (stab-in-the-back) the Nazi leadership ensured that their standard of living remained high.

The German *conquistadores* saw to this in part by savagely exploiting the occupied territories of Europe, enslaving millions of civilians and prisoners of war to work in Germany for starvation wages, and looting of natural resources of these lands to feed and fuel the Reich. In this there was no novelty, but in a remarkable piece of scholarship Aly traces the origins and development of Reich Credit Bank (RKK) certificates, which were crucial in keeping the Reichmark stable, at the expense of the currencies of the occupied territories and enabled Wehrmacht soldiers to buy goods at 'firesale prices' and send them home to their families. Inevitably, currencies such as the franc became worthless.

Aly describes how in 1942 Göring played Father Christmas, planning as early as summer to loot France and the Low Countries to ensure that soldiers' families and others on the home front would have access to the widest possible range of liquor, cosmetics, toys and the like. Given that the goods were paid for in francs from the occupation budget and that all purchases went into the state coffers, it was 'win, win' for the Nazis; inflation was lowered by curbing excess domestic spending power while new revenues poured into the treasury. (ibid., pp132/3).

With puckish glee Aly extensively quotes from the wartime diaries of the good soldier, Heinrich Böll, to send home as much as he possibly could from France. Butter, chocolate, soap, even a suckling pig were among the items he sent home. The devil of temptation proved too much for this 'Christian, a humanist and a pacifist with an austere style tinged by satire' (Adrian Webb *The Longman Companion to Germany Since 1945*, 1998, p266). For Aly, Böll's fall from grace adds weight to his materialist interpretation of history: 'one reason for the pervasive, though in Böll's case passive – loyalty felt by Germans towards the Nazis' (H.B. p110). The author has given a new twist to the tale of guns and butter.

The corollary of Aly's insistence that base self-interest led Germans to consistently support the Nazi regime from 1933 is that this led them to ignore in turn the systematic plunder of Jewish property and assets by the state, the ghettoization of Germany's Jews, followed by their disappearance east. *Hitler's Beneficiaries* continues work on the Holocaust begun by Aly in the mid 1980s.

In 1991, *Vordanker der Vernichtung* (*Architects of Annihilation*) was published, with an English language translation appearing a decade later. In it, Aly and his co-author, Suzanne Heim, sought an answer to the question, 'Why in 1941 did the German leadership decide to murder millions of men, women and children?' Their answer was a chilling one: "The policy of mass murder was not primarily motivated by racist or terrorist ideology, but was an instrument designed to speed up the industrialisation and agrarian rationalisation of the Government General as an 'emerging country." (Götz Aly and Suzanne Heim: *Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the logic of destruction,* 2003 edn., p184). The policy of annihilation had a basis in rational thinking meeting utilitarian goals.

In 1995, Aly's *Endlösung* as published, appearing in English in 1999 as *Final Solution: Nazi population policy and the murder of the European Jews*. The title encapsulated Aly's central argument. In 2002 in collaboration with Christian Gerlach, *Das Letzke Kapital: Ideologie, Realpolitick und der Mord den Ungarischen Juden 1944-1945* was published. David Cesarini has written that Aly and Gerlach have 'shown that the Germans entered Hungary with various rational objectives keyed into their strategic goals... Eichmann was not simply charged with a mad project to exterminate Jews.. The enterprise was inhuman, but it was not insane.' (David Cesarini: *Eichmann: his life and crimes*, 2004, p162).

In *Hitler's Beneficiaries* Aly develops his line of thought, proposing a further structural factor that motivated the Wehrmacht to seek a 'final solution'. This was 'field officers interest in exacting the largest possible contributions from occupied countries towards the cost of occupation. The motive was not personal greed...' (H.B. p281). His particular focus is on Serbia, 'the only country in which enough documentation has survived to make it possible to reconstruct with a fair degree of clarity the decision making process regarding Jewish assets.' (ibid p187)

It is a chilling tale of the murder by May 1942, of Serbia's 22,000 Jews and the confiscation of their assets. According to Aly these were sufficient to cover military occupation costs for six months and very effectively reduce inflationary pressure on the Serbian dinar.

But when was the bond between the Third Reich and its citizens broken? When did public confidence in Hitler's regime finally evaporate? The conventional route for most historians would be to research the diaries and journals of both Nazi luminaries and German citizens. Sources such as Goebbels and Klemperer would beckon. Further research might include SD reports on civilian morale (*Sicherheitsdienst*; Security Service) (Heinz Boberach, ed., *Meldungen ans dem Reich 1938-1945. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitdiensts der SS*, 1984). Aly takes a different road claiming 'it is possible to fix the moment at which public confidence in the Hitler regime finally evaporated.' He attempts this by 'looking at the rates at which the Germans saved money' (H.B. p299-300). The example he gives is of savings which before 20 July 1944 had been in decline, shooting up after the attempted assassination of Hitler but then from 1 August immediately declining when the failure of the coup became apparent. In a wider perspective Aly claims that in the second half of 1943 the rate of growth in savings fell as German military fortunes slumped.

Once more material factors are to the fore in his analysis. Aly writes history with Swiftian savagery. His view of his fellow Germans is uncompromising, a people for whom God was their belly, a nation of Yahoos. In the Germany of *Hitler's Beneficiaries* Houyhnhnms are all but extinct.

Aly's achievements in this book are significant. His dogged pursuit of clues and his skills of historical detection are in the tradition of Fritz Fischer. His chapter, 'The Trail of Gold' explores the mystery of the missing gold of the Jews of Salonika. It is a historical whodunnit which reads like the plot of a Robert Harris novel. In it, Aly succeeds in solving the mystery of the missing gold of Salonika's Jewish community, all 12 tons of it. The fate of the port's Sephardic Jews, 46,000 of whom were deported to Auschwitz in 1943 is well known (David Cesarini, op cit p148), but what of their gold? For decades, alleges Aly, the prison confession of the Nazi functionary, Dr Max Merten, was swallowed whole; the gold was at the bottom of the sea, deliberately put there by him. By dint of the most detailed research (91 footnotes accompanying the story) Aly shows that it was systematically stolen by the Nazis and used to pay for the Wehrmacht's huge occupation expenses in an impoverished country, and to combat the threat of debt.

The leading criminals were Eberhard von Thadden, a Foreign Office official responsible for 'Jewish Questions' and Hermann Neubacher, former Mayor of Vienna, Hitler's Plenipotentiary for South East Europe and Serbia. As with so many Nazi crimes, few administrative documents were either created or preserved but Aly picks out Thadden's role by detailed scrutiny of his travel expenses and itinerary, while he plots Neubacher's part in the infusion of gold into the Reichsbank.

Aly has added new dimensions to our understanding of the war against the Jews waged by the Nazis and – after 1939 – their collaborators and fellow travellers in the territories they conquered. All the figures known previously to us are here, but Aly extends the circles of guilt outwards to include the economic and bureaucratic functionaries. Most of these criminals are unknown to all but a few academics, and Aly provides us with no thumbnail sketches of these people. It will be left to other historians to paint them, warts and all. Aly has established the integral relationship between the Nazi ideologues, the undisputed monsters, and men he identifies as wilful instigators of huge crimes of expropriation and theft. To illustrate: Kurt von Behr, head of the German Red Cross, switched from looting the Louvre to commandeering the household goods of the Jews of Western Europe for redistribution to German families bombed-out by the RAF. Such was the enthusiasm of this humanitarian that in the interests of such victims he demanded the arrest of the sixty Jewish families left in Liege (H.B. p125).

For many young people the Holocaust is one of History's black holes into which unspeakably evil forces sucked millions of innocents. Thus each year hundreds of school students visit Auschwitz, see into the heart of darkness and on their return, relate to their peers the dimensions of the crime. But historians are tasked to go beyond such awareness-raising of horror and ask the question, 'Why?'. Aly has added a new dimension to our understanding of these monstrous acts.

Yet for all his talents we must gang warily with much of Aly's work. He is a historian better with the microscope than the telescope. The overviews in his opening chapters have to be handled with caution. The most able of our dissertation-writers in Advanced Higher History would challenge several of his generalisations.

On the hyperinflation of 1923 he asserts that it 'led to the de facto impoverishment of the nationalistically inclined middle classes' (ibid, p32). To which our alert student would reply, quoting the memoirs of Erna von Pustau: 'There were winners too'.

And in his determination to show that Nazis really did create a 'People's Community' he states, 'The Nazis made automobiles affordable to everyday Germans.' (ibid. p21). Adam Tooze, by contrast, has subjected the 'People's Car' project to the most detailed analysis, concluding, 'not a single Volkswagen was ever delivered to a civilian customer in the Third Reich... the entire conception of the 'people's car' was a disastrous flop.' (Adam Tooze: *The Wages of Destruction*, 2006, p156)

Aly claims that the Nazis 'promise of real equality within the ethnic community' was realised in the success of uniformed organisations such as the Hitler Youth, which were 'a way of obscuring differences between the well-off and their less fortunate peers.'(H.B. p30). Richard J Evans is less sanguine: 'the effect of the Hitler Youth on the younger generation was mixed. The more it evolved from a self-mobilizing movement fighting for a cause into a compulsory institution serving the interests of the state, the less attractive it became to the younger generation.'(Evans, op cit, p275)

Large sections of *Hitler's Beneficiaries* contain detailed economic statistics and arguments which make parts of the book very heavy going. Adam Tooze has subjected Aly's calculations and assessments to the most rigorous analysis both in *The Wages of Destruction* and in an article on *Hitler's Volksstaat* available on Tooze's website. Significantly, of the three great British scholars of Nazi Germany; Evans, Kershaw and Tooze, it is only the last who appears in the bibliography of *Hitler's Beneficiaries.*

Aly might become a historian better equipped in the area of generalisations were he to become familiar with the works of the major authorities on German history writing in English.

Does Aly remain a prisoner of his past? Born in 1947, in the 1970s he became involved in West Germany's radical left wing politics. This was the decade of the ultra-leftism of the Baader-Meinhof

group. Aly was a member of *Rote Hilfe* (Red Aid) which gave help to victims of political persecution. He suffered from the backlash against left-wing activists and was suspended for a year from his job as a children's home warden. His subsequently developing career as a researcher and writer took place outside Germany's history 'establishment'. Does this help to explain what appears as fairly primitive Marxism, the undiluted 'vulgar materialism' which distorts his analysis of 'ordinary Germans' in the Third Reich? He surely goes too far in devaluing the force of ideas behind men's actions. Bizarrely, Aly's apparent contempt for ideas and principles closely resembles that of a historian of whom he might never have heard, Sir Lewis Namier, who died in 1960. And further, speaking of her late husband, Lady Namier said, 'He never hunted in a pack, he was always an outsider.' (Ved Mehta: *The Fly and the Fly-Bottle*, 1963, 1965 edn., p220). It is an evaluation that also perfectly fits Aly.

The sturdily independent publishers, Verso, themselves a kind of outsider, are to be congratulated for making Aly's challenging work available to British readers. It is a book which ought to be read by every teacher delivering the history of the Third Reich to their students.

RON GRANT

Stonewall Jackson					**Donald A Davis**
Palgrave Macmillan	£12.99	Hbk	204p	2007	ISBN 978 1 4039 7477 8

Will the real 'Stonewall' Jackson please stand up? The hero of First Bull Run where his nickname was provided by General Barnaby Bee who was trying to rally his own men, to the faltering, indecisive leader during the Seven Days Battle; Jackson is an enigma. Certainly, he appeared to be more decisive and deserving of his reputation as the most respected leader, after Lee, of the Confederate Army when operating independently, than when under someone else's command. His recommendations for promotion were often based on friendship than military ability and he could nurse a grudge; witness his feud with General Loring for example. Yet it cannot be denied that his work in the Shenandoah Valley in 1862 kept the Federal Army under McClellan guessing as to what he would do next.

What makes a great general? This is an issue many Advanced Higher candidates have struggled with in their dissertations. An analysis of Jackson might help them to sort out the criteria needed to assess such a general; as Jackson was ready to admit, he was as human as the next man. As General Wesley Clark pointed out in his foreword to the book, Jackson possessed formidable skills and once decided upon a course of action, he would not be moved. On the other hand, this stubbornness did work against him. His belief that his God would call for him when He was ready meant that Jackson took extreme risks. Yes generals must be prepared to show themselves to their men, especially at times of crisis, but Jackson often went too far and indeed such an incident was to cost him his life in the 'friendly fire' incident of May 1863.

Little is known of his early childhood. What is known is that this orphan entered West Point Military Academy in 1846, with few of the privileges or the education of his contemporaries. West Point, at this time a bastion of military engineering, proved hard work for the cadet. Yet perhaps it was here that the trait of stubbornness was reinforced as he simply refused to give up and worked at the curriculum with the same dogged determination he would later show on the battlefield.

Like many of his classmates of that decade, Jackson was to 'cut his teeth' in the war with Mexico. Here, working alongside a certain Captain Robert Edward Lee, he learned a valuable lesson as Davis points out: "Avoid the enemy's strength and spring an attack on his weakest point".

Jackson would follow this example on many occasions between 1861 and 1863. Other valuable lessons from this conflict included the way that a small force could block a superior opponent with shrewd defence, the importance of placing artillery well and the need for bold offensives even if against the odds, and never letting your opponent have time to recover from your attacks.

The decade of the 1850s was a testing one for the young military man. The down-sizing of the US army after the Mexican War meant tedious frontier duty in one western outpost after another. Tiring rapidly of this, Jackson left the army and was appointed as a teacher in the Virginia Military Institute. From this time, Jackson had learned valuable lessons; the importance of intelligence and having a map of the area in which the army was operating.

Technology would also play a vital part in the outcome of the civil war. The locomotive bearing Jackson and his men from the Shenandoah Valley to Bull Run Creek would turn the tide of that battle in favour of the South. The day ended in confusion but the Northern forces had been routed and as for Jackson, "He had won the affection and allegiance of his men, who would now follow him anywhere, and also the respect of his peers".

However, it was Jackson's role in the battles of 1862 that would establish his place in Southern minds. Using the lessons already learned, his manoeuvres in the Valley against much larger Federal forces have become the stuff of legend. Marching and counter-marching, out-flanking and strategic withdrawals left a series of Union commanders befuddled as to just where he and his forces were and what his intentions were. The result was that the Shenandoah Valley belonged to Jackson and any Union forces entering it did so at their peril. Another consequence of the 'Shenandoah Ghost' was that the very name of Jackson would induce fear into enemy commanders and ordinary soldiers alike. As the author noted; "Throughout early 1862, the South sustained severe set-backs from losing vital port cities [New Orleans], to suffering a disastrous loss at Shiloh, to having General McClellan snailing along toward Richmond. Against such a bleak backdrop, the stirring tales of Stonewall and his heroic fellows in the Valley lifted morale for Southern fighting men and civilians alike".

Despite this, however, Davis is at pains to point out the failures in Jackson's command. Principal amongst these must be his inability or unwillingness to share his inner-most thoughts with his subordinates. Jackson was almost secretive in his battle preparations and was either unable or unwilling to share these with his closest commanders. The result was that, apart from the man at the top, no one else in his command knew what was to happen outwith their own particular sphere. It was as a result of this weakness that Jackson, the human dynamo of the Valley, appeared lethargic in the Battle of Seven Days. Unable to maintain communication with his forces due to the unfamiliar wooded terrain in which they were operating, Jackson's forces were unable to co-ordinate attacks and men would wait around at vital times during the campaign for orders that never came. "His personnel decisions were based on criteria known only to him".

Jackson would promote men from well down the officer corps but would give no explanation for such a move. The result, as in the case of Major Frank Paxton, was bitterness and division within the officer corps.

Another weakness that Davis identified was Jackson's inability to prioritise his time. On at least two occasions in the Virginia campaign of June 1862, Jackson had exhausted himself by attending to the minutiae of the working of his command when rest would have been a better use of his time, Battlefield exhaustion again would lead to an apparently lethargic Jackson failing to, or being late in, following orders. The result was; "The great reputation Stonewall Jackson had won in the Shenandoah was in tatters. Brilliant in the Valley, he was a failure on the Peninsula. Time and again, he did not show up where and when he was needed. Longstreet decided he was over-rated, and A.P. Hill formed a grudge against him for neglecting to help".

However, as the author continues; "The one who counted most, however, was Robert E Lee and he did not lose faith in Jackson".

Indeed, Davis concludes that; "He [Jackson] and Lee were a perfect match, both aggressive and both at their best in unorthodox offensive operations. In defence, they were shrewd, daring and immovable".

This partnership was to found at Second Bull Run (Manassas) when the Army of Northern Virginia sent the Army of the Potomac (under Pope) "homeward to think again" and in the Battle of Antietam. In the latter, Jackson's corps saved the bacon of Lee's forces by blocking Burnside's

advance and forcing him to hold his position, allowing Lee to order the withdrawal of his forces from Maryland. The consequences of this action were twofold. First, Lee's army was further depleted and each loss was a double blow as the pool of reserves in the South was drying up. Secondly, it led to the Emancipation Proclamation though as Davis comments; "The prospect of Negroes being set loose ignited a blaze of anger and fear throughout the South. Experienced soldiers returned to duty, and from Mississippi to Virginia, men and boys surged forward to join the Confederate ranks".

Jackson's forces were again to plug the gap during the Battle of Fredericksburg when Union forces surprised Confederate opponents under General Maxcy Gregg. The result was a rout and Fredericksburg was the nadir of Northern hopes, both political and military.

Of course, Jackson's apotheosis was to come at the Battle of Chancellorsville. The stuff of legend, his flanking movement that caught 'Fighting' Joe Hooker totally unawares and led to the collapse of the Federal right wing, was the culmination of a plan which had called for the division not once, but twice, of an inferior Confederate force in front of the Union lines. Again, using topography to advantage, Jackson had escaped Union attention and his 18,500 men forced Hooker into withdrawing once more in the face of a triumphant Army of Northern Virginia.

However, that trait noted earlier of always pushing himself to the front was to result in his death at the hands of his own men. Recklessness or bravado, his death cost the South dearly. As Lee was reported to have aid; "General Jackson may have lost his left arm, but I have lost my right".

Indeed, James McPherson, using the idea of reversibility, has speculated as to what the outcome of day one of the Battle of Gettysburg might have been had Jackson been leading the forces against Seminary Ridge.

So, does Jackson deserve his reputation? The final chapter does attempt a neat summation of the case for and against. On the one hand, Jackson was an individualist who thrived on independence of command. Secrecy was his badge of honour and he would brook no political interference in his command. However, this secrecy was an Achilles Heel of the general. After his wounding at Chancellorsville, for example, none of his commanders knew what they should do next.

Again, his need to lead from the front could result in his taking needless risks. Davis comments that; "His disregard for his own safety ended up costing him his life and the South one of its most talented leaders". It is hard to see how he could function in a modern day army!

On the other hand, he inspired the men around him to fight like devils and to believe that, despite overwhelming odds, they could prevail. Life under his command was not easy. Men would endure harsh weather, faced forced marches day after day and were short of rations and appropriate clothing and footwear but they would have followed their leader to the ends of the earth. What would a modern day commander give for such attributes?

His belief that knowledge was power resulted in an insatiable demand for gathering intelligence, aggressive planning, fast deployment and following up on any action undertaken. To this end, the role of Jed Hotchkiss, personal map-maker to General Jackson, was of crucial importance as he provided the information to allow Jackson to hide his movements from enemy eyes or to move his forces swiftly from place to place.

Davis has produced a book worthy of the eponymous general in the title.

Thus, Jackson was one of the great generals of the Civil War. Why? Let us leave the final word with the man himself: "Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never let up in the pursuit so long as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can then be destroyed by half their number.

"The other rule is, never fight against heavy odds, if by any possible manoeuvring you can hurl your own force on only a part, and that weakest part, of your enemy and crush it. Such tactics will win every time, and a small army may thus destroy a large one in detail, and repeated victory will make it invincible"

JIM MCGONIGLE

The Wallace Book					**Edward J Cowan [Ed]**
John Donald	£14.99	240pp	Pbk	2007	ISBN 10 085976 652 7

As Lizanne Henderson's extensive bibliography at the end of this superb collection of essays suggests, there is no shortage of writing on the subject of Scotland's most compelling and least understood hero, William Wallace. Seven centuries of legend, myth and worthy historical enquiry have loaded so much on to the slim body of evidence about Wallace that it is reasonable to be sceptical about another addition to the library, especially given the spate of publishing on the subject which followed Mel Gibson's treatment of the story in 1995. It is heartening then, that Professor Cowan has eschewed any attempt to cash in on the 'Braveheart' phenomenon – this collection's prosaic title, ***(The Wallace Book***) is as modest as the amount of concrete evidence which exists about the man who was Guardian of Scotland in 1297 and 1298. Nevertheless, the title also promises an approach to the subject which is sober, scholarly and reflective. The editor is to be congratulated on marshalling an eclectic group of authors from a number of disciplines to provide an account of the current state of 'Wallace scholarship' which is both exhaustive and refreshing.

Professor Cowan's own contribution, detailing the development of the writing and re-writing of Wallace's story is a very useful examination of the difficulty of trying to create rigorous history from slight and often unreliable sources. His pertinent comments regarding those histories inspired by Blind Harry, especially James McKay's ***William Wallace Braveheart***, which he regards as *'unconsciously demonstrating the worthlessness of such an approach'* should be carefully considered by teachers trying to find suitable material to put before Advanced Higher candidates.

It is in the essays of the other 11 contributors, however, that the real nuggets are to be found. Fiona Watson successfully negotiates the evidence in order to assess *'what we do – and do not - know'* about William Wallace, a task that remains urgent given the persistence of long held misconceptions about the man and his career. AAM Duncan's impressive and detailed analysis of the surviving documents is an excellent companion piece to Watson's essay. Professor Duncan has done more than most in advancing our understanding of Wallace's origins and his entertaining account of his forensic study of ancient documents in order to coax ever more understanding from them is a real treat for the committed medievalist.

Indeed, there are many treats in this book which makes it more than just a dry antiquarian approach to the well known facts pertaining to Wallace's life. Michael Prestwich writes a thought provoking piece on the Battle of Stirling Bridge in 1297, drawing interesting comparisons with Edward's Welsh campaign and urging a degree of caution over the only really detailed source relating the story of the battle, the Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough. Prestwich does well to remind us that Wallace's greatest victory must also be seen in the context of his eventual failure, and that the significance of his career and position were never clear. This is a theme which is explored in great detail by Alexander Grant in his outstanding essay on Wallace's social position with regard to the Scottish nobility. His comment that Wallace's social standing was so ambiguous that it was problematic even in his own lifetime seems to sum up so much about why we find it difficult to write anything definitive about him, and why historians continue to worry away at the subject. The problem is not simply the lack of evidence, but the fact that he confounded, confused, impressed and intimidated his contemporaries – English and Scot alike. Whatever else that can be said about the man, he does not fit any of the comfortable stereotypes about medieval Britain which, astonishingly, persist in even some academic circles. Perhaps it was Wallace's very 'oddness' which leads Grant to conclude, convincingly, that Wallace was not viewed as a patriotic hero by war-weary Scots in 1304 but as a fanatical, criminal, refusnik who was an obstacle to peace.

The most unexpected contribution in this volume is Alexander Broadie's fascinating assertion that the work of John Duns Scotus may have been influenced by his understanding of the Anglo-Scottish conflict at the time of Wallace. The connection with Wallace is tenuous enough, but his central argument that echoes of Duns Scotus' thought can be found in the Declaration of the Clergy (1310) and the Declaration of Arbroath (1320) is an interesting one.

Beyond those essays which look at the 'historical' Wallace there is also an appropriate and serious look at the place that Wallace has played in the debate on Scotland's social, cultural and political development in the centuries since his gruesome execution. The essays in the second half of the book largely concern the way in which the 'material evidence' relating to Wallace has been used to help to construct Scottish identity in a variety of contexts. Felicity Riddy's study of Blind Harry provides an interesting new perspective, reminding us that whether we like it or not, he did much to create that sense of identity in his epic work. Contributions by Elspeth King, Colin Kidd, James Coleman and David Caldwell all provide valuable insights into the way that so much of the Wallace myth has been created and how it continues to be controversial today. The National Museum of Scotland made no reference to Wallace when it opened in 1998, and David Caldwell offers only the slimmest hope that the famous 'Wallace Sword' actually belonged to the man himself.

Richard Finlay's assessment of the development of Wallace as a nationalist icon in the 20th century offers a perceptive comment on the continuation of Wallace's appeal – it is, once again, the ambiguity in Wallace's social position. The Wallace of the early 21st century – Mel Gibson's Wallace – is a class warrior and a nationalist: a potent combination as every student of 20th century history knows. Once again, slim evidence allows us to let Wallace bear whatever interpretation we choose. It is to be hoped that the 'Wallace Book' will encourage readers to place Wallace more firmly in his proper historical context and to resist the temptation to take liberties where the evidence does not let us draw solid conclusions. Sadly, however, but perhaps inevitably, the myths remain more potent and satisfying – it is now nearly a century since Evan Barron first suggested that the role of Wallace has been exaggerated, but it is Mel Gibson's interpretation to which many people instinctively respond. This book is a serious attempt to turn the tide, and it deserves to be widely read and discussed, but it would appear that 'Braveheart' is here to stay.

ROBIN FISH

This review first appeared in the September 2007 issue of SATH's Resources Review.

The Renaissance World					**John Jeffries Martin [Ed]**
Routledge	£135	702 pp	Hbk	2007	ISBN 978 0 415 33259 0

The betrothed couple kneels before relatives and rulers, asking for a blessing on all that they are about to undertake. Flags and pennants flutter in a stiffening breeze. The distant ships await their embarkation on a pilgrimage voyage to Rome. Ten virgin companions are already aboard, along with their eleven thousand attendants. It is a scene of hope and serenity. Yet the adventure will end in tragedy – the martyrdom of the bride at Cologne in a massacre by the Huns, who will ravish and murder the female company. It is then in that sense a sad leave-taking for those who know what lies ahead.

This image of the "Life of St Ursula" by Vittore Carpaccio lies at the heart of John Jeffries Martin's vision of the Renaissance. In line with most historians he acknowledges that the Renaissance was a movement in intellectual, artistic and scientific practices, beginning in the mid-fourteenth century. It was also though a world in movement, dynamically connected to upheavals as well as to more gradual transformations in the economic, political and religious realms. Its consequences would prove enormously important in Europe and far beyond it. Carpaccio's painting captures that image of an old world and a new, a medieval world and a Renaissance world, by showing the legend of the newly betrothed Ursula, the daughter of the King of Brittany, and Conon, her husband-to-be, the son of a pagan King of England. England is presented as a medieval gothic land of castles, fortified walls and towers, imposing but heavy. Brittany on the other hand is a magical world of exquisitely proportioned buildings, a dignified cityscape, evocative in every sense of the sophisticated buildings of the Italian Renaissance, notably of Carpaccio's Venice itself. A movement has been born and the world is in motion.

Carpaccio painted the nine panels of his "Life of St Ursula" in the 1490s, a time of giddy change. Ottoman power was expanding in the eastern Mediterranean, with the Turks overrunning many of Venice's strongholds. The Portuguese had sailed around the Cape of Good Hope in the late 1480s, a feat that would soon open up a direct sea route to the lucrative spice markets of the Indies. News of Columbus's voyages and his discovery of another new route to the Indies (or so it was widely believed at the time) reached Venice while Carpaccio was working on the Ursula cycle. In 1494 the French king Charles VIII, with 30,000 troops, invaded Italy, exposing the fragility of the Italian duchies and republics. In Florence the political firebrand Girolamo Savonarola was preaching the Apocalypse. Change in the Renaissance world stretched far beyond the arts. Larger forces were at work in European culture and society.

The Renaissance World is an anthology of chapters contributed to in the main by American historians, students of literature and art historians. The themes of the book include the movement of ideas, the circulation of power, making identities, and beliefs and reforms. Whilst these themes are explored by a fascinating variety of approaches, John Jeffries Martin also identifies three preludes or preconditions to the Renaissance: the fascination with antiquity, the rediscovery of perspective, and the Black Death. All three left Europe a different place.

The first of Martin's preludes is reflected in a chapter by Ingrid Rowland on the transformation of Rome into a great Renaissance city. Rowland presents a challenge to the assumption that Rome only came into its own as a Renaissance city in the sixteenth century, during what has become known as the High Renaissance. She suggests a number of factors which propelled Rome into a new city. There was of course the palpable presence of ancient monuments. Beyond that lay the ambition of individual popes who patronised artists, intellectuals and humanists. Rowland tells us of the competitive spirit at large in Rome among painters, sculptors and architects. Then there was the social mobility within the papal court, fostered by the papal demand for talent rather than mere wealth. Pilgrims, refugees, scholars and merchants were active in the city and brought new ideas with them. Finally, there was on behalf of the popes a conscious use of art to respond to local and international anxieties and ambitions. With all these forces at play Rome was, in Rowland's words "at the centre of civilisation" from the pontificate of Martin V. It was gradually transformed from a faded imperial capital into a magnificent, monumental centre of the Christian world. Renaissance popes and their builders and painters turned an imaginary ideal of Christian unity into a physical, political and religious reality, a capital as ancient as Jerusalem and as worldly as Constantinople. As Constantinople succumbed to Sultan Mehmet II, Rome rose to replace it as the New Athens. Its educated citizens studied both Greek and Latin. Pope Nicholas V's Vatican Library contained collections in both classical languages, ancient pagan authors alongside Christian writers. As Rowland puts it "Christian piety was thus infused with classical grace".

Whilst bringing forward the beginning of the Roman Renaissance, Rowland holds to the generally accepted view that the two most significant papal patrons were Sixtus IV and Julius II. Sixtus invited a team of painters from Florence, including Botticelli, Ghirlandaio, Signorelli and Perugino, to paint different episodes in his new chapel. He trusted that the competitive pressures of painting side by side would challenge the artists to do their best work in the Sistine Chapel as quickly as possible. Julius II (taking his papal name from Julius Caesar) continued his uncle's work though on a different scale. With funding from the Sienese magnate Agostino Chigi and from the sale of indulgences Julius ordered a complete rebuilding of St Peter's, razing to the ground the early Christian monument. He thus sent a signal to the newly-expanded Christian world, including the Spanish colonies in the New World, that sixteenth-century Rome was a new Rome, not just revived and remodelled but recreated, the modern capital of a truly universal Church.

In line with other historians Rowland holds that Julius would do nearly anything to see his visions brought into being. Twice he climbed into a suit of armour to lead military expeditions against the cities of Perugia and Bologna, expelling their ruling families and installing his own governors. Yet Rowland forgives Julius for his worldliness, something Erasmus could not. In his pamphlet "Julius Excluded from Heaven" Erasmus imagined Julius stomping in vain up to the pearly gates in a suit of armour. Rowland sees things differently, describing Julius as "quietly constructive and pointedly intellectual", "lively, fierce and creative".

John Jeffries Martin's second prelude to the Renaissance is the rediscovery of perspective, which presented a new way of seeing the world. This was first developed in the fifteenth century by the Florentine architect Filippo Brunelleschi, then elaborated on by Leon Battista Alberti in his "On Painting" of 1435. Alberti rediscovered the idea of perspective – or optical geometry - from Euclid's "Optics". Thus the practice of perspective was shown to be the result of intellectual rather than learned skill. Alberti drew a correlation between the visual arts and the seven liberal arts, thereby distinguishing painting from the artisanal practices and mechanical arts with which it had been customarily associated. In this way Alberti made a persuasive case for elevating the status of the visual arts and their masters. Such enhanced status for artists is usually ascribed to the sixteenth century, to the arrival of Michelangelo as told by Vasari. Once more Carpaccio's "Legend of St Ursula" is used to illustrate the phenomenon, especially in its magnificent background buildings. Yet perspective was more than just a painter's trick. Lyle Massey in his chapter "Framing and Mirroring the World" shows that perspective was quickly recognised as central to other disciplines – astronomy, cartography, engineering and mathematics. "Perspective", he argues, "proved a way not only of representing but also of knowing, even conquering the world". Massey argues that naturalistic representation should be seen as a form of inquiry about the world, on a par with other forms of natural philosophy. The invention of perspective heralded a new era in which painting would be seen as a proposition about vision and the order of nature. With its perfected, geometric basis and its idealised viewpoint, perspective was thus the "ultimate evidence of the human ability to command knowledge of the world".

The final prelude to the Renaissance was, or so John Jeffries Martin argues, the Black Death. For five years, from 1348 to 1352, it spread like a slow-moving fire over the continent, mysteriously skipping some places but devastating others. This epidemic killed as many as one out of every two Europeans. However, paradoxical as it may seem, the Black Death, whilst in the short term so catastrophic and disruptive, in the longer term led to a fundamental shift in mentality, opening up the Renaissance world. Samuel Cohn in his chapter "The Black Death, tragedy, and transformation" argues that the disease awakened "a new more confident sense that humans could exercise some control over nature", for example by taking steps to reduce the risk of contagion. It also led to a heightened sense of "memorialisation" by families. By this Cohn means that increasingly after the first visitations of the Black Death medieval society turned away from the mendicant ideals to a new obsession with earthly glory and remembrance. Money was set aside to assure honourable burials in tombs; frescoes, sculptures, bas-reliefs and chapels with perpetual masses were paid for to preserve memories in this world as well as to help souls in the next. Finally, the Black Death led to new political awareness as the common man saw for once that his labour was of value to his bosses. As the increased tax burden fell on a smaller population, demands to see it well spent rose, awakening new political expectations. In all these senses the Black Death was a prelude to intellectual developments (not least in medicine). It brought forth many of the defining traits of the Renaissance. In Cohn's words it "provided the subsoil of a new Renaissance mentality".

The Renaissance World is an important addition to Renaissance scholarship, offering a wide range of historians, thirty-five in number, the opportunity to put forward their work and invite challenge. A paperback edition would be warmly welcomed because there is much in this anthology which would be appreciated by a wider audience. It contains a carefully edited collection of essays, arranged under clear themes, which range widely over the period, stretching our definition and understanding of the Renaissance. Douglas Biow's essay on "Food: Piero Aretino and the art of conspicuous consumption" pushes scholarship into previously untouched areas. Others such as John A. Marino's "The Invention of Europe" build on outstanding scholarship from a previous generation of historians. *The Renaissance World* is ultimately uplifting, as surely the Renaissance itself was. As the editor puts it, "The Renaissance showed and still shows that the humanities have the potential (too rarely realised) of enlarging our understanding of ourselves, our world, and others".

PETER LOVEGROVE

The British Women's Suffrage Campaign 1866-1928 **Harold L Smith**

Longmans £13.99 Pbk 167pp 2007 ISBN 978 1 4058 3284 7

In his recent history of the Second World War Professor Norman Davis states that after sixty years most people should have a clear idea of the narrative of that particular conflict. He then spends the next 400 pages of ***The Second World War: No Simple Victory*** proving that indeed most people probably do not have such an accurate overall view of the war. The same can be said of the votes for women campaign. We all know the story- the campaign to get women the vote languished until the founding of the WSPU and their campaign was much more successful than the rather lacklustre suffragists. Even so they had no success, so the suffragettes then turned to more militant methods. The movement was dominated by the Pankhursts but it was Emily Davison who threw herself in front of the King's horse, the act to be caught for posterity by an early newsreel camera. Then the government resorted to the Cat and Mouse Act to prevent suffragette martyrs starving themselves to death. In August 1914 the Great War broke out and the suffragettes halted their campaign. Eventually in 1918 women were given the vote as a reward for their contribution to the war effort.

The central role allotted to the WSPU probably owes much to 1931 book by Sylvia Pankhurst – ***The Suffragette Movement*** and the 1970s television series and book ***Shoulder to Shoulder***. Smith argues that this is too simplistic an interpretation and cites the work of Sandra Holton who rescued the NUWSS from obscurity and supposed impotence in her 1986 book ***Feminism and Democracy***. Smith's analysis of the campaign to get the vote for women shows it to have been a much longer, more nuanced and more complex business than the standard fare usually reproduced in many textbooks.

The campaign for women's suffrage began long before the appearance of the WSPU and indeed the NUWSS and Sandra Holton argues that its roots lie in mid nineteenth century northern radicalism where women dissenters were angered by the sexual double standards of the time. In particular the 1864 Contagious Diseases Act was seen an unacceptable attack on women. The foundation of the Manchester Society for Women's Suffrage (1866) predated the foundation of the London one and the National Society of Women's Suffrage Societies. In London the concern had been the restriction on married women's property which had led to the formation in 1855 to the Married Women's Property Committee which was headed by Barbara Leigh Smith. Women, of course, would get nowhere without the support of male members of parliament and they owed a considerable debt of gratitude to both James Mill and his son John Stuart Mill. The latter tried to get the word "men" in the reform bills of 1865 to "person" which would have allowed women to get the vote but he was defeated. The suffragists then used the courts to argue that the word "man" also encompassed women but the courts rejected this semantic sleight of hand.

By 1870 women had received the right to vote for local councils (thanks to John Bright's amendment) and school boards but the right to vote in a general election would evade them until 1918 despite the active campaigns that went on throughout the nineteenth century. This is another canard that Smith is anxious to squash ie that nothing happened before the WSPU arrived on the scene. In 1870 John Bright presented the first bill for women's suffrage but Gladstone objected and it was defeated in Committee, and throughout the 1870s annual bills were presented and all were defeated. In 1884 an amendment to the Liberal Suffrage Bill was drawn up to enfranchise 100,000 women to offset the Liberal advantage gained from enfranchising the agricultural labourer. Frances Power Cobbe declared that the lady of the manor would have no vote while the labourers, or as she put it a "rabble of illiterates", would have the vote. Again Gladstone opposed the measure and party discipline meant that it failed and while the 100,000 women voters might have been a boon to the Conservative Party the backbenchers would have none of it.

One can see throughout this period many of the issues which would bedevil the question of women's suffrage from the time it was first mooted right through until the granting of equal suffrage in 1928. Firstly there was the issue of exactly which women were to get the vote. Was it to be on the basis of equal suffrage with men or was it to be more open. If the latter was the case then there would be pressure to further extend the franchise and end the property qualification altogether for

men as well as women. Was the vote to be given to married women as well as single women, after all the married woman's husband probably would have the vote already so her views could thus be expressed. The second issue was the question of political advantage as party leaders tried to work out just how much or how little their party would be advantaged or disadvantaged by a particular franchise qualification. Thirdly there was the emergence of a strong anti-suffragist group who argued against giving the vote to women on grounds of the physical and emotional differences between men and women and that it would be against custom and tradition.

Smith argues that strangely enough it was an act designed to make politics more honest that had an important impact on the women's campaign to get the vote. In 1883 the Corrupt Practices Act made it illegal for political parties to pay canvassers and so parties began to rely on unpaid volunteers to do this work and many of them were women. The Primrose League was formed in 1883, the Women's Liberal Association in 1887 and the Women's Franchise League in 1889.

Another common feature which developed during the second half of the nineteenth century and one which continued into the twentieth was the tendency of the women's groups to split on issues such as the role of men in the campaign, the role of married and single women and also simply along party political lines. Despite these splits and contrary to suffragette mythology there was a great revival of suffragist campaigning in the 1890s. In 1892 an amendment to give the vote to women was defeated by only 28 votes and this revival culminated in the foundation, in 1896, of the NUWSS led by Millicent Fawcett. But again divisiveness was in the air and the movement split in 1897 when another bill passed its second reading but then ran out of time because the Conservative government would provide no more parliamentary opportunities for debate.

The NUWSS' great rival the WSPU was founded only a few years later in 1903 and it is a measure of the superior publicity of this organisation that the commonly held view is that it was their activities that did so much to gain women the vote. In a sense this is an accurate reflection of the contemporary situation in the years before 1914 when so much of the publicity was generated by the WSPU. Yet as Harold Smith points out, while they were very active both before and after 1908 in heckling men's meetings, window breaking, arson, chaining themselves to railings, the fact remains that by 1914 the "WSPU could block progress but it could not bring about reform". Also there is general agreement amongst expert historians that the WSPU was in real difficulty by the time the war broke out. Membership was in decline, some left, others joined but the total was always heading downwards. WSPU funds had been seized by the police and the militants were exhausted by the impact of the hunger strikes and again the movement was splitting, with Christabel Pankhurst leading a more militant group which refused to listen to the pleas of Lloyd George and George Lansbury, not to mention Sylvia Pankhurst, that if militancy was called off then a reform bill would be introduced. Sandra Holton argues that by this stage the WSPU was interested in militancy for its own sake rather than actually getting the vote. By 1914 the organisation had quarrelled with every party that would ever be in a position to give women the vote.

The WSPU was not the only militant women's organisation to campaign for votes for women. There was the Women's Freedom League and the Women's Tax Resistance League to name but two, and these predated the WSPU and campaigned by withholding tax payments. It is true that the WSPU revitalised this campaign but the Pankhurst sisters split over what was more important, class or sex. To Sylvia the militants had to link up with the socialists and as Socialist Feminists aim to create a truly democratic society. Christabel on the other hand regarded the sex war as more important than the class war. She distrusted working men and thus radical feminists would have nothing to do with the ILP or any other political party. By 1912 the WSPU had expelled men from the organisation which meant they lost the support of the Pethick-Lawrences (he a future cabinet minister in Attlee's government) which helps to explain why funds were so low by 1914 since the WSPU had relied on this couple for much of their finance.

The rhetoric as well as the actions of the WSPU became ever more militant not to mention military. The movement was a disciplined army, its task was to liberate half of mankind and the movement was to rebel and indulge in guerrilla warfare, according to Mrs Pankhurst in 1912.

While the WSPU was speaking and acting as a military organisation and generally quarrelling with all the other parties and even each other so that Sylvia was also expelled in 1912 the NUWSS was not sitting doing nothing. Firstly it has to be understood that the NUWSS was a much larger organisation than the WSPU and that while it did not generate the publicity that the WSPU did it also worked assiduously behind the scenes to advance the cause of women. It coordinated suffrage societies, liaised with Parliament and exerted influence behind the scenes.

Secondly Millicent Fawcett, the leader of the NUWSS, had more political nous than the Pankhursts and realised that a reform had to go through the Commons and the Lords and that meant cultivating Liberal support especially after the Liberal landslide of 1906. The Conservative Party was not forgotten and the importance of Conservative women campaigners has often been underestimated. Smith identifies Lady Balfour, Lady Jane Strachey, and Lady Selbourne as Conservative activists who lobbied hard within the party for women to receive the vote. But this in turn caused tensions within the NUWSS as provincial branches felt the London headquarters were too dominated by Conservative women. Fawcett herself was a Liberal Unionist who opposed Home Rule for Ireland.

Fawcett believed that women were superior to men and that moral force rather than physical force was the correct path to go down. Sandra Holton and Jo Vellacott have argued that the WSPU and NUWSS were symbiotic until 1908-9 (sort of good cop, bad cop routine) but that as the WSPU became more militant the suffragists pulled back in horror and this culminated in a public breach in November 1908. Fawcett believed that the suffragette's militancy showed them to be no better than men and that they had thus forfeited the claim to get the vote.

As always with the government the issue was, which women should get the vote. Campbell Bannerman led a government where the majority of the MPs supported the idea but not all of them. To raise the issue was to invite the party to split and in 1906 it had only just recovered from the divisions caused by the Boer War. In 1910 a Conciliation Bill was introduced which would have extended the suffrage to women on the same basis as for local elections. But it was defeated on the Second Reading because many Liberals and Irish Nationalists thought it would favour the Conservative Party at a time when party fortunes were so close that every seat counted.

So while the suffragettes were getting all the publicity for the cause by their increasingly militant activities and increasingly alienating all political parties, the suffragists were working assiduously behind the scenes to influence those who could actually get them the vote. The suffragists formed electoral alliances with the Labour Party in those constituencies where the sitting Liberal MP did not support the cause. An Election Fighting Fund was established to help this process although it did lead to tensions within the NUWSS, but a full scale split was avoided.

Thus Smith argues quite convincingly that by 1914 the cause was winning much wider and potentially successful support across the political spectrum, the Labour Party was wholeheartedly in support and even Balfour and Bonar Law supported the Conciliation Bill (but then they would) as indeed did the Chairman of the Conservative Party. Therefore far from bringing about votes for women the Suffragettes were by this time the major obstacle to their very aim.

The suffragists and suffragettes finally won, at least partially, their aim that women should be allowed to vote in general elections in the 1918 Representation of the People Act. For the mythical person atop the Clapham Omnibus this was due to the war effort by women in munitions factories and all the other war work which they did. This has a serious historical provenance. The doyen of Great War social historians (the late Arthur Marwick) argued this in his 1977 book, ***Women At War***. Smith questions this thesis. He argues that the war swept away many of the obstacles to women getting the vote. Asquith had to resign in 1916, the WSPU ceased campaigning and indeed split since many women could not accept Emmeline Pankhurt's exaggerated patriotism, especially her daughter Sylvia who became a pacifist.

The suffrage issue for both sexes reappeared on the political agenda in 1916 which was when the next general election should have been held after the changes contained in the 1911 Parliament Act. With five armies fighting in France and conscription it was clear that the old property based qualifications could no longer work. A Speakers Conference was summoned to discuss the issues

and it was agreed that women should get the vote but Sir John Simon and others argued that it should not be too radical. Giving the vote to all women over 21 would mean that they would make up the majority of the electorate and for many politicians this was a step too far. However, a report in 1916 had argued that mothers deserved the vote and so the proposal was that the vote should be given to women over 30 who were also local government electors or the wives of local government electors. This effectively excluded the young, unmarried women who made up the majority of women war workers.

Even with these restrictions the cabinet took some time to agree to the changes. Lords Curzon and Milner were strongly opposed while other Conservative leaders supported change if carried out cautiously and even many women's groups were not entirely happy with the compromise. In the end the Bill became law and 8.4 million women received the vote and thus made up 39.6% of the electorate. Five sixths of the new electors were mothers, and the female working class were effectively excluded.

Smith is surely correct in saying that for many the further reform of the suffrage in 1928 is seen as an inevitable tidying up of loose ends left over from the First World War. This was certainly the view of Sylvia Pankhurst in 1931 who said that the change came about "virtually without effort". Smith identifies differing historical interpretations put forward by Cheryl Law, Susan Pedersen, David Jarvis and Anthony Seldon. The latter argues that there was broad Conservative support for further reform except for a "right wing rump". Smith is critical of this view arguing that until at least 1927 there was considerable Conservative opposition to further extending the vote to younger women. This was known as the "flapper vote" and I suppose the equivalent today would be the "ladette vote".

Perhaps surprisingly the Labour Government of 1924 made no attempt to equalise the franchise fearing that the women's movement undermined class based ideology. The Conservative victory in 1924 was certainly helped by the million women who were members of the party and who recruited, canvassed, and raised funds for the party. Shortly before polling day in December 1924 Baldwin pledged the party to further franchise reform but as usual he was vague on specifics. Meanwhile women's groups led by Eleanor Rathbone and Lady Rhondda kept up discreet pressure on the government and from within the party Lady Astor pushed the cause of further reform.

The question was; if the suffrage was to be equalised what was to be the age at which it was to be available to both men and women. The Conservative back benchers and Central Office would have preferred 25 but that would mean a large group of men between 21 and 25 losing the right to vote. Given the social tensions in Britain at this time as shown in the General Strike this was unlikely to be a political runner. This did not defer the die hard Tories campaigning against any change. Lord Birkenhead published articles against the proposals despite being in the cabinet as Secretary of State for India and the *Daily Mail* was vociferous in its opposition to the "flapper vote" – young, unmarried women who were independent, sexually active and ignorant of politics.

In the end political expediency won. 25 would anger the men and not satisfy the women and Baldwin accepted that women were as divided as men and as likely to vote Conservative as Labour or Liberal. Also if the Conservatives lost the next election due in 1929, Labour was likely to introduce such a reform and they would get the kudos and the Conservatives be seen again as reactionary. Baldwin squared the Women's Conservative Conference with the help of Lady Elveden MP and it accepted the vote at 21. The full Conservative Party also accepted the proposal and in 1928 equal suffrage became fact when the Bill passed the crucial Second Reading by 387 to 10. Churchill and others absented themselves from the vote.

Smith's fairly short book (111 pages of text plus 27 pages of sources) provides a highly readable analysis of the suffrage movement and its ultimate success. It successfully questions many of the common assumptions of the general public about the movement and provides a framework that will allow senior pupils to see the suffragettes in their correct historical context and provide evidence for more analytical essays rather than simple narrative.

JIM DUNBAR

The American Civil War **Adam I P Smith**

Palgrave £21 Pbk 2 75pp 2007 ISBN 978 0 333 79054 0

"In the final analysis, slavery caused the Civil War. But the relationship between slavery and the outbreak of war was not straight-forward. The Civil War did not come about because slavery was an intolerable violation of the nation's dedication to freedom. The vast majority of northerners did not go to war in 1861 to abolish slavery and the vast majority of Confederate soldiers had never owned a slave. To say that slavery was fundamental to the causes and course of the war is, therefore, not to say that a moral contest over the rights and wrongs of slavery led in some ineluctable way to conflict, although in one sense the war certainly represented a moral crisis". The aim of the author is to explore the changing nature of public opinion towards the institution of slavery as a cause of the war and the way that public opinion altered during the conflict which affected the way in which the war was fought.

Given the length of the book, it would be impossible to cover every detail and indeed the author notes that "This book is written in the spirit of an interpretative essay rather than with any ambition to be comprehensive".

Smith is of the view that the massive social and economic changes wrought in the USA in the first half of the nineteenth century "altered the way in which localities and regions interacted with one another, as independent regional economies were integrated into a truly national market". This led the North and South to view each other's institutions in a way that did not exist prior to the development of industry and mass communication. However, he is quick to point out that who should enjoy the fruits of America's development was limited by both race and gender. "Although many factors were involved in the articulation of sectional identities in the decades preceding the war, all were subsidiary to the one compelling problem of slavery". In a sub-chapter, the author deals neatly with the development of slavery, the rise of abolitionism and the debate over the profitability of slavery. In the end, he argues that "profit was the bottom line". This leads to a discussion of the role of the slave-owners, Here Smith picks out a fatal paradox. "Slavery was a highly vulnerable institution but slave-owners were politically powerful". This allowed them to stand apart from the trend during the early nineteenth century of abolitionism (in Britain and the Empire for example) and to use the federal structure of the American government to protect their 'property rights'. It was when this privileged position was threatened that southerners "gave up on the Union".

Such a position was reflected within the Democratic Party. Whilst many had misgivings over Southern tactics, party loyalty demanded obedience to the pro-Southern stand. This began to collapse as events like Kansas and Nebraska unfolded during the 1850s. Slavery extension and the future of slavery became inextricably linked and "Each side saw the question not only as a point of deep principle, but also an issue of great practical political significance". Add to this the impact of *Uncle Tom's Cabin,* the Fugitive Slave Act and the Dred Scott decision all helped to erode belief in the ability of the Union to meet all these conflicting demands.

Chapter Two looks in detail at the events of the 1850s that were to lead to war. Included are the details over Kansas-Nebraska, the rise of the Republican Party, and their counter-parts in the South, the secessionists) and the impact of the election of Lincoln in 1860. Smith does a fair job in providing a narrative that allows the reader to follow the course of his argument without getting too bogged down in the minute details of this turbulent decade.

The Failure of Limited War looks at the standing of both sides on the eve of combat. In answer to the current argument that "God favours the big battalions" he argues that "not all the technological and industrial advantages could be applied in any straightforward way to winning military campaigns". For the South, he also notes that a purely defensive strategy was not an option since "independence could not simply be declared; it had to be won and conceded if it was to be real and enduring..." It was the inability of the Union forces to defeat the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia under the generalship of Robert E. Lee in the summer of 1862 that led Lincoln to argue in favour of emancipation.

Smith rightly points out the gamble that Lincoln took in linking the fate of the Union with the future of slavery and that decision was based on an assessment of the mood of Northern public opinion in September 1862. The Proclamation meant an end to the limited nature of the war. No longer was it to be fought for "The Union as it was" but rather for "The Union as it should be". This produced a furious reaction from the South and led to the need to crush the ability of that section to wage war to allow the North to deliver the promise made on 1st January 1863.

Chapter Four provides a summary of the main military events between 1862 and 1864, charting the rise of U.S. Grant and the successes and failures of the Confederacy during this period. This saw the emergence of the policy of total war, typified by the actions of Sherman's men and Smith points out the importance of the capture of Atlanta in September 1864 to Lincoln's campaign for re-election.

Citizen Soldiers takes the reader on a well-trod journey. Starting with Bell Wiley's *Life of Johnny Reb and Billy Yank,* through James McPherson's *What they fought for?,* to the writings of Shelby Foote, the author sheds little that is new in this area. However, the narrative is skilfully woven and the reader comes away feeling satisfied that a greater understanding of the armies of the Civil War has been provided.

Chapter Six provides an update of the standard study of the Confederacy by C.P. Rowland but is more immediately accessible that Emory Thomas's *The Confederate Nation.* However, the result was the same: a government dedicated to the idea of states rights found itself interfering more in the lives of its citizens and its component parts than the Federal government ever had done and that produced a backlash against Davis and the Richmond government. As in Gabor Borritt's *Why the South Lost*, Smith covers all of the main reasons for Southern defeat that resulted from the idea that the South was fighting for a conservative revolution!

There follows an analysis of the North at war and the way in which the war effort was sustained by a variety of individuals and organizations. Central to this process was the election of 1864 and to a lesser degree the issue of reconstruction, both of which are covered in reasonable detail.

Finally, there follows a brief analysis of the reasons for Northern victory and Southern defeat.

The title contains a useful guide to further reading and also has several useful maps and statistical tables. If you teach this option, then this is well worth having in the departmental library as a way of an introduction to what Lincoln described as this "fiery trial".

JIM MCGONIGLE

This review first appeared in the September 2007 issue of SATH's Resources Review.

Folk in Print: Scotland's Chapbook Heritage 1750-1850					**Edward J Cowan and Mike Paterson**
John Donald	£25	438pp	Pbk	2007	ISBN 978 1 9046 51 9

Before reading this, I was only dimly aware of chapbooks, and this probably does not make me unique. Described as a "great untapped treasure-trove of history, literature and popular culture, which has largely been ignored", the prolific Ted Cowan and his collaborator Mike Paterson provide what is undoubtedly an accessible introduction to the genre. The book has developed from a research project based on Glasgow and Strathclyde universities, but involving other collaborators, and has been partly funded by a research grant from the British Council and a subsidy from the Strathmartine Trust.

Like any reader with little or no knowledge of a book's subject, I went to the introduction for illumination and instruction. Chapmen - essentially itinerant peddlers or "flying stationers" - were despised and seen as morally suspect by much of the Scots population, but also had an aura of

romance and adventure. Most chapbooks, or chaps, were one sheet of paper, printed on both sides and folded twice, making 8 pages, although larger ones were produced. The chapmen would carry what they thought would sell, so weight and size were all-important, hence a preponderance of shorter and more compact items. The period chosen by the authors was when chapbooks were at their most popular, selling about 200,000 copies a year (equivalent to 600,000 today) and also a time of rising literacy and social and economic change. It is interesting to realise that chapbooks were produced by every European country from the 16th century onwards, in other words once printing presses became widespread. The contribution of chapbooks to our musical heritage is important, given that songbooks were far and away the most popular chapbooks by a factor of two to one, although many songs offered for sale were not new.

While categorising chapbooks is difficult, Harvey, writing in 1903, identified five categories - humorous, instructive, romantic, superstitious, ballads and songs - but many chapbooks included several items, based on the notions of diversity and value for money. Writing is often unattributed, making it very difficult for historians to pin down sources accurately, and print quality is variable, with frequent mis-spellings and grammatical mistakes - very much like today's media, perhaps. Most of the chaps reproduced are from the collection held in the Glasgow University Library as a result of a 1929 bequest, but there seems little reason to doubt that the selections are typical of the genre.

Cowan and Paterson explain that the first Scottish chapbook can be identified as 1682, but that there were undoubtedly earlier ones. Perhaps Scotland's most famous chapbook author was Dougal Graham, about whom little is known. Born around 1724 near Stirling, he became a chapman at a very young age and was present at the battle of Culloden, publishing his *A Full Particular and True Account of the late Rebellion* in Glasgow in September 1746. Like other chapbook authors, he seems to have been well-read in both contemporary literature and his country's history and was a talented writer. Graham later became a printer in Glasgow and was appointed (probably) a "skellat bellman" by the city - a town crier - a responsible and well-paid job, but seems to have continued to publish chapbooks, although he may have produced print for other publishers. As with so many others, we cannot be sure which chaps Graham actually wrote, but the collection includes two of his best works, *John Cheap the Chapman*, perhaps autobiographical, and *The History of the Haverel Wives*. Most other authors were anonymous, although some are identified, such as William Cameron (Auld Hawkie), Alexander Wilson of Paisley, who emigrated to America where he continued to produce chapbooks, and George Miller of Haddington. However, established authors were often ripped off, with large chunks of Burns, Scott and Hogg being published in chapbook form, very rarely acknowledged and sometimes amended - no real copyright law to protect authors in those days, it would seem.

Chapbooks seem to have been crucial in helping to preserve vernacular Scots in the nineteenth century, when it was under attack, although many chaps, especially on more "elevated" topics were published in English. This is of especial interest as most literate Scots would have learned to read from the Bible, which was, of course, in English. We also learn the importance of chapbooks in preserving Scotland's heritage of ballad and song, and how the advent of cheap book publishing, starting with *Chambers' Journal* and the first edition of *Whistle-Binkie; A Collection of Songs for the Social Circle*, both appearing for the first time in 1832, was the beginning of the end for chapbooks, although some continued past mid-century. These ballads and songs were invariably cleaned up by the zealous moral guardians of the Victorian age, losing much of the coarseness and some of the vitality of the originals. However sentimental these songs were, it is pointed out that in 1890, hundreds of thousands of Scots were only a generation away from the countryside after huge economic and social upheavals, so:

"It is little wonder that folk sought solace in a phantom past, or sang of an older time that inevitably seemed more secure and comfortable than many a present." (p38)

There are some interesting facts in the introduction, which count in the "did you know?" category. Johnston Press, owners of Scotsman newspapers and a clutch of local titles, began as a Falkirk chapbook printers' office; there was a National Lottery between 1675 and 1826, with latterly six prizes of £30,000 each, easily equivalent to today's millions, and no doubt equally unattainable; and a whistlebinkie was

someone who provided entertainment at a wedding, usually by whistling.

The main body of the book is in thematic sections, starting with The Chapmen themselves, which includes the aforementioned *John Cheap the Chapman*. There follow sections on The Folk and their Condition, Trades and Occupations, The Masons, Houghmagandie (with an interesting etymological discussion), Courtship and Wedded Bliss, The Demon Drink, The Sailors, The Soldiers, The Irish, The Gaels and The Adventurers. Houghmagandie includes a salutary tale in verse (like many) - *The Dominie Depos'd* - of (and supposedly written by) an Aberdeenshire teacher and Kirk session clerk who fathers an illegitimate child and then disappears to join the army and thus avoid social ostracism. The last section has a wide range of stories including that of William Wallace, which borrows heavily from Blind Harry and Scott's Tales of a Grandfather, and a more contemporary adventure of a naval lieutenant who fell down an old coal pit near Glasgow, waited seven days to be rescued, and lived to pay to immortalise his foolish tale in chapbook form - an early example of vanity publishing?

The section on the Gaels has an interesting contribution by Naomi Elysia Harvey, who convincingly argues that there was not really a market for Gaelic chapbooks in the Highlands, with its relatively low literacy rate and oral tradition. She postulates that Gaelic chapbooks were not a commercial venture but an attempt by educated Gaels to promote the language by showing that it had a popular literature of its own. It was thus aimed at those who criticised Gaelic, by showing its quality and vitality.

Overall, each piece in the collection has an explanatory commentary, written by Cowan, which puts them in their historical and cultural context. It seems to me that the book itself is an historic publication, revealing an important aspect of Scottish history which has been hidden for far too long.

DAVID G ARMSTRONG







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